SPECIAL SOUTH VIETNAMESE CABINET MEETING OF 16 OCTOBER 1968 AND VICE PRESIDENT KY'S REACTION TO THE BOMBING HALT PROPOSAL

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06923735
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2021
• Case Number: F-2019-02256
• Publication Date: October 19, 1968

Approved for Release: 2021/11/10 C06923735
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
19 October 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Walt W. Rostowl."-'-----.
Special Assistant to the President
The Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
SUBJECT:
1.
Special South Vietnamese Cabinet Meeting
of 16 October 1968 and Vice President Ky's
Reaction to the Bombing Halt Proposal
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
2. Ky said that those present seemed ready
to endorse the bombing halt until Ky raised the issues of NLF attend-
ance at the talks and the political need for making public the NVN
concessions. Ky argued that if the NLF could not be kept out of the
Paris talks, the GVN should at least insist that the terms of NLF
participation under Hanoi's sponsorship should be simply and clearly
spelled out to insure that the NLF did not appear as an equal par-
ticipant with the GVN. He did not trust the North Vietnamese to
keep their word, Ky-said, and the GVN should press for maximum
concessions, clearly spelled out, now when its leverage was greatest.
Ky said that the majority at the meeting, naming specifically Vy,
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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Vien, and two assembly speakers, agreed with him and Thieu then
agreed to seek adjustments in terms of the bombing halt.
3. Ky feels that the matter of representation on each side at
the peace talks was never really settled during the many weekly
meetings he and Thieu had with American Embassy officials; the
subject was always changed just as decisions or agreement seemed
near.
4. President Thieu had wired instructions to
Ambassadors Bui Diem and Lain to insure that they insist in their
.talks with American officials on a GVN presence at any future peace
talks and that the NLF not be given a status equal to the GVN's.
Thieu also instructed his Legislative Liaison Officer Nhuyen Cao
Thang on 18 October 1968 to brief bloc leaders in the Assembly on
the bombing halt proposal and to line up Assembly suppOrt for the
GVN's position. A closed-door session of the Assembly is scheduled
for 1500 hours 19 October 1968 to review the peace proposals and
this session would lead to Assembly support of the
GVN's ultimate position.
5. Ky and Ambassador Berger had met at 1700
hours on 18 October 1968 and Ky had described their talk as frank and
cordial. Ky had told Berger, in response to Berger's question, that
he understood Berger's position clearly but continued to disagree
with some of them. Ky tried unsuccessfully to get an appointment
with Thieu after his talk with Berger but was told by Thieu's protocol
officer that Thieu could not receive him on the 19th.. Ky is trying
to follow protocol, understands the need for national unity, and will
do his part, but believes Thieu must also show some understanding.
6.
2
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the details of "our side, their (b)(1)
side" had been left very vague in discussions with the Embass and (b)(3)
that it had never been clear who would head "our" delegation. L (b)(1)
l(y. did (b)(3)
not find the total package unacceptable but felt it best to try to wrap (b)(1)
up the loose ends now. For example, even if the NLF could not be
(b)(3)
excluded, the subject should be fully explored since NLF representa-
tion could take a number of forms, each with significant substantive
differences.
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