CYPRUS (WEEKLY REVIEW)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06909061
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2022
• Case Number: F-2019-02114
• Publication Date: August 23, 1974

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Weekly Review
et
SC kkh 00774/74
23 August 1974
Copy No 636
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CONTENTS (August 23, 1974)
The WEEKLY REVIEW, issued every. Friday morning by the
Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant
cilvelopments of the week through noon on Thursday. It
frequently, includes material coordinated with or prepared by
the Office of Economic Research, the Cffice of Strategic
Research, and the Directorate of Science 1 'and Technology. MIDDLE EAST
Topics requiring more comprehensive treatrn'ent and therefore AFRICA
published separitely as Special Reports .are listed in the
contents.
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods involved
Additional Warning
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
EAST ASIA
PACIFIC
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE
EUROPE
INTERNATIONAL
SPECIAL
REPORT
1 Cyprus
6 Arab States - Israel: Groping Their Way
8 Egypt-Libya: Meeting Produces Little
8 Arabian Peninsula: Radicals Shift
10 Iran-Iraq: Tensions Rise
11 Portuguese Africa: Ups and Downs
12 Cambodia: New UN Tactics
13 Vietnam: Communist Pressure Continues
14 Japan: Tanaka's Political Outlook
15 Korea-Japan: Assassination Aftermath
16 Malaysia: No Election Surprises
17 Mexico: Major Oil Find
18 Panama-Cuba: Diplomatic Relations
19 Nicaragua: Once and Future President
20 Alternatives to Non-Proliferation
21 France: Defense Policy Review
21 UK: More Nat!onalization
22 European Communist Conference
24 Effect of Oil Money
(Published separately)
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Cyprus President Clerides and
Vice President Denktash
CYPRUS
The fighting on Cyprus wound down this
week following a cease-fire�declared on August
16�after Turkish forces had succeeded in gaining
control of the northern third of the island. Ef-
forts to reopen the Geneva peace talks have
proved fruitless so far, but Greek and Turkish
Cypriot leaders have agreed to talks on human-
itarian issues that could be expanded to cover
political topics. The Karamanlis government in
Athens has refused to negotiate unless Turkish
forces return to the positions they held on August
9�before the second round of fifihting. Mean-
while, Turkish military successes have set off a
wave of anti-Americanism in Greece and Cyprus,
where it is believed that the US could have
blocked the Turkish action. US Ambassador
Davies was killed during a demonstration at the
US embassy in Nicosia on August 19.
status of Negotiations
The scheduled meeting between President
Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf
Denktash is the first sign of diplomatic progress
after a week of stalemate. The two leaders have
agreed to discuss urgent humanitarian issues�such
as the massive refugee problem�arising from the
Cyprus conflict. Clerides has said that he will not
negotiate on the broader political issues until the
matter of returning refugees to their homes is
resolved, but any indicat.on of flexibility on the
part of the Turks could give the Greek Cypriot
leader the room he needs to broaden the talks.
It is generally considered by diplomatic
observers that any breakthough will have to come
as a result of negotiations between the two
Cypriot communities. Athens has rejected all sug-
gestions that peace talks resume between Greece
and Turkey, saying it cannot talk in the face of a
"fait accompli." The Greeks could probably
accept any reasonable settlement made by
Clerides, but to make major concessions in direct
talks with the Turks would be. politically unac-
ceptable for the Karamanlis government.
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For their part, the Turks seem prepared to
wait out the Greeks for as long as necessary.
T urkish military moves south of the so-called
"Attila Line"�which delimits the northern third
of the island claimed for a Turkish Cypriot
autonomous area�were probably designed, at
least in part, to force the Greeks to the con-
ference table. The failure of this gambit has led
the Turks to take initial steps toward establishing
an autonomous Turkish administration in north-
ern Cyprus. The Turks have indicc.Ltd a willing-
ness to negotiate on the area of Turkish control
west of Morphou and to make minor adjustments
in the "Attila Line" elsewhere, but the longer
talks are delayed, the more difficult it will be for
the Turks to consider moving out of areas
presently under their control.
Greek Reaction
The Karamanlis government has remained
firm in its intention to withdraw from military
participation in NATO, although it has not yet
taken any steps to make the withdrawal official.
According to NATO Acting Secretary General
Pansa, the Greek Defense Ministry has instructed
its representative on the NATO military com-
mittee that a 15-day withdrawal notice for Greek
military personnel will become operative on the
date Athens actually issues the recall order.
NATO authorities are somewhat encouraged by
the fact that Greek officers so far have only
received readiness orders, indicating that Athens
may be having second thoughts.
The future status of US military forces in
Greece is even more unclear. There have been
hints that the Karamanlis government will order
US forces to leave the country, but government
spokesmen continue to deny that such a decision
has been made. Restrictions have, however, been
placed on US access to certain facilities, and
limitations have been placed on US military
flights into and out of Athens.
The announcement of military withdrawal
from NATO, which was extremely popular in
Greece, has strengthened Prime Minister Kara-
manlis' hand for the time being. He has further
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consolidated his control by reshuffling the top
echelons of the army and installing military
leaders he trusts in the top positions. On August
19, Karamanlis ousted the armed forces chief,
General Bonanos, and the army chief, General
Galatsanos, as well as several other senior military
officers identified with the previous regime.
General Arbouzis, who commanded the Greek
army contingent in Korea, was called out of
retirement to replace Bonanos, and General
Davos, former commander of the army corps on
the Greek-Turkish border and a critic of the last
junta, was named army chief. Former Greek
strong man General loannidis was not included in
the purge, but there is speculation that he will be
forced to retire by being passed over in the next
round of military promotions.
Anti-US Sentiment
Turkish military successes on Cyprus have
sparked an upsurge in anti-American sentiment in
both Greece and Cyprus. Demonstrations have
now been banned in both countries, but not
before US Ambassador Davies' life was taken in
an attack on the US embassy in Nicosia and
serious threats were marIP against the security of
the US base on the Greek island of Crete.
The attack in Nicosia was apparently
planned�possibly by the right-wing EOKA-B ter-
rorist group�and there are indications that one
purpose of the violent demonstration was to kill
Ambassador Davies. While marine guards and
local security forces confronted demonstrators
who set a fire within the compound, a machine
gun located in a building across from the embassy
raked the ambassador's office. The ambassdor and
a secretary were killed in a corridor outsIde the
ambassador's office where they had sought
refuge.
Soviet Political Reaction
The Soviets are trying to square their in-
terest in a unified and independent Cyprus free of
NATO links with their desire to avoid alienating
Turkey. As a result, they have not committed
themselves to meaningful support for any of the
contending parties.
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Demonstrators hurl objects at embassy building
Moscow has not openly criticized Ankara
because it does not want to risk damaging its
longer term interests in Turkey: unhindered
passage through the straits, weakening of Tur-
key's ties with NATO, and a decline of US in-
fluence there. The Soviets have told the Turks
that they have three basic interests in the final
settlement for Cyprus:
� no US military bases to be allowed on
the island;
� no partition of Cyprus;
� continued Cypriot independence, what-
ever the form of government.
The imprecision of the third stipulation
appears designed to appeal to Ankara. Some form
of federation and a continued Turkish military
presence are not ruled out. In addition, Moscow's
public support for Makarios, whose return is
unacceptable to the Turks, has diminished con-
siderably during the last few weeks.
The Soviets have been chary about courting
the new regime in Athens. Rumors of Soviet-
Greek military cooperation notwithstanding, Mos-
cow has failed to give the Greeks any significant
support. The Soviets are, nevertheless, still
intrigued by the turn of events in Greece. They
have applauded Athens' decision to pull its troops
out of NATO, and over the longer term will
encourage its drift away from the US.
Moscow has been frustrated by its exclusion
from all significant diplomatic efforts to solve the
crisis. The Soviets hzve attempted�without
notable success�to get more involved through the
UN. Soviet press articles continue to demand a
greater role for the UN and to say that NATO hid
failed to settle the Cyprus problem because of
"ulterior motives." Soviet criticism of NATO will
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probably increase as the attempts to reconvene
the Geneva peace talks proceed.
Still, the Soviets can take heart from some
favorable developments, such as the fall of the
Greek military junta and the withdrawal of
Greece from NATO, which have been achieved at
no cost to them.
Military Situation
After a four-day Turkish advance across
Cyprus, both Greek and Turkish forces on the
island agreed to a cease-fire on August 16. The
Turks, however, continued their advance until
August 18 and took an area of high ground near
the N icosia-Larnaca road, which they had
declared as an "ancillary objective." Since then,
the cease-fire has held with a few minor excep-
tions.
The major Turkish objective of seizing the
northern third of Cyprus�along a line running
generally from Lefka through Nicosia to
Famagusta�was achieved shortly before the
cease-fire was implemented. The Turks' advance
had been expected to stop when it reached the
southernmost of the two major roads between
Nicosia and Famagusta on August 16, but their
forces continued toward the besieged Turkish
Cypriot enclave at Melousha. By August 18, the
Turks had captured the village of Pyroi, thus
gaining control of the important Nicosia-Larnaca
road. The southward advance finally stopped at
the village of Troulli just west of the British base
�at Dhekelia.
Prior to the cease-fire, the heaviest fighting
on Cyprus was north of the Nicosia airport, where
Turkish troops attempted to overrun the camp of
a 950-man regular Greek army contingent. The
Greeks repulsed the numerous attacks despite
heavy Turkish air and artillery strikes. Since the
cease-fire, there have been no reports of attacks
on the Greek camp.
On the mainland, the US defense attache in
Ankara reported that a convoy of at least 500
military vehicles moved southwest from Adapa-
zari toward Bursa on August 19. Some of the
trucks carried troops in battle dress, and others
were towing artillery pieces and transporting sup-
plies. The destination and purpose of the convoy
has not been determined.
Turkish Chief of Staff Sancar
We are in full control
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MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Territory Controlled
by Turkish forces
Kra:11a
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,Adapazarl
*Ankara
Larnaca
CYPRUS
LEBAN, N
SUES
CANAL
Famagusta
CYPRUS
UK Sovereign base area
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NILES
556451 8-74
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