CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1958/09/04

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06830669
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: January 27, 2020
• Document Release Date: January 30, 2020
• Publication Date: September 4, 1958

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3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
4 September 1958
Copy No. c 59
CENTRAL
IYTELLIGENCE
BULLLTIN
DOCUMENT NO
NO CHANGE IN CL S.
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TOLTUC,x)
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
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4 SEPTEMBER 1958
.1
L THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Peiping apParently continues build-
hp opposite Matsua; renewed heavy
shelling of offshore islands expected.
Chou En-.la; tells Asian diplomats
Peiping will "liberate Kinmen."�
. IL ASIA-AFRICA
India reserved on Taiwan Strait
situation.
Violence increasing as Burma pre-
pares for elections.
Nasir accuses US of planning "direct
.aggression" against Communist
China.
IIL THE WEST
0 France may explode nuclear device
before 31 October.
0 Chile - Earlier advantage of con-
servative presidential candidate
jeopardized by opposition gains on
election eve.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
4 September 1958
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
*Taiwan Strait situation (as of 0100 EDT, 4 September):
There continue to be indications that the Chinese Commu-
nists gradually have been assemblinE a naval force near. .th
Matsus.
there may soon be a renewal of heavy
shelling and possibly further action against the offshore is-
lands. Soviet and Chinese Communist propaganda continues
to =pear to set the s age for further action. I ,_ __ ______ _
The Nationalists are finding it difficult to resupply Kin-
men, but the latest reports indicate that there are good sup-
plies of most items on the island.
(Page 1) (Map)
Watch Committee conclusion�Taiwan Strait:
1. It is likely that the Chinese Communists will con-
tinue heavy artillery barrages, interdict supply lines to
the offshore islands by using artillery, naval, and air ele-
ments as necessary, and maintain a high state of readiness
for air operations.
2. The Communists have increased their capabilities
to bring heavy pressure on the Kinmens (Quemoys), the.
Matsus and smaller offshore islands and could launch ma-
jor attacks against them. With the possible exceptions of
Kinmen, Lieh Hsu (Little Quemoy), and Matsu Island, in-
vasions could be launched with little or no warning. The
assembly of amphibious lift necessary for invasions of the
major offshore islands has not yet been observed.
3. The Chinese Communists are likely to seize one or
more of the smaller offshore islands and it is possible that
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they will attempt the seizure of one or more of the larger
offshore islands. Incidents between US forces and Chinese
Communist forces are also likely.
4. The Chinese Communists probably do not intend to
initiate major offensive military action against Taiwan and
the Penghus (Pescadores) in the immediate future, although
they now possess a capability for major air attacks.
Communist China:
(Page 4)
II. ASIA-AFRICA
India: New Delhi's reserved diplomatic reaction to date
to the Taiwan Strait situation apparently reflects new uncer-
tainties over the Sino-Soviet bloc's methods and intentions.
This uncertainty, however, does not foreshadow a change in
India's basic position on the China problem.
(Page 5)
Burma: Incidents of violence between the adherents of
rival political factions are increasing as the country prepares
for general elections expected in November. Security forces
fear a resurgence of terrorism by the Communist People's
Comrade party, which is known to have cached most of its
arms in the jungle. (Page 6)
4 Sept 58 DAILY BRIEF
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Yemen USSR:
Badr to arrange a"
the USSR. Badr ha
that the rebel Ima
round of arms ne
been initiated by
�
The Imam has instructed Crown Prince
second deal," presumably for arms, with
s also been ordered to inform the USSR
m of Oman is seeking arms aid. A second
gotiations with the Soviet .Union was to have
Badr late last spring,
UAR: In
the US of pl
China, whic
The speech
of UAR "in
denied in
casts.
Mid
tion
US
de
a Cairo speech on 3 September, Nasir accused
anning "direct aggression" against Communist
h he called the representative of the "real" China.
presumably reflected his sensitivity to charges
direct aggression" in the Middle East, which he
a lengthy defense of his Voice of the Arabs broad-
Watch Committee conclusion--Middle East:
Although a deliberate initiation of open hostilities in the
Lie East is unlikely in the immediate future, the situa-
remains unstable throughout the area, particularly where
and UK interests or commitments are involved, and inci-
nts and coups could occur at any time.
NOTE: The survival of the Jordanian regime continues to be
threatened. If the regime in Jordan collapses, action by Israel
and other neighboring countries to take control of Jordanian
territory is likely.
I IL THE WEST
French nuclear test: The De Gaulle government may,
for reasons of prestige, attempt to explode a nuclear device
prior to US-UK cessation of testing on 31 October, even
though the technical equipment needed to obtain useful scien-
tific test data will probably not be available before early 1959.
French officials may be counting on the favorable political
4 Sept 58
DAILY BRIEF lii
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impact of an early test both on the 28 September constitu-
tional referendum and on plans for the French-Italian-
German arms cooperation. (Page 7)
Chile: The advantage in the 4 September presidential
elections earlier attributed to conservative Jorge Alessan-
dri has been jeopardized by continuing gains for Communist-
backed Salvador Allende and an increase in the strength of
Christian Democratic Eduardo Frei. If none of the candi-
dates gains a popular majority, Congress will choose among
them on 24 October and is likely to pick the man receiving
the most votes. (Page 9)
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Ann Communist hoop
strength
000 Nationalist troop
strength
1-f Piston fighter
+ Jet fighter
Piston light bomber
14
� Jet light bomber
ti� Ground�attack
SELECTED MAJOR AIRFIELDS INDICATED
IN BOLD TYPE .
Hengyang �
80806/80904
liankow
Nanchang
thaNcsmu
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Wencho
11 IN TAIWAN
.CHINGYA
UNGCNI
CLIENGNAI
*Canton
Swat.*�
� cAo:. � HONG KONG
SOUTH CHINA.. SEA
STRAIT
IANG
Orcr� oy
� KiNMEN IS.
86,000
46'2-SECRET
at. EAST CHINA SEA
TAIWAN
331,000
aSTATUTE MILES
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Taiwan Strait situation (as of 0100 EDTp 4 September)
an unidentified
Chinese Communist vessel, which on 20 July was operating
near Tsingtao and by 23 August had moved as far south as
the Choushan Islands, is now in the Santu Bay area. Many
of the Chinese Communist Navy's larger ships have been
based at Tsingtao;
At least 13 uniden-
tified vessels, suspected of being motor torpedo boats and
auxiliaries, have moved to the Bantu Bay area during the past
month.
There also are indications that the Chinese Communists
have been arming merchant vessels.
The commander of the Foochow Military District has
broadcast instructions to district party and civil officials
similar to those which preceded the heavy shelling of 23 Au-
gust, suggesting that there soon may be increased shelling
or other action against the offshore islands.
Communist ground forces in the Foochow Military Dis-
trict now are believed to include at least two additional armies,
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making a total of four armies in that area. This means that
troop strength has been increased by 92,000 to a total of
284, 000.
Adverse weather in the Taiwan Strait area is hamper-
ing air operations. On 3 September, however, Communist
planes flew over Matsu and nearby areas, but did not attack.
Since 1 September, there have been no more broadcast
warnings to Nationalist troops on Kinmen or Leih Hsu (Little
Quemoy) that they must choose between surrender and annihi-
lation. Two defection appeals which the Chinese Communists
had announced would be broadcast on 2 September were
dropped without explanation or rescheduling.
The Peiping press on 3 September continued to feature
reports of world "condemnation of US provocations" and
claims that the Chinese people would smash "the imperialist
aggression." Domestic regional broadcasts ignored the Taiwan
Strait situation on 1 and 2 September.
Moscow made its first current reference to the Sino-
Soviet Alliance in an Izvestia article distributed by TASS to
Europe on 3 September. The article, which did not cite any
details of Soviet obligations under the treaty, said: "The
Soviet Union, tied to the Chinese Peoples' Republic by bonds
of their inviolable fraternal alliance, fully supports this just
struggle. This should never be forgotten by the US imperial-
ists, whose brink-of-war policy has led to a series of complete
failures."
As of 3 September, the Kinmen airstrip appeared undam-
aged and the auxiliary strip was being extended. At least one
aircraft has landed each night since 23 August, but no cargo.
has been offloaded. Only two of ten LCM's based at Kinmen re-
main in operation, reducing Nationalist ability to offload ship-
ping in Liaolo Bay. The supply situation on Kinmen, however,
is reported to be good with the exception of a few items, such
as soybean oil for cooking.
A member of the Nationalist general staff has said that the
staff is pessimistic regarding the ability of the Nationalist navy
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to maintain the Kinmen supply line, and that the United
States must participate since in the past it has refused to
give the Nationalists adequate equipment to do the job alone.
the Na-
tionalists can continue to supply the islands with some Amer-
ican assistance. Chiang Kai-shek now
seems to be settling down to the problem of breaking the
Communist blockade.
Chiang Kai-shek had empha-
sized the need for taking retaliatory action against the main-
land. He said that he could not accept American limitations
on his right to retaliate in sell-defense, although he still did
not want to take action without American concurrence. He ex-
pressed concern that continued inactivity would result in un-
favorable psychological reactions which would endanger the
support for him and his government.
Ambassador Drumright believes that although Chiang may
�
have overstated his case, the Generalissimo genuinely fears
that his position as anti-Communist leader is being under-
mined by a non-retaliatory policy. Nevertheless, Drumright
believes that Chiang will not take action without prior consulta-
tion unless the military situation becomes more desperate.
4 Sept 58 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Page 3
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Chinese Communist Attitude Toward Offshore Islands
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Sino-Indian Relations
New Delhi's restrained diplomatic reaction to date to the
Taiwan Strait situation may derive in part from new uncer-
tainties over the Sino-Soviet bloc's long-range intentions while
there has been no change in India's basic position on the China
problem. The Chinese Communist shelling of the offshore
islands, occurring shortly after the Nagy execution and the
adoption of a "hard" bloc line toward Yugoslavia, is so pat-
ently a violation of Panch Shila�the five principles of peace
and coexistence�that India cannot officially express its sym-
pathy for Peiping's claim to the islands.
�
The Indian Government is also seriously concerned over
Chinese Communist activities involving the Himalayan border
areas. The Chinese Communists, despite Indian protests,
have persisted in publishing maps showing parts of India and
Burma as Chinese territory. Ever since the Chinese occupa-
tion of Tibet, New Delhi has been plagued by Chinese military
violations of poorly defined ICashmiri, Nepalese, and Indian
borders and has received no satisfaction in talks with Chinese
representatives. Reports received
early in 1958 that the Communists had constructed a road
from Sinkiang to Tibet across a portion of Kashmir le
Delhi to dispatch reconnaissance teams to investigate.ew-7
reports regarding
Tibetan resistance to the Chinese Communist regime have
probably also helped to strengthen Indian doubts about Com-
munist methods. Peiping's unwillingness to permit Prime
Minister Nehru to visit Tibet this September as previously
planned reportedly piqued the prime minister. Nehru has now
tentatively scheduled a trip to Bhutan for 16 September to in-
vestigate the impact of the Chinese Communists on that re-
mote Himalayan kingdom's border and trade.
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The .Security Situation in Burma
The Campaign for Burmese general elections expected
in November has been accompanied by a steady increase in
political violence, especially in south and central Burma a-
mong labor supporters of the two factions of the Ant-Fascist
People'S Freedom League.
Police officials for the past three months have been
complaining of the direct interference of Home Minister Bo
Min Gaung in the administration of the police department and
of his forcing the release of politically protected criminals.
Career officers complain that if they have associated with
_followers of Ba Swe and Kyaw Nyein, the top opposition lead-
ers, they are being harassed and given, undesirable posts,
while others who associated ivith Premier INTA's followers
have received unearned advancement.
� Some army officials question their ability to Maintain
order during the political campaign and coming election, as
a result of the recent disbandment of local defense units and
the legalization of the Communist People's Comrade party .
(PCP) on 15 August following its formal "surrender y � The
army claims that the PCP cached most of its arms in the
jungle and may resort to terrorism to advance its candidates
for Parliament.
There is yet no firm Wication of the probable election
outcome. Burmese. political parties of the left as well as �
the AFPFL are.in the process of fragmentation, and no sin-
gle party appears to have increased its strength appreciably.
CONFIDENTIAL
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III. THE WEST
France May Attempt Early Nuclear Test
For Political Effect
The De Gaulle government may attempt for prestige
reasons to explode a nuclear device prior to the 3t October
US-UK cessation of testing, even though the technical equip-
ment needed to obtain useful scientific test data will prob-
ably not be available to France before early 1959. Although
previous estimates did not envisage the first French test be-
fore late 1958 or early 1959, officials in Paris now appear
sensitive to the unfavorable world reaction which would ac-
company a first French test held after cessation of testing
by the present atomic powers.
The government may be counting on the favorable polit-
ical impact an early test would have on French public opinion
for the constitutional referendum on 28 September. An early
test would also reinforce De Gaulle's position vis-a-vis some
army elements in Algeria whose unconditional obedience to
him is open to question.
The French may also have in mind the impact such a
test could have on the De Gaulle-Adenauer meeting to take
place on 14 September. The negotiations of the French,
Italian, and German defense ministers last winter envisaged
the possibility of German and perhaps Italian cooperation in
the French nuclear weapons program, as well as in the devel-
opment and production of other modern weapons. The status
of the resulting tripartite arrangements, ostensibly limited
to conventional weapons, appeared in doubt when De Gaulle
came to power, because of uncertainty as to his views on
French-German relations and on nuclear cooperation. De
Gaulle assured Italian Piemier Fanfani early in August, how-
ever, of his intention to honor the three-power agreement,
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and the ensuing US-UK decision to halt nuclear testing may
have induced him to seek outside help to accelerate France's
nuclear weapons program.
France is estimated to possess enough plutonium to ex-
plode a nominal-yield device prior to 31 October, and to have
been held back until now primarily by delay in completion of
chemical separation plant facilities.
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Chile's Communist-backed Candidate Improves Chances
For Presidential Election
Continuing gains for Communist-backed Salvador Allende
and an increase in the strength of Christian Democratic Eduardo
Frei are threatening the favored position of conservative Jorge
Alessandri" in the 4 September presidential elections. No can-
didate is likely to poll the clear majority necessary to ensure
election. Congress therefore will probably make the ultimate
selection on 24 October but is likely to confirm the popular
plurality.
The chief issue in the election is the persistent inflation
which has been Chile's most pressing problem for many years.
The failure of the plan suggested by the US-sponsored Klein-
Saks mission in early 1956 to stabilize the Chilean economy has
forced Chileans to look toward individual leaders representing
sharply contrasting economic programs. The right-wing parties
supporting Alessandri advocate free enterprise and a minimum
of state intervention. Allende, backed by the Socialists and
Communists, advocates greater state control of the economy,
extensive land reform, and expansion of trade with the Soviet
bloc. The Christian Democratic candidate, Eduardo Frei, also
favors considerable state intervention in Chile's economy.
CONFIDENTJ
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CONFIDENTIAL
� '
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Special Adviser to the President
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CONFIDENTIAL
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