BRAZIL: REASSESSING THE NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06859535
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 18, 2020
• Case Number: F-2017-01987
• Publication Date: May 2, 1979

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INTERNATIONAL ENERGY INViEEKLY REVIEW
2 May 1979
Brad Reassasising if,. Nuclear Power Program
brad is sag down Its nuclear paver plans. Only four of the eight West
mtsumm:Siteuniimtire_oriolnellitolanned oil apparently be Installed.
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BRAZIL: REASSESSING THE NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM
During his recent visit to Brazil, West German Chancellor Schmidt and his host
apparently agreed that their troubled nuclear agreement will go forward, but on a
more modest scale than originally planned. Brazilian President Figueiredo reaffirmed
Brazil's intention to implement current contracts, but refrained from promising to
place contracts for the last four of the planned eight reactors Higher costs, lower
projee NJ electricity demand, construction delays, and increased domestic criticism of
the program make it extremely likely that Brazil will scale down its plans, and despite
public disclaime . Brazil will nroba ly complete no more than four West German
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reactors by 1090.
Current Nuclear Program
Brazil launched an ambitious long-term nuclear energy program when it signed
an accord with West Germany in 1975 for installation of eight power reactors and
facilities for a complete nuclear fuel cycle by 1990. The government projected that
nuclear power would meet 10 percent of Brazil's electricity needs by 1990 and 40
percent by the turn of the century.
Brazil is now constructing a 3,100-megawatt, three pressurized water reactor
(PWR) complex at Angra dos Reis, south of Rio de Janeiro. The first reactor is a 626-
MW Westinghouse unit that will probably be fully operational in 1980, about three
years behind schedule. The other two Angra reactors being built under the agreement
with West Germany were originally scheduled to go on line in 1983 and 198-4. Site
preparation and other problems will probably delay operation until at least 198.5 and
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1986, however. Brazil also originally planned to build six additional reactors by 1990
with German assiStancr�brinizing total nuclear generating capacity to more than
10,000 MW.
Aside from reactors, Rrazil is also building a uranium hexafluoride conversion
plant, a demonstration enrichment plant, and a fuel fabrication plant at Resende in
the state of Rio de Janeiro. Moreover, a reprocessing plant, hot cells, and other
facilities associated with plutonium technology will be located on a separate, as yet
undetermi:sed, site. A $350 million plant for imenufacture of major reactor compo-
nents is practically completed at Itagual, Rio de Janeiro, in line with Brazil's plan to
increase the local content in nuclear construction to 85 percent by 1990.
Reevaluation of Nuclear Program
Several factors have led Brazil to reconsider its nuclear power plans. Cost
estimates have more than tripled for the reactors alone, to $16 billion from the original
estimate in 1975 of $5 billion. Estimated cost for the full program is now more than
$20 billion. Cost overruns are due to construction delays, new safety features, higher
financing charges, and inflation.
Electric power demand is growing far more slowly than the Brazilians anticipated
in 1975. Those projections�the basis for the current nuclear program�estimated
electricity dPmand at 412 billion kilowatt-hours (kWh) in 1990, corresponding to an
average annual growth rate of nearly 13 percent and requiring 95,000 MW of installed
capacity. More recent Brazilian demand projections foresee demand of 300-billion-
kWh or 70,000-MW installed capacity for 1990. We estimate 1990 demand at only
2.50 billion kWh�requiring a 55,000-MW installed capacity.
Brazilian scientists and government leaders are increasingh critical of the
program's soaring costs and disappointed over West German dela.% in trancfprrino
nuclear technology.
Other domestic criticism has been
generate() by untavorabie press attention to site security, safety procedures, and
environmental concerns.
Outlook
While the previous administration in Brasilia had inves+ed too much of its
political prestige to back off the nuclear power program, the Figuci redo administra-
tion will likely trim the program to more realistic levels. Figueiredo has selected a new
energy adviser and a new Minister of Mines and Energy who have called for
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development of of conventional power generation and a slowdown of reactor construc-
tion.
As Brazilian projections of electric power demand become more realistic,
hydroelectric programs are assuming a greater role. Brazil's hydroelectric potential is
more than adequate to meet power requirements into the 1990s and beyond.
Hydroelectric facilities already provide 86 percent of Brazil's present generating
capacity of 25,000 MW, and with completion of the massive 1taipu hydro facility in
the mid-1980s, this capacity will increase by 25 to 40 percent. Brazil recognizes that,
compared with nuclear power, hydro plants have far lower operating costs and a
longer useful life
Despite continued commitment to a full nuclear fuel cycle, problems in
implementing the nuclear program have already led to delays of the uranium
enrichment program that will probably preclude production before 1989 Construc-
tion of the planned commercial enrichment plant, with an annual capacity to fuel
only two reactors, has been delayed because of cost overruns and technical difficulties.
Brazil will comnlete only a pilot enrichment facility by the early 1980s to test
component
The delay in the enrichment plant will keep Brazil dependent on imports of
foreign enriched fuels beyond 1990, the year it wanted to achieve nuclear fuel
Independence. The reduced scale of other nuclear support services such as mining, ore
concentration, and fuel fabrication as well as nuclear equipment construction, will
make nuclear power even more costly. Moreover, the reactor component plant will
have only a small market in Brazil should the nuclear program be cut back, and
Brasilia will have difficulty finding foreign buyers as worldwide nuclear reactor
demand declines. On the other hand, curtailment of the program will permit diversion
of Brazilian resources to other more productive programs including hydroelectri.
capacity expansion
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