NID: POLAND: SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe: A 30-Year Legacy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06826761
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: November 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: December 10, 2019
• Publication Date: August 19, 1989

Approved for Release: 2019/10/29 C06826761
POLAND:
Mazowiecki
Reportedly Asked To
Form Government
Situation Report
President Jaruzelski apparently has asked Solidarity adviser
Mazowiecki to form a government; a Solidarity-led government
might offer weary Poles new hope for genuine power sharing but
would still face staggering economic problems and probably stiff
bureaucratic resistance. Jaruzelski is waiting for the results of a
potentially stormy Communist party Central Committee plenum that
opens today before making a formal announcement. Mazowiecki,
however, hinted publicly yesterday that Jaruzelski had asked him
to form a new government. He is editor in chief of a Solidarity
newspaper, is relatively moderate, and is a longtime adviser to Lech
Walesa.
Comment: The plenum may be the final hurdle for a Mazowiecki
government. Angry hardliners concerned about their waning
influence will bitterly oppose Jaruzelski's course as an abdication of
the party's leading role; party moderates will tout Solidarity's
apparent willingness to include Communists as ministers of defense
and internal affairs. It is conceivable that the Communists would
threaten to boycott a Mazowiecki government in the hope of forcing
Jaruzelski to renege on his offer to Solidarity..laruzelski controls the
security forces and would veto any appeal from discredited hardliners
to use them to block formation of a new government.
The new government will have far more popular support than any
Communist government has had and stands a better chance of
persuading demoralized workers and consumers to be patient and to
accept austerity. The new premier will probably move quickly to
select cabinet ministers representative of the different factions in
Solidarity as well as the allied United Peasants' and Democratic
Parties.
The country's huge foreign debt, near hyperinflation, consumer
shortages, and obsolete industrial base make economic policy
Mazowiecki's biggest challenge. His immediate problem will be to
end the proliferation of wildcat strikes against spiraling food prices
and for inflationary wage hikes. Hardliners in the security forces, the
military, and the state bureaucracy have been kept off-balance by the
accelerating pace of political change but will try to frustrate some
government policies; they may work actively to embarrass the coming
government. Over the longer term, popular good will will be strained
by extreme consumer austerity, and government unity may be
threatened by the conflict of economic and philosophical approaches
within Solidarity.
continued
--TO-Seurat-
TCS 2893/89
19 August 1989
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TOiNeortt
6.2(d)
Soviet Concerns
A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman recently called the proposed
Polish government sensible. During his visit to Paris last month,
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said that the USSR would not object
to a Solidarity member forming a government in Poland and that
Moscow's primary concern is for internal stability. Last month in
Paris, President Gorbachev publicly warned against outside attem ts
to destabilize Bloc countries undertaking difficult reforms
Gorbachev said Western support or eaving
the Warsaw Pact or using debt as a lever would be going further than
Moscow could tolerate.
Comment: The Soviets now appear willing to accept a Solidarity
government with Communists in key roles, but a Solidarity
government in Warsaw will mean more trouble for Moscow in
managing relations with other Pact members. The USSR is not likely
to try to undermine a Solidarity government unless it takes Poland
out of the Pact or CEMA or adopts openly anti-Soviet policies. Even
then, Moscow would prefer a crackdown by Polish elements and
would use its own military only as a last resort.
If a new government is reasonably successful and does not challenge
fundamental Soviet interests, Gorbachev will be spared significant
damage but may come under more pressure to adopt a multiparty
system in the USSR. If there is economic chaos, political violence,
and a further erosion of the Communist party's position in Poland.
Gorbachev could argue that it proves the wisdom of his rejection of
such a multiparty system. His opponents, however, will still hold him
responsible for any Polish crisis and use it to rally support.
Impact of Polish Soviet acquiescence in the establishment of a Solidarity-led
Events in Eastern government in Poland is likely to be the turning point for reform in
Europe the rest of Eastern Europe.
The East Europeans continue to be cautious in reporting political
changes in Poland. East Germany, which has to be one of the
countries most alarmed by events in Warsaw, has been silent.
Czechoslovak media are questioning Solidarity's willingness to
maintain Poland's commitments to the Pact and charge that it has
repeatedly "broken its word."
Comment: Reformers and hardliners will see Soviet acquiescence
in true power sharing as opening the way for political changes
undreamed of even a month ago. Hardliners will feel backed to the
wall by Moscow's "betrayal" and forced to choose between d f n ing
themselves and throwing in the towel.
2
continued
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3.3(b)(1)
6.2(d)
6.2(d)
6.2(d)
6.2(d)
6.2(d)
6.2(d)
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I�V I
I Li �I
West European Reactions to Poland
Centrist and conservative newspapers are portraying developments in
Poland as further evidence of the "bankruptcy" of Communism, but
no government has yet commented. Some articles, particularly in the
West German press, are raising the fear that instability in Poland
will lead to Soviet intervention. Most editorials are skeptical of
Solidarity's ability to cure Poland's economic woes, and some have
urged a Western "Marshall Plan" for the Poles.
West European leaders probably expect more instability in Poland,
which they fear could weaken Soviet President Gorbachev. A
non-Communist government in Poland will strengthen the arguments
of leaders such as West German Foreign Minister Genscher for
substantial assistance to reformist regimes. They see aid as essential
to reduce the risk of instability and to ease the threat to Gorbachev's
rule. The French, as EC President, are likely to point to the
EC-sponsored aid effort as the best channel for the West to help the
new Polish Government develop.an economic reconstruction
program.
Bonn also welcomes reform in Poland as a stimulus to liberalization
in Eastern Europe, which it hopes will, in the long run, ease the
division of Germany. It almost certainly fears, however, that rapid
change might provoke a backlash in Moscow or among hardline
regimes such as that in East Germany.
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The most immediate consequences are likely to occur in
Czechoslovakia, where dissidents and the hardline Prague
government will be energized by the events in Poland. Illegal
demonstrations on Monday marking the 21st anniversary of the
crushing of the "Prague Spring" will probably draw a larger, more
militant crowd than would otherwise be the case, and the regime will
feel even more compelled to stifle any such backsliding in
Czechoslovakia.
The most significant long-term impact is likely to bc felt in Hungary,
where political reform already is far advanced. Party reform leader
Imre Poszgay will be encouraged to press for a clean sweep of the old
guard at the party congress this fall rather than a compromise that
would leave some of them in place. If party reform does not meet his
expectations, Poszgay may jettison the Communist party and lead a
new social democratic�type party into next year's elections.
Furthermore, the non-Communist opposition groups are likely to be
encouraged to pull out all the stops and try to bring the Communists
down.
Events in Poland will confirm East Germany's worst fears about the
deleterious results of reform in Eastern Europe and the wrong-headed
course it believes Gorbachev is on. The leadership probably will
move quickly to defuse the refugee impasse with West Germany and
Hungary so it can concentrate on holding the line against change and
cling even more closely to Czechoslovakia and Romania.
The long-term effect of events in Poland and Moscow's apparent
noninterference policy toward Eastern Europe is likely to be the
progressive erosion of the political power of the local Communist
parties, despite the resistance of hardliners.
3
�TOPSOCCeL.
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6.2(d)
6.2(d)
6.2(d)
6.2(d)
6.2(d)
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