WILLIAM J. CASEY AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE: AN OVERVIEW

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06923310
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: January 30, 2024
• Document Release Date: October 16, 2023
• Case Number: F-2018-02730
• Publication Date: June 1, 2017

Approved for Release: 2023/09/28 C06923310
SECRETIINOIORN
CIA Leadership, 1981-1987
(U) William J. Casey as Director of Central
Intelligence: An Overview
(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(U) We could be on the
verge of an historic
turning point in this
century. . . . 300,000
freedom fighters are
risking their lives in Af-
ghanistan, Cambodia,
Angola, Ethiopia, Nic-
aragua, Mozambique
and Yemen.
�William J. Casey,
25 September 19861
(U) William Joseph Casey served
as President Ronald Reagan 's di-
rector of central intelligence (DCI)
during 28 January 1981-29 Janu-
ary 1987 in the midst of a period of
great political flux in the world. In
late 1986, he was diagnosed with
a malignant brain tumor, and in
mid-December he took medical leave.
He formally resigned just over a
month later He died on 6 May 1987.
To mark the passage of 30 years since
the passage of a most extraordinary
DCI, we are publishing the following,
which is the concluding chapter of
a forthcoming classified history of
Casey's term as DCI.
�Editor
� � �
(U) The Brezhnev Doctrine, pro-
claimed when Soviet and other East-
ern Bloc forces invaded Czechoslova-
kia in 1968, held that any country that
adopted a communist form of govern-
ment would remain, irreversibly, in
the Soviet-led "socialist camp." The
military movement into Czechoslo-
vakia squelched the political opening
of the Prague Spring and unambigu-
ously demonstrated that any attempt
by a socialist state to liberalize its
political system would be stamped
out with overwhelming force. The
United States condemned the Brezh-
nev Doctrine but arguably acquiesced
11111111111111111111111111
in it by continuing a policy of d�nte
with the Soviet Union through much
of the Nixon and Carter presidencies,
by the end of which the Soviets had
considerably expanded their political
and military influence in the Third
World.
(U) Slightly more than a year after
taking office, President Reagan ef-
fectively declared war on the Soviets
in the Third World. In a speech on
9 May 1982 at Eureka College, his
alma mater, Reagan pledged that the
United States would support people
fighting against the spread of com-
munism anywhere in the world. In
the years that followed, the Reagan
administration more vigorously chal-
lenged the Soviets with a multiyear,
worldwide program of supporting
"freedom fighters" resisting Marxist
regimes backed by the Soviets or
(U) The views, opinions, and findings expressed in this article are those of the
author and should not be construed as asserting or implying US government en-
dorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official
positions of any component of the United States government.
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CIA Leadership, 1981-1987
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Soviet proxy governments, such as
those of Cuba, Vietnam, and Libya.
(U) Casey and the Rea-
gan Doctrine
(U) The practice of pushing back
against the Soviets came, later, to
be known as the Reagan Doctrine.
National Security Advisor Robert C.
"Bud" McFarlane traces the origins
of the formal doctrine�albeit not
by that name to National Securi-
ty Decision Directive (NSDD) 75,
an updated statement of US policy
toward the Soviet Union signed by
President Reagan in January 1983.
NSDD 75 repudiated d�nte and�in
a nine-page document�declared that
the United States would "contain and
over time reverse Soviet expansion-
ism by competing effectively on a
sustained basis with the Soviet Union
in all international arenas."2
(U) Secretary of State George
Shultz wrote that he enunciated the
Reagan Doctrine in a speech on
"America and the Struggle for Free-
dom" at the Commonwealth Club
in San Francisco in February 1985.
Insisting that for many years "our
adversaries acted without restraint"
in spreading communism and in en-
forcing the "infamous" and "chilling"
Brezhnev Doctrine, Shultz declared
the United States would now "stand
firmly in defense of our interests and
principles and the rights of peoples
to live in freedom." The moderate
Shultz noted that he had carefully
reviewed the draft of the hardline
speech with the president and shown
it to DCI William Casey and others at
one of their monthly "Family Group"
lunches at the White House. Casey,
Shultz recalled, was very supportive.
"Don't put this into the interagen-
Ill000000
'111111111111111111111111111111.
IIIIIIIIIIIIft
uuuuuuuuuuuuuu
(U) A National Security Council meeting in the Oval Office on 12 November 1985, just
before President Reagan's summit meeting in Geneva with Soviet leader Gorbachev. Photo:
Ronald Reagan Library, #C31939-20
cy clearance process," he extolled.
"Don't let anyone change a word."3
(U) President Reagan, his two
secretaries of defense, two secretaries
of state, six national security advi-
sors, and DCIs Casey and Webster
all deserve credit for supporting and
implementing the policy that by 1985
came to be called the Reagan Doc-
trine, and which ultimately thwarted
Soviet ambitions in the Third World.
They deserve credit as well for grad-
ually implementing the succession
of political, military, economic, and
technological actions that squeezed
the Soviet Union to the point that�
when combined with the country's
even more important domestic politi-
cal, economic, and social problems
the USSR imploded. The collapse
of the USSR, the end of centuries of
Russian/Soviet imperialism, the end
of nearly 50 years of communism in
Eastern Europe, and the reunifica-
tion of Germany were, undoubtedly,
developments more far-reaching than
anything Casey foresaw when he
spoke of a possible "historic turning
point in this century." Taken together,
these developments constituted a pro-
foundly important victory for the ad-
ministrations of Ronald Reagan and
George H. W. Bush, the Congress,
the United States, and the West.
(U) More than any other sin-
gle individual, William Casey was
the originator and driver of US
on-the-ground actions that slowed
and finally arrested the expansion
of Soviet presence and influence
abroad. He was the de facto father
of the Reagan Doctrine and created
the reality to which the name became
attached. Shultz recognized Casey's
central role when he wrote about how
the United States was supporting
the opposition to Marxist regimes in
many countries, referring specifically
to Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua,
and Cambodia. Shultz described how
Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard She-
vardnadze finally informed him that
38
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CIA Leadership, 1981-1987
(U) William Casey commenting during a National Security Council meeting in the White
House Situation Room on 14 August 1986. Photo: Ronald Reagan Library, #C36569-9
Soviet forces would be withdrawing
from Afghanistan and about what he
believed had forced the Soviets to
take this step. "In March 1985, with
Bill Casey pushing hard and with me
in full agreement, the president had
stepped up sharply our level of as-
sistance to the Mujahidin [resistance
fighters]." With the Soviet departure
from Afghanistan, the Brezhnev Doc-
trine suffered its first serious breach.
The Reagan Doctrine, Shultz empha-
sized, "brought results.'
(U) Afghanistan
(U) The most definitively suc-
cessful of the worldwide programs
opposing the Soviets was, indeed,
the one that Shultz highlighted US
support to the Afghan mujahidin.
Casey inherited this program from
the Carter administration, but over
the years working within the
administration, with Congress, and
with liaison partners he increased
its size and lethality immensely as
the goal of US policy transitioned
from checking the Soviets to ex-
pelling them. With some charitable
oversimplification, Reagan confidant
Edwin Meese later observed, "Bill
was a stalwart in advocating the use
of Stinger missiles. That, more than
anything else, brought about the
Soviet defeat in Afghanistan and the
collapse of the Soviet Union."' In
fact, there were many domestic and
international considerations involved
in the Soviets' decision to withdraw,
but there was no doubt that the seem-
ingly endless and growing insurgency
was a key factor and that the role of
the United States and the Agency in
supporting Pakistani partners and the
mujahidin resistance was critical to
its ultimate success. In Afghanistan,
Bill Casey led the most historically
consequential covert action in the
history of the CIA.
(U) Central America
(U) Casey was even more di-
rectly responsible for what became
one of the most controversial co-
vert actions�backing the Contra
resistance to the Sandinista regime
in Nicaragua. Unlike Afghanistan,
there was at the outset no established
insurgency in Nicaragua; no reliable
foreign provider of arms, training,
and sanctuary; no funding sources
beyond the United States; and no res-
ervoir of support in the US Congress,
press, and public. Casey had Rea-
gan's support, but almost everyone
else (with the important exception of
Secretary of State Alexander Haig)
was either apathetic or opposed to
what was seen as Casey's war. To end
Nicaragua's support to the insurgen-
cy in El Salvador and to counter the
growth of Cuban and Soviet influ-
ence in Nicaragua�which Casey
considered a communist threat to
the entire Western Hemisphere�he
began during his first year in office
to mold rural campesinos, former
Somoza-era national guardsmen, and
assorted oppositionists into a militar-
ily capable Contra force that operated
with paramilitary support from the
CIA until 1984.
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CIA Leadership, 1981-1987
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40 �S.E.GREffiltOtterRIT�
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CIA Leadership, 1981-1987
(U) Rebuilding CIA's covert action infrastructure and its
operational capabilities was one of Casey's major accom-
plishments. (b)(1)
(b)(3)
(U) CIA Legacy
Covert Action. Rebuilding
CIA's covert action infrastructure
and its operational capabilities was
one of Casey's major accomplish-
ments. Over his six years in office,
he secured vastly increased funding
for covert action'
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
/consis-
tent with wider US policy goals.
(U) As a means of fighting back
against the Soviets, covert action
was Casey's highest priority, and
it was probably the single category
of Agency activities to which he
devoted the most time. In the aggre-
gate, the Agency's covert programs
during the Casey years, 1981 to
1986, contributed significantly to
US success in thwarting what had
been a continual expansion of Soviet
influence abroad. Soviet expert and
former DCI Robert Gates has written
that the first meaningful, authoritative
change in the thrust of Soviet foreign
policy can be traced to Soviet Pres-
ident Mikhail Gorbachev's speech
to the 27th Congress of the Soviet
Communist Party on 6 March 1986�
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�SECRET-MiterPORN�
CIA Leadership, 1981-1987
(U) Under Casey, the process of producing estimates
was not for the meek He held strong views on many key
intelligence issues and his vigorous approach to debating
analytical points intimidated the uninitiated.
the date that "should be marked as
the beginning of the end of the Cold
War." From that time, Gates contin-
ued, there emerged "a radical turn in
Soviet foreign policy away from the
confrontations of the past and toward
international cooperation. . . extend-
ing, finally, to the last redoubt of the
Cold War the Third World." On
4 December 1989�three years after
Casey left office Warsaw Pact lead-
ers formally condemned the invasion
of Czechoslovakia and declared the
Brezhnev Doctrine dead.'
(U) The Intelligence Community.
For historians and the popular press,
Casey's legacy will always be his
leadership and involvement in covert
operations. To his Intelligence Com-
munity and Agency colleagues and
their successors, however, he also
bequeathed a broader legacy. Above
all, that entailed rebuilding the IC
expanding funding, increasing the
number of personnel, and growing
the capabilities of all agencies. It
involved improving the collection of
intelligence through human sources
and new ground-based and overhead
technical collection systems, as well
as strengthening the quality of anal-
ysis. In these efforts, Casey received
wide support from the heads of the
other agencies. They recognized and
appreciated his clout in the admin-
istration, his success in securing
resources, his respect for their oper-
ational autonomy, and his invitation
to involve themselves personally in
his priority task of preparing na-
tional intelligence estimates. Casey
was generally not territorial and had
no taste for bureaucracy or inter-
agency bickering. His era marked a
significant elevation of cooperation
among the senior leaders of the IC.a
(U) The Estimative Process. Casey
followed through on his often-stated
view that his most important respon-
sibility was to oversee the prepa-
ration for policymakers of national
estimates that were timely, relevant,
and of high quality. Under Casey,
the process of producing estimates
was not for the meek. He held strong
views on many key intelligence
issues and his vigorous approach to
debating analytical points intimidated
the uninitiated. But he enjoyed the
give and take and clearly respected
those who knew their brief and were
able to represent their case effec-
tively. One seldom changed Casey's
mind on basic substantive issues,
especially regarding the Soviet
Union, but those holding different
views had an opportunity to make
their positions known and to express
them in print. Casey on several
occasions forwarded estimates and
other analytical papers to policy-
makers noting that they reached
conclusions with which he disagreed.
Policymakers praised some estimates
and criticized others. Reviewing the
record, it is perhaps not surprising
that the latter category contained a
significant number of estimates that
effectively challenged US policy. At
a minimum, even these were timely
and relevant. Under Casey's tute-
a. (U) The director of intelligence and
research at the Dept intent of State, Amb.
Hugh Montgomery, recalled, "Casey never
really engaged the Community as such, but
he was very supportive of [NR."�Inter-
view with author, 27 February 2013 [U].
lage, estimates�produced in greatly
increased numbers had an impact.
a) CIA Organization�DI. Within
CIA, Casey's legacy also includ-
ed two significant organizational
adjustments. Early in his tenure,
the director set in motion a review
that reorganized the Directorate of
Intelligence so that its constituent
offices were defined by their area of
geographic responsibility rather than
by academic discipline�politics,
economics, military and weapons
analysis, and the like. For managers,
this was a traumatic adjustment at the
time, but over the longer term pro-
moted closer substantive cooperation
among Agency experts from different
disciplines working on a given coun-
try or region. Equally important, it
facilitated interactions on the part of
managers and analysts with counter-
parts in the Directorate of Operations
and elsewhere in government, who
for the most part were also organized
on a geographic basis. For analysts,
this organizational change was the
most significant in the history of the
Agency, and it endured for 35 years.
(U) CIA Organization�DO. Ca-
sey's most significant organizational
move in the Directorate of Opera-
tions was to create an organization
specifically to counter terrorism.
From the beginning of his time at
CIA, Casey had focused on Libyan
sponsorship of regional subversion
and international terrorism. By mid-
1985, more numerous international
terrorist outrages (backed by the
Libyans and others) and the plight of
US hostages held in Lebanon led him
to expend even more effort working
counterterrorism issues with Agency
officers, liaison counterparts, and US
government colleagues. Prompted
by his own findings and a govern-
42
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CIA Leadership, 1981-1987
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(b)(3)
(U) Casey's willingness to do the job himself, coupled
with a sometimes short temper and impetuousness, led to
some comical results.
ment-wide review of options for a
more aggressive and comprehensive
counterterrorism policy, Casey in ear-
ly 1986 created the Counterterrorism
Center (CTC). The new organization
was truly an innovation�a center
that was located organizationally
within the DO but made up of experts
from all directorates and (in only
token numbers originally) the FBI
and other agencies. CTC suffered se-
rious growing pains, as area divisions
(especially the Near East and South
Asia Division) saw it as a competitor,
but it prospered to the point that it
eventually became the largest opera-
tional component in CIA. Other CIA
centers would follow (counternarcot-
ics, counterproliferation, and coun-
terintelligence), and decades later,
CTC and the others served as models
for a comprehensive reorganization
of the Agency into regionally based
"mission centers" that combined op-
erations, analysis, and technical and
support personnel.
�(S/ALF9-Leadership/Manage-
meta Casey was a more effective
leader than manager. He foresaw
the benefits of the reorganizations
and directed them implemented. He
recognized the need for a second CIA
headquarters building and built it.
But he did not and, with all the de-
mands on the time of a CIA director,
perhaps could not devote the close
and continuing management atten-
tion that would have been required
to solve certain other problems that
he continually lamented
(U) Leaving aside covert action,
Casey's approach to management
was more exhortation than execution.
During one conference, he explained
to senior managers that Churchill
during World War II had a sticker
that read "Action This Day." The
prime minister attached this sticker
to memorandums he sent to subordi-
nates "to make things move." "That
spirit," Casey charged, "should be the
bottom line of what we call the Ex-
cellence Program." Casey launched
his "Excellence Program" with a
speech to employees in January
1984; within months it had produced
a "credo" outlining Agency values,
what Casey described as a "three foot
high pile" of submissions of ideas for
improvements submitted by hundreds
of employees, and several dozen
implemented actions that the direc-
tor judged responsive to his call to
maximize superior performance from
a large organization. Many managers
considered the effort a passing fad,
but it reflected Casey's perennial
desire to take action now.a
a. (U) Casey was frank to acknowledge that
he had been inspired to initiate his program
by reading Tom Peters and Robert H. Wa-
terman, Jr.'s best-selling management book,
In Search of Excellence: Lessons from
America's Best-Run Companies (Harper-
Collins, 1982).
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (June 2017)
(U) Casey could be very direct
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
10n other
occasions he said that lagging recruit-
ment "particularly annoys me" and
that the DO needed to look outside
its traditional career trainee program.
The Agency, he argued, needed more
lateral hiring of individuals "with
Slavic, Oriental, Hispanic, Arabic
language and culture. We must be
prepared to settle for poorer English,
less education. . . trade superficial
qualities for experience and in-
stincts." Casey told senior operations
managers that the CIA would never
be able to acquire all the information
it needed "from people who will take
or can pass polygraphs."'
1(b)(1)
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(U) Casey's willingness to do the
job himself, coupled with a some-
times short temper and impetuous-
ness, led to some comical results.
Late one afternoon, Casey was
frustrated that it was taking so long
for him to receive a copy of a paper
he had dictated, only to be told that
the Wang word processor in his outer
office was malfunctioning. Hearing
(b)(1)
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CIA Leadership, 1981-1987
this, Casey commanded his executive
assistant: "Get Wang on the line!"
The director explained that he was
acquainted with Dr. An Wang, the
founder of the company that made
the offending machine. Despite
protestations from his staff that they
could fix the problem, Casey's call
was placed and the next day a team
from Wang, sent by Wang, showed
up in the director's office.1�
(U) While Casey was demanding
and sometimes abrupt, he granted
subordinates great authority and
leeway and was, himself, an extraor-
dinarily hard worker, all of which
inspired loyalty and respect. Senior
CIA officers were impressed, and
then amused, when Casey finally took
a proper vacation after 18 months
on the job. With Mrs. Casey and his
daughter, Bernadette, the director
traveled to the American Southwest
for a two-week holiday. While in
the area, Casey took side excursions
to visit the Sandia Corporation and
Airborne Laser Laboratories in New
Mexico; the Satellite Test Center,
Special Projects Office, Defense Lan-
guage Institute, and Naval Postgrad-
uate School in California; the North
American Air Defense Command in
Colorado; and the Area 51 testing
ground in Nevada." The expectation
at Headquarters was that he would
doubtless return rested and ready to
attack in all directions at once.
(U) Relationship with the Pres-
ident Casey was also respected
within CIA, the Intelligence Commu-
nity, and in wider government circles
because President Reagan in an
unprecedented move�made him a
member of the cabinet. The two men
had not known one another prior to
the campaign, but Reagan and his
advisers credited Casey with getting
(U) Casey offering counsel to the president in the Oval Office on 11 March 1983. Photo:
Ronald Reagan Library, #C13369-13
the president elected. They were of
the same generation, shared a com-
mon worldview, and thought alike on
key issues. As a result, a bond was
established, and Casey had regular
and assured access to the president.
(U) Casey saw a lot of President
Reagan. Over his six years in office,
the director attended an average of
23 cabinet meetings annually. He was
present at an average of 50 formal
NSC or National Security Policy
Group (NSPG) meetings per year.
Reagan normally chaired both of
these groups. Beyond that, Casey
typically attended nine smaller, less
formal meetings with the president
and others related to intelligence
and national security matters, and
had seven "one-on-one" (often with
an accompanying aide and with the
national security advisor present)
meetings with the president each
year. Not unimportant in Washington,
Director and Mrs. Casey also joined
the Reagans for an average of eight
social occasions each year.u.
(U) Casey's senior executive
assistant recalled that Casey did not
telephone Reagan often, but when he
did he always got through." Accord-
ing to National Security Advisor John
Poindexter, Casey spoke by tele-
phone with Reagan more frequently
than any other member of the NSC. A
sample of Agency and White House
records suggests the two typically
spoke by telephone six to eight times
per year.a Poindexter remembered
that Casey, whether he met in person
a. (U) CIA historian
upon reviewing CIA records, found that
there were six telephone calls in 1981�
Center for the Study of Intelligence,
unpublished and undated manuscript [not
classified]. White House records show
that there were eight telephone calls in
1986�William B. Lytton III, "Summary
of Contacts between the President and DCI
Casey in 1986," memorandum for Arthur
B. Culvahouse, Jr., 20 August 1987 [not
44
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with Reagan or telephoned, usually
provided the president a paper sum-
marizing his key points. Reagan read
this material as he did the innumer-
able memorandums and letters Casey
sent Reagan that were not associated
with a meeting or telephone call�
unless the document was too long or
detailed, in which case Reagan might
request that others summarize the key
points for him.'4 In all, Casey may
have had more contact with the presi-
dent he served than any other director
of the CIA.
(U) Casey and Reagan did not
have a particularly close personal
relationship, despite the relative
frequency of contact between them.
Both were paradoxes. They were out-
going and loved other people's com-
pany, yet were also very private and
virtually never shared any personal
information about themselves, even
with those whom they had known for
decades. Beyond that, Casey revealed
to a few close associates that he had
reservations about Reagan's lack
of intellectual interests and relaxed
work habits. As Casey confidant
Jeane Kirkpatrick charitably put
it, "Casey liked and admired the
president and thought he had good
judgment about foreign policy, but
wished that he was more involved�
more deeply and personally."15
(U) The frequency of contact, the
volume of information Casey pro-
vided Reagan, and the attention the
president is known to have accorded
that information demonstrate, at a
minimum, Casey's great determina-
tion to support the president and the
close professional and political, if
not personal, relationship that existed
classified] (White House Legal Task Force
Records, box 92814).
(U) Casey may have had more contact with the president
he served than any other director of the CIA.
between them. Throughout his time
in office, Casey took advantage of the
fact that he had advised Reagan on
substantive matters during the cam-
paign and of his status as a member
of the cabinet to offer advice not only
on intelligence and national security
matters, but about domestic issues as
well. During his trip abroad as
DCI, for example, Casey
followed up on a matter discussed at
a recent cabinet meeting by sending
the president a cable with recommen-
dations on a draft presidential public
statement on funding entitlement
programs; years later, Casey was
sending Reagan letters advising on
economic and budget issues in light
of the coming reelection campaign.'6
(U) Vice President Bush, some
key cabinet members, and several
senior White House political advisers
thought Casey should not be in the
cabinet and had too much influence
with Reagan, particularly through
his influence on Reagan's speeches
and his involvement with domestic
issues.'' One White House insider
who was close to Casey, however,
recalled that "Reagan cared about
Casey and they [the White House
advisers] knew it. They tried to min-
imize his influence, but he was too
big to take on.""
(U) Senator Paul Laxalt (R-NV),
who served as Reagan's campaign
chairman while Casey was campaign
manager, knew both Reagan and
Casey well and maintained regular
contact with each throughout the time
Casey was DCI. Looking back on
that period, Laxalt observed that Ca-
sey, above all, loved his country and
hated its enemies. So did Reagan. On
all matters, "Casey was a formidable
force protecting the president. Ca-
sey's judgment was highly respected
by the president." National Security
Advisor Richard Allen described the
relationship between Casey and the
president even more succinctly, if
indelicately: "Bill Casey was a great
American. He was so goddamned
loyal�absolutely.',20 (b)(1)
(b)(3)
(U) Iran-Contra. For better and
worse, Casey's loyalty to Reagan
was never better demonstrated than
during the period of the Iran-Con-
tra affair. Reagan was emotionally
and politically preoccupied by the
detention of American hostages in
Lebanon, leading him to inquire
regularly of his national security
advisors and Casey about what more
could be done to secure their release
and to his bit-by-bit approval of the
Israeli-inspired, NSC-controlled,
largely fruitless effort to secure the
hostages' release by selling arms to
Iran. Better than any other senior
member of the national security
team, Casey understood Reagan's
thinking and deteimination to explore
every possible avenue. He lent CIA
support to the program, unrealistical-
ly trying along the way to disavow
Agency responsibility for, or con-
trol of, it even when a presidential
finding was signed. With the notable
exception of Secretary of Defense
Caspar Weinberger, who opposed
the effort throughout, other members
of the NSC offered muted support
for the program or acquiesced. After
it became public, some, notably
Shultz, were publicly critical.
(U) Casey was the NSC mem-
ber most concerned about Soviet
and Cuban expansionism in Central
America and was the architect of
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CIA Leadership, 1981-1987
(U) Casey�alone among cabinet-level officers�insisted
on testifying before Congress in defense of the adminis-
tration.
the covert program to support the
Contra resistance to the Sandinistas
in Nicaragua. He was also the most
determined that the administration
should find a way to continue support
for the Contras during the period
Congress disallowed support from
the CIA. Reagan backed him, and
all NSC members were involved in
deliberations on how, legally, to raise
funds. Some funds were raised from
foreign states. Separately, the NSC
staff created a private "enterprise" to
purchase arms and forward them to
the Contras. When more funds were
needed, the NSC staff conjoined the
Iran and Contra resupply efforts,
illegally diverting profits realized by
the sale of weapons to Iran to support
the Contras.
(U) Reagan and Casey denied
having any direct knowledge of
the financial diversion prior to the
time it was publicly disclosed by
Attorney General Meese, although
Casey was informed of rumors that
funds were being diverted a month
before Meese's revelation and asked
that this information be shared with
White House counsel. Iran-Contra
investigators found no credible evi-
dence that contradicted the accounts
the director and the president provid-
ed them. Nevertheless, the otherwise
positive legacies of Reagan and
Casey they who had authorized and
implemented the Reagan Doctrine
that rolled back the Soviets were
forever melded to and tarnished by
Iran-Contra. Outside the national
security advisors and the NSC staff,
Reagan and Casey were the most
active supporters of the ill-advised
operations to secure the release of
hostages in a manner incompatible
was held at Saint Mary's Parish in
Roslyn Harbor, on Long Island, near
Casey's home of almost 40 years. At
the last moment, the bishop of the
diocese, John McGann, decided to
preside in place of the local parish
priest. The bishop arrived late (de-
layed by several motorcades), mak-
ing some mourners impatient, but not
distressing in the slightest President
Ronald Reagan, sitting serenely in
the front row.
(U) The occasion was pure Casey.
The bishop credited Casey for his
lifetime of support to the church, but
used his homily primarily to attack
US policy in Central America. In
particular, he criticized "the vio-
lence wrought . . . by support of the
Contras." The bishop's condemnation
irritated many and was received with
stony silence.
(U) Former UN Ambassador
Jeane Kirkpatrick followed with a
eulogy praising Casey. She noted that
with longstanding US policy, and to
support the Contras during the period
when US government funding was
not authorized. Their motives may
have been noble, but their judgment
failed them.
(U) When the scandal erupted,
Casey alone among cabinet-level
officers�insisted on testifying before
Congress in defense of the adminis-
tration. During his fourth appearance
in December 1986, his failing health
left him impaired to the point that the
sympathetic chairman of the commit-
tee adjourned the hearing.
(U) Last Days
(U) On 15 December 1986, Casey
suffered a medical crisis in his office
and took leave from his duties as
DCI. He resigned on 29 January 1987
and died on 6 May. A funeral mass
223
1""111:1"11"
"1111111111111111111111111111111,11,11.11,,,','
(U) President and Mrs. Reagan offering their condolences to Mrs. Casey's widow, So-
phia, as daughter, Bernadette, and Father Phillip Dabney look on at the funeral. (Reverend
Dabney had presided over the wedding of Bernadette and her husband Owen Smith, not
shown.) Photo: Ronald Reagan Library, #C40599-7
46 _SECEF-T-SiNGFORN-
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CIA Leadership, 1981-1987
he "could barely stand it when we
missed an opportunity to protect the
United States and promote freedom
. . . and supporting Nicaraguan free-
dom fighters had special priority for
him." Kirkpatrick continued, "Some
mean spirited, ill-informed com-
ments have been written and spoken
in the last days. These unpleasant
Endnotes
comments would not have overly
disturbed our friend. . . . He told a
university audience last fall, 'The
CIA is not a place for tender egos and
shriveling violets. The debates and
clashes of ideas can get rough." Kirk-
patrick's remarks prompted a burst of
applause.
+ � +
(U) Casey would have loved the
service. In a way, he had the last
word. His death notice in the Wash-
ington Post suggested that, "in lieu
of flowers, donations may be made
to the William J Casey Fund for the
Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters."
1. (U) William J. Casey, address to the advisory and editorial boards of the Washington Times, 25 September 1986, as quoted in Herbert E.
Meyer, Scouting the Future: The Public Speeches of William .1. Casey (Regnery Gateway, 1989), 157.
2. (U) Robert C. McFarlane, Special Trust (Cadell and Davies, 1994), 219-20; the complete text of NSDD 75 is at appendix B, 372-80.
3. (U) George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), 525.
4. (U) Ibid., 1086-87.
5. (U) Edwin Meese, remarks at centennial celebration of Casey's birth, Institute of World Politics, 13 March 2013 [U].
6. (U) Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War (Simon and
Shuster, 1996), 380,469.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
9.
10. (U) William J. Casey, "Computerization," memorandum for executive director, 6 September 1984 [S]�Job 88B00443R, box 16, folder
422.
11. (U) Office of the DCI, travel records, 17 May to 18 November 1982 [not classified]�Job 9300415R, box 1, folder 2.
12. (U) DCI's schedule cards maintained by his executive assistants [not classified]�Job 9300415R, box 1, files 1-6.
13. (U) Betty Murphy, interview with author Joseph Persico, 1 July 1988 [U].
14. (U) John Poindexter, interview with author, 24 September 2014 [U].
15. (U) UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, interview with author Joseph Persico, 19 September 1988 [U].
16.
17. (U) George H.W. Bush, interview with author, 6 May 1993 [U].
18. (U) White House speech writer Anthony Dolan, interview with author Joseph Persico, 29 June 1988 [U].
19. (U) Paul Laxalt, interview with author Joseph Persico, 21 September 1988 [U].
20. (U) Richard Allen, interview with author Joseph Persico, 16 December 1988 [U].
+ + +
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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