VIEWS OF VICE PRESIDENT KY ON THE PROPOSED BOMBING HALT

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06923736
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2021
• Case Number: F-2019-02256
• Publication Date: October 21, 1968

Approved for Release: 2021/11/10 C06923736
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
21 October 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostow
Special Assistant to the President
The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
SUBJECT: Views of Vice President Ky on the Proposed
Bombing Halt
1.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
a. Ky is pleased with Thieuls press conference statements
at Vung Tau, calling the position which the President enunciated
on a bombing halt one which all Vietnamese can support. Ky
believes that the GVN leadership is more united on the bombing
issue than it has been on any recent question, and although he
had suggested a tougher line to Thieu, he has no policy on the
bombing issue separate from the President's.
b. Ky sincerely believes that achieving an agreed GVN
position on the bombing halt is not enough; it is vital also to
reach agreement with the U.S. Ky proposed to Ambassador
Berger on 18 October a possible compromise which Ky regards
as eminently fair. This proposal calls for the announcement of
a bombing halt "after consultation and agreement between the
GVN, the USG, and the Allies" coupled with a statement that the
DRY has agreed to meet with GVN representatives to explore
ways to end the war. Ky believes this statement would meet
the GVNis political need for a publicized quid pro quo and the
source "understands" that it would be acceptable to Thieu.
(Comment: Ambassador Berger says that no such specific
compromise proposal was offered by Ky during their 19 October
talk.)
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var.
c. Ky believes that an important missing factor is know-
ledge of how the bombing halt proposal originated. He does not
know whether the U.S. has already made secret commitments
to the DRV or whether there is still room for considerable
maneuver. He hopes to elicit this from Thieu or Ambassador
Berger.
2. is convinced that both Ky and Thieu will go to (b)(1)
some lengths to accommodate the U.S. on this question. Asked what (b)(3)
the GVN might do if the U.S. simply announced a bombing halt
unilaterally, he hazarded the guess it would issue a statement re-
serving its own rights and might even withdraw its observer dele-
gation from Paris. If, however, after the American announcement,
the DRY subsequently invited the GVN to talks in a manner which
recognized the GYN's primacy in SVN affairs, the GVN would
probably accept. considers Thieuis Yung Tau reference (b)(1)
to the GVN refusal to sit down with the NLF in any guise unfortunate (b)(3)
propaganda, since both Ky and Thieu arewilhirtg to settle for an NLF
presence at Paris sOlong as the GVN does not appear to be plac_e_
on an equal footing with the Front.
4_
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Approved for Release: 2021/11/10 C06923736