D/CIA DAYBOOK

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06824115
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: July 1, 2024
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2024
• Case Number: F-2017-02177
• Publication Date: June 19, 2017

Approved for Release: 2024/04/10 C06824115
Slk� 10/1\,..
Director/Central Intelligence Agency
D/CIA Daybook
Monday, 19 June 2017 (as of 1130, 19 June)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
Tab A
Meeting and Photo Op with Senator Marco Rubio and Tab B
the Bay of Pigs Veterans Group (b)(3) NatSecAct
1
bEuRE17711ffeliff-
Tab C
Tab D
Tab E
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
Tab F
Approved for Release: 2024/04/10 C06824115
Approved for Release: 2024/04/10 C06824115
UNCLASSIFIED//IOUO
(U) Meeting with Senator Marco Rubio and Bay of Pigs Veterans
19 June 2017
Scene-setter
(U/iFetter) You will have a courtesy call with Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL) and sevE �o)(-(171,�
The visit will include a o) NatSecAct
Bay of Pigs veterans on Monday, 19 June,
group photo at Director/OCA will accompany you. (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6)
(U) Before your courtesy call, the group will receive a guided tour of the Museum and
lunch.
(U) Please note- Thp aroup miaht take this opportunity to present you with a signed
photo and book
Protocol has been informed.
Attachments:
� Sequence of Events
� List of Attendees
� Biographies
� Background on Bay of Pigs Invasion
(b)(6)
UNCLASSIFIEDHFOU0
Approved for Release: 2024/04/10 C06824115
Approved for Release: 2024/04/10 C06824115
UNCLASSIFIED/X-044e-
(U) Meeting with Senator Marco Rubio and Bay of Pigs Veterans
(b)(3) NatSecAct
19 June 2017
Sequence of Events
Security Check-in and Photo at the Agency Seal
Museum Tour with Museum Director Toni Hiley
Lunch in
Courtesy Call with D/CIA in the D/CIA Conference Room
Group photo with D/CIA in the D/CIA Conference Room
(b)(3) CIAAct
UNCLASSIFIED//
Approved for Release: 2024/04/10 C06824115
Approved for Release: 2024/04/10 C06824115
UNCLASSIFIEDHFGUO
(U) Meeting with Senator Marco Rubio and Bay of Pigs Veterans
19 June 2017
Attendees
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
Senator Marco Rubio
Veterans
D/OCA
Toni Hiley � CIA Museum Director
� Chief/DS Legislative Liaison
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
UNCLASSIFIED/ii-OUO
Approved for Release: 2024/04/10 C06824115
Approved for Release: 2024/04/10 C06824115
UNCLASSIFIED//F-G140
(U) Meeting with Senator Marco Rubio and Bay of Pigs Veterans
19 June 2017
(b)
(b)
UNCLASSIFIEDNPOtta
Approved for Release: 2024/04/10 C06824115
Approved for Release: 2024/04/10 C06824115
UNCLASSIFIED//FOU0
UNCLASSIFIED// 0
Approved for Release: 2024/04/10 C06824115
Approved for Release: 2024/04/10 C06824115
C
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
�G0114F414EN-TIAbYttefOlTrcr
Approved for Release: 2024/04/10 C06824115
Approved for Release: 2024/04/10 C06824115
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
(U) Meeting with Senator Marco Rubio and Bay of Pigs Veterans
19 June 2017
(U) Background on Bay of Pigs Invasion
Excerpts from 17 April 1961: The Bay of Pigs Invasion
by CIA Chief Historia
Preparation (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(U) CIA's proxy force of some 1,500 Cuban paramilitary, fighters landed at the Bay of
Pigs on 17 April 1961. Within two days, however, the Cuban military had repelled the
invaders and humiliated the Agency and the Kennedy Administration. The failed assault
was CIA's biggest operational failure to date and seriously discredited it in Washington.
(U) After three years of guerrilla warfare, Fidel Castro entered Havana on 1 January
1959 at the head of a ragtag army and forced Dictator Fulgencio Batista to flee the
country. In February 1960, Cuba signed an agreement to buy oil from the Soviet Union.
When the US-owned refineries in the country refused to process the oil, Castro
expropriated the firms, and the United States broke off diplomatic relations with the
Cuban regime. Castro established increasingly close ties with the Soviet Union, and he
and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev signed a variety of pacts that resulted in large
deliveries of economic and military aid in 1960. Within a year, Castro proclaimed
himself a communist, formally allied his country with the Soviet Union, and seized
remaining American and foreign-owned assets.
(U) At the White House's behest, CIA soon began developing rilans to oust Castro
based on the successful 1954 Guatemalan operation (PBSUCCESS). The initial plan
called for the infiltration of 30 Cuban exiles to form resistance cells. After receiving
President Eisenhower's approval for Project JMARC on 17 March 1960, the new Deputy
Director for Plans, Richard M. Bissell Jr., greatly expanded the project's scope to
include an amphibious assault by 1,500 men supported by B-26 bombers purchased
from the US Air Force and piloted by Cuban exiles. CIA's proprietary airlines would
loan additional aircraft. Operating with a $13 million budget, CIA began training Cuban
fighters in 1960 and 1961 in Guatemala and Nicaragua. The attack force was named
Brigade 2506.
(U) Although President Eisenhower had followed the plan's progress, he never ordered
that it be carried out. President-elect John F. Kennedy received a briefing on CIA's
Cuba project in late November 1960 and an update during presidential transition
briefings in January 1961. Yet as the invasion plans neared completion, several
changes took place. CIA planners considered air strikes essential to destroy the Cuban
air force and to provide close support for the invasion force. In mid-March, planners
added a second air strike to the plan, to occur on the day Brigade 2506 landed. The
site of the amphibious assault also changed from near Trinidad to the Bay of Pigs
(ironically, Castro's favorite fishing ground), ninety miles south of Havana on Cuba's
UNCLASSIFIED/iFOU0
Approved for Release: 2024/04/10 C06824115
Approved for Release: 2024/04/10 C06824115
UNCLASS I Fl EDALFeeer-
south coast. Near the Bay of Pigs lay the seaside town of Giron with an airstrip that
could accommodate B-26, C-46, and C-54 aircraft. This change alone prompted
wholesale revisions in the landing and supply timetables and in air and sea dispositions.
D-Day was set for 17 April 1961.
(U) Any doubts that President Kennedy may have had in February or March were put to
rest by Bissell, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.
As Bissell recalled in his memoirs, Reflections of a Cold Warrior, the "Fear of
cancellation became-absorbing.... It is possible that we in the Agency were not as frank
with the President about deficiencies as we could have been. As an advocate for
maintaining the President's authorization, I was very much afraid of what might happen
if I said, `Mr. President, this operation might as well be made open because the role of
the United States certainly cannot be hidden." In reality, preparations for the invasion
were a badly kept secret, considering the involvement of 1,500 Cuban exiles--recruited
openly by CIA in Miami, where Cuban agents were plentiful--and Alabama National
Guard pilots. Further, on 10 January 1961, the New York Times ran a front-page article
revealing the location and function of one of the Cuban brigade's training camps in
Guatemala.
The Invasion
(U) Any remaining element of surprise was completely lost on 15 April 1961 when six
(reduced from 16) Cuban-piloted B-26 bombers struck two airfields, three military
bases, and Antonio Maceo. Airport in a failed attempt to destroy the Cuban air force.
The air strikes immediately became a matter of concern for the United Nations; and,
with the increased attention, President Kennedy canceled the second air strike planned
for D-Day and denied last-minute CIA appeals to get US Navy air cover for the invasion.
Finally, pre-landing teams at the Bay of Pigs sent in to mark suitable landing spots
discovered rocky beaches and coral reefs and then exchanged gunfire in the pre-dawn
hours with Cuban militiamen, fully alerting Castro.
(U//FOU0) When the landing began on 17 April, the Cubans responded in force, and
Castro's air force dominated the invasion beaches, disabling or sinking two supply
ships. This resulted in the loss of an entire battalion of fighters, critical munitions and
supplies, and communications equipment. Once the rebels landed, they quickly found
that the expected popular support of the Cuban people never materialized; instead, the
small invading force faced a fully mobilized Cuban military. Brigade 2506's pleas for air
and naval support were refused at the highest US government levels, although several
US Navy aircraft operated over the beaches on 18 April, while American contract pilots
dropped munitions and supplies on 19 April (four died as a result). By the afternoon of
19 April, the battle was over. Of 1,500 men in the invading force, 114 were killed, and
over 1,100 were captured (the remainder never landed). The Brigade 2506 prisoners
were repatriated in late 1962 in return for a ransom of $53 million in food and
pharmaceutical products.
UNCLASSIFIEDUFGUe--
Approved for Release: 2024/04/10 C06824115
Approved for Release: 2024/04/10 C06824115
UNCLASSIFIED//FOU0
CIA and the Fallout
(U) The Bay of Pigs proved a major embarrassment for the new Kennedy administration
and CIA. During the invasion, DCI Allen Dulles was in Puerto Rico to give a speech,
and President Kennedy was at his country estate in Virginia. Both evidently assumed
that their absence from Washington would enable them to deny any connection with the
operation. Dulles was so completely cut off from events that he did not know the
venture had failed until he returned to Washington. On 22 April, the president ordered
General Maxwell Taylor to conduct an investigation of the fiasco and the practices and
processes for paramilitary operations short of war. Attorney General Robert Kennedy,
Admiral Arleigh Burke, and DCI Dulles rounded out the Taylor study group. The Taylor
report, delivered to the president in mid-June but not circulated, criticized CIA
conceptualization and planning, as well as the Joint Chiefs, who approved the operation
after only casual consideration.
(U) Dulles ordered Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick to conduct CIA's internal
review. Kirkpatrick delivered his 170-page report to the new DCI, John McCone, on
20 November 1961. The internal report was highly critical of the operations group that
planned the assault, especially for neglecting to get appraisals of its prospects from
other Agency offices with pertinent expertise. The Kirkpatrick Report proved highly
controversial within the Agency itself, prompting a rebuttal from senior operations
officers and an embargo on its dissemination.
(U) One explanation for the CIA's involvement in this debacle was given by the
Agency's general counsel, Lawrence Houston, who cited the air of "cockiness" at CIA
after its successes in the Iranian and Guatemalan Ventures of 1953 and 1954. R. Jack
Smith, a senior analytical manager at the time, stated that operations develop a
momentum of their own, and once so many people have invested time and effort in a
particular project, they become blind to its faults. Bissell pointed out that the three
liaison colonels assigned by the JCS to CIA were privy to the scenario, helped plan the
operation, and became emotionally committed to it. The JCS concluded from their
report that the operation had a "fair" chance of success. In addition, little guidance was
provided on what the brigade should do after landing, and no contingency plan was in
place if the invasion went awry.
(U) Militarily, President Kennedy's cancellation of the planned second air strike allowed
Cuban aircraft to shoot down two B-26 bombers of the invading force, sink two ships,
and chase away the ship carrying the bulk of the exiles' ammunition. The planners also
did not seek out data from the Navy or Marines about the presence of reefs at the
landing site, which a U-2 had photographed. Lastly, with the exception of one US
military officer, the planners of the operation had little or no experience in amphibious
warfare.
(U) By November 1961, both Bissell and Dulles had left CIA at the behest of the
president, and John McCone had been selected as the new DCI. Kennedy's
disenchantment with CIA's handling of the Bay of Pigs operation prompted a significant
UNCLASSIFIED//F014Q.
Approved for Release: 2024/04/10 C06824115
Approved for Release: 2024/04/10 C06824115
UNCLASSIFIED/tPe.Ue
reorientation of the Agency's anti-Castro activities and a cutback in its paramilitary
operations taking place elsewhere in the world, most importantly in South Vietnam.
When the Kennedy Administration decided to resume efforts to oust Castro in Operation
MONGOOSE, it put the operation under Pentagon management--specifically,
counterinsurgency expert Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale--using CIA assets and
infrastructure and with Robert Kennedy as informal overseer.
UNCLASSIFI ED/APE34e�
Approved for Release: 2024/04/10 C06824115