PRESIDENTIAL VIEWS CONCERNING THE BOMBING HALT AND THE PARIS TALKS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06923741
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2021
• Case Number: F-2019-02256
• Publication Date: October 29, 1968

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
29 October 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
SUBJECT: Presidential Views Concerning the
Bombing Halt and the Paris Talks
. 2. Between 23 and 25 October 1968, President Nguyen Van
Thieu continued to hold discussions with a number of government
officials concerning a bombing halt and the Paris talks. Among
others, Thieu spoke with Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, the Prime
Minister, Thieu's Special Assistant Nguyen Phu Duc, the Interior
and Foreign Ministers, possibly Ambassador Bui Diem, and the
Chairmen of the Upper and Lower Houses.
3. While speaking with the Legislative Chairmen, the President
said he had told the Americans that he had instructed several people
to contact Hanoi to determine if Hanoi felt the time was propitious
� to engage in talks. If the DRV does not feel the time right, the
Americans had been informed that the Paris talks as well as the
fighting in Vietnam would continue as is. However, if Hanoi judges
the occasion right, Hanoi must then talk directly to Saigon to resolve
the issues. It is imperative though, that Hanoi be serious about
wanting to engage in talks. Thieu added parenthetically that .if Hanoi
would not agree to talks with the GVN Ambassador, Thieu would be
�willing to dispatch a GVN Cabinet Minister to handle the discusiions.
If the DRY is serious, the two sides could sit down and discuss the
future of Vietnam, the question. of peace, or any and all issues that
either-side cared to bring up.
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4. The President continued, then if. Hanoi "tells me to rec-
ognize the NLF, I would be willing to make that sacrifice.
However, If ..cl-ern. d:s-a- coalitiOrn.g-Oliern.rnerit,- I Would say
that IS una.cceptable:.:If l-lanOi asks to.r. eturn to nation.alist activi-
ties, I would say OK."
5. Thieu said that he was willing to see the talks drag on for
months or even a year, as long as NVN was serious about the talks.
They should not be used for bickering or propaganda purposes, Thieu
explained, and once the talks commence, the North Vietnamese
"will realize that I am serious". Thieu reiterated that it did not
matter if the NLF was included in the NVN delegation. However,
he would never let NVN tell the GVN to talk with the NLF.
6. Thieu was obviously concerned that NVN was guaranteeing
nothing in return for a bombing halt. He stated he had fold the
Americans that reciprocity was the most important issue. In �
Thieu's opinion, the best reciprocal act would be for Hanoi to begin
talks with the GVN, rather than a military de-escalation or troop
withdrawal from the DMZ.
7. He was also concerned that the U.S. Government wished to
do somethiffrtdraricalerr-iffitifd6r ficlierp-I-lum�Phrey on 5 November.
The inclusion of the NLF at Paris would aid Humphrey, said Thieu,
but the benefits are short-range. Thieu told Vice President Ky on
25 October that he was afraid the U. S. would force the GVN to deal
with-the NLF. He observed, -however ; that the. U. S. was caught
-between-the DRY and the GVN positions on the status of the NLF at
a confererice. � -
� 8. Ky said he felt Thieu should propose ,that..a three-way con-
ference be convened including the- GVN, U. S. and DRY. Thieu
responded that the Americans had told him that Hanoi may refer
to a three-way conference between the DRV, the U.S. and the NLF.
Thieu felt, however, that if the DRY would not accept the inclusion
of the NLF within the DRV delegation, then Hanoi was not yet ready
to engage in serious talks.
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7.
9. The President also mentioned that he was having difficulty
with the Americans in that they were urging him not to speak to the
press or make public statements to avoid leaks on the US/ GVN
talks. Thieu noted that he was trying to convey the impression
that he was a man of peace who would die, not for the world, but
for the people of SVN.
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