SNIE 11-9-69: CURRENT SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD THE US

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06813575
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2019
• Case Number: F-2019-00603
• Publication Date: July 11, 1969

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
11 July 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
SUBJECT: SLUE 11-9-691 CURRENT SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD THE US
1. The attached draft estimate has been approved by the
Board of National Estimates after consideration by the USIB
representatives.
2. This estimate has been placed on the agenda of the
USIB meeting scheduled for 1030, Thursday, 17 July.
Executive Officer
National Estimates
DISTRIBUTION A
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
11 July 1969
SUBJECT: SNIE 11-9-69: CURRENT SOVIET AMITUDES TOWARD THE US
This paper responds to certain specific questions concerning
US-Soviet relations posed by DI( on behalf of the Commander in
Chief, Pacific. A more comprehensive survey of the principal
factors which underlie the USSR's foreign policies and its inter-
national aims and intentions was issued earlier this year
(NEE 11-69, "Basic Factors and Main Tendencies in Current Soviet
Policy," dated 27 February 1969, SECRET CONTROLLED DISSEM).
That Estimate concluded that, short of major changes in the
Soviet system at home, the outlook is for chronic tensions in
Soviet-American relations. It also concluded that Soviet policy
toward the US would probably be characterized by cautious oppor-
tunism and limited pressures, perhaps with some increased watch-
fulness against the development of uncontrolled risks. We
retain our belief in the validity of both of these basic judg-
ments. At the same time, we note the development of increased
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Soviet alarm over the future course of relations with Communist
China. This alarm is likely at least for a time to have an
important impact on Soviet foreign policy overall; specifically,
it tends to encourage a somewhat more forthcoming Soviet attitude
toward relations with the US and toward particular issues
affecting the relationship.
I. THE USSR's BASIC STANCE TOWARD THE US
1. Soviet hostility toward the US and the West in general
was born with the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. It was nour-
ished by US participation in the Allied military interventions
which followed, and sustained through the 1920's and 1930's
by the continuing struggle against "class enemies" at home and
abroad. It diminished during World War II, but then reached a
high point of sorts in the early 1950's, during the last few
years of Stalin.
2. With Stalin's death, official attitudes were tempered
somewhat. Under Khrushchev, the notion of capitalist encircle-
ment was discarded. Limited contacts with the outside world,
including the US, were permitted, and the line toward the West
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began to fluctuate in intensity and assume a notably ambivalent
tone. The US was still evil, but "sober" elements in it were
capable, in effect, of good; the US remained the hostile leader
of the imperialists, but it was not necessarily seeking war; the
USSR was still duty bound to defeat or convert the US, but world
peace could somehow be assured if only the two countries could
get together. And policies toward the US began to reflect the
same kind of confusing mixture, ranging in mood and content
from the urgent and provocative to the relaxed and conciliatory.
3. Khrushchevis more conservative successors have sought
greater consistency and have tightened and toughened the approach.
They emphasize that, as a dangerous and devious adversary, the US
is to be both distrusted and despised. Nevertheless, they continue
to maintain that it is desirable for the two powers to keep lines
open to one another and, like Khrushchev� they still hold out the
hope that mutual hostility and suspicion might some day decline.
4. The current attitudes of the Soviet leaders are, of
course, conditioned by a general set of ideas, many of them
ideologically predetermined. Marxist-Leninist dogma affects
the way in which.these men analyze the problems that confront
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them and, in general, influences their manner of regarding them-
selves, their society, and the world at large. It reinforces
their feelings of distrust and hostility toward the US and
severely limits their ability to approach mutual problems in a
flexible mood. Moreover, the Soviet leaders now believe them-
selves for a variety of reasons to be on the ideological
defensive; this has generated a mood of "fearful conservatism"
which is likely to affect the tone of Soviet-American relations
adversely for some time to come.
5. But despite the undeniable effects of doctrine, non-
ideological considerations are playing an increasingly important
role in the formulation of Soviet foreign policies. The USSR
tends to behave more as a world power than as the center of the
world revolution. Thus the Soviets are inclined to establish
international priorities in accordance with a more traditional
view of Russian security interests and a more realistic view of
the possibilities for expanding their influence. The USSR
remains a thrusting and ambitious power, concerned to enlarge
its world position. But it tempers its ambitions with estimates
of opportunity and controls its hostility with measurements of
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power and risk. These opportunity/risk calculations are illus-
trated by the USSR's conduct in three areas which have figured
prominently in Soy-jet-American contention in recent years: Korea,
Vietnam, and the Middle East.
6. Korea. Moscow has for some time sought to win North
Korea to a pro-Soviet stance in the Sino-Soviet dispute. This
has involved fairly frequent visits to Pyongyang by top Soviet
leaders and a substantial Soviet military aid program.* It has
not, however, caught the Soviets up in any direct support of
adventurous North Korean tactics against the ROK 'and against
the US. On the contrary, we believe that the Soviets have
counseled Pyongyang to proceed with caution. Provocative
North Korean behavior not only raises the risk of war on the
USSR's doorstep, but complicates Soviet policies toward the US,
Japan, and China. In any event, Pyongyang's relations with the
USSR remain somewhat strained, and Pyongyang's aspirations
vis-a-vis the South are not of prime importance to the USSR.
* Soviet military aid to North Korea since 1956 has amounted to
an estimated $7704800 million. (The figures here and in the
footnotes to paragraphs 8 and 9 represent calculations in
US prices.)
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7. There have been reports of Soviet collusion with
Pyongyang in the seizure of the Pueblo and the shootdown of the
American EC-121. We do not find these reports convincing.*
Such behavior would be contrary to general Soviet interests, as
described above. It would also seem, in view of the large scale
Soviet intelligence collection effort in international waters
and air space, contrary to particular Soviet interests as well.
We have, in any case, reviewed the evidence specifically con-
cerning the USSR's attitudes and policies toward these inci-
dents and have concluded not only that Moscow was not involved
in planning them but that it witnessed both affairs with some
considerable discomfiture and apprehension. The text of an
We have examined the statement on this subject of the
Czechoslovak defector, General Jan Sejna, and find it wanting.
Sejna was for a time a valuable source of information on the
Czechoslovak armed forces and the Warsaw Pact, but his remarks
about the Pueblo seizure -- especially those which have
appeared recently in the public press -- are in our view high-
ly suspect. His account, for example, of a purported meeting
in Prague in May 1967 with Soviet Defense Minister Grechko --
during which Grechko is said to have discussed Soviet plans
for the seizure of an American intelligence collection vessel
is almost certainly inaccurate. During extended questioning,
he had given no hint that any such crucial meeting with Grechko
had taken place. In any case, the best available evidence is
that Grechko did not visit Prague at all during April, May,
or June 1967.
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official classified Soviet Party report on Brezhnevls speech
to the April 1968 plenum of the Central Committee, for example,
does not indicate that Moscow had prior knowledge of North Korean
intentions to seize the Pueblo. It clearly shows that the Soviet
leaders were concerned about the possibility of a forcible US
reaction, and had advised the leadership in Pyongyang "to exercise
restraint, not to give the Americans grounds for expanding the
provocation, and to settle the incident by political means."
8. Vietnam. The role played by the USSR in the Vietnam
war since 1965 is a more striking and more important example of
Soviet opportunity/risk calculations. The opportunity was, by
extensive material support to Hanoi, to help bring about a serious
reverse for the US and at the same time to contest Chinese
influence in Vietnam and elsewhere in Southeast Asia.* The risk
was not only of a possible armed encounter with the US in the area
but also of a radical deterioration of relations with the US
generally, a development which might bring unacceptable costs and
Soviet military assistance to North Vietnam began on a large
scale in 1965 and since then has totaled an estimated $1.6
billion. It reached a peak level in 1967 -- about $590
million -- but declined in 1968 (after the suspension of US
bombing) to about $310 million.
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risks at other points of confrontation. Throughout the Vietnam
war the Soviets have walked a careful line. They have given
material and political support to Hanoi in ways which they
believed would minimize the likelihood of dangerous US responses.
While until the opening of the Paris talks they adopted a
sharply hostile tone toward the US, they also refrained from
provoking any crises elsewhere and were willing to pursue
negotiations with the US on such issues as NPT. Since the
Paris talks began, they have adopted a tone which evidences
their hope of persuading the US that concessions to Hanoi would
have a beneficial effect on the negotiation of other Soviet-American
issues.
9. The Middle East. For the last dozen years or so the
Soviets have regarded the Middle East as an area of confrontation
with the Western Powers, in particular the US, but they also
probably saw it as an area offering much more of opportunity
than of risk. Their ties with and material support to the radical
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Arab states were aimed at using these states as instruments to
undermine Western influence in the area.* The likelihood of any
direct encounter with the US seemed slight. With the Arab-
Israeli war of June 1967 and the humiliating defect of their
clients, however, the Soviets appear to have acquired a sharpened
sense of the risks of their policy. Even now, however, they probably
are less concerned about the likelihood of direct confrontation with
the US than they are that their considerable investment and
influence will be jeopardized either by new Arab-Israeli hostilities
or by untoward political developments within the Arab states,
especially Egypt. Their moves to work with the US diplomatically
are an attempt to contain these risks, though they clearly do not
intend to abandon the competition for influence in the area.
Since 1955, the USSR has poured, or has promised to pour, into
the area some $2.5 billion in economic assistance and roughly
$2.9 billion in military aid. Of these amounts, the three
principal radical Arab states -- the UAR, Syria, and Iraq --
have received or been promised over half (some $1.4 billion)
of the economic aid and over 80 percent ($2.4 billion) of the
military aid. The balance has gone to Iran, Turkey, Yemen,
South Yemen, the Sudan, and Algeria. All figures are as of
1 July 1969.
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II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE RELATIONSHIP
10. The USSR's calculations of opportunity and risk, its
general concerns about its position as a world power, and even
its apprehensions about the security of the Soviet homeland,
have been greatly complicated by the leadership's growing
preoccupation with the problem of China. Indeed, there is good
reason to believe that the Soviet leaders now see China as their
most pressing international problem and are beginning to tailor
their policies on other issues accordingly. They have begun
publicly to suggest the need for some form of collective
security arrangement in Asia, largely, apparently, in order
to contain China. And they have, in addition, taken the position
that, because of the China problem, the USSR should generally
seek to avoid provoking unnecessary difficulties with the US.
11. The Soviets do not, of course, contemplate any sacrifice
of essential positions or renunciations of traditional doctrines;
they continue to view the US as basically their strongest
adversary; and, indeed, they fear that the US might someday
come to work against Soviet interests in collusion with China.
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But they clearly now believe that hostility toward the US
and the West should be muted, at least as long as relations
with the Chinese remain so tense.
12. The Soviet attitude toward the new administration in
the US remains generally circumspect. Provocative acts and
statements have for the most part been avoided. There have been
standard denunciations of US policies and continuing attacks
on "warmongers" in the US establishment, but the President
has been praised as well as criticized (though not harshly by name),
and it has been said that there are reasonable men in the US
who seek peace. Propaganda has on the whole suggested a wait-
and-see attitude, perhaps even a mildly optimistic assessment of
prospects for an improvement in the relationship.
13. Indeed, despite their many reasons for sober concern
about their position vis-a-vis the US, the Soviets seem now to
regard this relationship in a cautiously optimistic light. Their
relative military strength, especially in strategic weapons, has
greatly improved over the past six or seven years. Their influence
in certain important countries of the Third World has grown, and
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fear of Soviet aggressiveness has been declining, even --
despite the invasion of Czechoslovakia -- in Western Europe.
During the same period, the Soviets have seen domestic stability
in the US tested by disorders and severe political discord and
have observed increasing signs of public disenchantment with the
scope of the US role in international affairs.
14. The USSR has also showed a relatively restrained
approach to Western Europe. We do not think that the current
campaign for European security signals Moscow's intention to
abandon previous positions. On the contrary, the Soviets are
at least as anxious as ever to gain recognition of the status
quo, i.e., the division of Germany and the existence of a legitimate
Soviet sphere in Eastern Europe. But they do not now seem disposed
to stress the more controversial aspects of their position, nor do
they appear ready to dramatize their views through provocative
acts, as for example, in Berlin. At the same time, they no
longer emphasize the notion that the US should stand clear of
an all-European settlement.
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15. The strongest and most emotional language used by the
Soviets is now directed against China, not the US and the other
Western powers. This shift in the intensity of feeling about
foreign adversaries seems to have been reflected in the USSR's
apparently increasing willingness to discuss specific issues
with the US. Thus, though the Soviets' view of the US-USSR
strategic relationship is overriding, Moscow's current pre-
occupation with China has probably had some bearing on its
attitude toward the desirability of talks on strategic arms
control. Indeed, problems with China may have encouraged the
Soviets to look upon arms control measures with growing interest,
seeing in them a means to reduce tensions with the US and to
bring additional pressures to bear on Peking.
16. In the field of strategic armaments, the Soviets
have reached a sort of parity with the US and now must ponder the
implications of their achievement. None of the courses open to
them can be wholly appealing. An effort to surpass, or even
to keep pace with the US in the development and deployment of
advanced weapons systems would require enormous expenditures,
perpetuate the resource squeeze on the civilian economy, and
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perhaps divert funds from other military programs. And in
the process, Moscow could have no assurance that it would be able
to compete successfully with US technological prowess. On the
other hand, a Soviet decision not to try to keep pace with the US
seems highly unlikely; such a course would surrender many of
the fruits of past investment and allow the political perils of
strategic inferiority -- as the Soviets conceive of them -- to
re-emerge. Yet a decision to seek serious arms control measures
would not be easily reached. The Soviet leaders are ambitious,
opportunistic, and suspicious men. They are unlikely to conclude
that a strategic arms agreement is acceptable unless they are
convinced that aiming at a superior position is not feasible
and that the national interest could be served by a sort of
strategic stabilization. On neither count does it seem likely that
all the leaders would reach full agreement.
17. Nevertheless, it is still our belief that the Soviets
have strong reasons -- perhaps stronger than ever before -- to
consider carefully the whole problem of strategic arms control.
In the interim since our last estimates, we have seen nothing
concerning this subject which would alter this
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judgment.* On the contrary, the USSR's approach to the problem so
far this year tends to confirm it. The Soviets have not concealed
their suspicions of US motives. Nor have they hidden their
discontent with certain US attitudes and statements, in particular
US suggestions that there should be a linkage between arms control
and other, broader issues. But they have also sought to appear
patient about the timing of arms control talks and have tried to
convince the US that they have retained a sober --though not
eager -- interest in the negotiation of an agreement.
See NIB 11-16-68, "The Soviet Approach to Arms Control," dated
7 November 1968, SECRET, CONTROLLED DISSEM, and NIE 11-69,
"Basic Factors and Main Tendencies in Current Soviet Policy,"
dated 27 February 1969, SECRET, CONTROLLED DISSEM.
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