DECLARATION OF LOUIS J. DUBE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06890970
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: March 28, 2024
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2024
• Case Number: F-2014-01142
• Publication Date: May 13, 1985

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
X
PENN T. KIMBALL,
Plaintiff,
versus CIVIL NO. 84-3795 (WK)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, et al.,
Defendants.
X
DECLARATION OF LOUIS J. DUBE
- LOUIS J. DUBE, being first duly sworn, does hereby declare
and say:
1. I am the Information Review Officer (IRO) for the
Directorate of Operations (DO) of the United States Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA or Agency). I was appointed to this
position in March 1981, and have held operational and executive
positions in the DO since 1952. As IRO, I am responsible for
the review of documents containing information originated by
the DO, or otherwise implicating DO and Agency interests, which
may be responsive to Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and/or
Privacy Act (PA) requests and ensuing litigation. As part of
such review, I am responsible for ensuring that determinations
concerning the release or withholding of such information and
concerning the disposition of such documents are proper. The
statements made herein are based upon my personal knowledge,
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upon information made available to me in my official capacity,
upon advice and counsel of the CIA Office of General Counsel,
and upon conclusions and determinations reached and made in
accordance therewith.
2. Through the exercise of my official duties, I have
become familiar with the Plaintiff's 29 May 1979 FOIA/PA
request for all records on himself and his 27 November 1982
FOIA request for all records available on Janet Fraser Kimball,
his deceased wife, and with the documents retrieved and treated
in response to those requests. In response to Plaintiff's
request, Defendant CIA conducted a thorough search for all
documents retrievable by searches under the names of the
Plaintiff and Janet Fraser Kimball. These searches resulted in
the retrieval of eighteen (18) CIA documents. Of these
eighteen (18) CIA documents, one (1) document was released in
full, fifteen (15) documents were released in part and two (2)
documents were denied in their entirety under designated FOIA
and PA provisions. Additionally, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) located two (2) FBI documents containing
CIA information, which were referred to the Agency. Some of
the CIA information in these two (2) FBI documents was also
withheld. In preparing this Declaration, I have carefully
reviewed these documents to determine which information could
be released to Plaintiff Kimball and which information must
continue to be withheld. As a result of this review, I have
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determined that certain information is exempt from disclosure
and must be withheld from the requester.
3. The purpose of this Declaration is to explain why
certain information contained in the documents retrieved in
response to the Plaintiff's requests, and at issue herein, is
exempt from disclosure under the FOIA and Privacy Act.
Furthermore, I will explain why the claimed FOIA and PA
exemptions apply to the information withheld from the Plaintiff.,
4. For the Court's and Plaintiff's ease of reference, this
Declaration will be divided into two sections. In the first
section, I will discuss the general types of information
contained within these documents, and withheld from Plaintiff,
and the application of the appropriate FOIA/PA exemptions to
such information. In the second section of this
Declaration--the Document Disposition Index--I will discuss the
information withheld on each individual document,
cross-referencing the justifications to the appropriate
explanatory paragraphs in the first section by means of the
Letter Code List preceding the Document Disposition Index. To
facilitate consideration of the deletions made on the CIA
documents that were released in redacted form, copies of those
documents are attached hereto in the Appendix with letter codes
identifying each deletion. By comparing the letter code of the
deletion to the Letter Code List, Plaintiff and the Court will
be able to see exactly what type of information is represented
by the deletion.
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5. While the Agency believes the above procedure will
adequately justify its actions, nonetheless the CIA is prepared
to submit a classified affidavit or to make the full-text
documents available for the Court's ex parte, in camera
consideration should the Court deem such a submission
appropriate.
6. As DO/IRO, I am responsible for the determinations set
forth in this Declaration. After carefully reviewing the
documents addressed herein, I have personally determined and
affirm that the information withheld from Plaintiff may not be
released because:
(a) The information is currently and properly
classified pursuant to Executive Order 12356 as
information requiring continued protection against
unauthorized disclosure. Thus such information is
exempt from release pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(1)
and Privacy Act exemption (k)(1);
(b) The information withheld, if released, could
reasonably be expected to lead to the unauthorized
disclosure of intelligence sources and methods that
the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible
for protecting against unauthorized disclosure as set
forth in 50 U.S.C. �403(d)(3). Thus, such information
is exempt from release pursuant to FOIA exemption
(b)(3) and Privacy Act exemption (j)(1); and/or
(c) Certain of the withheld information reveals facts
about the organization, functions, names, official
titles, or numbers of personnel employed by CIA, all
of which categories of information are encompassed
within 50 U.S.C, �403g. Thus, such types of
information are exempt from release pursuant to FOIA
exemption (b)(3) and Privacy Act exemption (j)(1).
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Classification--FOIA Exemption (b)(1);
Privacy Act Exemption (k)(1)
7. Exemption (b)(1) of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. �552(b)(1),
provides that the FOIA does not apply to matters that are:
(A) specifically authorized under criteria established
by an Executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of national defense or foreign policy and
(B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such
Executive order.
Exemption (k)(1) to the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. �552a(k)(1),
states that the head of any agency may promulgate rules to
exempt any system of records within the agency from disclosure
if the system of records is subject to the provisions of
5 U.S.C. �552(b)(1). In other words, an agency may exempt
classified information from disclosure under the Privacy Act.
The Director of the CIA has implemented exemption (k)(1) by
promulgating regulations at 32 C.F.R. �1901.71(a)(1), which
regulations exempt classified information from disclosure.
Thus, Privacy Act exemption (k)(1) is �the corollary to FOIA
exemption (b)(1). As will be discussed below, Defendant CIA
has invoked FOIA exemption (b)(1) and Privacy Act exemption
(k)(1) to justify withholding of certain classified information
at issue.
8. The authority of a CIA official to classify documents
is derived from a succession of Executive orders, the most
recent of which is Executive Order 12356 (47 Fed. Reg. 14874),
which became effective on 1 August 1982. Section 6.1(c) of
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that Order defines national security information as
"information that has been determined pursuant to this Order or
any predecessor order to require protection against
unauthorized disclosure and that is so designated." National
security information is synonymous with classified
information. Executive Order 12356, �1.1(a). The documents
that have been withheld, either in part or in their entirety,
because of the classified information contained therein, were
reviewed under the criteria established in Executive Order
12356. Thus, the standards of that Executive Order apply in
evaluating the Agency's claim of exemption under exemptions
(b)(1) and (k)(1).
9. As a senior CIA official and pursuant to a written
delegation of authority from the Director of Central
Intelligence, I hold original classification authority at the
TOP SECRET level. I, therefore, am authorized to conduct
classification reviews and to make original classification
decisions. With respect to the information for which
exemptions (b)(1) and exemption (k)(1) are asserted in this
case, I have reviewed personally the determinations under the
standards of Executive Order 12356 and have determined that
such information is currently and properly classified. I also
have determined that certain of these documents were properly
classified under predecessor classification Executive orders
and that these documents or segments of documents retain their
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classified status at the CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET levels pursuant
to Executive Order 12356.
10, Initially, I have determined that the kinds of
information contained in the various documents concern one or
more of the following general categories of classifiable
information set forth in section 1.3(a)(4) of Executive Order
12356:
(a) Information that would reveal the identity of an
intelligence source or disclose an intelligence
method; or
(b) Information that would reveal intelligence
activities and interests of the CIA.
I have determined further that unauthorized disclosure of
this information, either by itself or in the context of
other information, reasonably could be expected to cause
damage to the national security. Executive Order 12356,
�1.3(b). Accordingly, I have determined that the withheld
information is properly classified at the SECRET or
CONFIDENTIAL levels, as indicated. Because the
information concerns classifiable categories of
information, and because unauthorized disclosure of this
information reasonably could be expected to cause damage
to the national security, such information satisfies the
substantive classification requirements of Executive Order
12356 and, thus, is properly classified. In this regard,
I note that the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence
sources or methods is presumed to cause damage to the
national security. Executive Order 12356, �1.3(c).
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11. I have also determined that the official
full-text copies of the documents containing information
withheld on the basis of exemptions (b)(1) and (k)(1) are
in conformity with the requisite procedural requirements
of Executive Order 12356. Each such document containing
classified information bears on its face a number
identifying' the classifying officer, the date of
classification review, the date or event for the next
scheduled classification review, information indicating
the agency or office of origin, and the level of
classification. Accordingly, such information satisfies
the procedural classification requirements of S1.5 of
Executive Order 12356. Since the information satisfies
the substantive and procedural classification requirements
of Executive Order 12356, such information is exempt from
disclosure under exemption (b)(1) of the FOIA and
exemption (k)(1) of the Privacy Act. In addition, and as
I will discuss later, since much of this information
concerns intelligence sources and/or methods, or CIA
organizational and functional information, such
information is coextensively exempt from disclosure
pursuant to exemption (b)(3) of the FOIA and exemption
(j)(1) of the Privacy Act.
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Intelligence Sources or Methods--
FOIA Exemption (b)(3); Privacy Act Exemption (j)(1)
12. Exemption (b)(3) of the FOIA states that the FOIA does
not apply to matters that are:
specifically exempted from disclosure by statute
(other than section 552(b) of this title), provided
that such statute (A) requires that the matters be
withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave
no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes
particular criteria for withholding or refers to
particular types of matters to be withheld.
5 U.S.C. �552(b)(3). Defendant CIA contends that there are two
statutes that operate pursuant to FOIA (b)(3) to exempt certain
of the information contained in the documents at issue. 50
U.S.C. �403(d)(3) requires the Director of Central Intelligence
to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure. The provisions of this section are further
implemented by virtue of 50 U.S.C. �403g, which provides that
the CIA shall be exempt from the provision of any other law
requiring the publication or disclosure of the organization,
functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of
personnel employed by the CIA. Thus, information falling
within the ambit of either of these two statutes is exempt from
disclosure pursuant to exemption (b)(3) of the FOIA.
13. Exemption (j)(1) of the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C.
�552a(j)(1), provides that the head of the CIA may promulgate
rules to exempt any of CIA's records systems from any part of
the Act, with certain exceptions that are specifically listed.
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In accordance with this statutory authorization, the Director
of the CIA has promulgated
�1901.61(d) and (e), which
portions of all systems of
regulations, 32 C.F.R.
exempt from disclosure those
records maintained by the CIA that:
(1)consist of, pertain to, or would otherwise reveal
intelligence sources or methods; or
(2) consist of documents or information provided by
foreign, federal, state, or other public agencies or
authorities.
As can be seen from the
(j)(1), as implemented,
FOIA exemption (b)(3).
above language, PA exemption
is the Privacy Act corollary to
As will be specified herein,
Defendant CIA has claimed exemptions (b)(3) and (j)(1) as
independent or alternative bases for withholding certain
of the information contained herein. Accordingly, in
discussing the categories of information withheld from
Plaintiffs, I will specify when exemptions (b)(1) and
(b)(3), (j)(1) and (k)(1) coextensively apply to the
information withheld. Conversely, when a certain segment
of information is withheld only on the basis of either
(b)(1) or (b)(3), (k)(1) or (j)(1), I will so designate.
Intelligence Sources--FOIA Exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3);
PA Exemptions (k)(1) and (j)(1)
14. Certain of the information has been withheld because
its disclosure could reasonably be expected to lead to the
identification of an intelligence source. Intelligence sources
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can be expected to furnish information only when confident that
they are protected from retribution or embarrassment by the
absolute secrecy surrounding their relationship with the CIA.
In other words, intelligence sources must be certain that the
CIA can and will do everything in its power to prevent the
public disclosure of their association with the CIA. For
example, if an American businessman is willing to share
information with the CIA that he obtains in the course of his
everyday business, such an individual could suffer serious
embarrassment and loss of business should the fact of his
collaboration with the CIA be publicized. In the case of a
foreign national abroad who has been cooperating with the CIA,
usually without the knowledge of his government, the
consequences of public disclosure are often swift and
sure--ranging from economic reprisals to possible harassment,
imprisonment, or even death. In light of the probable
consequence of disclosure, individuals are understandably
reluctant to cooperate with the CIA or with American
intelligence unless they can be absolutely certain that the
fact of their corporation will forever remain secret.
Moreover, intelligence sources who remain within their society
are at all times subject to retribution if and when they are
identified or, indeed, merely suspected of being CIA
collaborators. This is also true of intelligence sources who
may no longer actively cooperate with the CIA. In many cases,
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the very nature of the information passed necessarily tends to
reveal the source because of the limited number of individuals
having access to the information. If such information is
disclosed, the source may be perpetually vulnerable to
discovery, and retribution may be a real threat for him and his
family for many years.
15. Moreover, the release of information that would
identify an intelligence source most likely would have a
serious effect upon this Agency's ability to recruit other
potential sources in the future. As stated previously, most
individuals are reluctant to cooperate with the CIA unless they
can be positive that their identities will be kept forever
secret. If a potential source has any doubts about the ability
of the CIA to preserve secrecy, i.e., if he learns that the
identity of another source was disclosed by the Agency, his
desire to cooperate with the CIA would naturally be quite
small. In other words, individual sources, be they present or
future, simply will not work for the CIA if they are convinced
or believe that the CIA cannot protect their identities. The
loss of such intelligence sources and the accompanying loss in
critical intelligence that they provide, would have serious
effects upon the national security of this country.
16. The Supreme Court, in CIA v. Sims, recently affirmed
the critical need of the CIA to protect its intelligence
sources from public disclosure. The Court recognized that
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compelled disclosure of a source's name or other potentially
identifying information can cause a number of harms. First, it
can subject the source himself to retribution or exploitation
by our adversaries. Secondly, disclosure of one source will
inhibit the willingness of other sources to work for the
Agency, thus leading to a potential loss of critical
intelligence. Finally, compelled disclosure of intelligence
sources can help our adversaries pinpoint, and take steps to
counter, the specific areas in which the Agency is interested.
The Supreme Court fully realized that all of these probable
consequences would greatly impair the Agency's ability to carry
out its mission, and thereby harm the national security of this
country. Observing that the CIA would be virtually impotent if
it could not absolutely protect its intelligence sources, the
Court stated:
In exercising the authority granted by Congress
in Sec. 102 (d)(3) [50 U.S.C. �403(d) (3)1, the
Director must, of course, do more than simply
withhold the names of intelligence sources.
Such withholding, standing alone, does not carry
out the mandate of Congress. Foreign
intelligence services have an interest in
knowing what is being studied and researched by
our agencies dealing with national security and
by whom it is being done. Foreign intelligence
services have both the capacity to gather and
analyze any information that is in the public
domain and the substantial expertise in deducing
the identities of intelligence services have
both the capacity to gather and analyze any
information that is in the public domain and the
substantial expertise in deducing the identities
of intelligence sources from seemingly
unimportant details.
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* * *
The decisions of the Director, who must of
course be familiar with "the whole picture," as
judges are not, are worthy of great deference
given the magnitude of the national security
interests and potential risks at stake.
CIA V. Sims, 53 U.S.L.W. 4453 at 4458, 4459 (U.S. April 16,
1985),
17. For the foregoing reasons, I have determined that
unauthorized disclosure of information that would or could
reasonably be expected to lead to the identification of an
intelligence source would cause damage to the national
security. Thus, such information is currently and properly
classified and, therefore, exempt from disclosure pursuant to
FOIA exemption (b)(1) and PA exemption (k)(1). Coextensively,
information that could lead to the revelation of an
intelligence source's identity precisely falls within the ambit
of 50 U.S.C. �403(d)(3) and thus is exempt from disclosure
pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(1).
Intelligence Methods--FOIA Exemptions (b)(1)
and (b)(3); PA Exemptions (k)(1) and (j)(1)
18. Certain of the information has been withheld because
its disclosure reasonably could be expected to lead to the
unauthorized disclosure of intelligence methods. Intelligence
methods are the means by which, and the manner in which, an
intelligence agency accomplishes its business. Most organized
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professions or businesses employ methods to accomplish their
goals and objectives that are common to and, in some cases,
unique to that business or profession. A bank, for example,
uses accounting and financial recordkeeping methods, some of
which are unique while others are common to all banks. The
same general characterizations may be applied to an
intelligence agency such as the CIA and the intelligence
methods it uses. Many of the methods that CIA uses are unique
to CIA among all of the intelligence agencies. Many of the
methods are common to all intelligence agencies, and some
methods that CIA uses are common to activities other than
intelligence. The basic element in all of these variants is
that they are methods used by the CIA in its conduct of
intelligence activities. The use of such methods in that
capacity provides them with a special character in CIA records
that necessitates protecting the fact of their use, as well as
the details of their use, from unauthorized disclosure.
19. Intelligence methods must be protected in situations
where a certain capability or a certain technique or the
application thereof is unknown to those individuals or
entities, such as a hostile intelligence service, who would
take countermeasures. Secret information collection
techniques, analytical methods or technological devices are
valuable from an intelligence gathering perspective only so
long as they remain unknown and unsuspected. Once the nature
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of an intelligence method or the fact of its use in a certain
situation is discovered, its continued successful use is in
serious jeopardy. In fact, once an intelligence method or its
use is discovered, the method may be neutralized by hostile
intelligence services either by denying the information flow
via that method or using that method to provide false
information. This result is true whether the intelligence
methods are those used for the collection of intelligence
information, the conduct of clandestine activities, or those
techniques utilized in the analysis and evaluation of
intelligence information.
20. It is significant to note that the term "intelligence
methods" is not limited to sophisticated techniques and
electronic devices. Rather, "intelligence methods" also
includes the standard practices and procedures of an
intelligence agency. Knowledge of or insights into such
practices would be of invaluable assistance to those who wish
to detect, penetrate, counter, or evaluate the activities of
the CIA. In summary, it is the fact of the use of a particular
intelligence method in a specific context that is the
information that must be protected. Disclosure of this
information would allow anyone in the public to determine the
intelligence method at issue, thereby compromising the past and
future value of this particular method. For these reasons,
unauthorized disclosure of details pertaining to the
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intelligence methods in question could reasonably be expected
to cause damage to the national security, through compromise of
the method in question and a concomitant loss of intelligence
produced by that method. Thus, such information is currently
and properly classified and is exempt from disclosure pursuant
to FOIA exemption (b)(1), and PA exemption (k)(1).
Coextensively, since release of this information could lead to
the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence methods, such
information falls within the ambit of 50 U.S.C. �403(d) (3) and
is thus exempt from disclosure pursuant to FOIA exemption
(b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(1).
Cryptonyms--FOIA Exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3);
PA Exemptions (k)(1) and (j)(1)
21. Certain of the information withheld consists of
cryptonyms. A cryptonym is an artificial word used as a
substitute for the actual name or identity of a person or
project. Cryptonyms are used to provide an added measure of
security to minimize the adverse effects that would flow from
the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence information, and as
such, they constitute an intelligence method. Cryptonyms are
used frequently in
the true name of a
matched with other
cables and other correspondence to disguise
person or project. When obtained and
information, a cryptonym possesses a great
deal of meaning for those who are able to fit it into the
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proper cognitive framework. For example, the reader of a
message is better able to assess the value of the information
contained therein if the reader knows the nature or identity of
the particular individual or project represented by the
cryptonym. Similarly, the reader of a message also could take
action to neutralize the intelligence value of a particular
intelligence source if the reader knows the identity of the
particular source represented by the cryptonym.
22. The mere use of a particular cryptonym can be an
important piece of information to an informed observer of
intelligence matters. While release or disclosure of isolated
cryptonyms would not necessarily create a serious likelihood of
damage to the national security, the disclosure of cryptonyms
in the aggregate or in a particular context would make it
possible to fit disparate pieces of information together and to
discern or deduce the identity or nature of the person or
project for which the cryptonym stands. Consequently,
individual cryptonyms must be withheld to prevent the public
accumulation of cryptonyms from which a pattern could be
discerned concerning CIA intelligence methods and against which
the significance of an individual cryptonym could be deduced.
23. Cryptonyms are intelligence methods used to provide a
degree of protection for other intelligence sources and
methods. Accordingly, information that would disclose
cryptonyms is withheld under the authority of exemption (b)(3)
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of the FOIA and (j)(1) of the PA as specifically exempted from
disclosure by the statutory provision that the Director of
Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting
intelligence sources and methods (50 U.S.C. �403(d)(3)).
Because the disclosure of cryptonyms could jeopardize the
individuals or projects to which they relate, disclosure of
cryptonyms also would cause or reasonably could be expected to
cause serious damage to the national security. Thus, such
information currently and properly is classified pursuant to
the criteria of Executive Order 12356. Accordingly, such
information coextensively is exempt from disclosure under FOIA
exemption (b)(1) and PA exemption (k)(1).
CIA Employee Names, Employee Identifiers,
Official Titles, and Organizational Data--
FOIA Exemption (b)(3); PA Exemption (j)(1)
24. Another statutory measure taken to protect
intelligence sources and methods (Section 6 of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. �403g) provides that
the CIA is exempt from the provisions of any other law
requiring the disclosure of information regarding the
organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or
numbers of personnel employed by the Agency. On the basis of
this statute, a number of CIA staff employees' names and other
personal identifiers of individuals or information related to
specific individuals (employee numbers, telephone numbers,
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initials of employees, etc.) have been deleted from the
documents at issue. Additionally, the titles or other
organizational identifiers of a number of CIA internal
organizational components also have been deleted. Such data
have been deleted to prevent detailed knowledge of CIA
personnel, structure, organization, and procedures from
becoming publicly available and possibly being used as a tool
for hostile penetration or manipulation. The names of CIA
employees have been deleted because the Agency does not
disclose the identity and affiliation of those employees who do
not come into public view during the course of their duties.
Such employees may have in the past served under cover or in
sensitive positions or operations, may be doing so now, or may
do so in the future. The public revelation of their
affiliation with the CIA could well be used to compromise past,
present, or future intelligence operations or activities; to
impair the usefulness of such individuals to the Agency; and/or
to place their lives, the lives of members of their families,
and the lives of intelligence sources they have worked with in
jeopardy. Since such information fits within 50 U.S.C. S403g,
deletions from portions of the attached documents have been
made pursuant to exemption (b)(3) of FOIA and (j)(1) of the
Privacy Act.
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Dispatch and Cable Numbers, Headquarters File Numbers,
Access Limiters, Notations and Filing Information
FOIA Exemption (b)(3); PA Exemption (j)(1)
25. Information in certain of the documents must be
withheld because it would reveal internal file and control
markings. Such data are withheld to prevent detailed knowledge
of the CIA's structure, operations, and procedures in order to
prevent hostile penetration of the CIA and concomitant
disclosure of intelligence activities or intelligence
interests. For example, certain file indicators within the
documents at issue disclose methods used within the DO to keep
track of those individuals the DO has an operational interest
in the subject of the document. Disclosure of such file
indicators would provide an adversary with useful information
concerning the methods of the DO. Certain of the documents
also contain "action indicators" that define which DO
components are responsible for a particular program. Their
disclosure would provide an adversary with useful information
about the internal structure of the DO. Project file
indicators also may reveal areas of geographic and functional
interest. Such information, while an indispensable tool for
managing an information retrieval system and for focusing
resources on a particular area, can, when matched with other
like information, endanger the security of CIA filing systems
and expose internal CIA organizations and functions to scrutiny
and countermeasures by hostile intelligence services.
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26. For these reasons, information pertaining to the
filing systems, and thus the structure, of the Agency itself,
are intelligence methods exempt from disclosure under FOIA
exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(1). It also should be
emphasized that such organizational details are of the kind
contemplated by 50 U.S.C. �403g, discussed previously, which is
an exempting statute within the meaning of FOIA exemption
(b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(1).
Segregability
27. After carefully reviewing the documents at issue, I
have determined that there are no further meaningful segregable
segments of information that can be released to Plaintiff. A
release of any further information would risk compromise of the
intelligence sources, intelligence activities, and methods
sought to be protected. Any bits of nonexempt information
would, in my judgment, be meaningless without details of the
context in which they appear. Once exempt information is
deleted, any nonexempt bits of information are meaningless.
Document Disposition Index
Preface
28. This index will identify all documents retrieved and
reviewed for release in response to Plaintiff's FOIA/PA
requests. A total of eighteen (18) CIA documents and two (2)
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FBI documents containing CIA information are identified in this
index and are assigned numbers corresponding, in part, to those
used in Defendants� 28 July 1982 letter to the Plaintiff.
Documents treated after the date of this letter are assigned
numbers following those numbers in that letter. The nature of
the material withheld as exempt is identified and described to
the fullest extent possible without disclosing information that
must continue to be protected.
29. The Letter Code List that follows sets forth the
various categories of information deleted from the documents.
As to those documents that were released in part, letters
designating appropriate categories in the Letter Code List have
been placed on the released version of each CIA document to
indicate the kind of information contained in each deletion.
For example, the letter "C," where used in connection with a
specific deletion, indicates that the information was deleted
because it would disclose an intelligence method used in
collection operations, analytical activities, or support of
clandestine activities. The categories in the following Letter
Code List also refer back to the paragraphs in the first part
of this Declaration that explain the rationale for the
particular category of information withheld. The list also
provides, with each listed category, the FOIA and PA exemptions
invoked for deletions of that category of information. When a
document is discussed, each type of information denied will be
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cross-referenced by means of a letter code to the first section
of the Declaration where a full justification for withholding
of the information is discussed.
Letter Code Listing
A) Information concerning intelligence activities and
interests that is properly classified; FOIA exemption
(b)(1) and PA exemption (k)(1). (See 11 7-11.)
B) Information concerning the identity of an intelligence
source or circumstantial information that, in combination
with other information, could lead to the identification of
an intelligence source; FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3)
and PA exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1). (See If 14-17.)
C) Information concerning an intelligence method; FOIA
exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and
(k)(1). (See 11 18-20.)
D) Cryptonyms; FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA
exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1). (See ft 21-23.)
E) CIA employee names, salaries, identifying data (initials,
employee numbers), official titles, telephone numbers and
organizational data; FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption
(j)(1). (See f 24.)
F) Dispatch and cable numbers, Headquarters file numbers,
access limiters, notations and filing information; FOIA
exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(1). (See ft 25-26.)
G) Classification markings and related control markings; no
exemption. Deleted for purposes of providing unclassified
version for release.
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DOCUMENT DESCRIPTIONS
Document No. 1
Undated biographic data (one page). This document was
released in full.
Document No. 2
Memorandum (one page), 8 December 1958; classified
"SECRET." Agency component designations, titles, initials, the
name of an Agency employee and organizational data were deleted
under PA exemption (j)(1) and FOIA exemption (b)(3) and are
represented by letter code "E." The full-text copy of this
document is properly classified because the entire document
viewed with the deleted information concerning Agency
components tends to reveal a classified Agency activity or
interest. (See letter code "A.") Consequently, as indicated
by the letter code "G," the classification marking "SECRET" has
been removed to provide an unclassified version of this
document.
Document No. 3
Name Check (two pages), 10 December 1958. The letter code
"E" indicates where an Agency component and initials of
employees were deleted under PA exemption (j)(1) and FOIA
exemption (b)(3).
Document No, 4
Name Check (one page), 17 December 1958. The letter code
"E" indicates where initials of Agency employees have been
deleted under PA exemption (j)(1) and FOIA exemption (b)(3).
Document No. 5
Investigative Report (Synopsis and 21 page report), 15
December 1958; classified "SECRET." Information concerning
classified intelligence activities and interests has been
deleted on pages 9, 16, 17 and 21 of the report, as represented
by the letter code "A," pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(1) and
PA exemption (k)(1). As represented by letter code "B,"
classified information concerning intelligence sources has been
deleted in the Synopsis and on pages 3, 4, 6-9 and 21 pursuant
to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1)
and (k)(1). As represented by letter code "C," classified
information concerning intelligence methods has been deleted on
page 21 pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA
exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1). As represented by letter code
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"D," cryptonyms have been deleted on pages 2 and 4-7 pursuant
to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1)
and (k)(1). As represented by letter code "E," information
concerning CIA employee names, titles and identifying data have
been removed from this report on pages 1, 2, 4-13, and 15-21
under FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(1). Finally,
the classification marking "SECRET" has been removed on each
page, as represented by the letter code "G," to provide an
unclassified version of this document.
Document No. 6
Name Check Report (one page), 22 December 1958. The letter
code "E" indicates where Agency operating and component
initials have been deleted under PA exemption (j)(1) and FOIA
exemption (b)(3).
Document No. 7
Record Check (one page), 22 December 1958. The letter code
"E" indicates where initials of Agency employees have been
deleted under PA exemption (j)(1) and FOIA exemption (b)(3).
Document No. 8
Passport Check (one page), 22 December 1958. The letter
code "E" indicates where initials of Agency employees have been
deleted under PA exemption (j)(1) and FOIA exemption (b)(3).
Document No. 9
Memorandum (eight pages), 25 September 1959; classified
"SECRET." This memorandum contains classified information
concerning intelligence activities and interests that has been
withheld, as indicated by letter code "A," on pages 1, 2, and
5-7 pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(1) and PA exemption (k)(1).
Information concerning intelligence sources, represented by
letter code "B" on pages 4, 5 and 7 has been withheld pursuant
to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1)
and (k)(1). Information concerning intelligence methods,
withheld on similar FOIA and PA exemptions, has been deleted on
pages 1, 2, 6, and 7 as represented by letter code "C."
Cryptonyms have been deleted on pages 1 and 5-8 pursuant to
FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and
(k)(1) and are represented by letter code "D." Agency titles,
components, employee names and initials and organizational
information have been deleted on pages 1, 2 and 4-8 under PA
exemption (j)(1) and FOIA exemption (b)(3) as represented by
the letter code "E." Information identifying Agency files has
been deleted pursuant to PA exemption (j)(1) and FOIA exemption
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(b)(3) as represented by the letter code "F" on page 1.
Finally, the classification marking "SECRET" has been removed
on each page, as represented by the letter code "G," to provide
an unclassified version of this document.
Other information in this document originating with the
Department of State (State) and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) was deleted at the request of these
agencies. The deletions requested by State (paragraphs a-e on
page 3) and by the FBI (paragraphs 1-3 on page 4) will be
addressed by those agencies.
Document No, 10
Memorandum (one page) with Attachment (three pages), 10
October 1959; classified "SECRET." Classified information
concerning intelligence activities and interests and
intelligence sources and methods was deleted in the final
paragraph on page 3 of the attachment (represented by letter
codes "A," "B," and "C") pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and
(b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1). A cryptonym,
represented by letter code "D," was deleted from the cover
memorandum pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA
exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1). Information concerning the name
of an Agency employee and Agency titles, components and
organizational information has been deleted from the cover
memorandum and page 3 of the attachment under PA exemptions
(j)(1) and FOIA exemptions (b)(3) and is represented by letter
code "E." The classification marking "SECRET" has been removed
on each page, as represented by the letter code "G," to provide
an unclassified version of this document.
Other information in the attachment was deleted at the
request of State, the FBI and the Office of Naval
Investigations (ONI). ONI requested the deletion of portions
of the first three lines in the third subparagraph under
paragraph "b" on page 1. The FBI requested the deletion of the
remainder of that subparagraph on page 1. State requested the
deletions on page 2 of the attachment. These deletions will be
addressed separately by those agencies.
Document No. 11
Memorandum (three pages), 18 November 1959; classified
"SECRET." Information concerning classified intelligence
activities and interests has been deleted on pages 1, 2 and 3,
as represented by the letter code "A," pursuant to FOIA
exemption (b)(1) and PA exemption (k)(1). As represented by
letter code "B," classified information concerning intelligence
sources has been deleted on pages 2 and 3 pursuant to FOIA
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exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and
(k)(1). As represented by letter code "C," classified
information concerning intelligence methods has been deleted on
page I pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA
exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1). As represented by letter code
"D," cryptonyms have been deleted on pages 1 and 3 pursuant to
FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and
(k)(1). As represented by letter code "E," information
concerning CIA employee names, titles, identifying data and
organizational information has been removed on pages 1 and 3
under FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(1). File
handling information has been deleted on pages 1 and 3 as
represented by letter code "F" pursuant to FOIA exemption
(b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(1). Finally, the classification
marking "SECRET" has been removed on each page, as represented
by the letter code "G," to provide an unclassified version of
this document.
Other information in this document originating with the FBI
was deleted at their request. The information deleted at the
request of the FBI (two deletions in paragraph #5 on page 2)
will be treated by that agency.
Document No. 12
Memorandum (two pages), 18 November 1959; classified
"SECRET." Information concerning classified intelligence
activities and interests has been deleted on pages 1 as
represented by the letter code "A," pursuant to FOIA exemption
(b)(1) and PA exemption (k)(1). As represented by letter code
"C," classified information concerning intelligence methods has
been deleted on page 1 pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and
(b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1). As represented by
letter code "D," cryptonyms have been deleted on page 1
pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions
(j)(1) and (k)(1). As represented by letter code "E,"
information concerning CIA employee names, titles and
identifying data have been removed on pages 1 and 2 under FOIA
exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(1). A file number has
been deleted on page 1 as represented by letter code "F"
pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(1).
Finally, the classification marking "SECRET" has been removed
on each page, as represented by the letter code "G," to provide
an unclassified version of this document.
Document No, 13
Memorandum (one page), 24 March 1960; classified "SECRET."
A cryptonym has been deleted as shown by letter code "D"
pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions
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(j)(1) and (k)(1). As represented by letter code "E,"
information concerning CIA employee names, titles, identifying
data and organizational information has been removed from this
memorandum under FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA exemption
(j)(1). Finally, the classification marking "SECRET" has been
removed as represented by the letter code "G" to provide an
unclassified version of this document.
Document No. 14
Memorandum, 1 July 1960 (one page); classified "SECRET." A
cryptonym has been deleted as shown by letter code "D" pursuant
to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1)
and (k)(1). As represented by letter code "E," information
concerning CIA employee names, titles and identifying data has
been removed from this memorandum under FOIA exemption (b)(3)
and PA exemption (j)(1). A file number has been deleted as
represented by letter code "F" pursuant to FOIA exemption
(b)(3) and PA exemption (j)(1). Finally, the classification
marking "SECRET" has been removed as represented by the letter
code "G" to provide an unclassified version of this document.
Document No. 15
Form, 6 July 1960 (one page); classified "SECRET." This
form was denied in its entirety. The specific purpose of this
form, in this case, is to forward the 1 July 1960 memorandum
(Document No. 14) to the responsible component for action. The
form, itself, is classified "SECRET" in blank (i.e. without any
classified information entered onto the form) because it
reveals CIA's intelligence methods (See letter code "C") and
contains detailed information concerning the organization and
function of Agency components (See letter code "E"). The
information entered on this form includes an exempt file number
(See letter code "F") and references by component name to the 1
July 1960 memorandum, which component name was appropriately
deleted from Document No. 14 pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(3)
and PA exemption (j)(1). Consequently, as this form consists
entirely of classified information concerning intelligence
methods and contains information concerning exempt file numbers
and Agency components, this document is denied in its entirety
under PA exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1) and FOIA exemptions
(b)(1) and (b)(3).
Document No. 16
Memorandum, 13 November 1958 (one page) with attachment
(one page); classified "SECRET." Information concerning
classified intelligence activities and interests has been
deleted on the memorandum and the attachment, as represented by
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the letter code "A," As represented by letter code "D,"
cryptonyms have been deleted in the memorandum pursuant to FOIA
exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and
(k)(1). As represented by letter code "E," information
concerning CIA employee names, titles and identifying data have
been removed from the memorandum under FOIA exemption (b)(3)
and PA exemption (j)(1). Finally, the classification marking
"SECRET" has been removed on both pages, as represented by the
letter code "G," to provide an unclassified version of this
document.
Document No, 17
Memorandum, 10 February 1959 (two pages); classified
"SECRET." Information concerning classified intelligence
activities and interests has been deleted on pages 1 and 2, as
represented by the letter code "A," pursuant to FOIA exemption
(b)(1) and PA exemption (k)(1). As represented by letter code
"B," classified information concerning intelligence sources has
been deleted on the pages 1 and 2 pursuant to FOIA exemptions
(b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1). As
represented by letter code "E," the name of a CIA employee has
been removed from page 2 under FOIA exemption (b)(3) and PA
exemption (j)(1). Finally, the classification marking "SECRET"
has been removed on both pages, as represented by the letter
code "G," to provide an unclassified version of this document.
Document No. 18
Form, 20 May 1959 (one page); classified "SECRET." This
form was denied in its entirety. This document is classified
"SECRET" because of the information it contains concerning
CIA's intelligence interests and activities (See letter code
"A"), intelligence sources (See letter code �Tiwy, intelligence
methods (See letter code "C"T-a-nd because of the detail it
contains concerning the organization and function of Agency
components (See letter code "E"). This document also contains
an exempt file number (See letter code "F"). Consequently, as
this document consists entirely of classified information
concerning intelligence interests, sources and methods and
contains information concerning exempt file numbers and Agency
components, this document is denied in its entirety under PA
exemptions (j)(1) and (k)(1) and FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and
(b)(3).
FBI Referral No, 1
FBI Memorandum, dated June 4 1959 (one page); classified
"CONFIDENTIAL." The CIA requested the deletion of the
information in the subject line of this FBI memorandum because
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it pertains to a classified intelligence interest and activity
(See letter code "A"), which is withheld pursuant to FOIA
exemption (b)(1) and PA exemption (k)(1).. The CIA information
in the body of this memorandum would tend to reveal
intelligence sources (See letter code "B") and is withheld
pursuant to FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions
(j)(1) and (k)(1).
FBI Referral No. 2
FBI Memorandum, dated 5/20/59 (two pages); classified
"SECRET." The CIA requested the deletion of information in
paragraphs 1 and 3 on page 1 of this memorandum because this
information would tend to reveal intelligence sources (See
letter code "B"). This information is withheld pursuant to
FOIA exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(3) and PA exemptions (j)(1) and
(k)(1).
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the
United States that the foregoing is true and correct.
C/1
�4e,L
LOUIS J.// DUBE
DATED: J3 /
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