NID: YUGOSLAVIA: PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe: A 30-Year Legacy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06826854
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2019
• Publication Date: January 24, 1990

Approved for Release: 2019/10/29 C06826854
'7777
Special Analysis
YUGOSLAVIA: Prospects for Stability
The Communist party congress that ended Monday did little to clarify
uncertainties about Yugoslavia's future. Sharp conflicts and a walkout
by the Slorene delegation will erode the party's prestige and authority
and will speed morement toward a multiparty system, but they may also
a vacate c tensions at the root of the country's instability.
The congress voted for a multiparty system, abolishing the
Communist party's constitutionally-mandated leading role, and
endorsed greater protection for human rights. These steps amount to
an endorsement of the liberal platform championed by the Slovenes,
who nonetheless walked out after losing a vote that would have
enhanced the autonomy of the republic parties. The refusal by the
other republics to endorse Serbia's effort to continue the congress
without the Slornes was a defeat for Serbian strongman Milosevic.
Mmement to a Multiparty System
The practical effects of the party's breakup arc likely to be minimal;
the national party has been paralyzed for the past two years by
internal differences and has made few meaningful decisions.
Endorsement of a multiparty system represents a belated recognition
of a political trend that has already gained significant momentum.
There are already some 40 opposition political parties in 1 t1 e country.
some with as many as 70,000 members.
Of Yugoslavia's eight republics, Slovenia and Croatia are already
planning to hold multiparty elections this spring; Montenegro,
Macedonia, and Bosnia are moving more cautiously in the same
direction. Even orthodox Serbian leaders now publicly support a
multiparty system. a largely meaningless concession because no
elections are scheduled in Serbia until 1994.
The evolution toward a multiparty system will do little to ease ethnic
tensions and may make them worse this year. The new parties may
pander to nationalist, and even secessionist, sentiments. Parties with
nationalist agendas have already trn formed in Serbia, Slovenia,
and Croatia.
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Implications for the Markovic Government
The tensions within the national party probably will enhance the
clout of Premier Markovic's government. Nonetheless. Markovic
must surmount imposing obstacles to put Yugoslavia on the road to
political and economic health. Hc will have to persuade powerful
regional leaders to agree on badly needed economic reforms: failure
to do so would mean the continued decline of an economy already
suffering hyperinflation.
The government will also have to coax the Army's senior officer corps
to accept tighter budgets, a gradual loss of the .Army's political role,
and a diminution of the military's prestige. Finally. Markovic must
obtain help from political leaders in Slovenia and Croatia to brake
the secessionist forces that could fragment the country and risk civil
war.
Grounds for Guarded Optimism
Markovic and other reformists nonetheless have some things working
in their favor. Although the secessionist fever might grow apace with
nationalist sentiments, the shrill ethnic squabbles that dominate the
Yugoslav headlines probably exaggerate the depth of secessionist
sentiment. Published polls indicate that even most Slovenes wa t
greater autonomy within Yugoslavia, not secession.
The military and security forces have resisted the ethnic divisions
that have weakened other Yugoslav institutions, and they continue to
support a united Yugoslavia. Memories of a bloody civil war during
World War II remain vivid, persuading many Yugoslays that ethnic
tensions must not be permitted to get out of hand. Finally.
Yugoslays�including many in the leadership�have not given up
hope that the country can be politically reformed.
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--TriirSreget_
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Approved for Release: 2019/10/29 C06826854