NID: HUNGARY: REORIENTING SECURITY POLICY

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe: A 30-Year Legacy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06826778
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2019
• Publication Date: November 2, 1989

Approved for Release: 2019/10/29 C06826778
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Special Analysis
I I UNGARY: Reorienting Security Policy
Growing liberalization promises changes in Hungary 'S foreign and
defense policies and is raising doubts ab ut its continued membership
in the li'arsaw Pact.
Budapest's foreign policy establishment apparently has concluded
that Pact opponents of its democratic transformation. not NATO,
are the greatest threat to Hungarian security. Hungary singles out
Romania as a particular danger because of tensions over Romanian
persecution of the large Hungarian minority in Transylvania and
because it fears Romanian leader Ceausescu is not rational. Budapest
reportedly is eager to relocate military forces from western Hungary
to the Romanian border.1
The leaders of the ruling Hungarian Socialist Party support the
compiete withdrawal of remaining Soviet troops from Hungarian
territory but appear willing to accept Moscow's view that further
reductions must await the outcome of the ('FE talks. A government
with substantial participation by other parties, such as is likely
after next year's elections, probably will press Moscow for further
withckawals. A National .Assembly subcommittee. after hearing
citizen complaints about noise and environmental pollution near a
Soviet military airfield, has already introduced Hungary's nascent
democracy to security policy by recommending that the governm7t
ask Moscow to close it,
The Neutrality Issue
Any pppularly elected government almost certainly will put
withdiawal from the Warsaw Pact on the agenda with the USSR in
its firs-. two years to protect its domestic legitimacy. All of the major
opposition groups have called at least for eventual neutrality, and
the heat of an open election campaign may lead some to demand
immediate, unilateral withdrawal from the Pact. The next
government may be the more tempted to press the Soviets harder on
neutrality because economic austerity will deprive it of other issues.
except the dispute with Romania, that can win it immediate popular
support.
continued
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id .110,
14
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TCS 2955/89
2 November 1989
Approved for Release: 2019/10/29 C06826778
Approved for Release: 2019/10/29 C06826778
Although several senior Soviet officials told
Hungary could leave the Pact if it wanted to do so. Soviet
Deputy Foreign Minister Aboimov's later remarks suggest Moscow
still believes the Pact must remain intact as long as NATO exists.
Neutrality is likely to become a major issue in Hungary in the next
several months, and half-measures such as special status for Hungary
within a reformed Pact are not likely to satisfy either the most radical
opposition groups or the voters.
IS
.1-01-312)
TCS 2955/89
2 November 1989
Approved for Release: 2019/10/29 C06826778