LIBERIA: DOE LIKELY TO FALL

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06861713
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 3, 2020
• Case Number: F-2017-02018
• Publication Date: May 11, 1990

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Directorate of
Intelligence
MASTER FILE COPY
00 NOT GIVE OUT
OR MAN ON
-Secret.
. Africa Review
11 May 1990 '
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ALA AR 90-011
11 May 1990
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Africa Review
.11 May 1990
Articles
Liberia: Doe Likely to Fall
Recent rebel gains have accelerated the disintegmtion of the Liberian
Army, fed growing alarm in Monrovia, and caused cracks in the
regime that dramatically increase the probability that President Doe
will soon fall
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Africa Review
Articles
Liberia: Doe Likely To Fall
Recent rebel gains have accelerated the disintegration
of the Liberian Army, fed growing alarm in Monrovia,
and caused cracks in the regime that dramatically
increase the probability that President Doe will soon
fall. The rebels' strength has grown rapidly over the
past month and they probably are capable of
overrunning Army units in the port of Buchanan and at
Roberts International Airfield before moving toward
Monrovia. On the government side, inept leadership,
reliance on hastily trained new recruits, and mounting
tactical and logistic difficulties are sapping Army
morale. We believe troops will continue either to desert
or retreat toward Monrovia in the face of rebel
advances.
Doe�still convinced that the United States will come
to his aid�remains bent on a military solution, but
appears to be increasingly isolated and out of touch
with the military realit
maneuvering indicate that heretofore loyal elements
around Doe are moving to protect themselves or
improve their bargaining position before the rebels
reach Monrovia. Doe's departure is likely to usher in a
period of anarchy and bloodletting; no individual or
group in the country appears capable of imposing an
orderly transition and the rebels have indicated no
interest in sharing power. The primary threat to
American citizens and installations would come from a
breakdown in law and order in Monrovia as the
situation there deteriorates. Some Army elements could
target Americans in retaliation for their perceived
abandonment by the United States.
Rebels Gaining Upper Hand
The insurgents have maintained the military initiative
and gained considerable ground during the past month.
As a result of earlier successes, they operate freely in
nearly all of Nimba County, where they recruit and
train, and have expanded operations to adjacent
counties. During the past two weeks, they have
consolidated control at a US corporate-owned rubber
estate near the coast�less than 100 miles from
Monrovia�where abundant food, vehicles, and other
supplies have allowed them to reprovision.
we estimate the
rebels have grown from less than 200 when they began
operations in December to roughly 1,000 combatants
and 2000 to 4,000 trainees and supporters, drawn
almost entirely from the Gio tribal group in Nimba
County that has long suffered under Doe's Krahns.
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The insurgents' ultimate objective is the capital; rebel
leader Charles Taylor's claim that his forces are
preparing to enter Monrovia to oust Doe soon is fueling
alarm there and has triggered an exodus of expatriates.
We believe that the rebels probably are bringing arms
and reinforcements from their base camps in Nimba
before resuming their march toward the capital, and are
likely to be ready to move again soon. They probably
will first try to demoralize the Army further by taking
the port of Buchanan, but could bypass the port and
attempt to seize Roberts International Airfield, a vital
objective on the road to Monrovia. Their progress (b)(1)
probably would be slowed substantially if retreating (b)(3)
Army forces destroyed a key bridge west of Buchanan.
the rebels also may be
planning to set up another base at the Firestone rubber
plantation, near Roberts, before attacking the capital.
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--geese
Rebel Activity
MONROVIA
Buchanan
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ate occupied
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North Atlantic
Ocean
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O 5 50MIles
715847 (A02839) 5-90
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Army Disintegrating
Army attempts since December to push back the rebels
have been crippled by incompetent leadership and an
inability to implement a coherent counterinsurgency
strategy. Regional commanders have been shuffled
frequently and have had little chance to establish
control over their troops, composed largely of hastily
trained new recruits. The Army's recent and sudden
decision to replace General Craig in Buchanan after
only a few weeks as commander there is only the latest
example of increasingly erratic personnel policies.
the breakdown in
military leadership has precluded planning, leaving key
installation such as Roberts Airfield virtually
unguarded.
The unwillingness of troops to fight is a fundamental
problem. Chronic desertions�of some 1,400 troops
deployed to Nimba County and Buchanan, less than
600 can be accounted for�have severely hampered
Army operations. Even members of Doe's ICrahn group
apparently are deserting.
mounting tactical and logistic difficulties�severe
shortages of weapons, vehicles, gasoline, and
ammunition�are limiting their ability to engage the
rebels. Although
recent arms shipments and other military
assistan0 will
temporarily boost Army morale, we doubt that the ill-
trained troops will be able to use them effectively.
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Outlook
Doe is almost certain to fall, in our judgment. His
growing isolation and the military's glaring deficiencies
severely limit chances the President would be able to
forestall his departure through military or political
means. We judge that Doe's loyalist forces probably
have little prospect of stopping the rebel advance, let
alone defeating the rebels militarily. Although the
estimated 750 remaining members of the executive
mansion guard and the special antiterrorist unit in
Monrovia probably would be capable of protecting the
executive mansion, it is unlikely they could defend the
city as well, and they may lack the will to do either.
The other soldiers assigned to guard Monrovia are (u)( I )
poorly trained and ill-equipped for urban combat. (b)(3)
Nonetheless, Doe has said repeatedly that he is
unwilling to seek a political compromise with the
rebels; even if he accepts that he has no alternative, we
doubt that Taylor would agree to negotiate with him.
We doubt that any individual or group in the country
will be in a position to promote an orderly transition.
Instead, we expect Doe's departure to usher in a period
of anarchy and ethnic bloodletting, especially in
Monrovia, the duration and severity of which will
depend in part on how he leaves power. If Doe goes
voluntarily, leaving a senior non-Krahn military officer,
such as Defense Minister Barclay, in command, Doe's
successors might be able to negotiate with rebel leaders
to end the confusion and begin building a coalition
government.
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Charles Taylor
�
Charles Taylor�head of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia and leader of a more than four-month-old
insurgency against the Liberian Government
Taylor was not thought at the outset of rebel operations in
December 1989 to have the necessary military experience to engineer President Doe's overthrow. Several
factors�including indiscipline on the part of the Liberian Army, tribal animosities ripe for exploitation,
widespread discouragement with Doe's rule, and Taylor's persistence and underestimated leadership skills�have
strengthened his prospects. Taylor has claimed he wants to promote democracy, but press interviews cast doubt on
his intentions: recently Taylor stated he plans to remain head of state for at least five years after taking power.
It is increasingly clear that Taylor is determined to succeed Doe. In January 1990 Taylor stated his objective as
"an all-out armed struggle until Doe is removed and a democratically elected government is brought to power, not
necessarily headed by me, Charles Taylor." Since then his appetite appears to have grown in proportion to his
military successes. Recently, he explained to the international press that the Liberian people had begged him to
initiate the coup and would be so grateful for a return to true democracy that they would force him to become
leader
Taylor is not a natural fan of the United States, but probably realizes that maintenance of the historically close US-
Liberian relationship could be crucial to the survival of a fledgling regime under his control. As an adviser to the
then-new Doe government in 1980, he promoted a policy of "genuine nonalignment" and threatened on various
occasions to strengthen ties to anti-US regimes.
On the other hand, in recent
months Taylor has avoided anti-US statements and appears to be going out of his way to assure goodwill toward
the United States: "Americans are decent people, they are our friends . . . We intend having good relationships," he
has said.
Born in southwestern Liberia, Taylor is an Americo-Liberian, descended from freed US slaves who established
Liberia in the 19th century. He lived in the _United States in the 1970s�possibly earning a master's degree in
economics�and subsequently went into the import-export business near Boston. Returning to Liberia to accept a
post in the Doe government, Taylor was cashiered in 1983 for alleged large-scale theft of government funds and
coup plotting. Having fled to the United States, he was arrested at Monrovia's request but later escaped from jail.
He returned to Africa where he became involved in dissident activity.
government troops probably would not respond to
commands from any new leaders to engage the rebels.
If Taylor's forces gained the upper hand, we believe the
rebels would indiscriminately begin slaughtering
ICrahns, seeking retribution for Army atrocities
committed_Awistilra�_Gt fellow io tribesmen.
Moreover, given the low level of
troop morale and discipline, many of the remaining
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How Taylor reacts to emerging circumstances also will
play a major part in determining the length and
intensity of turbulence in the capital. In our view, the
violence after Doe falls, but before a clear successor
emerges, would be unlikely to subside quickly, unless
Taylor could be persuaded to cooperate with other
political groups rather than bidding for sole control by
force. The prospects for reaching a compromise would
be complicated further if any of the several groups of
exiled Liberian dissidents--sene g the end of Dcie's
rule is at hand�enters the fightin
Although we cannot rule out Taylor's willingness
to negotiate in such circumstances, his statements so far
suggest that he is opposed to sharing power with other
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groups. As a Liberian of American descent, or so-
called Americo-Liberian, Taylor probably has few
personal supporters and is viewed with suspicion by
most indigenous groups. They fear he is using the Gio-
ICrahn conflict to restore power to the Americo-
Liberian minority that ruled Liberia before Doe.
To ensure his takeover or consolidate his control, Taylor
may request increased assistance from his Libyan
backers. If he believes the rebels will win, Libyan
leader Qadhafi probably would be tempted to increase
clandestine support even before they reached the
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capital, perhaps by airlifting supplies if the rebels
controlled Roberts Airfield. If the rebels reach
Monrovia and claim power, Qadhafi probably would
respond�as he did when Rawlings assumed power in
Ghana in 1980�by recognizing Taylor's new
government and flying in arms and ammunition to help
shore up Taylor's fledgling regime. Qadhafi probably
would consider sending Libyan military personnel as
advisers and instructors only if he judged that Thylor
was firmly in control.
Implications for the United States
The primary threat to American citizens and
installations would come from a breakdown in Army
discipline and law and order in Monrovia. The
potential for such a development will increase
substantially if the Army fails to stop the rebels at
Buchanan. If the insurgents seize Roberts Airfield, less
than 30 miles from Buchanan, the 5,000 US citizens
remaining in Liberia could be stranded, although most
arc scattered throughout the countryside where they
probably would be at less risk than those in Monrovia.1
We doubt that either the government or Taylor would
deliberately seek to harm US citizens who stay, but
Americans could be subjected to unauthorized
harassment or caught in a crossfire between rebels and
government troops. The US communications relay
facilities ir Mnnmvin nmhahlv wn,sld n,t be
thmatenei lthough
I As many sand other Liberians may hold dual US
citirenshir"2"17
Liberian citizens, including some soldiers. may seek
refuge at the sites. he Voice
of America installation outside Monrovia probably is
the most vulnerable US facility. It could be a target for
rebels seeking to take advantage of its large stocks of
food, fuel, and vehicles, and coif turn into a conflict
zone between rebels and soldiers
As the security situation deteriorates, representatives
from both the Liberian Government�such as some
members of a delegation who were due in Washington
for talks beginning 7 May�and the Taylor rebel group
are likely to appeal to the United States for a public
show of support. Doe or the survivors from his regime
may plead for US intervention to prevent bloodshed,
while the rebels would probably seek US recognition to
legitimize their authority over the country. Taylor's
political agenda, beyond overthrowing Doe and seizing
power for himself, is vague. Although Thylor has
claimed he would eventually hold elections and restore
civilian rule, his sincerity is suspect. Taylor also has
tried to dispel concerns that he is anti-US, and his ties
to Libya probably are as opportunistic as are Qadhafi's
to him. Taylor might try, however, to use US facilities
as leverage in an effort to obtain economic assistance.
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