LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT FROM W. E. COLBY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06835005
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: December 17, 2019
• Case Number: F-2019-00399
• Publication Date: September 17, 1974

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JE1/4.1�1CyaCiNIZI.1 I !WE
Executive Registry
rhe President
/he White House
Washington. D. C. 20500
Llear Mr. President(
17 Ai- ;
17 September 1974
Attached is a recapitulation of the Congressional oversight of CIA.
activities as requested by Secretary Kissinger.
CIA's relations with Congress axe on three levelse
a. Where appropriate (although iidrequently). CIA appears in
� open Beagles or releases testimony given in (=native session.
when it is neither classified nor revealing of intelligence sources
and methods.
b. In executive session. CIA appears before a variety of corn-..
mittees to provide substantive inteLligence data and asseesments.
We use our most sensitive sources as the basis tor such testimony,
but we do not reveal or discuss them or our operations.
c. Oversight of our operations is conducted by Appropriations
and Armed Services Subcommittees in executive session. No
matters are held secret from these committees. and It is my
obligation to volunteer to them matters of possible interest.
The above arrangement La longstanding and has been subject to
various attempts to change it over the years. In particular. the Fondly&
Affairs Committees have pressed /or greater exposure to our operational
activities.
In my confirmation hearings and publicly I have taken the position
that CIA will respond to Congress' oversight in any method established
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by the Congress, hut that I propose to continue the established procedures
until the Congress changes them. This is of course only a reflection of
the Constitutional independence of the Congress and its power. in ,entrernis,
to legislate with respect to our authorities or appropriations. A bill cur-
rently exists in both Houses which would amend the National Security Act
to provide that CLA's activities be reported to the Congress 'In such man-
ner as the Congress determines. ' I have indicated support of this amend-
ment.
The attached paper presents on page 12 certain options for your
consideration as to how this matter might be handled in the future. Those
might be used by you as the basis for the discussions you indicated you
Intend to have with the Congressional leadership. I would be pleased to
discuss this with you further at your convenience.
Respectfully,
Is/ Bill
W. E. Colby
airector
Attachment
WEC:blp
Distribution:
Original - Addressee via Secretary Kissinger (delivered to Rob Roy Ratliff
1 - OLC on 17 September 74)
I - OGC
(r) DDCI
I - DCI
I - ER
I - Assistant to the Director
NOTE: Copy also sent to Governor Rockefeller (w/atts) with covering note
from DCI (on 18 Septe.mbe r 74)
2'i9 2f3 king Of al4
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CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT - CIA
A. GENERAL
(Ae
. '74-;g
CIA was established as part of the National Security-Act of 1947. The
Agency's enabling legislation, the Contra! Intelligence Agency Act of 1949,
provided for the general administration of the Agency and exempted the Agency
from normal reporting requirements which could compromise Agency security.
On the basis of the provisions of this latter Act, the CIA appropriation is
handled securely and the organization, its functions, and the names of its
personnel are protected.
1. The Armed Services Committees (on the basis of juris-
diction over the legislation) and the Appropriations Committees
(to approve funds) have exercised continuous legislative oversight.
(a) The Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments (now the Committee on Government Operations)
actually held hearings and reported out the National Security
Act of 1947 but under the new Legislative Reorganization Act
the House Armed, Services gained permanent jurisdiction.
(b) In he Senate the corresponding Committee on
Expenditures challenged the referral of the National Security
Act of 1947 to the Armed Services Committee, but it was
defeated when the Senate upheld the ruling of the President
pro tern.
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(c) From time to time the Government Operations
Committees particularly on the House side have insisted on
a right of congressional oversight of the economy and
efficiency with which the Agenc:y conducts its activities.
Up to now the issue has not been joined, essentially
as a result of our voluntary cooperation with their
various investigations or informal handling between
committees. Chairman Holifield has been generally
supportive of the Agency position. Mr. Moorhead
and Mr. Moss being most interested in asserting
some type of jurisdiction.
(d) The Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
over recent years has pressed to extend its jurisdiction
over intelligence activities through the efforts to establish
the overall authority abroad of State, which it oversees,
and to include broad limitations on funding of programs
principally admilhistered by CIA.
B. CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. 1947 through early 1950's - Oversight was benign.
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(a) Controlled by strongly entrenched congressional
leadership and senior chairmen.
(b) Cold war psychology--rank. and file not pre-
disposed to interference.
(c) On the appropriation side, the basic concern
was--do you have enough money?
2.
Late 1950's
(a) Record of infrequent briefings of oversight
committees leads to Senator Mansfield's initiative for
Joint Committee (defeated in 1956 by vote of 59 to 27, with
12 original sponsors opposing i:he resolution).
(b) Sputnik era triggered wider congressional
interest in Age.ney information on the Soviet threat. Agency
initiated program of debriefing members of Congress who
had travelled abroad, inviting them to visit Agency facilities
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and on occasioniifield installations.
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3. Early 1960's'
(a) The Agency furnished intelligence briefings to
a number of committees including the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy on the Soviet nuclear energy program, and
general intelligence briefings to House Foreign Affairs and
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the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Soviet space
� program briefings to the House Science and Astronautics
Committee and Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences
Committee, and Soviet military posture briefings to the full
Armed Services Committees and the Defense Subcommittee
of House Appropriations.
(b) Pressure continued to grow for a Joint Intelligence
Committee which spurred the CIA Subcommittee of House
Armed Services to examine Agency activities rather intensively.
(c) Chairman Vinson appointed Representative Paul J.
Kilday as Chairman of the CIA Subcommittee of House Armed
'services with the mandate to give CIA more attention.
(d) The "Soviet Missile Gap" argument in the 1960
Presidential election spurred further interest in the Agency's
intelligence product.
(e) T4 U-2 flight of Gary Powers over the Soviet
Union and the Bay of Pigs invasion heightened congressional
debate and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 refocused attention
m the Agency's capabilities.
(f) Reflecting Senator Russell's growing responsibilities
for appropriations matters, sessions of the CIA Subcommittee
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of Senate Armed Services and Senate Appropriations were
held in joint session. Even so by 1965 Agency briefings of
these Subcommittees rose to L'.4 as contrasted with 9 the
previous year.
4. Late 1960's
(a) In 1966, the Foreign Relations Committee
reported a resolution to establish a Joint Committee on
Intelligence with Senator Russell defeating the move by 61-29
on jurisdictional grounds.
(b) In 1967 the Agency undertook a programmed
effort to contact and brief all new members of Congress on
the Agency.
(c) 1967 was al so the year of exposure of Agency
funding of the National Student Association.
(d) In 1969 the Agency's intelligence product came
to the front agaAp on the ABM system leading to a closed
session of the Senate to discuss the classified aspects of the
subject including data provided by the Agency.
(e) Legislative initiatives were beginning to be
proposed in an effort to circumscribe executive action through
CIA principally in Southeast Asia.
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5. 1970's
(a) The congressional structure which has fen.- a
quarter of a century served to shield the Agency from
intrusion or attack by the rank and file membership is in
a state of flux. The Russell'E. and Rivers' are gone.
McClellan is 78, Mahon is 74, and Stennis and Hebert are
73. Men down the seniority lists have become suspicious
or jealous over the secretive manner in which the oversight
responsibilities have been exercised and their ranks are
being periodically reinforced by newly elected younger
members. Many feel Agency information and Agency
activities should be more broadly accessible to the
Legislative Branch, and particularly to the Foreign
Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees.
(b) In 1971, as a result of the limitation by the
Democratic Catteus on subcommittee chairmanships and
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taking note of the writing on the wall, Chairman Hebert
appointed Representative Lucien N. Nedzi (D., Mich.)
as Chairman of a rejuvenated Intelligence Subcommittee
of House Armed Services Committee. Nedzi has proved to
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be an invaluable ally in dealing with problems in the
House-because of his reputation for diligence, thoroughness,
objectivity, and skepticism.
(c) In an analogous reaction to the changed political
atmosphere in the Senate, both Chairmen Stennis and McClellan
have changed earlier practices. Thus both now regularly take
transcripts. Senator McClellan invited Senator Church to attend
and participate in a Subcommittee meeting on ITT-Chile (no
leaks occurred) and Senator McClellan has offered any Senator
the specifics of CIA's budget on a classified basis (Tab A).
(d) Many members while sharply critical of foreign
and defense policy appear to have a high regard for the Agency's
intelligence product, fearful only that the Agency's capabilities in
the covert action field may be misused by an Administration.
They are anxious to have a closer relationship with the Agency and
thus more influence on. its activities. Others are highly supportive
in foreign and defense fields, but are anxious to avoid battle on
issues such as the Agency's covert actio.n authorities.
C. CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PROCEDURES
1. Under existing guidelines so far supported by the chairmen of
our oversight committees, Agency operational activities are reported
solely to the four oversight committees.
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2. Security. Precautions: In formal sessions before these
subcommittees, the following security procedures are followed:
(a) Only selected stas'.1 members of the subcommittee
(no personal staff of members) are permitted to attend.
(b) Each hearing is preceded by a technical sweep
for audio-surveillance devices and technical monitoring is
maintained throughout the briefing.
(c) When transcripts are taken, only a reporter with
Top Secret clearance is used and the Agency maintains
control over the shorthand notes. The transcripts are
placed under controls agreed to by the Committees and
the Agency.
(d) Under House rules all members are entitled
access to all Committee records. (Tab B)
(e) The membership of the four oversight
Subcommittees %.re set forth in Tab .G.
D. REVELATIONS ON CHILE
1. On 11 October 1973 the Director briefed Chairman Fascell's
Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee, House Foreign Affairs
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Committee, on Chile. The purpose of the hearing as agreed to
by Chairman Morgan and Mr. Fascell in advance was a substantive
intelligence briefing on Chile.
(a) Mr. Harrington was present at that hearing,
and pushed hard to learn about Agency covert action activities
in Chile. . The Director refused to answer these questions,
citing congressional guidelines that such details are limited
to our congressional oversight committees and that we have
no secrets from them. Certain sensitive information, however,
was included in that testimony, and it leaked. (Tab D)
(b) On 22 April 1974 the Director appeared before
the Nedzi Subcommittee and provided a full briefing of the
Agency's covert action in Chile. A transcript was taken.
(c) Under the House rules, Mr. Harrington requested
access to that tra:nscript and signed an agreement to abide
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by the full ComMittee's rules for treatment of such material
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(no notes, contents will not be divulged to any unauthorized
person in any way, form, shape or manner).
(d) On 18 July 1974, Mr. Harrington wrote a letter to
Chairman Morgan (also reportedly to Senator Fulbright) which
contained a detailed rundown of the Director's 22 April 1974
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testimony before the Nedzi Subcommittee, outlining various
"40 Committee" approved covert action activities in Chile
from 1964 through 1973. Tab E �
(e) Although the letter was dated 18 July 1974,
the first information received by the Agency of the proposed
press revelations for the weekend of the 7th and 8th of September
was from New York Times reporter Seymour Hersh, who
suggested that his information had come from the minutes
of the "40 Committee." (The House was in recess with
most of the members out of town, including the House Armed
Services Committee who were travelling in Germany.)
(f) Our Committees have been fully briefed on the
Agency's activities in Chile. Tab F.
(g) Our Committees' reactions so far to the revelations
are as follows:
(1) On 12 September 1974 the Director met
with the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee (Stennis
and Symingtan in attendance) and reviewed once again
the Agency's activities in Chile, 1962-1973, and other
current covert action programs. While Chairman
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Stennis had a reporter present who made a
stenotape of the session, at the end of the hearing
Stennis ordered that it not be transcribed and the
stenotape is in the .Agency's possession. Senator
Stennis lamented the Leak but was glad it did not
occur on the Senate side--where he said the record
is good, and it is�a-nd agreed that the covert action
capability is necessa-ry and he had no problems with
any of the current covert action programs.
(2) On 16 September 1974 the Director met
with the Nedzi Subcommittee and reviewed current
covert action programs. A reporter was present
for a preliminary substantive intelligence briefing
but was dismissed by Chairman Nedzi before the
Director's briefing on covert action. All members
except
essrs. Arends and Fisher were in attendance.
Mr. Nedzi said that the Harrington matter is a matter
for the Committee to investigate and they will be
meeting With Harrington possibly later in the week.
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� (3) Chairman Mahon has scheduled a briefing
of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on
19 September 1974 to review the matter.
(4) The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee,
in a joint session with the Senate Armed Services
Subcommittee, was fully briefed on the Chile covert
action program on 13 March 1973. The staff is
reminding Chairman McClellan of this fact.
Except for the incident involving Mr. Harrington, the four Agency
Subcommittees have had an outstanding record on the protection of covert
operational information.
E. OPTIONS
Clearly the credibility of this Government in its ability to protect
intelligence sources and methods is under suspicion as a result of the
revelations concerning Chile. (We have already received many inquiries
from cooperative foreign intelligence services.)
(1) In light of the House rules, the most obvious protective
device is that our Subcommittees not maintain records on covert
operational information provided by the CIA. The Nedzi Subcommittee
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' '''action on 16 September 1974 in dismissing the reporter was a result
of an affirmative determination by the: Committee in this regard.
Senator Stennis' action on 12 September is of a like nature. The
problem with this solution is that there is then no evidence of the infor-
mation provided by the Agency, which makes it possible for the Com-
mittees to distance themselves from responsibility in the event serious
issues arise in the future about the extent to which the Agency has kept
its oversight committees informed.
(2) The overall arrangement could be made for the Committees
to keep no transcripts or records but that CIA would keep them in a
segregated collection. As directed by the four Chairmen, they could
be made available under escort for examination but not copying. However
practical, this might pose political and constitutional problems.
(3) The House rules could be changed to limit access to sensitive
operational information to the Subcommittee and perhaps certain other
designated members in leadership positions. This would not be likely
to be accepted by the full House.
(4) Committee access to certain operational information having
a substantial impact on the deliberations of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee could be
expanded to those Committees, or selected subcommittees thereof,
on the premise that such information would be handled with wisdom
and restraint. The increase in the exposure possibility from such a
course of action is clear. (Letter from Representative Fascell to
Chairman Morgan, Tab G.)
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(5) A Joint Committee on Intelligence might be established
with members from Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign
Affairs and Government Operations, with a separate�gtaff. The
resolution establishing it should clearly state that it will have
access to all information but that no information about intelligence
sources and methods will he made available to other committees
or Members without a specific congressional resolution.
(6) All of the above, of course, would have to be worked
out with the appropriate leadership and, in addition, the President
might want to� consult the leadership as to other alternatives.
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