CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1959/07/24

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06826587
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: February 25, 2020
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2020
• Publication Date: July 24, 1959

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24 July 1959
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CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
BULLETIN'
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24 JULY 1959
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Soviet-source sees no major change
in USSR-Yugoslav relations while
Khrushchev and Tito are in power.
II. ASIA-AFRICA
Burmese Government protests Chi-
nese Communist Embassy's "unfriend-
ly attitude" in connection with de-
fector case.
Baghdad Pact may face internal
crisis over question of military
structure.
Plans for evolution of Central African
Federation may be complicated by
attitude of British Labor party.
0
0
I I L THE WEST
American officials note decline in
West Berlin's morale.
Greece reluctant to move ahead on
missile bases program; uncertain
over domestic political aspects.
UK seriously concerned over future
of West Indies Federation.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
24 July 1959
DAILY BRIEF
I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
USSR-Yugoslavia: @urrent USSR-Yugoslav negotiations
over the developmental credits, which Moscow unilaterally
suspended in 1956, will be kept on a low level and no major
change in USSR-Yugoslav relations is likely as long as Titn
and Khrushchev are in noarer_
the USSR was irritated over
Belgrade's desire to be treated on the same favorable trade
terms as bloc members, and doubted that any significant
nart nf thp eradifia nrIll
(Page r eschedul
1)!
IL ASIA-AFRICA
*Burma - Communist China: The acrimonious exchange of
notes between Rangoon and Peiping over the attempted defec-
tion of a member of the Chinese Embassy is creating new
strains in Sino-Burmese relations. Rangoon has lodged a
strong protest against China's "unfriendly" attitude in refus-
ing to accept Burma's word that the defector had asked for
asylum. Peiping in turn accuses the Burmese of "conniving"
with and shielding American and Chinese Nationalist agents.
(Page 2)
Baghdad Pact: The Baghdad Pact may be facing a majo
crisis over the ques on of its military development. Some
top officials of the organization are reported to be convince
that "something must be done right away" about the pact's
military structure. Iran and Pakistan apparently belie.v_ey
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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC
Yugoslav-Bloc Relations
Yu oslav-Soviet negotiations now under way in Belgrade
concerning the developmental credits which were suspended by
the USSR in 1958 will be kent on a lnur level,
does not believe that a
significant part of the credits will be rescheduled because there
are "many more worthwhile countries" that deserve them, Ap-
parently only one session has been held�on 6 .Tulv�nt whirh
the Yugoslays presented their case.
Soviet irritation over Belgrade's desire to be treated on the
same favorable trade terms as bloc members.
the Yugoslays expected to buy Russian wheat at
the same price paid by the A1baniar_19
also did not foresee any major change in
Yugoslav-Soviet relations as long as Tito and Khrushchev remain
in power. He played down any Soviet interest in attempting to in-
fluence Yugoslav foreign policy in support of Soviet goals, since
the Yugoslays are already forced by their "socialist" preten-
sions to adopt policies fairly close to those of Moscow
information casts considerable doubt on a�number of
recent reports that Khru-
shchev will meet with Tito or Yugoslav Vice President Kardelj
in the near future. Even if such a meeting were held, basic
ideological issues would still block the re-establishment of party
relations and vitiate efforts to improve state relations-)
24 July July 59 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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II. ASIA-AFRICA
Burma and Communist China Exchange Acrimonious Notes
The attempted defection of a member of the Chinese Com-
munist Embassy in Rangoon is creating new strains in Sino-
Burmese relations.
The Burmese Government,
Is lodging a strong protest over
the embassy's "unreasonable and unfriendly attitude" in con-
nection with the case of Liu Ping-yi, a member of the embas-
sy's commercial section who asked for asylum on 12 July after
receiving a serious knife wound. The Burmese Government is
particularly irritated at the Chinese chares refusal to accept
its assertion that Liu had asked for asylum and at the charg�
insinuations of Burmese collusion in an alleged American plot
to subvert Liu.
Since that date the Chinese Communist charg�as appar-
ently subjected the Burmese Foreign Ministry to continual
harassment in his efforts to regain custody of Liu, who, whil
seemingly out of danger, is still hospitalized. an at least one
of these approaches, on 20 July, heated words were exchange
between the charg�nd Burmese officialtg
ommunist China
accused Burma of connivance with American and Chinese Nation-
alist agents. Peiping has threatened Rangoon with "responsibil-
ity for the consequences" if the Chinese demand for the return
of the would-be defector is not met.
The blustering Chinese tactics will increase the Burmese
Government's basic antipathy toward Communist China. Peiping
may be attempting to keep Rangoon off balance in order to dis-
courage government-inspired reporting of further developments
24 July 59
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in the case while Peiping presses for Liu's return. The Chinese
thus far have not threatened specific reprisals against Burma,
but may eventually feel the need to suggest that an "unfavorable"
attitude might jeopardize settlement of the long-standing border
dispute.
Rangoon will dispose of the case on its merits.
Liu now had recovered enough to be interviewed
by Chinese representatives.
24 July 59
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Crisis Developing Among Baghdad Pact Allies
home top officials of the Baghdad Pact are insisting that
"something must be done right away" about the pact's mili-
tary organization, according to Ambassador Warren in Ankara
where the pact headquarters is now located. There is apparent-
ly a genuine 'fear for the future" on the part of the regional
members of the organization, Iran, Turkey, and POcistan,
and a possibility that one or more may decide to jettison the
pact. The withdrawal of any remaining member would have
a strong psychological effect on the other....7
(act members appear to be re-examining the over-all
benefits to determine whether continued membership will
provide greater moral, military, and material advantages
than they would derive either from reliance on bilateral re-
lationships with Western powers or from shifting to a more
neutralist policy. The initial term of pact membership ends
in February 1960. Any member contemplating termination of
membership is required by the pact to give notice six months
prior to the expiration of the initial agreemenj.3
jan recently made a proposal which, according to British
General Jones, director of the pact's Combined Military Planning
Staff, would call for a supreme military headquarters to be located
in Tehran, the appointment of theater commanders, and the crea-
tion of a council to offer direction to the military organization.
Jones and the secretary general of the pact believe the proposal
should be studied and that great care should be exercised to
avoid offending the Shah, who is under both Soviet and domestic
pressure to make concessions to the USSRC
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British Party Controversy Poses Threat to Central African
Progress
' The British Labor party's far-reaching objections to the
c
Macmilr an government's plans for review next year of the con-
stitution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland�envisaged
in the 1953 Federation agreement--poses a further threat to or-
derly and rapid advance to independence for the Federation.
Basically the Labor party disputes the white-settler minority's
insistence on perpetuating its control in Central Africa. Labor
leaders' genuine worries about African developments are ac-
centuated by the party's search for a popular issue for the British
general elections expected this falg
Kapor's misgivings, which are shared by some back-bench
Conservatives, were expressed in a 'House of Commons debate
on 22 July on the government's plan to establish a 26-member
commission drawn from Britain, Central Africa, and the Com-
monwealth to prepare for the constitutional review. Party leader
Gaitskell called for major reforms, including parity for Africans
with other races in the legislative and executive officeslallortherii
Rhodesia, before holding the review conference. While the Labor
party has not refused to participate in the preparatory commission,
Gaitskell's criticism of its composition probably foreshadows an
intention to dissociate Labor from any commission findings. Some
British officials doubt that the commission will be useful under
the circumstance0
aylgst African leaders may be expected to back Labor's at-
tacks on the preparatory arrangements in view of the growing
native distrust of the racial policies of the white-settler govern-
ment of Prime Minister Welensky. The African opposition to the
Federation--at least on the part of Nyasalanders--was demonstrated
by the serious racial disturbances last February and March. Since
then the influence of the African political organization in the Federa-
tion reportedly has increased despite thA banning) Af such movements
in Southern Rhodeq9
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ILL THE WEST
Greek Government Reluctant to Proceed With Establishment
Of Missile Bases
[The Greek Government remains concerned over the pos-
sibility of public opposition to establishment of IRBM bases in
Greece and appears most reluctant to make an affirmative de-
cision on the issue at this time. While both Premier Karamanlis
and Foreign Minister Averoff have indicated a desire to pro-
ceed with the proposed IRBM program, other Greek leaders
are apprehensive over the internal political reaction. Thus far,
the government has done little to prepare the public for ac-
ceptance of such bas)
(or.eece took an important step toward acceptance of IRBM
bases in early May when it concluded a bilateral agreement with
the United States for exchange of atomic information. The Soviet
bloc then began an intensive campaign--alternating between pro-
posals for a nuclear-free Balkan zone and threats to obliterate
Greece in case of hostilities�designed to prevent further moves
toward establishment of bases. Greek Communist-front parties
joined in the campaign and were aided by center politicians seek-
ing an issue which would appeal to any neutralist sentiment in
Greece. All Greek newspapers with the exception of the far left,
however, have generally supported the government's rejection of
bloc proposals and threats, and there has been widespread crit-
icism of Soviet interference in what is regarded as an internal
issue:)
EN_r_hile eventual Greek acceptance of IRBM bases seems likely,
the American Embassy believes that, "in the absence of some ex-
ternal stimulus," the Greek Government will not initiate any action
in that direction in the near future-3
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24 July 59
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Jamaican Election Seen as Prime Factor in Future of West
Indies Federation
[he Macmillan government is worried about the future
of the year-old West Indies Federation, according to the Ameri-
can Embassy in London, and considers the 28 July Jamaican elec-
tion as the "first milestone" in determining its prospects. London
has apparently lost faith in the federal prime minister, Sir Grantley
Adams; it seems to be basing its hopes on some yet undiscovered
Jamaican leader who will throw his weight behind a stronger
federation as an alternative to both Adams and Trinidad's anti-
American premier, Eric Williams, who seeks return of the US
naval base at Chaguarama
aicreasing anti-Federation sentiment in Jamaica, however,
has made the island's role in the organization the main issue 4n
the election campaign. The opposition leader, Sir Alexander
Bustamante, has opposed the Federation from the beginning,
and Jamaican Premier Norman Manley, a principal sponsor of
federation, now has yielded to anti-Federation opinion within
his own party. Perhaps,because of the anticipated closeness
of the election, he now is on record favoring Jamaica's with-
drawal unless the constitution is revised to allow for the island's
superior economic position and its greater wealth and population.
At the federal constitutional conference scheduled for September,
therefore, the Jamaican Government will be committed to gain-
ing special concessions for Jamaica. This could further weaken
the Federation and threaten Britain's efforts to bring independ-
ence to the scattered Caribbean islancig
Zondon, meanwhile, continues to press the United States to
agree to a tripartite revision conference on the 1941 agreement
on US-UK Caribbean hasps ac 2rielfhpr measure to strengthen
the Federatio9
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N A IJLJ
THE PRESIDENT
The Vice President
Executive Offices of the White House
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Scientific Adviser to the President
Director of the Budget
Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization
Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination
Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities
Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
The Treasury Department
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Department of State
The Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State
The Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
The Deputy Under Secretary for Administration
The Counselor
Director, International Cooperation Administration
The Director of Intelligence and Research
The Department of Defense
The Secretary of Defense
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
The Secretary of the Army
The Secretary of the Navy
The Secretary of the Air Force
The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff
Commandant, United States Marine Corps
The Director, The Joint Staff
Chief of Staff, United States Army
Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy
Chief of Staff, United States Air Force
Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Commander in Chief, Pacific
The Department of the Interior
The Secretary of the Interior
Federal Bureau of Investigation
The Director
Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman
National Security Agency
The Director
National Indications Center
The Director
United States Information Agency
The Director
CONFIDENTIA L
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