INTELLIGENCE REPORT LEADERS OF COMMUNIST CHINA VI. MAO TSE-TUNG

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: The Nixon Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06928171
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: February 23, 2022
• Document Release Date: February 11, 2022
• Publication Date: October 1, 1971

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EO 13526 3.3(h)(2)
EO 13526 6.2(d)
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
LEADERS OF COMM UNIff CHINA
VI. MAO Tse-tung
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WARNING
This document co ains information affecting the national
defense of the Unite States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and , of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or reve lion of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized erson is prohibited by law.
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PREFACE
This report is the sixth in a series of in-
depth biographic studies of Communist China's top
leaders. The series fills a gap in our biographic
coverage of China's senior leadership.
This report was prepared by the Central Reference
Service and was coordinated within CIA as appro-
priate.
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BIOGRAPHIC BRIEF
Mao Tse-tung joined the Chinese Communist
Party (CC?) in 1921. After many years of agitation
within the Party, and in the face of considerable
opposition from Li Li-san, he became CC? Chairman
in 1935. Mao solidified his position in the hills
of Yenan and until 1949, when he marched victori-
ously into Peking, operated in China's countryside
guiding his band of followers through the anti-
Japanese and civil war years. In Peking, the
Central People's Government was founded, and Mao
became Chief of State.
Mao then negotiated a treaty with Moscow and
began a series of suppressive movements designed
to ensure his supremacy at home. The "cult" of
Mao spread, but following the disastrous Great Leap
Forward of 1958, Mao resigned his top government
post, while retaining the CC? Chairmanship. To
rejuvenate the CCP with a revolutionary spirit,
and to defeat the rising threat from "revisionists"
and "capitalist-roaders," Mao launched the chaotic
Cultural Revolution in 1965. Four years later he
remained leader of the CCP backed by a Politburo
entourage of loyal Maoists.
Mao, now 77, has been in uncertain health for
many of his adult years but currently appears to
be in good physical and mental condition. His life
has been a combination of the ruthlessness of a
totalitarian leader, the cunning of a clever Ming
Court official, and the sensitivities of a poet.
He is married to Chiang Ch'ing, his fourth wife.
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MAO WITH NI COLAE CEAUSESCU OF ROMANIA, JUNE 1971
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PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA MAO Tse-tung
(3029/3419/2639)
Chairman, Chinese Communist Party;
Chairman, Politburo; Chairman,
Military Commission
Mao Tse-tung has been Chairman of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) since 1935. He also holds
the following major positions: Chairman of the
CCP Politburo, member of the Politburo Standing
Committee, and de jure chairman of the Military
Commission of the CCP Central Committee (CCP-CC).
In addition, the existing draft constitution,
which will be discussed at the impending Fourth
National People's Congress (NPC), specifically
names him commander in chief of the whole army and
whole nation. This is a new title and appears to
be deliberately vague but more all-embracing than
the post of head of state, formerly held by the
now deposed Liu Shao-chli. Mao has been a Deputy
representing Peking municipality in the previous
NPC's.
Mao's rise to power was gradual achieved in
the face of considerable opposition from rival
leaders and, indirectly until 1935, from the Com-
munist International (Comintern) and the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Mao consoli-
dated his leadership in Yenan, Shensi, where he
developed an interpretation of China's situation
within the framework of Marxist philosophy. In
this period at Yenan, Mao solidified his position
as an ideological as well as political leader of
the Chinese Communist movement.
Since the Yenan era and the 1949 CCP takeover,
Mao has decided the fate of numerous party cadres
and has demonstrated a ruthless vindictiveness
toward anyone he believed disloyal to him. His
continued domination is the result of leadership
abilities, tremendous charismatic appeal, and the
often unrewarded loyalty proffered by lifelong
associates. The invaluable aid he has received
from Lin Piao, Chou En-lai, Chien Po-ta and K'ang
Sheng, his fellow members of the Politburo Standing
Committee, has been instrumental in maintaining
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his preeminence in China. There have been others,
of course, such as military elder Chu Te, as well
as the now purged Liu Shao-chli, Teng Hsiao-pling
and P'eng Te-huai, upon whom Mao has relied for
assistance and who stand out in the annals of CC?
history. Particularly noticeable is the respect
all of these men have had for Mao, even during
many years of internal troubles and discontent.
At times, the personality cult surrounding Mao
has prevailed to such a degree that his stature
could best be described as that of a semideity.
Whether Mao's personal traits are a result or a
cause of this stature is difficult to determine.
In any case, he exudes an air of extreme self-
confidence, is skillful in manipulating protago-
nists during infighting and intrigue, and demon-
strates great patience, a sense of timing, and
a readiness to retreat when necessary.
Early Life
Mao Tse-tung was born on 26 December 1893 to
Mao Shun-sheng, a moderately wealthy peasant farmer
and Wen Ch'i-mei, a kind, generous and sympathetic
woman and a devout Buddhist who gave her children
religious instruction. Mao was the eldest of four
children--three sons and a daughter. The family
lived in Shaoshan village, Hsiangt'an hsien, a
rural county some 20 miles south of the Hunan pro-
vincial capital of Changsha.
Early in life, Mao learned a lesson from his
relationship with his quick-tempered father who
frequently beat his sons. The elder Mao often
accused young Tse-tung of laziness and unfilial
conduct, but when the latter asserted his rights
by open rebellion, his father relented; when Tse-
tung remained weak and submissive, his father
only cursed and beat him more. Mao Tse-tung
later told American journalist Edgar Snow, "I
learned to hate my father but it probably bene-
fited me. It made me most diligent in my work."
From the age of 8, young Mao received a
traditional Chinese education at the local pr
school while continuing to work on the family
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arm.
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His teacher was harsh and severe and did not hesi-
tate to beat his students. At 13 Mao left school
to work longer hours on the farm. He managed to
continue reading, and stories of Western technol-
ogy and the mistreatment of Chinese at the hands
of foreigners stimulated his desire to resume his
education. He ran away from home, studied classi-
cal literature with an unemployed law student, and
at age 16 enrolled in Tungshan Academy. The fol-
lowing year he studied at a Changsha middle school.
With the outbreak of the Wuhan uprising on 10
October 1911, Mao joined an anti-Manchu Hunan army
unit, but thinking the revolution had ended he
resigned in 6 months to return to school. He soon
left school again, returned to spend about 6 months
at the Hunan Provincial First Middle School in
Changsha, then quit once more to begin a period of
self-education, reading poetry and romances and
serious works on Russia, England, America and
France. In 1913 Mao reentered the Hunan Provin-
cial First Middle School. This time he remained
until 1918, having been influenced by liberal
instructors such as Yang Ch'ang-ch'i, whose daugh-
ter Mao would soon marry.
During this period Mao became an enthusiastic
supporter of the magazine Hsin Ch'ing-nien (New
Youth), founded by Ch'en Tu-hsiu in 1915 after
Japan's announcement of the degrading Twenty-One
Demands. Ch'en, who later became dean of the
Faculty of Letters at Peking University and the
first secretary general of the CCP, wanted to
awaken China's youth ideologically and to show
the need for destroying stagnant traditions.
Inspired by Hsin Ch'ing-nien, Mao gradually built
up a small nucleus of serious-minded colleagues
and on 18 April 1918 founded the Hsin-min fisiieh-
hui (New People's Study Society) in Changsha.
(Among its activities, the society helped to
organize students to go to France under the work-
and-study program. In 1920 Mao went to Peking
with 20 such prospective students; at the last
however, he stayed in China.)
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Financially unable to enter a university, Mao
was given a minor position in the National Peking
University library by Li Ta-chao, head librarian
and soon to be another of the founders of the CCP.
Mao joined Li's Marxist Study Society and read Karl
Marx's Communist Manifesto and various other works
on socialism and class struggle. He returned to
Changsha in early 1919, took part in the Hunan
phase of the May Fourth (1919) Movement (a student-
led political crusade opposing the degradation of
China at the Paris Peace Talks), and then went to
Shanghai. There he met Chien Tu-hsiu and worked
out the plans for a Hunan Reconstruction Associa-
tion. Mao then returned to his native province,
where he continued the work of the New People's
Study Society, corresponded with Ch'en and took
up a teaching position. That winter he helped to
organize workers politically and instigate strikes.
Mao has declared that by 1920 he had become in
theory, and to some extent in action, a Marxist.
The Beginnings of the CCP
_
The founding date of the CCP is usually given
as July 1921, the occasion of the First CCP Con-
gress, in Shanghai. Of the 12 persons who partic-
ipated in the congress, only Mao, who was one of
two Hunan representatives, and Tung Pi-wu, who
represented Hupeh, are still active in the CCP.
After the congress, Mao returned to Changsha
to set up the party organization in Hunan, aided
by Li Li-san and Liu Shao-ch'i. Mao missed the
Second Congress, held in 1922. At the Third CCP
Congress, in Canton in 1923, he was elected to the
CCP-CC for the first time. He was also appointed
director of the Organization Department of the
party and until late 1924 worked out of CCP head-
quarters in Shanghai.
In 1923, at the outset of the period of CCP-
Kuomintang ( ) cooperation in the first united
front, Mao joined the KMT. In January 1924 he
became an alternate member of the KMT's First
Central Executive Committee. Mao threw himself
into his task of organizing cooperation with the
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KMT so enthusiastically
that he was soon looked
upon with suspicion in
his own party. By the
end of 1924, according
to his autobiography,
Mao became ill and
returned to Hunan for a
rest. There is little
doubt that his illness
was at least partly
political. He was under
heavy attack from those
in the CCP who were
opposed to an excessive
emphasis on KMT-CCP
cooperation at the pos-
sible expense of their
own party's independence.
(In fact, Mao was not
elected to the Fourth
CCP-CC in January 1925.)
MAO IN 19 23
Upon returning to his native province Mao
noticed a growing awareness and concern of the
peasantry for political matters. He began try-
ing to organize peasant associations, but his
work in the Hunan countryside was brought to
a halt by the provincial governor, and he was
forced to flee to Canton in the fall of 1925.
By this time the peasant movement in Kwangtung
Province had reached considerable proportions,
as had the tensions between the KMT and CCP
over the united front policy.
Much of the available evidence suggests Mao
still favored cooperation, and during the next
year and a half he played a rather significant
role within the KMT apparatus. In November 1925
he and two Communist colleagues gained the domi-
nant voice on the credentials committee for the
forthcoming Second KMT Congress.
At about the same time Mao became de facto
head of the KMT Propaganda Department, although
his title was only deputy chief. In this capac-
ity, at the Second KMT Congress in January 1926,
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he delivered a report on propaganda, in which he
stressed the need for the KMT to center its work
on the peasantry. Mao was again elected an alter-
nate meMber of the KMT's Central Executive Commit-
tee, and he continued to serve as acting head of
the Propaganda Department. In February he also
became a member of the Peasant Movement Committee,
more than half of which was made up of Communists,
and which apparently was intended as a device by
which the CCP hoped to gain control of KMT organi-
zations that dealt with peasant questions.
After March 1926 Chiang Kai-shek moved to
curtail Communist power. He was able to accomplish
much in this direction at the Second Plenum of the
KMT Central Executive Committee in May 1926. Mao
was removed from his Propaganda Department post,
and most of his fellow Communists were stripped of
their positions. Surprisingly, Mao continued to
occupy the important post of principal of the Peas-
ant Movement Training Institute during the period
from May to October 1926.
The institute, though under KMT jurisdiction,
had been a stronghold of the CCP since the school
was established 2 years earlier. While head of the
institute, Mao arranged for a number of top Commu-
nist leaders to teach or give lectures while he
himself lectured on the peasant question in China
and on methods of teaching in the countryside.
After his class graduated, Mao spent a brief
me in Shanghai as secretary of the newly estab-
lished CCP Central Peasants' Committee and then
made an inspection tour of rural areas in Kiangsu
and Chekiang. In December he was in Changsha,
where he gave the keynote speech to the First
Hunan Peasants' Association Congress, stressing
the critical importance of the peasantry to the
revolution.
The result of Mao's tour of Hunan was A Report
on the Investigation of the Peasant Movement in
Hunan. In this paper, Mao anticipated massive
rural uprisings in which the peasantry would over-
throw the landed classes. His plea that the party
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exploit the revolutionary potential of the peasants
went unheeded, however, because it conflicted with
official CCP policy. The CCP-CC published Mao's
report without comment, and Chien Tu-hsiu then
tabled it at the Fifth National CCP Congress in
Wuhan in May 1927. At this congress, which took
place 1 month after Chiang Kai-shek's anti-Commu-
nist coup in Shanghai, Mao was reelected to the
CCP-CC but only as an alternate member who was not
permitted to vote on policy decisions. Fellow
party members still held him in suspicion because
of his work with the KMT, and he had gained the
reputation of a "hot-head" who was not easily
disciplined. Not only did Mao oppose the party's
policy, or lack of policy, toward the peasants,
he also led the All-China Peasants' Union (whose
chairman he became in May 1927) in a series of
rebellions throughout Hunan early in the summer
of 1927. This was at a time when the Comintern
was issuing directives to stop inciting peasant
uprisings.
On 1 August 1927 a band of Communist forces
under Yeh T'ing captured KMT-held Nanchang, Kiangsi.
Within a few days they were driven out, and on 7
August an emergency CCP meeting was convened in
Hankow at which Chien Tu-hsiu was deposed as CCP
leader. A Provisional Politburo under Chili Ch'iu-
pai was established, and Mao became an alternate
member of that body.
Under revised instructions from the Comintern,
the Politburo planned a series of rural uprisings
(later known as the Autumn Harvest Uprisings) with
the ultimate goal of surrounding and capturing the
major Yangtze Valley urban centers. Mao was sent
to his native Hunan, and by September his 1st Divi-
sion of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army
began to experience minor successes. Soon, however,
after many battles and troop losses, the uprisings
failed. The KMT drove Mao's forces to Chingkang-
shan, a mountain retreat on the Hunan-Kiangsi border.
Repudiated and dismissed from the Central Com-
mittee and Politburo, Mao remained at Chingkangshan
through the winter of 927-28, completely cut off
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from the party center and short on food and arms.
In April or May 1928 Chu Te arrived with his ragged
troops and joined forces with Mao in the beginning
of an important, strategic alliance. Officially,
Mao was the political commissar and Chu the com-
mander of the 4th Army of the Chinese Workers' and
Peasants' Red Army. In the summer of 1928, Mao was
reelected in absentia to the CCP-CC by the Sixth
National CCP Congress, held in Moscow.
Kiangsi Period
During 1929 and early 1930 the Chu-Mao forces
marched about in southeastern Kiangsi near the
Fukien border while Mao was strengthening his per-
sonal position. In December 1929 he convened the
Ninth Conference of 1st Red Army delegates at
Kutien in Fukien. It was an obscure event, but
it signified his growing control over the Red Army
and was his initial attempt at independent policy
formulation.
Mao called for the subordination of military
to political affairs; he opposed the policy of city-
based revolution as advocated by Li Li-san, strong
man of the party in Shanghai; and he expounded his
own views on agrarian revolution and the means of
building up the Red Army for a revolutionary role.
The Kutien Conference marked the end of Mao's
passive resistance to the Soviet-oriented Li L -san
leadership and the beginning of his attacks on the
Moscow-educated "returned students" group known as
the "28 Bolsheviks." Mao's proposal to concentrate
his efforts on Kiangsi and his claim that his policy
was the only correct one were clear indications
that he intended to function autonomously. He had
perceptibly strengthened his position, and the
Comintern began to accord him public support.
In December 1930 Mao suppressed a local rebel-
lion against his authority at nearby Futien in
Kiangsi. This incident resulted in the first and
one of the most extensive and bloody purges car-
ried out by Mao prior to 1949.
Mao was secure in his position in the Kiangsi
Soviet by 1931, having been elected Chairman of the
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Revolutionary Military Council (RMC) in 1930 and
of the Provisional Chinese Soviet Republic (PCSR)
in 1931. Mao's position in the CCP, however, was
less imposing, and over the next year and a half
his policies--especially regarding military
strategy--came under constant attack from the
returned student faction and Chou En-lai.
Power in the CCP had shifted from Li Li-san
to the "28 Bolsheviks" who, by 1932, were head-
quartered in Juichin, Kiangsi. This development
signalled a temporary waning of Mao's power. He
was replaced by Chou En-lai as RMC Chairman, but
as disillusionment with Soviet guidance grew, Mao
gradually regained political strength. In late
1932 he was elected a full Politburo member for
the first time, and he has continuously served on
that body since then.
The Long March and the Yenan Era
In October 1934 the Kiangsi Soviet succumbed
to the KMT extermination campaigns, and the Red
Army set out on its historic Long March to Shensi.
En route, in January 1935, the Politburo held the
Tsuni (Kweichow) Conference at which Mao became
Chairman of the CCP. He also took back from Chou
En-lai the post of Chairman of the RMC. During
the next 2 years Mao reestablished the PCSR in
north Shensi, first in Paoan and then in Yenan
after December 1936. He remained in Yenan for the
next 10 years, devoting most of his time to the
consolidation and organization of the CCP.
From early 1935 Mao successfully withstood a
series of challenges to his position within the
party, and with each challenge his power increased.
His main opponents were Chang Kuo-t'ao, another CCP
founder, and Ch'en Shao-yii (Wang Ming), a Comintern-
sponsored advocate of strong Soviet ties. Mao was
aided by the services of Ch'en Po-ta, the late Ai
Ssu-ch'i, and other members of a "brain trust" he
had formed to counter the charges of the Moscow-
trained men that Mao did not understand Marxism-
Leninism.
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MAO ( 3RD FRN LEFT) IN YENAN, 1937
Several articles written around this time--
which form part of the basis of Chinese Communist
thinking--are attributed to Mao: "The Tasks of
the Chinese Communist Party During the Anti-
Japanese War" (1937); "On Practice" (1937); "On
Contradiction" (1937); "Strategic Problems in the
Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War" (1938); "On Protracted
War" (1938); "On New Democracy" (1940).
The Cheng-feng Movement
Mao's attacks on his opponents culminated in
the Cheng-feng (rectification) movement of 1942,
which dispelled any doubts about Mao's primacy
in the CCP. Generally designed to raise party
efficiency and ideology, the campaign also effec-
tively eliminated Mao's opposition in the party.
The specific target for Cheng-feng was Ch'en
Shao-ya, one of the leading "28 Bolsheviks," and
the greatest significance of the campaign was
Mao's insistence that Marxism be made Chinese.
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The message of the reform was that the Chinese
party was determined to direct its own revolutionary
activities. Mao called for the eradication of dog-
matism, subjectivism in thought, sectarianism in
party relations, and formalism in literature and
art. Party members were ordered to check on each
other's attitudes and ideology; incorrigible com-
rades were to be dismissed from the party, but a
second and third chance were to be given to those
who confessed and showed a willingness to reform.
Excesses in the early stages of the movement
worried the Central Committee. In July 1942 Liu
Shao-ch'i wrote one of his best known works, On
Intra-Party Struggle, which was a set of procedural
rules for the Cheng-feng movement. This proved to
be a turning point for Liu who at the time was in
central China as political commissar for Ch'en I,
the acting commander of the New 4th Army.
Mao summoned Liu the next year to aid him in
general party administration and in carrying out
the rectification campaign. Their goal was the
type of intensive indoctrination and training that
would allow party cadres to operate with unanimity
in guerrilla-controlled "Liberated Areas" where
close administrative control and inspection were
impossible. This indoctrination was to include
emphasis on the Sinicization process of Marxism
and the application of Marxist-Leninist theories
to China. The outcome of the movement was three-
fold: A group of high leaders fell from power;
the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" cult was inaugurated;
and Mao's position as leader of the party was con-
solidated as he affirmed the independence of his
own leadership from Moscow.
The 1944-49 Period
In 1944 Mao accepted an offer in principle from
Chiang Kai-shek legalizing all political parties in
China. As he prepared for the next phase of his
political career, Mao strengthened and consolidated
his hold on the organization and thinking of the
CCP. At that time he also headed the five-man
Secretariat of the Central Committee, then the
party's top policymaking body.
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MAO WITH AMERICAN OBSERVERS IN YENAN, 1944
The Seventh Party Congress, held during April-
June 1945, reviewed wartime developments and
elected a new Central Committee and Politburo,
both of which were composed overwhelmingly of men
who had proved their ability and their loyalty to
Mao during the difficult war years. A revised
party constitution was also adopted, and it offi-
cially enshrined the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" as
necessary to guide the entire work of the party.
Mao himself was reelected Chairman of the Politburo
and Secretariat.
A highlight of the meeting was an address by
Mao, "On Coalition Government," a statement that
summarized Mao's political thought as it had
evolved during the Yenan years and gave the con-
ditions under which the CCP might cooperate with
the Kuomintang. Mao proposed a "united front
or democratic alliance based on the overwhelming
majority of the people under the leadership of
the working class" to take the place of KMT politi-
cal tutelage after the defeat of Japan. He called
for two steps:
In the first stage, to form a provisional
coalition government by common agreement
of the representatives of all parties and
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people without party affiliation; in the
second stage, through free and unrestricted
elections, to convene a national assembly
which will form a proper coalition govern-
ment.
Mao challenged the KMT's ability to solve the
economic and political problems of China in terms
of Confucian tradition as suggested by Chiang Kai-
shek in his China's Destiny. Mao wanted a new
authority, namely the coalition government, which
would be responsible for tackling such questions
in the postwar period.
The civil war between Mao and Chiang continued
after the defeat of Japan. The Nationalists
occupied Yenan in March 1947, and Mao was then
reported in various rural areas of north China.
He finally entered Peking on 25 March 1949, 2
months after its occupation by Communist forces.
The Early Years of the People's Republic of China
From 21 to 30 September 1949 the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)
an "organization of the democratic united front
of the entire Chinese people," was convened. It
adopted the Common Program and the Organic Law,
which set up the Central People's Government (CPG)
of the People's Republic of China. Mao was named
Chairman (Chief of State) of the CPG and--in order
of rank--Chu Te, Liu Shao-ch'i, Sung Ch'ing-ling
(Sun Yat-sen's widow), Li Chi-sen, Chang Lan and
Kao Kang became Vice Chairmen. The highest civil-
ian policymaking body was the CPO Council, and
subordinate to that was the 20-man Government
Administration Council (GAC) headed by Chou En-lai.
The GAC had jurisdiction over ministries, commis-
sions and committees.
Mao faced two problems when he took over China:
the consolidation of authority and, as he wrote in
"On the People's Democratic Dictatorship" (July
1949), "the education of the peasantry." In Mao's
view, the traditional hunger for land and the indi-
vidualism of the peasants needed to be overcome,
as did the backwardness of rural areas with refer-
ence to modern agricultural methods.
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On 28 June 1950 the Land Reform Law was prom-
ulgated, but it produced disappointing results.
Land reform teams then urged the peasants to wage
"fierce class struggle" against local landlords
and to arouse class hatred. Mass trials and
accusation meetings became the order of the day,
and by November 1952 over 116 million acres of
land were confiscated and divided among 300 mil-
lion poor peasants. This campaign was carried
out at considerable human cost. By Mao's own
admission, some 800,000 people lost their lives
in the opening years of the People's Republic.
Mao also inaugurated three other suppressive
movements: the "three anti movement" against cor-
ruption, waste and bureaucracy in government
bodies and public enterprises; the "five anti
movement" aimed at merchants and businessmen as
a class; and the "study campaign for ideological
reform" designed to gain the support of China's
intellectuals (it resulted, however, only in
alienating them).
Mao Goes to Moscow
In December 1949 Mao made his first trip
outside China, traveling to Moscow to discuss
political, security and economic arrangements with
Stalin. Nine weeks of negotiation led to the
signing of the Sib-Soviet Treaty of Friendship,
Alliance and Mutual Assistance on 14 February 1950.
IN MOSCOW, I4 FEBRUARY 19 50
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In addition to defense and aid provisions, the
alliance called for Chinese recognition of the
independence of the Mongolian People's Republic.
Upon leaving Moscow, Mao declared that Sino-
Soviet friendship was "eternal and indestruc-
tible."
The alliance also provided China with war
materiel during the Korean conflict in which China
was involved from November 1950 to July 1953. The
performance of the Chinese Communists in that war--
in which the Chinese People's Volunteers fought
the Western world's strongest power without being
defeated--further enhanced the prestige of the
Chinese and of Mao, their leader.
With the death of Stalin in 1953Moscow, aware
of the importance of retaining China's friendship,
paid increased attention to Mao's ideological
stature. Soviet reviews of Mao's literary works
began to describe them as enriching Marxist theory.
The CCP went further, claiming for Mao the title
of the leading Marxist-Leninist theoretician.
Admitting his stature as a natural leader, many
non-Communist Western observers nevertheless
consider Mao's principal contribution to Marxism-
Leninism to be his concept of rural tactics. This
concept is known today as guerrilla warfare.
1954-57: Government Reorganization
The CPG was reorganized in 1954, and the
National People's Congress (NPC) became the high-
est organ of state authority. Mao was elected
chairman of the People's Republic of China and
the Council of National Defense, and under the
new constitution he had other wide-ranging and
undefined powers. Liu Shao-ch'i became head of
the Standing Committee of the NPC, and Chou En-
lai head of the State Council--the highest
administrative organ. The military-dominated
regional administrative system was abolished,
thus removing a source of potential personal chal-
lenge to Mao's leadership. In its place, a sys-
tem of provinces municipalities, and minority
autonomous districts was established.
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The first major internal attempt to jar the
party and government structure occurred in the
famous Kao-Jao case publicized in April 1955.
Kao Kang was the powerful head of the Northeast
Administrative Area (Manchuria) and also headed
the State Planning Commission. Jao Shu-shih was
a member of the same body and director of the then
important Organization Department of the CCP-CC.
In early 1954 both men mysteriously dropped from
public view, and in February of that year Liu
Shao-chsi made a call for party unity. He made a
scathing reference to those who "regarded the
department under their leadership as their indi-
vidual inheritance or independent kingdom." This
reference was not given full explanation until 4
April 1955, when Peking issued a report on the
so-called Kao-Jao antiparty alliance. The two men,
and a number of their subordinates, were expelled
from the party for "engaging in conspiratorial
activities" with the aim of deposing Mao and Chou
En-lai and stepping into their places. Kao com-
mitted suicide, and nothing has since been heard
of Jao.
In 1955 Mao decided it was time to advance
from socialism directly to "higher" forms of col-
lectivism, a theory based on what Peking called
"uninterrupted revolution." Mao's call for rapid
collectivization and a speedup in industry, science,
education and public health work was supposed to
be voluntarily implemented. It worked better in
the rural areas than in the cities, but by June
1956 it was clear that the program was out of
balance. The campaign had met with considerable
opposition, and it was later officially admitted
that during the first 7 months of 1957 there were
100 cases of agricultural sabotage in one small
county alone. Cooperativization was nevertheless
decreed complete by 1957; Mao declared that there
was a "high tide" of enthusiastic support for a
"Next Great Step" toward socialism. This was
clearly tantamount to a decree that such a step
was impending, but the nature of the move Was not
divulged until the summer of 1958.
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Meanwhile in September 1956 the CCP convened
the Eighth, Party Congress. Under the terms of
the revised constitution Mao retained the party
chairmanship. He was also elected to the newly
established Standing Committee of the Politburo,
which in effect replaced the former Secretariat
as the "inner Politburo." The Standing Committee
then consisted of Mao, Liu Shao-ch'i, Chou En-lai
Chu Te, Ch'en Yiin and Teng Hsiao-pling. A year
and a half later, Lin Piao was added to the group.
"Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom"
At the time of the Hungarian revolt in October
1956, Mao stated that a similar revolt could never
happen in China because the Chinese people under-
stood their freedom and the extent of its limits.
In May 1957 he launched the "Hundred Flowers" cam-
paign, based on the slogan "Let a hundred flowers
bloom, and a hundred schools of thought contend."
It was ostensibly designed to mobilize support for
the government among China's intellectuals by
permitting open criticism of political conditions,
including criticism of the CCP. This, Mao thought
would help prevent the type of situation that had
occurred in Hungary. The resulting rash of criti-
cism, however, was more than Peking expected, and
the CCP soon reimposed strict controls. "Rightists"
were denounced and intellectual dissidence was
quickly suppressed before it could spread to the
peasants and working class.
The Great Leap Forward: 1958-59
Mao next went from political to socioeconomic
experimentation as he launched the Great Leap
Forward and the People's Communes in 1958. He
wanted the people to accomplish in 4 years what
would normally take a decade. Mao required that
the utmost speed be used in incorporating enormous
numbers of workers into new productive enterprises
under a decentralized economic administration.
In 1958 he proposed the commune as a new organiza-
tional form for agriculture. Again, debate on his
new idea within and outside the party was intense.
In a move to ensure that his view on the commune
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(and other topics) would be heard, Mao created a
new party journal, Hung Ch'i (Red Flag), and
appointed Chien Po-ta as its editor. Hung Ch'i
replaced Hsieh Hsi as the major theoretical peri-
odical of the CCP.
There are many disputes about the campaign's
short- and long-range significance, but there is
little debate regarding the economic dislocation
that followed in the 1959-61 period. Discontent
became rampant, and the situation demanded a
retreat.
One of the first signs that Mao might be
in trouble was an announcement in December 1958
that he was resigning as Chief of State, osten-
sibly to give him more time to devote to reading
and theoretical writing. This was the first major
setback Mao had experienced since the People's
Republic of China was formed. Most of his actions
since the failure of the early communes and his
Great Leap Forward policies have been designed to
restore his authority and get the country moving
again in the revolutionary direction he wants.
During November-December 1958 the Sixth
Plenum of the CCP-CC called for a retreat from the
extremes of the Great Leap Forward. At the Seventh
Plenum, held in April 1959, Liu Shao-ch'i became
Chief of State and Chairman of the National Defense
Council. Chou En-lai replaced Mao as Chairman of
the CPPCC, the predecessor of the NPC as the high-
est governmental representative body. Mao became
Honorary Chairman.
The Lushan Plenum--August 1959
Mao attended the Eighth Plenum of the party,
held in Lushan, Kiangsi, in August 1959, to sup-
press the opposition raised against his policies
and preeminence. Gen. P'eng Te-huai, Minister
of National Defense, came to Lushan to challenge
Mao's recent policies, especially the Great Leap
Forward. P'eng did not seek to overthrow Mao--
only to moderate his excesses and open a construc-
tive debate on policy. He implied, however, that
China's leaders had ignored reality in the frenzy
of the Great Leap.
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P'eng's criticism of Mao and his policies was
no longer discreet as he said, "Putting politics
in command is no substitute for basic economic
principles, still less for the concrete measures
needed to run successful economic enterprises."
Mao openly acknowledged that some errors had been
committed but noted that if P'eng's destructive
criticism continued, it would bring the collapse
of the nation within a year.
The Central Committee voted on 16 August 1959
that P'eng Te-huai and his "antiparty clique"
had aimed at splitting the party. The Maoists'
triumph appeared total. On 9 September P'eng
wrote a letter to Mao that, in effect, seemed to
be an explanation and an apology for his actions.
It was in vain, however, for on 17 September Liu
Shao-ch'i delivered his "Order of the Chairman
of the People's Republic of China":
...it is hereby ordered to appoint Lin
Piao Minister of Defense; Lo Jui-ch'ing
Chief of Staff of the People's Liberation
Army [PLA], and Hsieh Fu-chih Minister of
Public Security; and to relieve P'eng Te-
huai of his duties as Minister of Defense
and Lo Jui-ch'ing as Minister of Public
Security.
On 30 September Nikita Khrushchev visited
Peking on his way back from a meeting with Pres-
ident Eisenhower. He brought gifts for P'eng
Te-huai, praising him as "the most righteous,
most courageous, most outspoken man in the CCP."
Khrushchev asked to meet with P'eng but was
denied the opportunity.
Domestic Affairs--1960-65
From 1960 to 1965 China gradually rose from
the economic and psychological morass into which
the Great Leap had precipitated the country. In
November 1961 P'eng Chen, first secretary of the
Peking Party Committee, chose 20 of his closest
associates to search the records of the two disas-
trous years of the Great Leap to find a rational
road to the future through a full understanding
of the errors of the past.
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By 1960 CCP morale was low and disillusionment
over the results of the Great Leap was high. The
organizational structure of the party was in dis-
repair, and younger party members lacked a revolu-
tionary spirit. A "socialist education" campaign
was begun in 1962 to reinvigorate the party with
such a spirit, but it failed and Mao held senior
party officials responsible.
During 1961 and 1962 numerous intellectuals,
economists and party cadres began to ignore Mao's
policies in five major areas: culture, education,
ideology, agriculture and industry. Therefore,
in what seemed to be an attempt to bolster his
apparently slipping image, Mao added three loyal
supporters to the party Secretariat: K'ang Sheng,
who was an alternate member of the Central Com-
mittee and a political security specialist; Lo
Jui-ch'ing, Chief of Staff of the PLA; and Lu
Ting-i, a propagandist and Vice Premier of the
State Council.
It was apparent that Mao continued to leave
the day-to-day conduct of party affairs to Liu
Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. According to
Cultural Revolution documents, one result of Mao's
neglect of economic planning and development was
that Liu and the party apparatus continued to
slight Mao's "mass line," substituting central-
ized control for decentralization and local self-
sufficiency, stressing material over ideological
incentives, and relying on expertise and organi-
zation rather than mass campaigns.
Mao was out of public view for long periods of
time from 1962 to 1965, often in seclusion at his
retreat outside Peking. His visible activities in
domestic matters continued to be relatively low key
during this period, but there was nevertheless a
steady increase in Peking's efforts to spread the
cult of Mao.
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CHATTING WITH YOUTH LEAGUE MEMBERS, JUNE 19611
The forthcoming Cultural Revolution was fore-
shadowed in a Jen-min Jih-pao editorial of 3 August
1964 entitled "Cultivate and Train Millions of
Successors Who Will Carry on the Cause of Proletar-
ian Revolution." This editorial was probably the
first time that party rectification (termed the
"reeducation of functionaries and readjustment
in the revolutionary ranks") and revitalization
(described as the selection and cultivation of
younger talent within the nucleus of leadership
at all levels) were authoritatively discussed as
closely interrelated subjects. The logic of the
new combination, coupled with the intensified
urgency of the regime's concern over training Mao-
ist successors, led some observers to see that
gradual but widespread personnel changes were
being contemplated at every level of the party
and government structure.
Faced with pressure from below, threatened
by "degenerate" ideas from within and without,
aware that younger men would inevitably take
over some day--regardless of their ideological
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qualifications--Mao and his aging supporters seem
to have decided that younger men must be readied
for positions of responsibility.
In January 1965, under Mao's supervision, the
Politburo drafted the "23 Articles," which shifted
the focus of the campaign to a general "clean-up,"
and basic construction in politics, economics,
ideology and organization. The "Articles" also
attacked high-level party officials as class ene-
mies for "taking the capitalist road."
The DismisBal of Hai Jul
By mid-1965 Mao had set up a group of five
party officials, led by P'eng Chen, mayor of Peking
and first secretary of the Peking Party Committee,
to conduct a "cultural revolution" among intellec-
tuals. In September of that year, at an enlarged
Politburo meeting, Mao issued a new series of
directives demanding a more vigorous attack on
"bourgeois ideology."
On 10 November Yao Wen-yjian, a literary critic
and then an obscure member of the Shanghai Municipal
CCP Committee, launched an attack on a play written
by Wu Han--one of P'eng Chen's deputies--entitled
The Dismissal of Hai Jul. The play was staged in
1960-61 and was the story of a legendary Ming
Dynasty official who brought exploiters of the
people to justice only to be dismissed through
court intrigue. The political significance of the
play lay in the analogy to the P'eng Te-huai case
and the issue of Mao's responsibility for the suf-
fering of 1960-61. P'eng Chen tried to subtly
evade those factors in a memorandum and instead
concentrated merely on the historical accuracy of
Hai Jul. He also authorized a counterattack on
Yao Wen-yuan (who is now a member of the Polit-
buro).
cri
fal
tha
In May 1966 a Central Committee circular
icized P'eng's memorandum and signaled his
from power. The cultural revolution team
he headed was dissolved. Peng's purge Was
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quickly followed by the fall of Lu Ting-1, head
of the CCP Propaganda Department, and T'ao Chu,
Lu's replacement. Chou Yang, a literary theorist
and member of the CCP-CC, was also an early vic-
tim of the purge.
The Calm Before the Storm
Mao revealed at an expanded Politburo session
in May 1966 that his "revisionist" opposition
program was centered at the very highest level of
party leadership. Addressing a number of these
top leaders in July, Mao disclosed that revolu-
tionary students and teachers (the precursors of
the Red Guards) were "going to impose revolution
on you people because you did not carry out the
revolution yourselves."
The Cultural Revolution Group was also set up
by Mao in July. It consisted of 17 members, headed
by Ch'en Po-ta and Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing and
advised by K'ang Sheng.
The year 1966 was marked by the near deifica-
tion of Mao and his thoughts and the appearance
of numerous big-character posters calling for the
overthrow of all "bourgeois reactionaries." Mao
himself wrote a poster--"Bombard the Headquarters"--
that openly attacked all those at the party center
guilty of "revisionism" and of "taking the capital-
ist road."
In August 1966 the 11th plenary session of the
Eighth CCP-CC adopted the 16-point "Decision Con-
cerning the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,"
which was drawn up under Mao's personal direction.
At the plenum, the party gave formal sanction to
the Cultural Revolution and to the censure of Liu
Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-pling, head of the Party
Secretariat. Mao stated that he only expected a
small minority of party cadres to resist and that
therefore, the prospects for the success of the
Cultural Revolution were good.
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REVIEWING RED GUARDS WITH LIN PIAO, AUGUST 1966
On the whole, however, provincial party leaders
withstood the first assault of the Red Guards much
more successfully than did their colleagues in
Peking. The extension of the Cultural Revolution
to agriculture and industry in mid-December 1966
and the formation among workers of revolutionary
rebel groups led to the collapse of most party and
administrative organs.
1967: The Year of the Storm
The first big blow against the existing order
came in January 1967, when revolutionary rebel orga-
nizations in Shanghai banded together and seized
power from the city's party and municipal authori-
ties. This act--the "January Revolution"--was
applauded by Mao and the CRG, and by 22 January the
Jen-min Jih-pao had made it clear that events in
Shanghai should be emulated throughout the country.
For the next 20 months--January 1967 to Septem-
ber 1968--revolutionary committees were established
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in all 21 provinces, three municipalities (under
direct control of the central authorities) and
five autonomous regions of China to take over the
powers of former party and government organiza-
tions. Mao paid a price for this Cultural Revo-
lution, however. It was carried on amid violence
and bloodshed, the purge of numerous high-level
party and government officials, the disruption of
the economy and party apparatus, and the bringing
of China to the brink of civil war. What often
astonished the outside world the most was Mao's
concurrence in or at least tolerance of this
anarchy to achieve his various ends, such as the
cleansing and rebuilding of the Chinese Communist
Party.
In 1967 Mao made a number of public appearances,
received several foreign delegations, and made two
tours into the Yangtze valley. The official praise
and "deification" of Mao during the year reached
unprecedented heights. A major segment of the
paper and metal industry was devoted to the produc-
tion and distribution of materials contributing to
the perpetuation of the Cult of Mao Tse-tung. In
1967 alone more than 76,000,000 sets of the Selected
Works of Mao Tse-tung were published, along with
some 47,000,000 copies of Mao's Selected Readings
and 57,000,000 copies of his poems. In addition,
there were the Mao badges, his portraits, and the
famous Little Red Beck, which permeated Chinese
society.
By the end of 1967, 13 of the original CRG
members had been purged for "rightist sympathies"
or "ultraleftist tendencies." Efforts to form
revolutionary committees and rebuild the adminis-
trative apparatus proceeded slowly. March 1968
witnessed a new purge of the military, which was
torn between its dual tasks of maintaining order
and implementing power seizures. The result was
a new surge of radical ferment that required Mao's
calling in the army to suppress militancy and
restore order. Finally, in September 1968, Chou
En-lai proclaimed that as a result of the "tremen-
dous victory" in the 20-month struggle "to seize
power from the capitalist-roaders," China was
"now all Red."
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Power Consolidated
The Ninth CCP Congress met in April 1969.
Because the campaign to rebuild the party (which
reportedly was originally directed by K'ang Sheng
and later by Chou En-lai) had had little success,
most of the delegates to the congress were selected
either by the central authorities or by ad hoc
meetings. At least 40 percent of the delegates
were PLA members, while many of the others were
labor heroes or Mao-study activists.
The new Central Committee reflected a similar
balance, with a preponderance of senior provincial
military figures, most of whom held concurrent
posts in revolutionary committees, replacing the
leaders purged during the Cultural Revolution.
Mao was again chosen Chairman of the CCP, and
Lin Piao was elected Vice Chairman. The composi-
tion of the Politburo and its Standing Committee
reflected the fact that loyalty to Mao and Lin was
a strong consideration in selection for those
elite bodies.
Mao and the Sino-Soviet Conflict
The Sino-Soviet dispute, which might partially
be called the Mao-Soviet rift, took root in the
early days of the CCP and began to blossom in the
decade of the fifties. It was in 1956 that Mao
reacted against Nikita Khrushchev's famous de-
Stalinization address to the 20th CPSU Congress
in February. Mao is reported to have told Anastas
Mikoyan in April that Stalin's merits outweighed
his faults.
Mao's public reaction to "de-Stalinization"
was expressed in "On the Historical Experience of
the Dictatorship of the Proletariat," which appeared
as an editorial in the Jen-min Jih-pao of 5 April
1956. A second editorial, "More on the Historical
Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat,"
was published on 29 December 1956. The editorials
disapproved of the lack of Soviet self-criticism
and censured Khrushchev's failure to consult with
other Communist parties in advance and to make an
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overall analysis of Stalin. In Mao's logic, to
affiim that Stalin's whole policy during the last
two decades of his life was basically a series of
crimes and errors was to cast discredit on the
entire world Communist movement and on the Chinese
Communists who had come to power with the support
of this movement. Khrushchev's attempt to estab-
lish a complete separation between Stalin and the
system he had dominated for a generation appeared
to Mao logically absurd and politically explosive.
KHRUSHCHEV (2ND FROM LEFT), LIU SHAO-CHII, MAO,
PIENG CHEN, 2 OCT i959
The year 1959 saw Sino-Soviet relations deterio-
rate at a markedly fast pace due to such factors as
Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence" line and dis-
sensions over China's border conflict with India.
Moscow's refusal to provide Peking with specifica-
tions on an atomic bomb and Khrushchev's suggestion
that year that Mao consider accepting a two-China
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C-,
Li
policy served to widen the gap between the two
powers. The U-2 incident of I May 1960 provided
Mao with more ammunition in his war of words as he
implicitly taunted Khrushchev for having displayed
"illusions" about imperialism and peaceful coexis-
tence.
Heightened polemics at the Romanian Workers'
Party Congress of June 1960 and at the 81-party
meeting in Moscow in November, coupled with the
recall of all Soviet experts in China the same
year, added new strains to Sino-Soviet tension.
Many letters, statements and communiques began
to pass between Peking and Moscow as the former
attacked "revisionist" Yugoslavia (meaning the
Soviet Union) while the latter counterattacked
"doctrinaire" Albania (meaning China).
In 1962 Mao openly challenged Soviet authority
in the world Communist movement. At the 10th CCP-
CC plenum, in September, Mao struck out at Khrush-
chev, publicly naming him as a wrecker of the
socialist camp and the "betrayer" of Castro. The
situation continued, and in mid-1963 Teng Hsiao-
p'ing held fruitless talks with the Soviets in
Moscow. Mao was pointedly present at the airport
to see Teng off and to welcome him back from his
trip.
The Chinese continued to issue a series of
letters to Moscow. The language and style were so
similar to Mao's that their authorship was widely
attributed to him. In any case, it is clear from
their importance that Mao at least authorized them.
The letters contained endless charges against the
Soviet Union and presented arguments, often char-
acterized by pungent wit and keen logic, that
China's sponsorship of continuing revolutionary
activity in the "Third World" was the only hope
for sustaining the international Communist move-
ment. Soviet responses indicated their sensi-
tivity on a number of issues, but Mao's goal of
turning Soviet policies around were, in large
part, a failure as of the mid-1960's.
The replacement of Khrushchev with Leonid
Brezhnev and Aleksey Kosygin in 1964 failed to
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alleviate Sino-Soviet tensions. Kosygin tried
unsuccessfully to negotiate a reconciliation with
the Chinese. PLA Chief of Staff Lo Jui-ch'ing
advocated a rapprochement with the Soviets, but
Lo soon became one of the purge victims (November
1965) of the Cultural Revolution. At the 11th
CCP plenum, in August 1966, Mao obtained sufficient
voting strength to carry his policies in the Polit-
buro and to keep China on an independent course of
action.
Mao's Family
Mao has had four wives. The first, whom he
married at 14, was a girl 6 years his senior with
whom he never lived. It was a marriage arranged
by his parents following traditional Chinese cus-
toms. No other information is available on his
first wife.
In 1920 Mao married Yang Klai-hui daughter
of his former teacher, Yang Ch'ang-ch'i. They
had two sons: An-ying was born in 1922, educated
in the Soviet Union, and killed in Korea in 1950;
An-ching, also educated in the Soviet Union,
became a translator of Russian political works.
Yang K'ai-hui was executed by the KMT in 1930.
Mao's third wife was Ho Tzu-chen, reportedly
a normal school graduate and a party member from
1927. Mao married Ho around 1930, and she bore
him five children, four of whom were left with var-
ious friends during the Long March. Ho was one of
about 30 women who survived the March despite her
having been injured or wounded several times.
About 1937 Mao married an actress in Yenan
named Lan P'ing. This is his present wife, Chiang
Ch'ing, by whom he has two daughters. Li Na (Hsiao
Li) was born in 1943, and Mao Ming was born in 1951.
Both were still living at home as of 1957, and one
was reported to be a history student at Peking
University in 1959. Li Na is supposedly married
to Politburo member Yao Wen-yaan.
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Mao had two brothers: Mao Tse-min was director
of the Financial Department of the Sinkiang Provin-
cial Government before his execution--probably by
the KMT--in 1943; and Mao Tse-tan, once a command-
er of a Red division, died in battle in 1935. The
KMT executed a younger sister.
Mao Tse-tung--the Man
In the past, Mao has been said to have the
naturalness and simplicity of a peasant. He has
long been noted as a man of simple tastes, plain
speech and plain living, but he occasionally appears
coarse and abrupt. He smokes, drinks little in the
line of alcoholic beverages, and consumes large
quantities of tea. Up to 1957 Mao had been known
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as a good orator, speaking in a high-pitched voice
with a noticeable Hunanese accent. He has been
overweight for some time but apparently has reduced
slightly in recent years. Mao is taller than most
Chinese and has prominent cheekbones, long slender
hands and a receding hairline.
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