COMMENTS ON THE DEMISE OF FORMER RUSSIAN PREMIER STEPASHIN

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06877054
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: May 10, 2022
• Case Number: F-2020-00968
• Publication Date: September 8, 1999

Approved for Release: 2022/03/09 C06877054
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Classified By: UNSPECIFIED
Classification Reason: UNSPECIFIED
Declassify On: X1
--(SHOGINEYSUBJ: COMMENTS ON THE DEMISE OF FORMER
RUSSIAN PREMIER STEPASHIN
Identifiers:
(b)(3)
Dates:
Date Acquired:
Date Published: 08-Sep-1999 19:01:00
Date Received: 09-Sep-1999 00:01:02
Coverage:
CIA Country Code: RUS
Region: EURASIA, RUSSIA
Publisher:
Agency Acronym: CIA
Office Name: NCS
Contact For:
REQUIREMENTS WELCOME.
COMMENTS, EVALUATIONS, AND
Warnings7(1770�44F-4__ CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE
(U) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
(U_)01NpRMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE REPORT CLASS S
1 E T--NOFORN--ORCON
(U) EXCLUSIVE DISSEMINATION TO ADDRESSEES LISTED AT END OF REPORT
(U) REPORT CLASS S TNOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--
DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.
ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT. END
OF MESSACE SECRET.
--(8-H496/41F-)1
RUSSSIAN MASS MEDIA MINISTER
MIKHAIL ((LESIN)) STATED THAT STEPASHIN NEVER ESTABLISHED HIMSELF AS AN
INDEPENDENT FORCE TO LEAD THE COUNTRY. LESIN FURTHER COMPLAINED THAT
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STEPASHIN'S INEFFECTIVE PUBLIC RELATIONS TEAM HAD FAILED TO MAKE HIM
APPEALING TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC. LESIN ALSO FAULTED STEPASHIN FOR NOT
ALLYING HIMSELF WITH ANY STRONG GROUPS IN MOSCOW AND NOT USING HIS
POSITION TO COLLECT COMPROMISING INFORMATION (KOMPROMAT) ON HIS ENEMIES
IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION (PA). BECAUSE OF HIS LACKLUSTER
LEADERSHIP, LESIN SAID, STEPASHIN HAD ALREADY ANGERED THE KREMLIN AND
WOULD SOON BE REPLACED.
(S//0C/NF) 2. LESIN ESTIMATED THAT STEPASHIN HAD BEEN UNABLE TO ANTICIPATE
THE WHIMS OF AILING PRESIDENT BORIS ((YEL'TSIN)). LESIN DESCRIBED YEL'TSIN AS
OUT OF TOUCH AND INADEQUATE FOR HIS JOB. IN ADDITION, LESIN SAID THAT IT DID
NOT TAKE MUCH FOR STEPASHIN TO UNWITTINGLY SLIGHT YEL'TSIN'S DAUGHTER AND
IMAGE ADVISER TAT'YANA ((D'YACHENKO)) AND PRESIDENTIAL CHIEF OF STAFF
ALEKSANDR ((VOLOSHIN)). LESIN OPINED THAT STEPASHIN'S FAILURE TO FIGHT BACK
AGAINST THE KREMLIN'S UNREASONABLE DICTATES BACKFIRED ON HIM AND MADE
THE PA MORE SUSPICIOUS OF HIM IN A SHORTER AMOUNT OF TIME. LESIN COMPARED
THIS WITH FORMER PREMIER YEVGENIY ((PRIMAKOV)), WHO OPENLY DEFIED THE PA
AND YET LASTED LONGER IN HIS JOB THAN THE MALLEABLE STEPASHIN. LESIN SAID
THAT D'YACHENKO AND VOLOSHIN HAD BECOME SOURED ON STEPASHIN BY LATE
JULY. THUS, BY THAT TIME, LESIN SAID, PA ADVISORS LIKE VOLOSHIN AND ANDREY
((VAVRA)) WERE ALREADY LEAKING STORIES TO THE MEDIA REGARDING STEPASHIN'S
EARLY DEPARTURE.
(SHOC/NF) 3. LESIN CONTENDED THAT VOLOSHIN'S AND VAVRA'S LEAKS TO THE MEDIA
WERE JUST ONE EXAMPLE OF A SERIES OF RASH ACTS COMMITTED BY THE PA
RECENTLY. ACCORDING TO LESIN, PEOPLE IN THE PA SUCH AS VOLOSHIN AND
D'YACHENKO ACT OUT EMOTIONALLY BECAUSE OF THEIR OWN FEAR THAT THEIR DAYS
IN POWER MAY BE NUMBERED. LESIN ESTIMATED THAT THE PARANOID PA CULTURE
MIGHT LEAD TO EVEN GREATER MISTAKES THAN THE FIRING OF STEPASHIN. FOR
EXAMPLE, LESIN SAID THAT HE FEARED THE PA MIGHT IMPOSE MARTIAL LAW. IN
LESIN'S OPINION, THIS WOULD ONLY PROPEL MOSCOW MAYOR YURIY ((LUZHKOV))
INTO POWER. LESIN NOTED THAT LUZHKOV HAD ALREADY TRIED TO CO-OPT
STEPASHIN BY OFFERING HIM THE NUMBER SIX PLACE ON THE FATHERLAND-ALL
RUSSIA ELECTION LIST.
(SHOC/NF) 4.
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THE PA HAD ORIGINALLY INTENDED TO USE (b)(3)
STEPASHIN TO HEAD A CENTER-RIGHT VOTING BLOCK ALLIED WITH YEL'TSIN AND THE
KREMLIN THE PA HAD EXPECTED STEPASHIN'S BLOC TO ALLY ITSELF (b)(1)
WITH THE "RUSSIA'S VOICE," "THE NEW FORCE," "THE RIGHT CAUSE" AND THE "RUSSIA (b)(3)
IS OUR HOME" PARTIES. THE KREMLIN EVEN EXPECTED THE "ALL
(b)(1)
RUSSIA" PARTY REGIONAL LEADERS TO JOIN STEPASHIN'S ALLIANCE.
THE PA'S UNREALISTIC GOAL OF FORMING SUCH AN ELECTORAL (b)(3)
COALITION AS INDICATIVE OF HOW OUT OF TOUCH THE PA REALLY WAS.
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Collection: HT
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Creator:
Agency Acronym: CIA
Office Name: NCS
Contact For: COMMENTS, EVALUATIONS, AND
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REQUIREMENTS WELCOME.
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Description: (U) NONE.
Distribution List.
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Language: en
Precedence: R
Source:
Subject: None
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