FURTHER VIEWS OF VICE PRESIDENT KY ON THE PRESENT BOMBING HALT NEGOTIATIONS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06923737
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2021
• Case Number: F-2019-02256
• Publication Date: October 23, 1968

Approved for Release: 2021/11/10 C06923737
otyrw
�
4110
�
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
23 October 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostol.vie"
Special Assistant to the President
The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
SUBJECT: Further Views of Vice President Ky on
the Present Bombing Halt Negotiations
I. The following information was obtained on 23 October
a. After meeting with Ambassador Berger on 22 October,
Vice President Ky described the bombing halt discussions
with the U.S. mission as stalemated. Ky said that not only
had the mission continued to oppose any face-saving GVN
announcement of DRV concessions made to obtain a bombing
halt, but Ambassador Berger went out of his way to indicate
that no firm DRY concessions had in fact been offered.
b. Ky had a chance to talk to President Thieu while
riding to the Supreme Court investiture on 22 October. Ky
believes that Thieu is standing fast and is unlikely to concur
in the U.S. position.
c. Ky believes the U.S. may announce an unconditional
bombing halt without GVN assent. While he believes that such
a rift between the two allies at this early stage would be most
unfortunate, he continues to regard the compromise proposal
he had earlier suggested to Ambassador Berger as the minimum
acceptable GVN position. A GVN "surrender" now would set
a dangerous precedent, encouraging the U.S. to try to override
'
: � ;'-1.1 I
RET
Approved for Release: 2021/11/10 C06923737
Approved for Release: 2021/11/10 C06923737
�
�
the GVN on future issues of even more vital interest to the
Vietnamese. Allowing the U.S. to act on its own now and
registering GVN dissent from the move would at least not
handicap GVN freedom of action in the future.
2.
Thieu believes Ambassador Bunker may have
engaged in a bit of duplicity. Supposedly Ambassador Porter told
President Park of Korea that Thieu had accepted the bombing halt
proposal at the same time that Ambassador Bunker was informing
Thieu that Park had accepted it.
perhaps based on a misreading of Thieu's usually placid initial
reaction to any proposal, but information
seems to confirm that there
is GVN malaise on this score.
3. Prime Minister Huong's Press Director, Buu Nghi, who
interpreted for the meeting..
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
41e Korean Ambassador Shin Sang
Chul told Huong on 21 October 1968 that Ambassador Porter told
Park on 15 October4968 that the GVN had already accepted a U.S.
proposal for an unconditional bombing halt. Shin had been instructed
by his government to confirm Ambassador Porter's statement with
either Huong or Thieu. Huong took Shin's story to Thieu at once
and now seems to believe that the USG was trying to dupe the GVN.
2
N.' .� '� ''' f-- "' 1 ' � -.
V... ...1,.i ............ I 1 .
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2021/11/10 C06923737