BACKGROUND (NOTE FROM NIO9) AGENDA

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06902817
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 65
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2022
• Case Number: F-2017-01794
• Publication Date: February 5, 1981

Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
TABLE OF CONTENTS
BACKGROUND (NOTE FROM Nib)
AGENDA
TAB 1
TAB
2
TAB
3
TAB
4
TAB
5
TAB
6
TAB
7
TAB
8
TAB
9
TAB
10
TAB
11
Cuban Foreign Policy and Activities Abroad
Cuba Promoting Revolution in Latin America
El Salvador Talking PoinLs
Nicaragua Talking Points
Cuba and Caribbean instability
Jamaica Talking Points
Background Reading
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
BACKGROUND
1. Dick Allen plans to start the Caribbean portion
of the NSC meeting with a briefing on the nature of the
problem and perhaps the current US policy posture. He
apparently will address both the short-term threat in
El Salvador and Central America and the long-term char-
acter of the challenge, with emphasis on the opportunity
open to us through support of the Seaga Government in
Jamaica.
2. We are preparing some informal talking points
for Allen's staff for use at the meeting. We are also
providing, as requested by Allen, a Caribbean Basin Fact
Book and maps and a table regarding the situation in El
Salvador.
3. The plan is for Secretary Haig to follow Allen
with a rundown on the progress of several interdepartmental
groups (El Salvador, Nicaragua, Jamaica). The entire
meeting (including consideration of Poland) is to last
one hour, and is listed as "informational." Nonetheless,
Haig may present a list of key policy decisions that are
needed, perhaps in the form of options. While CIA has
attended most of the IG meetings, we have not been kept
informed on a timely basis on the character of the
recommendations to Secretary Haig. Generally speaking,
moreover, the meetings have been poorly organized (with
many too many representatives from State). Thus, CIA
has been able to present assessments of the situation
with only limited effectiveness as compared with the
meetings formerly held under NSC Staff auspices.
Jack Davis
NIO/LA
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
-
025
THE WHITE HOUSE
WA SS, NOVO N
Mowry S. 19$1
THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY Or TVE TREASURY
Tat SWEETARY Or MOM
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE COUNSELLOR TO TEE MAIDEN?
THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT
THE DIRECTOR, MICE OF muctittacr AND =CET
THE WRECTOR OF =TM. IIETELLICENCR
IRE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SUURCT: . National Security Council Meeting
Thera vtll be a meeting of the National Security Council at �
1:30 p. 1114. Friday, February 6. The meeting vial be infermatinaal
sad WI last oat hour. �
lbs evade for the meeting will includes
U. S. toticy - Caribbean Beata
-- U. S. Policy - Poland
-- Future Topics for ESC.Yleettinga
. Principals only are requested to be present.
/4.4.44441/f/r*
Richard V. Al en
V
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
"
5 February 1981
CUBAN FOREIGN POLICY AND ACTIVITIES ABROAD
The Castro regime's foreign policy is based on a combina-
tion of geography, ideology, and President Fidel Castro's
psychological makeup. Castro, as the supreme decisionmaker in
Cuba, is the primary architect of that policy. He sees Cuba as
a very small country with extremely limited resources trying to
exist in a superpower environment. To achieve his goal of
complete independence from the nearest superpower, he deliverately
chose to ally himself with a distant superpower that could provide
the political, economic, and military support needed to maintain
himself in power. This alliance suited him ideologically because
in his formative years he had accepted an interpretation of
history that emphasized the negative influence of capitalism on
the world. It was thus convenient for him to focus on Washington
as the source of all of Cuba's ills and, by extension, all the
world's ills as well. Driven by a burning desire to be a major
actor on the world stage, Castro--once he had "freed" Cuba--took
upon himself the task of freeing the rest of the world.
His own revolutionary experience in overthrowing his
predecessor taught him that violence is an inevitable element of
all true social revolutions. He reasons that the old order will
always fight to retain its privileges and can be overcome only
through violence. Once victory has been achieved, it is then
necessary to consolidate the rebels' gains by destroying all old
institutions--social as well as political, economic, and military--
and replacing them with new ones totally subservient to the new
leadership. He saw the defeats of Salvador Allende in Chile and
Michael Manley in Jamaica as proof that true revolutionary gains
for the masses could not be achieved through peaceful means. He
therefore is committed irrevocably to violent revolution--revolu-
tion that is aimed at destroying US influence worldwide.
In applying his theory of violent revolution, he no longer
maintains the belief that a guerrilla team in the field is
sufficient to precipitate the conditions necessary for its own
success. He learned from Che Guevara's defeat in Bolivia in 1967,
and now places much greater stress on exploiting opportunities as
they arise naturally. In effect, the Guevara debacle�the worst
in a long string of guerrilla defeats�signaled an end to nine
years of reckless Cuban behavior in Latin America.
In the decade after the Guevara debacle, Cuban foreign policy
concentrated on bridge building, overcoming the isolation result-
ing from the policy of the 1960s, and improving Cuban prestige
worldwide. This new gambit had the advantage of making Cuba--
because of its improved position in the Third World�more
valuable to Moscow, thereby increasing Havana's leverage in
obtaining the Soviet assistance needed to ease the impact of he
Castro regime's continuing domestic failures. It also caused
Castro's attention to shift to Africa where Cuba's commitment to
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
violent revolution seemed tailor-de for a continent in the
throes of independence: what had been rejected in Latin America
was welcomed in Africa. During this period, Castro developed the
policy of sending abroad technical assistance missions that con-
trasted sharply to the guerrilla teams that had been exported in
the 1960s. The aid program has succeeded so well that Havana now
has more than 2,500 medical personnel serving around the world
and eventually will have some 25,000 construction workers in
foreign countries.
Events in Angola opened up a new era in Cuban foreign policy.
The massive Cuban troop buildup there in 1975, in which the Cubans
assumed the major burden of combat from the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Angola, was not the result of previous planning and
coordination between Moscow and Havana. On the contrary, it was
a unilateral Cuban operation designed in great haste to rescue
the force of Cuban military advisers and technicians who were being
overrun by Angolan factions supported by Zaire and South Africa.
The ease of the Cuban victory there, however, led directly to
Castro's willingness to respond favorably when a similar opportunity
to demonstrate Cuban military prowess occurred in Ethiopia. The
latter was a clear cut case of Cuban readiness to serve as Soviet
Gurkhas; Cuban combat forces in Ethiopia were there primarily to
preserve Soviet--not Cuban--interests.
As opportunities in Africa faded at the end of the last
decade, events in Grenada, Nicaragua, and Suriname indicated to
Castro that it was time to turn again to Latin America. He now
sees this hemisphere, and Central America in particular, as the
scene of the most promising opportunities to promote revolution
and damage US influence. His revolutionary fervor is further
increased by what he believes is the real threat of direct US
action against Cuba. He traditionally has used "the export of
the revolution" as a defensive tactic during periods of greatest
pressure from the US, in effect, having Latin American revolu-
tionaries "defend" Cuba by diverting US attention to other areas.
He sees El Salvador as his first priority with Guatemala not far
behind; Honduras and even Costa Rica are also on his timetable.
He is meddling in a number of other countries in the hemisphere
as well but he probably views these operations as having little
more than nuisance value--at least for the moment.
Havana will continue to maintain large Cuban military missions
in Africa and will continue to try to expand its non-military
presence as a means of bolstering its leadership role in the
Nonaligned Movement. It will aslo try to develop further its ties
to oil-rich radical Arab countries, hoping to exploit them for
economic as well as political reasons. Unless the forces it is
supporting in Latin America receive some decisive setbacks, Havana
will not deviate from its present course, which stresses subversion
rather than normal diplomacy in the hemisphere. Its relations with
Moscow will grow ever warmer, driven by Cuba's need for massive
Soviet aid and the Castro regime's inability to make its economy
work. His economic problems may cause Castro to try to develop a
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
more favorable modus vivendi with the US, but he will never lose
his basic antipathy toward the US nor will he ever surrender what
he considers as his "right" to promote violent revolution.
3
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Promoting Revolution in Latin America
Latin America has been Castro's first and lasting interest and
therefore has provided the clearest image of the Cuban leader's revolu-
tionary fluctuations over the past two decades--the early quixotic forays,
the retrenchment after Guevara's death in 1967, and the emphasis on diplo-
matic relations during the early 1970s.
In 1977, the level of Cuban support to Latin American revolution-
aries was at a low; the impetus seriously to reappraise strategy toward
the area did not arise until 1979, when the Sandinista threat to Somoza
became substantive. The Sandinista example spurred Castro to promote
actively the development of strong, viable revolutionary vanguard move-
ments in Central and South America beginning in 1979. That summer he
told several high-level Latin American visitors that Nicaragua proved
that armed struggle was the only path to revolution. Cuban officials
also warned Communist Party leaders in Central America that they would
lose Cuba's support if their parties did not actively promote armed insur-
rection. On 26 July 1980 Castro made this point publicly and in stronger
terms than he had used for years. He said that "the experience of
Guatemala, El Salvador, Chile, and Bolivia teach us that there is no
formula other than revolutionary struggle."
Castro's personal involvement with Central American Communist party
leaders and revolutionary movements has been more intense over the past
five months than in any similar period in recent years. His optimism over
trends in El Salvador in early 1980 was tempered by the failure of the
rebels to achieve a quick victory. But rather than losing heart, he has
pressed even harder for a revolutionary triumph. He seems convinced that
if Salvadoran rebels are to succeed this year, they must do so before the
new administration in Washington has established itself and developed a
Salvadoran policy that is accepted as reasonable by moderate Latin American
governments.
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
At the same time, Castro has been trying to light a fire under the
Guatemalan guerrillas and to convince Honduran leftists that they must give
high priority to preparations for eventually launching their own revolu-
tion. In his fervor to promote revolution, he appears to be offering the
Guatemalan guerrillas more arms than they can presently use, and to be
pushing the Hondurans toward a revolution they still are far too weak and
disorganized to wage successfully. This seemingly undue haste does not
result from Havana's ignorance of the leftists' capabilities and weaknesses;
it is more attributable to impatience, a desire to maintain the revolution-
ary momentum, and an interest in diverting US attention away from Cuba
itself. The Castro regime's traditional paranoia, fed by the deterioration
in relations with the US after 1978, increased markedly following the
November elections in the US.
There is also growing evidence of increased Cuban support for
guerrilla movements in South America albeit at a lower level than Central
America. Training of Chilean and Argentine guerrillas appears to have
increased substantially beginning in early 1979 followed by a number of
attempts--mostly unsuccessful in Argentina--to reinfiltrate guerrillas.
Terrorist activity has revived in Chile and renewed infiltration attempts
are likely. Meanwhile, the MIR and Montoneros most likely will maintain
a high international profile supporting the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and
possibly involving themselves in guerrilla operations elsewhere in the
hemisphere.
Havana's involvement with the M-19 in Colombia is growing. It is
suspected of having played a role in the occupation of the Dominican
Embassy in Bogota in March 1980 and reportedly received a large number of
guerrillas for training in Cuba late last year. Revolutionaries from
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Bolivia, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Brazil were believed to be receiving
political and military training in Cuba or with the PLO in Lebanon as
recently as last year. Small numbers of guerrillas from each of these
countries reportedly have been or will be reinfiltrated to develop new
guerrilla cadre. Elsewhere in the hemisphere, Havana's support for sub-
versive movements is minimal.
Continued Involvement in Africa
Havana continues to expand its influence and presence in Africa
despite some occasional setbacks. Large numbers of Cuban troops are
likely to remain in both Ethiopia and Angola so long as a significant
external threat exists. Small Cuban military detachments are in a
number of other African countries; Havana believes this type of support
pays off politically. For example, some 150 Cuban counterinsurgency
experts reportedly arrived in Mozambique last month to assist the Machel
government deal with a growing insurgency.
Castro's successes in Africa are largely attributable to his
ability to anticipate the needs of developing countries and to respond
quickly with assistance. Cuba's serious economic problems have not
prevented many Sub-Saharan countries from viewing it as an attractive
development model. Havana's entree is also aided by its support for
liberation movements in the region, and by its longstanding opposition
to colonialism and apartheid.
Having established diplomatic relations with seven African states
during the past two years, Havana now has ties with 37 out of the 46
Sub-Saharan countries. In addition to assessing local conditions, this
diplomatic network identifies and cultivates groups sympathetic to the
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Castro regime--whether they are part of or opposed to the ruling govern-
ment. Moreover, Havana hopes to buttress its claims to be nonaligned by
establishing diplomatic relations with countries of differing ideologies.
Following the one-week visit to Havana last fall of Paulo Muwanga,
chairman of Uganda's ruling Military Commission, Cuba and Uganda signed
an agreement on scientific and technical cooperation. Cuba sent 20 health
and agricultural specialists to Uganda and granted 200 scholarships to
Ugandan students for study on the Isle of Youth, where thousands of African
and Latin American children already are enrolled in work-study programs.
Although Muwanga's visit also sparked rumors of the imminent arrival of
Cuban troops, none are yet known to have arrived. The expected reduction
or removal of Tanzanian forces following the recent Ugandan elections,
however, could result in the introduction of some Cuban military advisers.
Havana expects to open an embassy in the Seychelles shortly. A
small number of Seychellois students already are attending school in Cuba,
and Victoria has agreed to accept a few Cuban doctors. Responding to
domestic pressure, President Rene thus far has refused to accept Cuban
armed forces personnel.
In recent months, Cuba has attempted to shore up relations with
some of its established African allies by playing host to a number of
high-ranking delegations and by signing several protocols increasing
bilateral cooperation. The foreign ministers of Madagascar (Malagasy
Republic), Benin, and Sierra Leone recently visited Cuba, as did members
of Ethiopia's Central Committee and of the Cuba-Cape Verde Intergovern-
mental Committee. In August, Burundi signed a protocol for economic,
scientific, and technical cooperation, and two months later Guinea-
Bissau signed a similar agreement. The accession of Joao Bernardo Vieira
�
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
to the presidency in Guinea-Bissau may lead to even closer ties; as
Minister of Defense in 1978, Vieira received advance military training
in Cuba.
Cuban military and economic assistance, however, has not kept
some African countries, such as Sierra Leone and Guinea, from drifting
away. Sierra Leone, a longtime aid recipient, early last year expressed
dissatisfaction over the costs of maintaining a mission in Havana and
threatened to close its embassy there. The desire of Guinea's Sekou Toure
to play a greater role in the nonaligned movement and his seeming turn
toward the West have created other problems. Toure, for example, has cam-
paigned aggressively to get the nonaligned movement to condemn the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, a move that Havana has had to resist. Cuba
recently turned down a request for science and engineering teachers, but
did send some road construction crews and 35 instructors for the Guinean
fishing school. Although Toure has moderated his Western tilt, his drive
for influence in the NAM could generate further frictions with Havana.
Gabon, never a close ally of the Castro regime, broke relations
last August, partly because Cuban diplomats were in contact with Gabonese
students. Libreville also views the sizeable Cuban presence in Angola as
potentially threatening. Havana is concerned that Libreville's move could
provoke other African leaders to charge Cuba with meddling in their diplo-
matic affairs or encourage them to protect the Cuban presence in Angola
and Ethiopia.
The Cubans also suffered a minor setback in Sudan recently, when
one of their diplomats arrived unexpectedly in Khartoum with the announced
intention of opening an embassy. The Sudanese suspected that the "diplo-
mat"--who had been forced to leave his post in Mexico City in 1972 after
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
a shooting indicident--was actually an intelligence operative. They
declared him persona non grata, and he left shortly thereafter.
Political Action Activities
The Castro regime uses cultural and informational exchanges and
contacts to introduce and expand its influence abroad. These activities
are part of a multifaceted yet carefully coordinated mechanism designed
to promote Cuban policies and undercut US influence worldwide. The mech-
anism is extremely complex and involves elements of the party, the govern-
ment, mass organizations, commercial and cultural entities, front groups,
and the regime's subversion apparatus, yet it is still flexible enough to
make allowances for national and regional differences as well as for
class distinctions in each country.
The main goals of these efforts are:
To raise the political consciousness of the masses
through propaganda.
To create political structures through which the masses
can be motivated and mobilized to suppport--wittingly
or unwittingly--Cuban policy goals.
To train revolutionary cadres to provide leadership.
Moreover, cultural exchanges and contacts provide the Cubans with a channel
through which they can identify cooperative intellectuals who can be useful
in propaganda operations; activists in labor unions, youth groups, and
women's and farmers' organizations who might profit from training and
indoctrination in special schools in Cuba; and potential agents for intelli-
gence collection and operations.
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Radio Broadcasts
Radio Havana, Cuba's shortwave broadcasting service, transmits over
355 program hours per week in eight languages to all points of the world.
This service uses eight transmitters located near Bauta, outside Havana;
since May 1979 it has also been relayed on several shortwave frequencies
from transmitter sites in the USSR.
Cuba also has mediumwave Spanish-language and English-language
broadcasts to the Caribbean nightly over "La Voz de Cuba," a network of
high-powered transmitters located in different parts of Cuba.
Prensa Latina
As the press agency of the Cuban Government, Prensa Latina combines
news gathering and intelligence collection with propaganda dissemination
and intelligence operations.
Prensa Latina has 36 field offices around the world and numerous
stringers. In addition to its press tranmissions to subscribers in all
parts of the world, Prensa Latina disseminates a number of publications
and places material in a variety of other foreign publications.
Front Groups
Havana sees its role in the Third World largely as that of an
organizer and then a catalyst of revolution with the successful comple-
tion of the former being a prerequisite for the success of the latter.
The Cubans either join existing groups and try to influence them from
within or, where formal structures are lacking, establish new organiza-
tions. To counter the influence of the Interamerican Press Association,
for example, they formed the Federation of Latin American Journalists,
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
with non-Cubans in the leadership to mask Cuban involvement. In Decem-
ber 1977, Cuban labor officials were instrumental in organizing the
First Caribbean Trade Union Conference which was attended by some 40
regional labor delegations.
Sports Competition and Cultural Events
Cuba places considerable importance on fielding large and usually
formidable sports teams for virtually all regional games where they can
arrange an invitation. The Castro regime not only sends impressive dele-
gations to cultural events elsewhere in the region, it also plays host
where appropriate. Havana was the site of the 11th World Festival of
Youth and Students in the summer of 1978, and entertained delegations
from some 140 countries or political entities.
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
_SEG-ReT"
5 February 1981
EL SALVADOR TALKING POINTS
Current Situation
1. The situation is reverting to patterns prevailing prior to
the January insurgent offensive but with higher levels of
violence.
The Salvadoran military appears to be resuming a
defensive posture; not having the resources to mount
simultaneous operations against the several large
concentrations of guerrillas in the country.
The left paid
its offensive
selective hit
a costly but not prohibitive price for
thrust and now is carrying out more
and run attacks on military and economic
targets--the sabotage of 56 electrical towers this
week is but one example.
Widening military operations by the insurgents pose
the danger that indiscriminate government counter-
measures will enable the guerrillas to boost recruit-
ment.
2. The insurgents at some point will renew more widespread
assaults, the timing dependent in part on the advice and
arms flow from Cuba and Nicaragua.
a. The Sandinistas apparently stepped up arms deliveries
in the past week or so
are also fostering the
tions to build leftist
but both Havana and Managua
concept of political negotia-
legitimacy and deflect some
of the international pressure being directed against
them.
,S.E,G-RET
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
.S.F.GRET"
3'
The Salvadoran insurgents have a demonstrated ability to
coordinate countrywide assaults and are acquiring the
experience to employ their sophisticated weaponry more
effectively.
a. Guerrillas still number 3-4,000.
b. Lacking broad popular support, they are attempting
to bring the economy and government to a halt.
4. The Salvadoran military believes it can contain the present
levels of guerrilla activity--but it cannot reduce the
magnitude of guerrilla operations in the near term.
5. Although the government has been able to deny mass popular
support to the insurgents, it continues to have no real
backing outside the military and the still narrowly based
Christian Democrats.
6. Junta President Duarte is the most able politician in the
country, but he is detested by business and distrusted by
most military.
a. Given the increasingly rightist cast to the military
leadership, any progress Duarte makes will be pain-
stakingly slow.
The Diplomatic Offensive
1. Junta President Duarte has laid plans for a more aggressive
campaign, both against the Nicaraguan Government, regionally,
and internationally.
2
_�.F.GREIr
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
2. These efforts suffer several weaknesses.
a. Duarte still probably hopes the US and Venezuela will
apply the principal pressure on Nicaragua.
b. Limited financial and manpower resources repeatedly
curtail plans
c. Even if it had the resources, the government would
still face a major task and one of the principal
problems is the widely held--and accurate--perception
of indiscriminate security force violence.
1. The failure to take action against right-wing
terrorists and the fact that the military frequently
operates outside civilian control provides unending
incidents and damaging publicity. This officially
condoned terrorism is the bedrock of the govern-
ment's problem.
3
_SECRET"
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
SECRET '
5 February 1981
NICARAGUA TALKING POINTS
A. During the past 18 months, Nicaragua and Cuba have coordi-
nated support activities in support of Salvadoran revolu-
tionaries, including the shipment of arms and materiel, the
provision of training and safehaven, propaganda, and stra-
tegic advice. Our evidence is abundant.
1. In Novmeber, arms transfers from Nicaragua--by land via
Honduras, by sea across the Gulf of Fonseca, and
especially by air from remote Papalonal airstrip--were
sharply increased.
2. Despite Nicaraguan denials, clandestine arms flights
have continued during the past two weeks, and Havana and
Managua
probably attempting to transfer as much insurgency as
possible before US pressure forces a lower profile.
3. We anticipate only a temporary and perhaps partial
standdown.
B. The immediate objective should be to persuade the Sandinistas
to halt the weapons deliveries by escalating the political
and economic costs to Nicaragua.
1. Take steps to contribute to the international isolation
of the Nicaraguan Government.
a. Present evidence
of Nicaraguan support for the Salva-
doran insurgency.
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
.JSEGREPIP"
b. Undertake a propaganda campaign highlighting
Nicaraguan support for revolutionaries and terror-
ists, restrictions on freedom of expression,
militarization, etc.
2.
C. Negative Aspects
1. While these measures may force the Sandinistas to cut
back on their support activities, we would expect them
to resume their aid to Salvadoran insurgents as soon
as circumstances permit.
2. The Nicaraguan Government will charge the US with
economic aggression, and this charge will readily be
accepted by some Latin American governments--for
example, Mexico and Panama.
2
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
.gEG�it�Elr
3. The Sandinistas will crack down on the private sector
and political dissidents.
4. Any economic sanctions will fall most heavily on the
Nicaraguan private sector, the group we have been trying
to support.
5. US investments in Nicaragua might be nationalized
without compensation, and Nicaragua could default on
repaying its foreign debt.
6. Barring Nicaraguan exports, and embargoing selected US
exports, would be temporarily disruptive, but alter-
native markets and suppliers could be found within two
years.
7. Revealing convincing evidence of Nicaraguan involvement
will jeopardize intelligence sources.
3
Approved for for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Briefing Note for the DCI for
NSC Meeting _on the Caribbean
6 February_1981
CUBA AND CARIBBEAN INSTABILITY
1. For the most part, the instability that threatens US interests
in Central America and the Caribbean generally is deeply rooted in
domestic problems.
a. Traditional elites are wearing thin and are increasingly
unable to meet the needs and command the respect of the population.
The governing ability of the traditional leadership generally is small
to modest. The problem and popular demands are large and growing.
b. A new generation of more potent radical groups looks to
Cuba for assistance in their drive to power through insurrection
(in Central America) and political action (in the Caribbean Islands).
2. And Cuba delivers, especially in Central America.
a. Keeps them going with pocket money when they are weak.
b. Strengthens them with training and arms as they show
potential.
c. As in Nicaragua, orchestrates the showdown with major
military assistance.
3. Castro also works to weaken governments through diplomatic,
propaganda, and intelligence operations.
4. In conclusion, for the most part Castro exploits rather than
creats the instability. But Cuban aid does affect the potency and degree
of success of radical groups. Thus, to a considerable extent Castro's
activities shape the pace and seriousness of the challenge to US interests.
CUBA'S MOTIVES FOR INTERVENTION
1. This is a bedrock policy,, which is not likely to be abandoned
except under extraordinary and continued US pressure--though the tempo
and intensity of support to radicals does vary with Castro's sense of
opportunity and US and other pressures.
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
2. From Havana's point of view, intervention
a. Enhances Cuban security by strengthening revolutionary
forces and boxing in the US ability to isolate and punish Cuba.
b. Feeds Castro's ego--in his self-chosen role as world-class
champion of revolutionary causes and crusader against imperialistic
forces.
c. Supports Soviet interests.
d. Helps avoid facing up to horrendous domestic problems.
CONSTRAINTS
1. There are no substantial domestic constraints.
2. The Soviets support Castro's policies, especially in Central
America, but probably are somewhat concerned that Castro could provoke
a forceful US response that would set back revolutionary momentum and
threaten Cuba directly and thereby pose difficult choices for Moscow.
3. The only potential major constraint is Cuban fear of US
retaliation. This cuts two ways, however.
a. Especially under President Reagan, the Cuban leadership
does fear US punitive measures.
b. Yet some hardline advisors recommend that best way to
protect Cuba is to trap and bleed US in a Central American "Vietnam".
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
.SEC-RET
5 February 1981
JAMAICA TALKING POINTS
A. Prime Minister Seaga, elected in a landslide last October that
gave him 51 of the 60 seats in parliament, inherited an empty
treasury and a staggering $1.4 billion foreign debt.
1. Since assuming office, Seaga has moved rapidly to impose
tight management on public spending and to implement an
ambitious three-year recovery program.
2. Seaga is keying his efforts to early conclusion of a
three-year loan from the IMF expected to total $570
million; he is also mustering a campaign to revive
domestic and foreign private sector investment.
3. Even with a complete drawdown of IMF funds and re-
scheduling of the commercial debt, Jamaica will still
be $250 million short of financing to achieve its op-
timistic 2-percent growth target.
4. Unemployment (estimated at 35 percent and probably
steeper in the urban slums) is an urgent problem for
Seaga; however, it is expected to remain high through
1981;
5. After eight years of negative real growth under Manley,
Jamaica suffers from a drop in real per capita income
of over 25 percent, a drain on foreign exchange to de-
fray sharply escalating oil bills, and the consequences
of the emigration of about 40 percent of the professional
class.
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
..arratrr
B. Seaga has made an encouraging start in bridging immediate
gaps but he will need substantial outside assistance over
the longer term.
1. To translate his popularity into a lasting mandate,
Seaga will have to show results soon if he is to meet
the high expectations of his followers.
2. Signs are that the "honeymoon" may be short and that
the island's powerful trade unions might resist any
further cuts in real wages under an anticipated IMF
austerity program.
3. Strains in Seaga's labor-based government will be ex-
ploited by both the legitimate opposition and the
small core of violence-prone radicals who stand to
gain at his expense.
4. Any increase in violence would tax Jamaica's poorly-
equipped and overworked security forces, which continue
to battle scattered lawlessness on the island.
- 2 -
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
.SEreRET
� 3 �
.�.F.GRET
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
 Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
(b)(
(b)(
1)
3)
6;7
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
(b
(b
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
pproved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
(b)(1
(b)(3
)
)
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
 Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
 Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
 Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
 Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
 Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
(b)
(b)
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
I H,E
F;cM Nt.ME,;�DDPESS. AND HO ND.
(Security Classification)
CONTROL NO. SC-01309-81
Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:
Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Copy 6
sa-er
(SeGuilty ClassifiGation)
.7 /
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Sik-itrr
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
5 February 1981
MEMORANDUM
WARNING NOTICE. BECAUSE OF THE EXTREME SENSITIVITY OF THE SOURCES,
NO DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS REPORT MAY BE MADE
TO PERSONS OTHER THAN THOSE DESIGNATED AS ADDRESSEES, WITHOUT AUTHORI-
ZATION OF THE ORIGINATOR. UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE COULD PLACE THE
SOURCES IN JEOPARDY AND SEAL OFF THEIR ACCESS TO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.
El Salvador--International Sup or t for the Insurgency (U)
Summary
Cuba and Nicaragua are coordinating an international network to supply
military weapons and equipment to insurgents in El Salvador. This pipeline,
coupled with training and advice for Salvadoran leftists, constitutes the major
thrust of an overall effort by Cuba and its allies to promote revolution
throughout Central America.
For a year and a half, the supply network has transported by air, sea, and
land tons of weapons provided by Cuba, Nicaragua, the Soviet bloc, the PLO, and
Libya, as well as quantities purchased on the international arms market. The
materiel is channeled primarily through Nicaragua, although other Central
American countries�particularly Costa Rica�periodically serve as transit
points. Cuba and Nicaragua also have provided the guerrillas with training and
advice on strategy and tactics and have helped unify the disparate insurgent
groups.
This memorandum was prepared by the Latin America Division of the Office
of Political Analysis and coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer
for Latin America and the Clandestine Services. Information available as of 1
February 1981 has been included in this memorandum. Questions and comments
should be addressed to Chief, Latin America Division
PA-M-8 1-1 0 053CX
SC-U1 309-81
DERIVATIVE ct. BY
D DECL REM ON 5 Feb 01
DERIVED FRONTultiple sources ,
.�.Frearir
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
�SEC-RET
Last fall Nicaragua began flying arms
directlu to guerrillas in El Salvador.
In addition, materiel continues to be shipped 7.n smatk boats
across the Gulf of Fonseca and overland through Honduras.
Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Soviet bloc countries also have been successful
in promoting international political support for the guerrilla cause by lobby-
ing at international forums and with individual countries, by providing direct
political training and guidance, and by a worldwide propaganda effort.
Regionally, Mexico has established contact with various elements of the
Salvadoran opposition and probably would break relations with the junta if the
prospects for a leftist victory improve dramatically. This would contribute
significantly to the growing international standing of the insurgent cause.
Former President of Venezuela Carlos Andres Perez also has helped boost inter-
national support for the guerrillas by inhibiting Caracas' backing for the
junta and by lobbying effectively throughout the region and within the Socialist
International (ST).
Political support from the SI, from West European public opinion, and
through Socialist and Social Democratic Party connections has enhanced the
guerrillas' international legitimacy and inhibited West European governments
from supporting the junta. These nations generally do not perceive their
political and economic interests in El Salvador as sufficient to challenge the
current of public opinion backing the Salvadoran left. .
Military Support
Over the past 18 months we have received conclusive evidence
of official Cuban and Nicaraguan clandestine assistance to Salva-
doran revolutionaries in the form of training, transit, materiel,
and arms. Weaponry provided by a number of Communist and Third
World countries has been channeled via Cuba to Nicaragua, then
infiltrated directly into El Salvador or by way of Honduras or
Costa Rica. Both Havana and Managua have furnished training to
Salvadoran insurgents, and both have been host to meetings called
to coordinate support efforts by Communist parties in the region.
The Panamanian Government also has participated in arms traffick-
ing in support of the Salvadoran revolutionaries, and the Costa
Rican Government has tolerated gunrunning activities in its terri-
tory.
2
ffif.f-Rer
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Setting Up the Cuban/Nicaraguan Support Mechanism. Shortly
after the Sandinistas came to power in Nicaragua in mid-1979, the
support network used during their insurgency was mobilized to
assist the extreme left in El Salvador. Under the direction of
the Cuban Embassy in Managua, training camps for Salvadoran insur-
gents were established in Nicaragua, with instruction provided by
Cubans, Nicaraguans, and other Latin American leftists. During
the last half of 1979, small quantities of arms and materiel were
infiltrated into El Salvador from Nicaragua--by land via Honduras,
by sea across the Gulf of Fonseca, and by air using various routes.
In addition, some Nicaraguan and other volunteers joined the
guerrillas in El Salvador.
As the support effort grew, Havana and Managua expanded their
activities in Costa Rica early last year. By late summer, however,
exposure of the supply network prompted Havana and Managua to
relocate most of their operations in Nicaragua.
Stepping Up the Arms Flow. Captured guerrilla documents
outline the efforts of Salvadoran revolutionary leaders last
summer to secure additional commitments of foreign material.
According to these documents, Vietnam pledged 60 tons of materiel,
and several Soviet bloc countries and Ethiopia also promised large
amounts of weapons and combat support equipment to the Unified
Revolutionary Directorate (DRU).
Most--if not all--of these supplies are transiting Cuba
enroute to Nicaragua for eventual delivery to El Salvador. Since
last September
a sharply augmented flow of military equipment
to Nicaragua
3
.aE�G�ftET"
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
_,5.1'ae:-i.?.�rlr
4
,SF.GaE"T
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
.S.rir,ak`�rir
The stepup in the arms flow to the Salvadoran insurgents was
part of a well coordinated effort orchestrated by Havana to boost
support for Central American revolutionaries in general. Consider-
ing increased external aid essential to the continuation of the
insurgency, Cuba sought improved coordination of support activi-
ties by leftist groups in the region.
The Nicaraguan Airlift. Subsequently, Nicaragua--at Havana's
urging--took a more direct role in delivering arms and materiel to
the Salvadoran left.
5
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Recent information indicates that Papalonal airstrip was
lengthened and new hanaars and parkina aprons were constructed
late last year.
Infiltration by Sea and Land. The Sandinistas also use a sea
infiltration route. Small launches operating out of several
Nicaraguan Pacific ports traverse the Gulf of Fonseca at night,
carrying arms, ammunition, and personnel. The boatloads of
guerrillas who landed on El Salvador's southeastern coast last
month almost certainly came from Nicaragua.
In addition, overland arms shipments throuah Honduras probably
have increased in recent months.
6
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Training. Close cooperation between Managua and Havana
extends to training programs for Central American revolutionaries.
Basic instruction is frequently given in Nicaragua with more
soohisticated courses tauaht in Cuba
Salvadoran and other Central American leftists are shuttled
between Managua and Havana
small groups of Salvadorans
return from Havana to Managua by air, presumably to infiltrate
into El Salvador.
Moreover, in December the Cuban Government distributed a form
to young people in Cuba, asking for volunteers to serve in Nicara-
gua and El Salvador; the form was similar to one circulated several
years ago for service in Angola and Ethiopia. Many young people
feel obliged to volunteer in order to progress in their careers.
Havana probably would not
contribute large numbers of Cuban troops or Cuban paramilitary
volunteers to the Salvadoran insurgency, unless the guerrillas
seize a portion of El Salvador and set up an internationally
7
_S_Er-R-Wr
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
recognized government, or unless the guerrillas were on the verge
of a military victory. Havana might be tempted, however, to
commit small numbers of Cuban volunteers in piecemeal fashion to
strengthen the ranks of guerrilla units in which the Cuban leader-
ship had confidence. The burgeoning Cuban presence in Nicaragua
may be connected to the support network for the Salvadoran insur-
gents, however, and the possibility of direct Cuban intervention
cannot be ruled out entirely.
Costa Rica. Nicaraguan and Cuban operations in Costa Rica
have included the establishment of training bases for Salvadoran
insurgents and international volunteers, weapons transfers, and
other support activities. These operations have enjoyed the
participation of numerous Costa Rican citizens, including not only
many private profiteers but also members of President Carazo's
cabinet and immediate family--motivated by monetary considera-
tions--and ideological sympathizers eager to see the Nicaraguan
model extended throughout the region.
Arms frequently have been transferred from Costa Rica to El
Salvador over the past year, utilizing the network already estab-
lished during the Nicaraguan revolution.
By last fall, press reports and a Costa Rican congressional
investigation had exposed much of the support network, forcing the
Cubans and Nicaraguans to relocate and restructure their opera-
tions. By November, a more sophisticated and extensive network
had been established in Nicaragua, also diminishing the spotlight
on Costa Rica.
Nonetheless, Costa Rica remains fertile ground for clandes-
tine support activities. The combined Civil and Rural Guards--the
only armed authority in Costa Rica--are small, vulnerable to
corruption, and divided among several ministries. Their limited
investigative and search capabilities are no deterrent to gun-
runners who use with virtual impunity the porous borders, sparsely
populated regions, and hundreds of remote airstrips. As witnessed
in the earlier Nicaraguan support effort, the ebbs and flows of
such activity in Costa Rica can be at once rapid and large-scale
in response to changing circumstances.
8
.5.B.C.RET
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
SQT
Panama. Panama has only intermittently provided material
assistance to the Salvadoran revolutionaries, and Panamanian
strongman Omar Torrijos generally favors political negotiations
rather than the Cuban strategy of violent revolution. Torrijos,
however, will authorize the use of Panamanian territory and the
involvement of National Guard officers for occasional small-scale
support to the Salvadoran left. Torrijos believes such actions
are necessary to maintain his credentials with the revolutionaries,
primarily in order to serve as a possible bridge in future negotia-
tions.
In addition, the National Guard has provided communications
training and facilitated the acquisition of radio pauinment for
one of the Salvadoran insurgent groups. F
The National Guard also collaborates with the Cuban Embassy
in Panama City in facilitating the transit of Salvadoran and other
Central American leftists to and from Cuba.
The Soviet Union. Soviet material support for the insurgency
in El Salvador has been indirect. For example, the USSR promised
and probably has provided the insurgents with arms via East Europe.
Moreover, the modern weapons furnished to the Sandinista People's
Army by the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries have
freed Western arms in the Nicaraguan inventory for transfer to El
Salvador.
9
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
JSF-C-Rte'T
Moscow also has provided advice and encouragement to the
insurgency, both publicly and privately, particularly via the
Salvadoran Communist Party.
The Palestine Liberation Organization and Libya. Palestinian
fedayeen groups and the Libyan Government reportedly have furnished
trainina and small arms to Salvadoran leftists. Since early 1980,
small numbers of Salvadorans
have been trained in military tactics in PLO camps in Lebanon,
Libya, and South Yemen. The PLO Air Force advisers currently
providing flight instruction to Sandinista pilots in Nicaragua may
be working with Salvadorans. In addition, over the past few
months Libya and various fedayeen groups have sent small arms and
explosives to Cuba for transshipment to El Salvador.
Political Support
If the military efforts of the Salvadoran insurgents do not
succeed in the short term, international political support for
their cause could provide the critical element for victory over
the longer term by legitimizing their use of violence as well as
the military contributions of their foreign backers. As is the
case with military aid, the most direct contributions of inter-
national political support come from Cuba, Nicaragua, the Soviet
Union, and the Communist bloc countries. Within the region,
political backing is provided by influential Latin American
leaders, such as former Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez,
and by governments in Mexico and Panama. West European support,
particularly that of the Socialist International, has an espe-
cially important effect in internationally legitimizing the
guerrilla effort.
Cuba, Nicaragua, Soviet Union, Communist Bloc. Cuba, Nicara-
gua, the Soviet Union, and other bloc countries manage a worldwide
propaganda campaign in support of the Salvadoran insurgency and
against the junta. The Cuban press agency, Prensa Latina, has 36
field offices around the world, plus stringers elsewhere. In
addition to the wire service and its own publications, Prensa
Latina places material in foreign publications and engages in
other propaganda activities. Radio Havana broadcasts worldwide in
various languages, including some Latin American Indian dialects.
Vast amounts of material are disseminated from Havana, and Cuba
covertly manages foreign publications that promote revolutionary
efforts, such as the periodical Tricontinental, voice of the Latin
American, African, and Asian Solidarity Organization.
10
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
The Soviet and Eastern bloc propaganda efforts also operate
worldwide, in the same fashion and to the same end. These coun-
tries manipulate the Communist-dominated International Organiza-
tion of Journalists just as Cuba does the Latin American Federa-
tion of Journalists. Havana and Moscow also control individually
a number of influential international journalists and cultivate
others.
Within Central America, Nicaragua's Radio Sandino and San-
dinista publications, including the newspaper Barricada, promote
the Salvadoran revolutionary cause. Nicaragua also acts as host
to the clandestine Salvadoran Radio Liberacion, while Cuba probably
provides most of the equipment and technical guidance.
A second form of political support involves the Cuban and
Soviet efforts to promote the insurgent cause at international
forums, with individual governments, and among foreign intellec-
tuals. Cuba has an extensive, efficient network for introducing
and promoting representatives of the Salvadoran left all over the
world. Havana and Moscow also bring indirect pressure on govern-
ments worldwide to support the Salvadoran revolutionaries by
mobilizing local Communist groups.
A third and more direct form of political support is pro-
vision of political training, materials, advice, and false docu-
ments for Salvadoran opposition leaders. This does not appear to
include extensive financial aid beyond training expenses and free
transportation for those who can make their way to Managua or
Mexico City. Salvadoran Communists and guerrilla leaders have
closely patterned political organizations after the Cuban models.
Mexico. Aside from Cuba and Nicaragua, no Latin American
nation has offered open political support to the Salvadoran insur-
gents. Mexico is the leading candidate of major status to break
those ranks. The Lopez Portillo government's decision to sever
relations with Nicaraguan President Somoza in 1979 gave the
Sandinistas one of their most significant boosts in international
legitimacy. The trend toward Mexican advocacy of the Salvadoran
opposition could have equally significant impact there. The
Mexicans are hesitant, however, and may wait for more decisive
indications of leftist ascendancy before making a definitive break
with the junta.
Most of Mexico's efforts to :establish channels of communica-
tion and influence with the Salvadoran guerrillas have been through
11
.a1:-C44+711",
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
.S.F.40-R�eT
the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and its new
regional political creation, the Permanent Conference of Latin
American Political Parties (COPPPAL). PRI leaders, including
perhaps the party president, have had personal contact with
Salvadoran guerrillas, their representatives, and nonguerrilla
opposition figures like Guillermo Ungo. COPPPAL's influence in
the region is questionable, but its prestige is enhanced by par-
ticipation of such former heads of state as Jamaica's Michael
Manley, Venezuela's Carlos Andres Perez, and Costa Rica's Daniel
Oduber. COPPPAL and some representatives of the left wing of the
PRI have condemned repression by the Salvadoran security forces
and voiced support for Ungo's National Revolutionary Movement
(MNR).
The Mexican Government, meanwhile, has clearly put distance
between itself and the Salvadoran junta for over a year. It is
still too uncertain about the relative strengths of the contending
forces in El Salvador to break completely with the junta. Never-
theless, it has allowed the Salvadoran opposition increasing
access to Mexican Government-controlled media; permitted demonstra-
tions, international propagandizing, and other solidarity activities;
and consented to meetings in Mexico City of FDR leaders. The
government believes these tactics reassure its own domestic left
and bolster its revolutionary credentials.
Mexican leaders probably believe that events are moving them
gradually toward a break with the junta. They judge that natural
forces are at work in El Salvador and these should be allowed to
come to a head, through violence if necessary. Although they pay
lip service to proposals for mediation and dialogue, the Mexicans
seem to prefer to stand above the fray, avoid involvement in
things that could become messy, and pontificate about noninterven-
tion and self-determination. Based on their experiences with
Mexican leftists and their relations with Cuba and Nicaragua,
Mexican leaders are confident they can co-opt any revolutionary
groups that emerge as victors in El Salvador.
Carlos Andres Perez of Venezuela. If Mexico seems likely to
become the most prominent government in the region to extend
political support to the Salvadoran left, former President Carlos
Andres Perez of Venezuela already is the most important individual
in the hemisphere to promote the same cause. Although out of
office for two years, Perez remains a powerful figure in Venezuela,
in the region, and among the Latin contingent of the Socialist
International. He apparently has frequent contact with various
12
..SF-GRET"
�
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
.SgQ�ittIF
representatives of elements of the Salvadoran left and travels
about the region working on their behalf, lobbying effectively
with presidents, ex-presidents, and others.
Perez exerts great influence on public opinion in Venezuela,
and he controls much of Democratic Action (AD), the country's
leading opposition party and pivotal bloc within the congress.
The constraints he imposes on the efforts of the Venezuelan Govern-
ment and the ruling Social Christian Party (COPEI) to aid the
Salvadoran junta represent one of his most important contributions
to the Salvadoran insurgency. Accusations by Perez and AD that
the government and COPEI are supporting the junta and Salvadoran
Christian Democracy at the expense of other forms of democracy
have enmeshed policy toward El Salvador in a wider and increas-
ingly bitter partisan rivalry in Venezuela.
Perez is convinced that the revolution in Nicaragua was a
good thing and equally convinced that he played a major role in
bringing it to pass. He views the rest of Central America in the
same light, sees few real distinctions among the four northern
tier countries, and wants to be a leader on the side of change
throughout the region.
In El Salvador, Perez advocated through most of 1980 a
negotiated solution with a new, expanded junta built around pro-
gressive army Colonel Majano and including such representatives of
the left as MNR leader Ungo. He agrees with Panamanian leader
Torrijos that progressive elements of the armed forces should be
preserved, while such rightists as junta members Colonels Gutierrez
and Garcia should be purged.
Perez insists he is actively supporting the revolutionary
left in El Salvador in order to preempt Fidel Castro. He meets
irregularly with Castro, whom he believes he can influence, and
claims that he otherwise avoids contact with Cubans.
Perez and Torrijos are in frequent contact and reinforce each
other's efforts in the region. As the practicability of the
"Majano solution" declined late in 1980, Perez and Torrijos
widened their efforts to involve and influence prominent Latin
American leaders. They also may have grown increasingly impatient
with the intransigence of Ungo and some guerrilla leaders, but
they have not yet changed their basic approach. Some of Perez's
AD colleagues on the other hand, may be rethinking their views on
El Salvador, which could moderate their opposition to Venezuelan
13
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
5..Ereatfi
Government support for the junta. At the same time, Perez is
increasing efforts to capitalize on his considerable influence
with the Latin American Committee of the Socialist International,
which has now become pivotal in his political support for the
Salvadoran left. The Latin contingent's denunciation of the junta
and advocacy of the Salvadoran FDR is a prime determinant of the
SI's decision to adopt that same position.
Panama and Costa Rica. Panama's support for the Salvadoran
opposition is more qualified than that of Perez. Torrijos believes
he is well suited to mediate between the armed forces and the
left. A graduate of the Salvadoran military academy, he has
maintained contacts over the years with many Salvadoran officers.
He has less affinity for the guerrillas than he did for Nicaragua's
Sandinistas, whom he aided but lost influence with after their
victory.
Nevertheless, he has worKea nara to
establish lines of contact with all elements of the left, and he
has enhanced his credibility with them by facilitating the transit
of arms and guerrillas through his country.
Torrijos proposes for El Salvador an alliance of the left and
the reformist military, with the civilian and military far right
isolated and emasculated. He believes his regime is an appro-
priate model. Convinced that the military institution must remain
intact, Torrijos has centered his strategy for the last year on a
government and army built around Majano.
In pursuit of this goal, Torrijos has aided the guerrillas
politically by providing advice and by pressing for inclusion of
the left in a reformed junta. Torrijos and his emissaries have
met with representatives of all ciroups, including the u
Majano, Ungo, and Gutierrez.
The ouster of Majano
from the junta in September 1980 set back Torrijos' effort, because
the Colonel's capacity to gain wide acceptance among either the
left or progressive officers is reduced.
Torrijos will continue to try to play a role and in the
process will aid the guerrillas to maintain his own influence. If
the left prospers in El Salvador, Torrijos will increase his
support on a parallel basis to gain a larger voice. In the event
of a leftist victory, he would adjust to the collapse of the armed
forces and attempt to befriend and gain influence with the revolu-
tionary regime.
14
.15-F-ZRe7
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
..S.E�Git"ET"
Western Europe and the Socialist International. The Salva-
doran left receives political support from Western Europe through
party connections with the Socialist International and with
individual European Socialist and Social Democratic parties. The
left also gains indirectly because of inhibitions on the part of
West European governments to support the Salvadoran junta.
Public opinion in Western Europe strongly opposes the junta
as a repressive, unpopular, rightwing regime that is too weak to
survive without substantial US military aid. Media coverage--
almost universally biased in favor of the Salvadoran opposition--
has contributed to widespread opposition to the junta and US
support for it. Other factors include:
Historical West European perceptions that Washington's
Latin American policy generally seeks to protect US
economic interests by supporting rightwing dictator-
ships.
Opposition by the Catholic Church.
Active and successful public relations campaigning by
(--"\ the Salvadoran FDR.
Inability of Salvadoran junta representatives to gener-
ate an effective public relations campaign.
West Europeans also generally do not share Washington's level
of concern about a "Cuban threat" to Central America. They would
be much more impressed by evidence that the leftist coalition had
less regard for human rights or less democratic potential than the
junta.
West European governments do not believe that their political
and economic interests in El Salvador are significant enough to
challenge public opinion, in spite of contradictory pressure from
their most important ally, the United States.
Nevertheless, all o
the governments have preferred not to take a stand.
15
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
�...EreatT
In the absence of decisive governmental policies, national
political parties have taken the lead on the issue of El Salvador.
Christian Democrats generally support the junta, which has major
participation by Salvadoran Christian Democrats including Presi-
dent Duarte. Socialist and Social Democratic parties have been
heavily influenced by the Socialist International's Latin American
members, who support their colleague, Salvadoran Guillermo Ungo.
The Western Europeans believe that Ungo's social democratic party
could significantly moderate the extremists in any future leftist
government.
The tendency of the SI's European leadership to defer to its
Latin American members in formulating a response to US policy on
El Salvador is consistent with its strategy for courting the Third
World. Moreover, the pleas by Salvadorans Ungo and Oqueli,
Dominican Pena Gomez, and Venezuelan Perez reinforce the instinct
of the European left to oppose US policies in Latin America.
16
_ISECREur
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817
SUBJECT: El Salvador--International Support for the Insurgency
Approved for Release: 2022/02/17 C06902817