EL SALVADOR: ELECTION OUTLOOK

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06812671
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2020
• Case Number: F-2019-00695
• Publication Date: March 6, 1984

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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency,
Agency, the intelligence organization of the Department of
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department o
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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SNIE 83.1-84
EL SALVADOR:
ELECTION OUTLOOK
mati�n valutsie as a 2 Muth 1984 was
used in the itetsuration of this Estimate..
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CONTENTS
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KEY JUDGMENTS
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DISCUSSION
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Political Parties and Candidates
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The Christian Democratic Party
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Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA)
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Party of National Conciliation (P( '1`,1) ...........��������������-�������������. ��� ��
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Salvadoran Authentic Institutional Party (PAISA)
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Govermnent Strategy and Capabilities
Runoff Election Possibilities
ANNEX:
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KEY JUDGMENTS
We laelieve the 25 Klarch presidential election in El Salvador ill
take place on schedule. Quest it concerning voter registration, ballot-
ing procedures, and development of all adequate security plan remain
to be restalved, bat there appears to be little chance that the contest will
lae at or postponed.
The stakes seem to be high for all elements in tins election.
lleporting indicates that public intemst is as keen as it was during the
voting for the Constituent Assembly in 1981 In several opinion polls,
produced by a variety of spcmsors, over 80 percent of the respondents
said they at to vote. Nevertheless, difficulties with the election
registry and guerrilla disrupticms could result in a voter turnout
soniewhat laelow the 1982 level. Indeed, the government, becatise of its
inability to provide security, plans not to place ballot boxes in over 70 of
261 municipalities.
Six parties have chosen presidential and vice-presidential candi-
dates and are actively campaigning. With the exception of the Christian
Democrats, the parties are to varying degrees conservative, No party to
the left of the Christian Democrats is expected to participate in the
elect it
The military views the election as an essential factor for improving
in intage and maintaining US assistance. It has pledged to
remain neutral in the election and has reprimanded smite of for
partisan. political activities At the same tinae, however, the military is
concerned about potential postelection mmpering with its own preroga-
tives by the winner, and it is seeking to protect those prerogatives by co-
ordinating a policy position paper with all parties prior to the balloting.
Such a pact would do much to allay tnilitary ccincerns, but would not
preclude coup phitting before or after the election, particularly if the
Christian Democrats win.
The Marxist guerrillas of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation
Front OFMLN) and their political allies in the Revolutionary Democratic
Front (FDR) clearly regard the election as a major challenge, The
guerrillas appear especial's, concerned that an honest election with a
large voter turnout could strerigthen the legitimacy of the government
and harm their cause as the election did in 1982, but the coming
election does not ret3resent fttr them the critical test that it does for the
Salvadoran Goverrmient and participatirm parties.
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The FDR-FMLN alliance has denounced the balloting as a US-
inspired farce,
In our judgment, the
insurgents are likely to step up attacks on selected towns and cities and
to attempt various sabotage, terrorist, and other spectacular operations
against public utilities, bridges, and military installations.
the guerrillas are not likely to mount a general
nationwide offensive because they consider it too costly in men and
materiel and fear it would be politically counterproductive Instead,
guerrilla actions probably will be aimed at eroding confidence in the
government, undermining military morale, distracting attention from
the electoral process, and reducing voter turnout in some key areas.
The armed forces will be stretched thin, and the insurgents may
adjust their strategy depending On the results of the initial balloting. On
balance, however, we believe that the armed forces can provide
sufficient security in most areas of the country to ensure a large election
turnout and protect both rounds of balloting.
It is unlikely that any of the slates for the three largest parties could
win a majority in the 25 March balloting. Instead, the two top parties
probably will face one another in a runoff election, which must be held
within 30 days after the initial balloting results have been certified. The
party coming in third on 25 March is likely to play a significant role in
determining the outcome of the runoff election*
The Christian Democratic Party (PDC) is likely to win a plurality
of between 40 and 50 percent in the first ballot. The ultraconservative
Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) probably will place second,
followed by the moderately conservative National Conciliation Party
(PCN). Hence, a runoff probably will take place in late April or early
May between the PDC and ARENA candidates, with the PCN in the
swing position Although the PDC might be able to win a runoff without
direct support from the PCN, ARENA probably cannot In the event
that the PCN agrees to support the PDC, as one source reports has al-
ready occurred, the Christian Democrats' chances of winning would be
enhanced.
The assassination of a leading presidential contender would change
the electoral situation dramatically. The loss of Roberto D'Auhuisson
would be a serious blow to ARENA, but the assassination of Jose
Napoleon Duarte would not necessarily harm�and might even im-
prove�prospects for the Christian Democratic Party because it could
offer a strong replacement candidate. The assassination of either major
presidential candidate, however, would undermine the credibility of
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the electoral process and could precipitate serious partisan violence
after the balloting.
Whoever is elected president of El Salvador will be constrained in
exercising his power by the military, by the current Legislative
Assembly and that elected in 1985, by the new Constitution, and,
inevitably, by US policy demands At the top of his agenda will be the
need to reach an accommodation with the military and opposition
political parties, to mollify the private sector, and to assure a continued
flow of US military and economic assistance.
The victory of a conservative coalition headed by ARENA leader
Roberto D'Aubuisson would probably result in the eventual undoing of
reforms and the loss of needed domestic and international support. The
first reaction of the military will be to keep him in line, and support
from the armed forces and the private sector could sour over time An
attempt to further politicize the military, for example, could lead to a
crisis within the officer corps. Moreover, if a cutoff in US assistance ap-
peared imminent, a major confrontation between the government and
the military could ensue.
Despite D'Aubuisson's views on counterinsurgency tactics, he is not
likely to deal more effectively with the guerrillas D'Aubuisson has a
simplistic prescription for the insurgency�the "scorched earth" ap-
proach�that does not deal with the current reality of the war. The
Army would be no more capable than before of dealing with trained
and well-coordinated insurgent units that can draw on considerable
external support Furthermore, a campaign of brutal repression would
cause popular support to drop and provoke a cutoff in foreign aid.
Moreover, some officers and men would recoil from the tactics of
suppression. There would be desertions to the guerrillas, increasing
popular support for the guerrillas, and a large refugee exodus
Meanwhile, ARENA 's unsavory image abroad would limit its
ability to secure foreign economic loans and aid, further reducing the
potential for businessmen to invest in the economy. Most labor organiza-
tions dislike ARENA policies, and intimidation of moderates and
liberals by ARENA could cause members of the democratic opposition
to side with the insurgents or leave the country. Clearly, such a
government would also face negative public opinion in the United
States, particularly if the human rights situation did not improve. This
would make it even more difficult for Washington to carry out its
policies in El Salvador and elsewhere in the region.
We believe the implications of a victory by a centrist coalition led
by Christian Democratic candidate Duarte for the future of El
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Salvador�and for US regional policy�would be significant more
favrtrable thatt would be the case with an ultraright victory. The
standing of El Salvador with some Latin American and West European
countries would improve, and US policy toward San Salvador would be
more acceptable internationally. Nloreoirer, in an effort to secure a
political solution to the conflict, a centrist government would probably
be more inclined to niove toward reconciliaticm with those Msurgent
den it' who could be persuaded to participate in the democratic
process.
Nevertheless, a victory by a Christian Dernocratic-dominated
coalition would be divisive if 1)uarte and the rest of the Christian
Democratic leadership were to pursue policies that the private sector
and the armed forces perceived to be inimical to their institutional
interests and their ability to conduct the war�such as a more vigorous
reform program or a restructuring of the military command. Even if
the Christian Democratic leadership and its coalitkai partners respected
the military's prerogatives, political inachinatitnis by the extreme right
and disinformatitm by the extrerne left ccaild reinforce the armed
forces deep suspicion of the Christian Democrats, generatirtg triajor
tensions and impeding the leadership's ability to govern
The elections are a necessary step in the transition to dentocracy,
but by themselves they will not provide a near-term solution to endemic
political, social, and military institutional problems* Violence will
continue, and US pressure and support will still be requirecl to achieve
political, economic, and military progress.
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DISCUSSION
1, On 25 March, after four years of widespread
violence, economic chaos, and social upheaval, Salva-
dorans will be able to vote for a president If no
candidate gets a majority of the votes a runoff
between the two top contenders will be held approxi-
mately a month later. After the inauguration, sched-
uled for 1 June, the new president will have five years
in which to attempt to bring the war to an end while
establishing the social and economic conditions neces-
sary for stability.
The Stakes
2. Most Salvadorans are even more anxious for an
end to the guerrilla conflict now than when they
elected a Constituent Assembly in March 1981 At that
time 13 million voters turned out�estimated at some
80 percent of those eligible�to choose provincial
representatives tasked with putting together a frame-
work for democratic government that would achieve
peace and stability. For many Salvadorans that goal
probably appears as elusive as ever, and, for some,
another election in the midst of war and considerable
civilian displacement may seem futile. The US Embas-
sy reports that over a quarter of a million citizens�
mostly peasants�are displaced from their homes by
violence and economic hardship within El Salvador.
Conservative estimates suggest that a similar number
have migrated to nearby countries and the United
States since 1979.
S. Nevertheless, the psychological resiliency of the
Salvadoran populace is impressive. Labor unions re-
main active, and democratic peasant organizations
show increased political power and resolve despite
rightist pressures Meanwhile, the managerial sector�
made up of businessmen and professionals�also ap-
pears committed to seeing the conflict through. Its
political and economic pressure groups are now more
active in public debate than at any time since the 1979
coup Capital flight has slowed dramatically, and El
Salvador's economic decline seems to have bottomed
out Indeed, some growth may be possible this year
with continued international financial aid to cover
government debt servicing and generate investment
credit for the priy�ate sector. If this trend is to con-
tinue, the population will need to perceive that the
presidential election is a success.
4 Leaders of the political parties are conducting a
vigorous election campaign. One opinion poll indicat-
ed that an overwhelming majority of the electorate
would be voting in the hope that the election would
bring peace, but the various political groupings have
offered few substantive ideas about how to achieve it.
Although the six registered presidential candidates
recently participated in an unprecedentedly dignified
public debate, the campaign has consisted largely of
personal attacks and oratory about economic revital-
ization This crude strategy could pay some dividends
however, at least for the more established parties
Name-calling between candidates tends to comple-
ment traditional Salvadoran emphases especially
among the less educated, on personalism patronage,
and loyalty to the group. Other recent opinion polls
suggest that jobs and the cost of living may be of more
immediate importance to a majority of Salvadorans
than the less concrete notion of peace.
5. The issue for the Salvadoran elite, however, is
more than just who wins. The quality of the election�
turnout, procedures, results�ideally should equal or
exceed that of 1982. A successful election with wide-
spread participation and the formation of a broad-
based government would improve the government's
image at home and abroad, undermining the appeal of
the guerrillas It might lead some non-Marxist ele-
ments in the insurgent alliance to participate in the
1985 elections for the Legislative Assembly. A tainted
and poorly run election would have largely the oppo-
site effect It would be likely to result in greater
polarization, to increase the appeal of the guerrillas,
and perhaps to renew coup plotting within the mili-
tary
6. The military plays a central role in the election
by protecting the balloting and accepting the results.
The transition to more democratic rule since the coup
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in 1979 has not been easy for the military, and
political problems continue in the officer corps. A
powerful minority of ultrarightist officers in the
armed forces controls a significant number of troops
hese of fic rs might
press for the overthrow of a new government led by
the Christian Democrats, or readily carry out the
draconian policies of a new administration tinder the
Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA).
7. The majority of the officer corps, however,
probably adheres to the conservative pragmatism of
Defense Minister Vides and officers of the high com-
mand, who have pledged that the military will respect
the outcome A top priority for the military will be
protection of its institutional autonomy xis-a-vis an
elected civilian government, and assurances that a new
administration will not make political concessions to
the guerrillas. According to the US Embassy, President
Magana will attempt prior to the election, to get all
the political parties to approve a military position
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S. The Marxist guerrillas of the Farabundo Marti
National Liberation Movement (FMLN) and their
political allies in the Revolutionary Democratic Front
(1/311) clearly regard the election as a major challenge,
but it does not represent for them the critical test that
it does for the Salvadoran Government and participat-
ing parties. The insurgents are concerned that�short
of achieving a power-sharing arrangement with San
Salvador�prospects for a successful Marxist revolu-
tion will worsen if the country institutionalizes its
reforms and representative government, but they are
unwilling to take part in elections for fear of losing.
We believe this is due largely to the failure of the
leftist alliance to widen its popularity with the elector-
ate in the two years since the elections for the
Constituent Assembly�now the Legislative Assembly,
9. Nevertheless, the guerrillas have managed to
maintain the strength of their combat forces and have
scored significant tactical successes against the govern
-
mein. Though some insurgent leaders doubt they can
overthrow the government as long as it continues to
receive US aid, the momentum generated by guerrilla
successes probably has convinced other commanders
that military victory is possible.
10. A successful presidential election would consti-
tute a political setback for the insurgents Locally, it
probably would cause the insurgents morale problems
and make it more difficult to attract new recruits.
Overseas, it would lead to a dropoff in financial and
'cal support from left-of-center backers in West-
Europe, some of whom already appear to be
amining their support for the guerrilla cause.
1. Foreign military, financial, and diplomatic sup-
port will remain a key factor in the ultimate success of
any government that is formed after the balloting. A
well run election would go a long way to achieve this,
and it also is likely that San Salvador would achieve
greater leverage in regional affairs�such as the Con-
tadora peace initiative discouraging outside sponsor-
ship of power-sharing talks with the insurgents. Con-
versely. if the balloting is poorly run or the results are
tainted, progress the government has made in diplo-
matic circles will be undermined and foreign aid to
the country is likely to be in jeopardy,
Political Parties and Candidates
The Christian Democratic Party (PDC)
12. As in past elections, the Christian Democrats
will be on the left end of the political spectrum in the
25 March contest According to most opinion polls no
other candidate is more popular than PDC, candidate
Jose Napoleon Duarte,' (See inset) At age 58, and two
years out of power, he is recognized as the country's
preeminent reformist politician Nevertheless, Duarte
is not universally admired, and we believe he will not
achieve a majority victory in the first round of the
election. As titular head of the civilian-military junta
from December 1980 to April 1982, Duarte presided
over a nation racked by violence and precipitant
economic decline. Despite his relatively pragmatic
handling of most of the crises facing the government
at that time, his stubborn personal idealism and his
vanity reinforced his radical and intransigent image
within the armed forces the private sector, and
probably among many citizens who voted against his
party in the March 1982 Constituent Assembly elec-
tions.
Biographic profiles on all six
candidates appear in the annex
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et'S'EreREZ,
sidenti d vice-presidential
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13. US Embassy and other reporting suggests that
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Duarte is aware of this and is attempting to alter his
tyle
Some members of Duart s party want
the PDC ticket to make a greater effort to attract
middle-class professional voters, lest they cast their lot
with conservative parties that could strengthen D'Au-
buissoMs hand in a runoff.
14. The PDC leadership is upbeat about the coming
election and its -peace and jobs- platform. Reporting
suggests the party has accumulated a respectable war
chest from local fundraising activities and donations
from international democratic organizations Well
attended rallies in the cities and towns and stumping
in the countryside suggest greater momentum for the
Christian Democrats than they had during the 1982
campaign. Although several opinion polls conducted
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by various sponsors lack consensus on the margin of
voter preference, all seem to indicate that the PDC
ticket is likely to receive a plurality at least as solid as
the 40 Percent captured by the Party in 1982.
Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA)
15. Nearly three years have passed since the
ARENA party was founded, essentially as a political
vehicle for former Army major D'Aubuisson (see inset)
and some ultrarightist associates engaged in coup
plotting and terrorist activities Since then, the party
has used its highly nationalistic, anti-Communist, eco-
nomically conservative message to secure significant
financial resources and to develop an impressive politi-
cal machine with a broad constituency. Sizable por-
tions of both the urban working classes and the
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peasantry voted for the party in the 1982 Assembly
election, and attendance at recent ARENA rallies
reportedly has been high. Although I)*Aubuisson re-
mains the party's charismatic leader and was chosen
unanimously as its presidential candidate, the organi-
zation appears to be managed by upper-middle-class
professionals and businessmen like vice-presidential
candidate Hugo Barrera. A variety of conservative
pressure groups also have affiliated themselves vvith
ARENA
16. According to the US Embassy, D'Atibuisson is
exuding confidence at press conferences and political
rallies but it is doubtful that ARENA is significantly
stronger than in 1982. Indeed rather than enhancing
its popular mandate on 25 March, ARENA could have
Problems maintaining its 1982 voting share of 30
percent. Since the Assembly elections, a few reports
have suggested that D'Aubuisson has lost favor among
some conservative backers because of his inability to
control either the provisional government or the
armed forces, and because of his ineffectiveness in
blocking reform legislation. Past reporting also has
suggested that sonic followers recruited earlier from
more moderate parties may have defected back, per-
haps alienated by the political extremism and anti ITS
sentiment associated with ARENA and in particular,
by D'Atibuisson's notoriety as a sponsor of death
squads. The 25 March balloting will see ARENA
sharing the conservative vote with at least four other
parties, and reportedly its leaders are concerned about
their prospects if they face the Christian Democrats in
a runoff. No moderate conservative party is commit
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Party of National Conciliation (PCN)
17. The PCN, formerly the official party, appears
to be in a stronger Position than in 1982 despite a
major internal split. Led by moderately conservative
landowners, businessmen, and professionals, PCN
ranks are made up of middle- and lower-middle-class
workers and peasants According to US Embassy offi-
ials, some 10,000 supporters�many of them appar-
ently bused in from the countryside by party organiz-
ers�attended the December nominating convention
in San Salvador. Judging from media accounts presi-
dential and vice-presidential candidates Francisco
Guerrero and Pio Ayala have carried on an active
campaign particularly in the small rural towns The
PCN may be short of money. The US Embassy has
reported that PCN leaders have suggested that Wash-
ington finance the party.
18. Although some of its leaders reportedly expect
to place second in the March balloting, PCN probably
will receive the third-largest bloc of votes in the
election�perhaps 15 to 20 percent, according to
recent polls It has moderated its policies to appeal to a
centrist constituency and hopes to present a middle
ground between the far-right ARENA and the left-of-
center Christian Democrats. The PCN also views itself
as a swing party in any runoff between ARENA and
the PDC. Moreover, Guerrero and other PCN officials
probably maintain many traditional links to the armed
forces, who founded the party as an electoral vehicle
to legitimize military rule. Most officers probably
would prefer to see the PCN ticket prevail in the
coming election PCN leaders know that is unlikely,
but they hope that the military will look favorably on
them in a coalition
Salvadoran Authentic Institutional Party (PAISA)
19. PAISA was formed in October 1982 by its
presidential candidate, former Army colonel Roberto
Escobar Garcia. Once a stalwart of the PCN, Escobar
served as a cabinet minister in two military govern-
ments before retiring in the aftermath of the 1979
coup Escobar 's new political grouping grew a year ago
when nine of 14 PCN deputies in the current Legisla-
tive Assembly announced they would switch alle-
giance to PAISA from the more moderate leadership
of the PCN. Current Assembly President Julia Castillo
and her colleagues had represented the right wing of
an already conservative PCN, and their defection gave
the new PAISA a particularly hardline orientation.
The party has been hoping to capture the support
of conservatives disillusioned with D'Aubuissonws
ARENA and the PCN. Nevertheless we believe that
PAISA will have to struggle just to place fourth in the
balloting and is likely to seek alignment with ARENA
during the election and its aftermath.
The Smaller Parties
20 According to the US Embassy, four other all
conservative parties have legally qualified to partici-
pate in the March election The Democratic Action
(AD) party remains an enigma to most observers The
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US Embassy views the party's constituency as some-
what right of center, but its leadership appears in-
creasingly populist and centrist. The party's presiden-
tial aspirant, Rene Fortin Magana, claims that his
two-year-old party is a social democratic movement
led by reform-minded intellectuals and professionals.
Despite its tiny membership and lack of funding and
organization, AD received 8 percent of the vote in
1982. Because of a system of proportional representa-
tion that generally favors larger parties, AD received
only two Assembly seats,
The party may raise its share of the 1982
vote and would be like y to side with the Christian
Democrats in a runoff election against the rightwing
parties.
21. The Salvadoran Popular Party (PPS) is an ultra-
conservative grouping that represents the interests of
bankers, agrobusinessmen, and other industrial and
commercial elites. An early rightwing splinter of the
old ruling National Conciliation Party, the PPS has run
candidates in every election since its founding in 1965.
Its candidate for the March presidential contest is
Francisco Quinonez, a wealthy entrepreneur who
recently stepped down as head of the government's
Peace Commission. The December nominating con-
vention for the PPS attracted perhaps 1,000 support-
ers. The party is unlikely to improve much upon its
1982 share of 3 percent of the ballots, which won it a
single seat in the Constituent Assembly. Two other far-
right parties�the Popular Orientation Party (POP)
and the Centrist Stable Republican Movement
(MERECEN)�are unlikely to attract significant sup-
port and would side with ARENA along with the PPS.
The Electoral Process
22. As in 1982, the mechanics of the March ballot-
ing are being handled by the Central Elections Coun-
cil, representing most of the political parties in the
Assembly. Council plans for running the polling cen-
ters, distributing the ballots, and tabulating the votes
9
are similar to those of 1982. During the 1982 contest,
the council printed and numbered 2 million ballots,
some 1.5 million of which were used in the election.
Approximately 300 polling places housing 4,500 voting
tables were open during 1982, and most were super-
vised by more than one independent observer and
protected by security personnel. This year, some 8,000
voting boxes capable of handling 500 ballots each are
to be distributed. We believe that most supervisory
measures to discourage fraud that were effective in
1982 will again be used by the council The use of
indelible ink to mark the fingers of voters will proba-
bly be more effective than the invisible ink and black
light method used in 1982.
23, The major difference in the running of this
election will be voter registration. In 1982, open
registration governed the balloting, enabling anyone
with a valid identification card to vote for the party of
his choice anywhere in the country. Although fraud
was not a significant factor in the 1982 election some
Salvadoran political leaders and members of the elec-
tion council have insisted on local registration as a
guard against voting irregularities. The council has
installed new computers to facilitate both the registra-
tion process and tabulation of votes. Registration of
voter IDs depends on local municipal records, howev-
er, and some identification records no longer exist
because of guerrilla attacks on townhalls. A new
'registry should be completed on time, although it may
omit a relatively small number of eligible voters
24. The balloting is structured so that most voters
will cast their ballots in the municipalities where their
identification cards were issued. The new electoral law
states, however, that some people will be allowed to
vote in surrogate polling centers�a procedure that
will help reduce the threat of lowered turnout, This
will relieve the burden on tens of thousands of dis-
placed adults now living in refugee camps inside El
Salvador
25. The quality of the election should be equal, if
not superior, to that of 1982 to undercut critics and
guerrilla propagandists who are ready to denounce the
election as a sham. Almost certainly there will be
mechanical problems that will affect the speed and
efficiency of balloting and tabulation in some jurisdic-
tions. Many technical assistants and observers hired by
the elections council in 1982, for example, were poorly
trained and needed constant supervision to avoid
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multiple errors. This was partly offset, however, by
foreign observers and journalists who generally put
logistic problems into perspective and lent important
legitimacy to the balloting process. A number of West
European and Latin American governments and orga-
nizations have accepted San Salvador's invitations to
send observers, but most of those invited have de-
clined. There is no word yet on whether the govern-
ment will issue credentials to all media representatives
who request them
26. The military has once again announced that it
will abstain from the voting. Some elements within the
military, however, probably will attempt to influence
the way people vote in certain localities. For example,
Defense Minister Vides and other senior officers re-
portedly have reprimanded at least two field com-
manders for intimidating peasants to vote for D'Au-
buisson. Although the high command will discourage
intimidation, we believe that some individual com-
manders will attempt to influence voters.
The Security Situation
27 In the period leading up to the Constituent
Assembly elections, we had good information that the
guerrillas planned to disrupt the balloting The guerril-
las followed their plan closely, including penetrations
of the capital on election day, but the military effec-
tively countered this offensive, and the electorate
successfully cast ballots in most areas of the country.
28. The 1982 elections were a major setback for the
guerrillas and caused serious infighting and tactical
dislocations among their various factions for several
months. In mid-October 1982, however, a new dual
political military strategy was introduced by the
FMLN-FDR alliance that has kept the Salvadoran
military largely on the defensive The guerrillas have
launched repeated offensive operations employing
larger and more sophisticated units that now can
threaten lightly equipped 350-man Army battalions.
The guerrillas also have been scoring propaganda
points by pushing for a power-sharing arrangement
with San Salvador. Information indicates that insur-
gent leaders believe that, if they could achieve a cease-
fire and integrate cadres into the government and the
armed forces, they could inspire popular support,
control the military, and eventually consolidate full
power over the country
Guerrilla Strategy and Capabilities
29. The 1984 presidential election, however, com-
plicates the guerrillas' quest for power. With the
installation of a popularly elected government�a new
Legislative Assembly is to be elected in April 1985�
San Salvador stands to receive greater domestic and
international support, political and military. We lack
good information, however, on guerrilla military strat-
egy and intentions in dealing with the election. So far,
the guerrillas have denounced the balloting as a fraud,
and stated that, while they will not attempt to disrupt
the voting nationwide, they will continue normal
military operations and prevent balloting in areas they
control.
30. We do not believe the guerrillas will allow the
elections to take place unimpeded, or that they will
Launch a general offensive to disrupt the elections
nationwide. The guerrillas recognize the damage that
the election can do to their cause, but are also aware
that their ability to disrupt or postpone it is limited.
They would calculate that a nationwide general offen-
sive would be extremely costly in men and materiel,
would fail militarily, would not prevent the elections,
and would be likely to undercut their international
standing.
31. The guerrillas are more likely to coordinate
concentrated attacks on civilian and military targets
during the election period. Their objective would be to
erode confidence in the government, undermine mill-
tary morale, reduce voter turnout in key areas, and
tarnish the image of the newly elected government.
32. Recent reports indicate the insurgents are plan-
ning concentrated attacks in San Salvador and selected
departmental capitals. Guerrilla forces have been con-
centrating in traditional staging areas north of San
Salvador, and all five FMLN factions reportedly will
carry out operations to discourage voter turnout.
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. This is to be accompanied elsewhere in the
country with a steady increase in terrorist bombings
and assassination attempts against politicians and pos-
sibly US personnel. The guerrillas also are capable of
various spectaculars, including, for example, another
attack on Ilopango airbase, sabotage of major hydro-
electric facilities and key bridges, or the destruction of
oil storage tanks at the modern port of Acandla in
western El Salvador.
34. In the event of a runoff election, the insurgents
may change their strategy. If it appears on the basis of
the first round balloting that the election is going
badly from their point of view�a large turnout, with
a stable coalition government likely�they may decide
to launch a major offensive to prevent a second round.
On the other hand, if the turnout is low, ARENA looks
like a winner, or coup plotting is under way, they may
take a hands-off attitude.
Although there is little chance for a dramatic
near-term consolidation of the five factions into a
single guerrilla army, we expect more interfaetional
cooperation during this election period than in 1982
Government Strategy and Capabilities
37 The military�with considerable US assist-
ance�is developing a comprehensive security plan
centers
targets.
38 The armed forces lack sufficient personnel to
simultaneously garrison population centers, defend
economic and military installations, and pursue the
enemy in the field. An effort is under way in some
areas to supplement small security forces with local
civil defense forces, but the lack of weapons, training,
and prover leadership will continue to hinder progress.
that entails large-scale patrolling operations in the
countnrside until shortly before the elections, when it
will assume a more static defense posture. As a result
of recent command changes, more competent and
aggressive officers are directing their forces against
some areas of guerrilla concentration to keep the
insurgents from mobilizing for raids on population
military outposts, and important economic
39. The government will have difficulty establish-
ing adequate security in much of the north and east
before the election In 1982 the government placed no
ballot boxes in about 30 municipalities located in areas
of guerrilla concentration. This time because the
insurgents have greater mobility, firepower, and influ-
ence in some conflict zones than in 1982, the govern-
ment plans not to place ballot boxes in over 70 of the
261 municipalities nationwide (See map.) The insur-
gents may seek to capitalize on this by claiming they
have significantly expanded their areas of control since
1982. Moreover, some guerrilla leaders might declare a
-liberated zone- for propaganda effect, although they
would be unlikely to try to hold their ground if the
armed forces challenge them.
40. Nevertheless, we believe that the armed forces
can provide adequate security in most areas of the
country to ensure a successful election turnout and to
protect the balloting. The guerrillas lack the strength
to overrun all major population centers in the east
simultaneously, but the armed forces will be stretched
thin and the insurgents may be able to make successful
incursions into one of the departmental capitals, as
they did in 1982. Although the insurgents can tempo-
rarily disrupt major road links with the north or east,
they cannot isolate those entire regions to prevent all
balloting.
Possible Outcomes
41 The Christian Democrats have the only party
with any real hope of attaining a first-round victory in
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ACNO
Contested Area Balloting
* Municipality with no voting in
1982 election
o Municipality where voting snot
scheduled for the March 1984
election
LA Insurgent concentration
PO
Pacific
2
111ifittifittatti
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the 25 March balloting. Opinion polls generally suggest
voting patterns similar to those in 1982, with the PDC
placing first, ARENA second, and the PCN a close
third. A large percentage of poll respondents, however,
remain undecided about their choice for president
42, The Christian Democrats hope to build on the
40 percent of the vote they captured in 1982. Recent
reporting indicates that they have gained additional
support from some peasant and urban labor organiza-
tions as a result of their strong reformist stance in the
Assembly and their promises to position these elements
in a new government Nevertheless, the PDC will have
to attract support from additional sectors to garner
more than 50 percent of the vote. An ARENA victory
in the 25 March balloting is unlikely because conserva-
tive voters will be distributed among several rightist
parties.
43. Prospects for a first-round victory also might be
diminished if some voters decide to vote for the
smaller parties in the first round, knowing that the
second-round ballot is the one that really counts. For
example, some middle-class voters who might have
been persuaded to vote for the PDC, may balk at the
controversial Duarte candidacy and cast their first-
round ballot for the tiny, centrist Democratic Action
party. Similarly, potential second-round ARENA vot-
ers might throw their support initially to the smaller
ultraright parties.. Others could decide to support the
center-right PCN on the assumption that a vote for the
AD or the PPS would be wasted, while the PCN is in a
strong enough position to challenge both political
extremes
Runoff Election Possibilities
44. A runoff election most likely would match the
Christian Democrats against ARENA. Although such a
contest would have some polarizing effect within
society, it also would offer the electorate a definitive
choice and probably inspire a good voter turnout.
45. According to the new electoral law, party slates
cannot be altered between the first and second rounds
of balloting. Thus the PDC and ARENA could not
form coalitions by offering the vice-presidential slot to
another party, but they probably would seek the
support of other parties by offering positions in the
cabinet or other political favors
13
46. In the second round, the AD probably would
align itself with the Christian Democrats while the
four rightwing parties�PPS, PAISA, POP, and
MERECEN�would look to ARENA. This would
leave the PCN in a swing position. Even with the
backing of all the far-right parties, ARENA almost
certainly would require the support of most PCN
voters to defeat the PDC. Likewise, PCN backing for
the Christian Democrats would virtually assure success
for Duarte and his party, although it is possible that
the PDC could win a runoff election if it came to
terms only with the AD and its middle-class constitu-
48. It is highly unlikely the PCN could win a first-
round victory, but there is an outside chance it might
place second in the first round balloting behind the
Christian Democrats. This is the scenario most feared
by the PDC, which is concerned that the PCN's
moderate rightist presidential candidate, Francisco
Guerrero, could attract sufficient votes in the second
round from the far right and the center to gain the
presidency. For such an outcome to occur, however,
the well funded and highly organized ARENA would
have to stumble badly.
49. If D'Aubuisson or Duarte were assassinated, the
electoral situation would change dramatically. The loss
of D'Aubuisson would be a serious blow to ARENA's
prospects because the party lacks an adequate replace-
ment for its well-known and charismatic presidential
candidate It would also give the PCN a large boost
and greatly improve its chances for a second place
finish.
50. The assassination of Duarte, however, would
not necessarily harm the PDC's election prospects.
Foreign Minister Fidel Chavez Mena is the logical
replacement candidate, and his stature within the
party as well as his rapport with conservative sectors of
society would bring to the ticket advantages that
Duarte lacks. The assassination of either major presi-
dential contender, however, would undermine the
credibility of the electoral process and could precipi-
tate serious partisan violence after the balloting.
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Implications of the Election
51. Whoever is elected president of El Salvador�
Duarte, D'Aubuisson, or conceivably Guerrero of the
PCN�will be constrained in exercising his power by
the military, the current Legislative Assembly and that
elected in 1985, the new Constitution and, inevitably,
US policy demands At the top of his agenda will be
the need to reach an accommodation with the military
and opposition political parties, to mollify the private
sector, and to assure a continued flow of US military
and economic assistance To achieve this agenda the
new president�at least over the near term�probably
ill be forced to adopt the cautious pragmatism of the
provisional governments that have preceded him since
the 1979 coup
PDC Victory
52. A majority win on 25 March by the Christian
Democrats would assure continued progress toward
reforms but it would also carry with it significant
risks. A first-round victory by the PDC could be
viewed by Duarte as a mandate to push more ambi-
tious social and economic reforms. Such reformist zeal
would be likely to antagonize military and civilian
rightists, leading to possible coup plotting or other
destabilizing activities Even if the Christian Demo-
crats were to follow a cautious path, their radical
image among conservatives�who especially distrust
Duarte�could provoke a confrontation pitting the
executive branch against the military and conservative
civilian leaders.
53. Prospects for continued moderation of the polit-
ical process and long-term social and economic devel-
opment probably would be enhanced if a PDC victory
did not result until the second round. In a runoff
election, Duarte most likely would seek the backing of
one or both of the more centrist parties�the AD and
the PCN. If the AD and, more important, the PCN
agreed to back the PDC in exchange for positions in
the new administration and other favors then centrists
in the executive branch would he sharing power with a
centrist majority in the Assembly. Such a coalition
would offer the best chance for support from the
private sector, organized labor, and the military for
policies favorable to long-term democratization and
economic recovery.
54. A key to stability for such an arrangement
would be the attitude of the armed forces. The
inclusion of the AD and the PCN in a PDC-led
coalition probably would reassure the majority of the
officer corps. Although suspicious of Duarte, conserva-
tive officers would be prepared to work with his
administration as long as perceived objectionable tend-
encies within the PDC were offset by the pragmatism
of conservative elements within the coalition. In turn,
support from the military would help the new govern-
ment to reach an accommodation with some civilian
rightist elements in the other parties and the private
sector.
55. Nevertheless, a victory by a Christian Demo-
cratic-dominated coalition would be divisive if Duarte
and the rest of the Christian Democratic leadership
were to pursue policies that the private sector and the
armed forces perceived to be inimical to their institu-
tional interests and their ability to conduct the war�
such as a more vigorous reform program or a restruc-
turing of the military command. Even if the PDC
leadership and its coalition partners respected the
military's prerogatives, political machinations by the
extreme right and disinformation by the extreme left
could reinforce the armed forces' deep suspicion of the
PDC, generating major tensions and impeding the
leadership's ability to govern.
56. A Duarte presidency would assure continued
progress toward reforms, and popular support for the
government would grow, rather than trending toward
the guerrillas A Duarte presidency would have little
near-term impact on the tactical military situation, but
the government would be more inclined to move
toward reconciliation with insurgent elements that
could be persuaded to participate in the legislative
elections in 1985. Prospects for a political settlement,
however, would be severely constrained by the mili-
tary's fear of a sellout and the guerrillas basic intransi-
gence
57. It is unlikely that a Christian Democratic-led
government would make much progress on the eco-
nomic front, and much will depend on whether
Duarte seeks the cooperation of the private sector.
Nevertheless, economic prospects might improve
somewhat because a moderate government would be
in a better position to attract foreign aid. Any substan-
tial increase in foreign investment, however, will
depend primarily on improvement in the security
situation.
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58. El Salvador's diplomatic position probably
would improve Some West European governments
would be more inclined to upgrade their relations, but
bias against El Salvador in Western Europe and Latin
America will remain strong. The government's legiti-
macy would be strengthened, perhaps enabling its
leaders to press for a regional treaty in the Contadora
context more favorable to its own and US interests El
Salvador's image in the United States probably would
improve as well, strengthening public support for
Washington's policies in the region
ARENA Victory
59. A first-round victory by D'Aubuisson would
create at least as many problems as one by Duarte.
D'Aubuisson and his party could, for example, inter-
pret an outright victory as a mandate to undo most of
the economic and agrarian reforms initiated in the
past four years Such actions would require repressive
violence, leading to an even greater polarization of
Salvadoran society, and virtually preclude any hope of
attracting external support. An ARENA victory would
further politicize the armed forces A major confronta-
tion with the military could ensue if a cutoff in US
assistance appeared imminent.
. Victory by ARENA in a runoff election would
be less problematic, at least in the near term, to the
extent that ARENA entered into a coalition with
other, less radical parties PA1SA, the PPS, and espe-
cially the PCN would exert at least some moderating
influence. Nevertheless, over the longer term, pros-
pects for successful political and economic leadership
by a conservative coalition would probably vvorsen.
Such a government might be preferred initially by the
15
armed forces, but an attempt by a rightist civilian
administration to subordinate the military command
structure to a particular ideology or economic strategy
could provoke a crisis
61. Although there would be strong domestic pri-
vate-sector confidence in an ARENA government,
local economic and security conditions still would
hamper capital investment Moreover, foreign assist-
ance would be constrained by skepticism over the
policies�real or imagined�of a rightwing adminis-
tratiori. The new government also would be less
willing and able to engage the guerrillas or their
political allies in a dialogue.
62. Mkubuisson has a simplistic prescription for the
in scorched earth- approach�that
does not deal with the current reality of the war. The
Army would be no more capable than before of
dealing with trained and well-coordinated insurgent
units that can draw on considerable external support.
Furthermore, a campaign of bmtal repression would
cause popular support to drop and provoke a cutoff in
foreign aid. Moreover, some officers and men would
I ecoil from the tactics of suppreSSi011, There would be
desertions to the guerrillas, increasing popular support
for the guerrillas, and a large tel exodus
63. Under an ARENA-led coalition government,
the human rights situation would be unlikely to irn-
prove. While death squad activity might Wane some-
what if the ultraright felt less compulsion to use this
form of control so indiscriminately, the persecution
and intimidation of political opponents could escalate,
driving many of them to side with the insurgents or to
leave the country.
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DIS E
ATION NOTICE
1. This document was disseminated by the Directorate of intelligence.
furs of some source material reflected herein, this copy is for th
and use of the recipient only.
2. This be retained, or destroyed by burning in accordance vn
turned to the Directorate of Intelligence.
esseminated overseas, the overseas recipients
At the end of this period, the document should
enty, or permission should be requested of the for
with IAC4)-69/2, 22 June 1953.
4. The title of this document when used separately from the text is unclassited.
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