NID: EAST GERMANY: PROSPECTS AFTER HONECKER

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe: A 30-Year Legacy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06826773
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: November 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2019
• Publication Date: September 22, 1989

Approved for Release: 2019/10/29 C06826773
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Special Analysis
EAST GERMANY: Prospects After Honecker
Any new leadership in East Berlin probably will continue to shun
genuine reforms because they would tend to undercut the rationale
for East Germany's existence as a separate German state. The recent
massise exodus and the non-Communist government in Poland,
howew make it i easingly difficult for East Germany to avoid
change.
The regime's failure to prevent more than 23,000 East Germans from
fleeing to the West through Hungary or to get more than nominal
support from Moscow and Prague in blaming the situation on Bonn
and Budapest is likely to hasten the formal replacement of ailing
party-state chief Erich Honecker.
The unauthorized exodus has been particularly damaging because
legal emigration also has been unprecedentedly high this year and
because of plans to celebrate the "success" of Honecker's orthodox
line at the 40th anniversary of the East German state early next
month. The arrival of Soviet Politburo member Ligachev in East
Berlin during the exodus, ostensibly for agricultural discussions,
is evidcnce of Moscow's concern about the problems of policy drift,
Honecl.er's health, and regime stability highlighted by the exodus.
Politburo member and party secretary for security, youth, and sports
Egon Krenz is probably the best positioned to succeed Honecker.
Although lhardline views may work
against him with younger and more reform-minded party leaders, his
national power base and caution regarding change probably make
him attractive to the powerful orthodox elements and the entrenched
party bureaucracy. East Berlin party boss Guenter Schabowski, who
cultivat5 a more populist style, is also a major contender. A
deadlock between them would improve the prospects of district party
secretar:es Siegfried Lorenz, Hans-Joachim Boehme, and Hans
Modrow, amon whom Modrow appears the most committed to
reform.
Modest Policy Changes
Discontent in East Germany has increased under the influence of the
sweeping liberalization moves in Poland, Hungary, and the USSR.
The reforms in those countries harshly illuminate East Germany's
continued
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economic and political stagnation. Any successor leadership. even
under the orthodox Krenz, probably will adorn at least cosmetic
changes to patch up the regime's crumbling authority. It might, for
example, use some of East Germany's roughly $8 billion in hard
currency reserves on consumer imports to restore sagging labor
morale, reactivate the dialogue with the Pratt slant church, and
tolerate more media openness.
Although less likely, a new leadership might also show greater
flexibility in relations with Bonn and the US to shore up its battered
international standing. It could trade on any liberalizing measures
to placate Bonn and case growing frictions in the intra-German
relationship. .A variety of minor steps, such as concluding a cultural
agreement. paying World War II-era Jewish property claims, or
partially settling US property claims, are possible to improve
relations with the US.
Honecker's successors are unlikely to make fundamental shifts
toward political pluralism or a market-oriented economy. They
will realize that major changes would undermine the rationale for
a divided Germany. already weakened by the reduced sense of
East-West conflict. Even cautious moves risk encouraging public
pressures for more radical change.
�
Long-Term Outlook Gloomy
In the longer run, a new leadership probably will choose renewed
repression as the only alternative to growing instability, unless
a truly reform-minded leader emerges. Because the economy remains
relatively healthy by Soviet Bloc standards, a beleaguered East
German regime might muddle along for some time, but eventually
public disaffection and economic deterioration rooted in
technological obsolescence, labor shortages, inadequate energy
supplies, and diminishing international competitiveness will catch
up with it.
The pace of change will also remain hostage to developments
elsewhere. Sharp setbacks for economic or political liberalization
in Poland, Hungary, or the USSR, for instance, would strengthen
East German hardliners opposed to change and discourage reformers.
Conversely, the continued progress of reform elsewhere in the Bloc
would leave a hardline East German regime subject to incre7ing
external and domestic pressures for change.
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