PRESIDENTIAL MEETING ON LAOS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06887353
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: July 31, 2024
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2024
• Case Number: F-2014-01314
• Publication Date: April 19, 1963

Approved for Release: 2024/06/12 C06887353
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Memorandum From thee
:7 Directorate of Plans
(Colby) to the Director of Central_Intelligence (McCone)
undated [April 19, 1963].
(1.?Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI-McCone Files,
Aj :7 Soopet. Sent via the
Deputy Director (Plans).
APPROVCD 10.F.ASr;
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DEPART/NT OF STATE
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
VIA:
SUBJECT:
PARTICIPANTS:
Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director (Plans)
Presidential Meeting on Laos, 19 April 1963
The President, The Secretary of Defense,
The Attorney General, Undersecretary
Harriman, Assistant Secretary lulls man,
Assistant Secretary Nitze, Mr. McGeorge
Bundy, Mr. Michael Forrestal
General Carter,C
--3t, Mr. Colby
1. General Carter gave a briefing on the situation in Laos.
2. In answer to the Presidents question, Mr. Hilsman stated
that the present difficulty comes from an escalation of the tension
between the Pathet Lao and the neutralists.
3. The President asked what diplomatic action was in course
or contemplated. Governor Ha.rritnan and Assistant Secretary
Ialsrnan stated that we had gone to both. the British and ICC and had
supported Souvanna Phounaa in plaping clear responsibility for the
present situation on the Pathet Lao. They stated that the Depart-
ment is considering a direct approach to the Soviets, including
possibly the dispatch of Governor Harriman for a personal discussion
with Chairman Khrushchev, but they want to be very sure what
pressure points we have to apply to the Soviets before sending him.
They pointed out that the Soviets themselves have very slight leverage
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on the DRV and the Pathet Lao, as they are currently giving them
little aid. The major danger from the Soviet and the Communist
point of view is one of reinvolvement of the United States in the
situation and they consider that this possibility could be suggested
to the Soviets. The President asked whether we would not appear
to be bargaining from a weak position by sending Governor
Harriman, to which the answer was the contrary, that the Soviets
would take this as an indication of our strong feelings. Also brought
in was. the importance of taking some action which indicated to our
friends and the neutralists that they were supported, in order to �
maintain their morale.
4. Mr. Bundy stateg that any- approach to the Soviets should
be viewed in context withAurrently the scheduled presentation of
United States and British views on nuclear testing. Khrushchev is
returning to Moscow this weekend at which time the British and the
United States Ambassadors will probably see him on this subject.
It was suggested that they might add orally our strong concern over
Laos.
5. With respect to possible United States military action, Mr.
Hilsman indicated that the State Department is considering as a
minimum the return of the White Star teams. A further step might
be sending United States forces to Thailand. At this point, Secretary
McNamara reiterated DOD's recommendation that United States
troops not be sent to Laos,and various other contingencies which had
been discussed. If troops were sent to Thailand, he stated that they
should be air elements, not Marines. He stated that consideration
was being given to moving a carrier task force into the Gulf of Tonkin
off Hanoi as a direct threat. At the minimum, it was suggested that
we might alert some of our forces in order to indicate the seriousness
of our intentions.
6. The President then stated that he wished to have a National
Security Council meeting on 20 April, at which the Department of
Defense should propose steps which could be taken in the military
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field and the Department of State recommend various steps in the
diplomatic field. He has asked that Ambassador Llewellyn
Thompson return from the West Coast for this nr eting in order
that it may consider the Soviet reactions and attitudes.
7. On at least two occasions during the meeting the President
indicated his belief that Soviet activities in Cuba should be considered
as an element of the problem in Laos. He recognized that action
against the Soviets in Cuba would not affect Laos directly but he did
feel that the Soviets were continuing the type of harassment effort
in Laos that we had stopped by the Cuban exiles. and that the Soviets
were not moving out of Cuba as we wished. He believed that there
were perhaps direct steps we could take in. Cuba, such as resumption
of low-level reconnaissance, which would place pressure on the
Soviets at a place where they were somewhat weaker as a concomitant
action to pressures we might impose in the area of Laos.
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