SOUTH AFRICA: NEW IAEA ROLE DEVELOPING

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06813285
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 23, 2020
• Case Number: F-2018-00226
• Publication Date: March 30, 1993

Approved for Release: 2020/03/16 C06813285
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Contents
Notes
South Africa: New IAEA Role Developing 10
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SOUTH AFRICA: New IAEA Role Developing
International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors are in South Africa to
discuss Pretoria's past nuclear weapons prograrn
Last week, President de Klerk invited the IAEA to view the
remnants of the program in order to verify that six nuclear explosive
devices have been dismantled.
the IAEA would be allowed to destroy the
manufacturing facilities associated with the devices if there are
any lingering international concerns. South Africa also says it has
destroyed all weapons program components, drawings, and computer
software.
Comment: The IAEA has never before been called on to verify the
dismantlement of nuclear explosives. Although the Agency has gained
some experience in the assessment of a weapons program from its
inspections in Iraq, it needed expertise from nuclear-weapon states to
help it assess the Iraqi data. The IAEA probably needs similar help
to assess any South African activities that are unique to nuclear
weapons. The South African case could strengthen calls for an IAEA
role in the verification of dismantlement elsewhere, as in such
countries as Ukraine and Kazakhstan, which have pledged to accept
full-scope IAEA safeguards. Any sensitive nuclear weapons
information the Agency obtains in South Africa, moreover, will
require more stringent security measures than the IAEA normally
uses; the problem is particularly acute because such countries as Iran
and Libya are Agency members
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Approved for Release: 2020/03/16 C06813285