MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Fall of the Libyan Monarchy
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06809342
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: August 20, 2019
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2019
• Publication Date: October 16, 1969

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October 16, 1969
MEMORANUUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
The President asked that 1 send you a copy of this paper which was
received in this office. He would appreciate your comments on it
by November 6.
Henry A. Kissinger
Attachment
This same memo sent to: The Secretary of Defensel:
The Attorney General
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c3NrIr ENTIAL
EXCLUSIVELY/EYES ONLY
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EXCLUSI
ENTIA.L October 22, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR
The Director 4 Central Intelligence
Per our conversation attached is the paper,
"The Modern World, A Single 'Strategic
Theater".
Henry A. Kissinger
Attachment
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CON
EX SIVELY/EYES ONLY
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 14, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR
� HENRY KISSINGER
This is to return your memorandum to the President providing
a strategic overview of world relations.
Please note that the President wants you to send this, together
with a note from the President, to Secretary Laird, Secretary
Rogers and Attorney General Mitchell. They should be asked to
comment on it and to have their comments to the President within
a two-week period, due date November 6.
Attachment
1.1
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COLE-
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WHITE HOUg"
WASNINOTOT
� MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESID7r-'NT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger K,
SUBJECT: A Strategic Overview
Attached is a memorandum written by an acquaintance of mint..
which provides a rather comprehensive assessment of the Units
States' position in the world. Although I do not agree with its
every last word, it does define the problem we face -- the
generally deteriorating strategic position of the United States
during the past decade.
Many analysts have written about the problems faced by the
�ComMunists. But 1 do not believe that the world situation, as
viewed from Moscow, provides great cause for Communist
pessimism.
Andrei. Zhdanov's "two-camp'.' speech in September 1947 referred
only to Bulgaria, Poland and Romania as relatively secure Com-
munist.states and allies. He saw no real possibility in the Middle
East and no hope in Latin America. He considered China to be
imperialist. But Zhclanov's pessimistic outlook has not been
justified by subsequent events -- certainly during the last decade.
���
11.�
In the Middle East, Russian influence is spreading and
moderate Arab governments are under increasing
pressure:
In Latin America, the potential for guerrilla warfare
grows, and the outlook for future Nasser-type (if not
Communist), anti-American governments improves.
In Europe, NATO is in a state of malaise, accentuated
by our shifting policies over the last 10 years. Europeans
are increasingly concerned about isolationist currents
within the U. S. (particularly within the liberal community).
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In Asia, as you saw on your trip, leaders are concerned
about the future U.S. role there.
You inherited this legacy of the past decade. The lesson one can
draw from, it is not that we can fight this trend on every issue. But
foreign policy depends on an accumulation of nuances, and no opponent
of ours can have much reason to believe that we will stick to our
position on the issues which divide us. When Hanoi compares our
negotiating position on Vietnam now with that of 18 months ago, it
must conclude that it can achieve its goals simply by waiting.
Moscow must reach the same conclusion.
These are dangerous conclusions for an enemy to draw, and I believe
that we therefore face the prospect of major confrontations.
Hence, my concern about the gravity of the situation, of which I
thought I should let you know.
Attachment �
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CO NTIAL September 29, 1969
The Modern World, A Single "Strategic Theater"
Section A
1. It is one of the truisms of our time that because of the
$ensational development of communications and transportation, the
globe has shrunk with distances between formerly far-away countries
having been reduced to mere hours of flight time. We all pay continuous
lip service to the axiom that the hallmark, today, of relations among
States, even among continents, is interdependence rather than inde-
pendence. But while every political writer and speaker belabors this
point ad nauseam, we actually deal with the Mideast, Latin America,
the Atlantic Region, Eastern Europe, NE Asia, and SE Asia as if we
were still living in the WW-II era when it was realistic and feasible
to speak of a European, an India-Burma-China, a Pacific "Strategic
Theater" as essentially separate and autonomous.
2. In theory, people may understand the phenomenon of inter-
dependence rather well and be quite aware of the fact that the whole
globe, by now, has become a single strategic theater. In practice,
however, near-unavoidable bureaucratic compartmentalization has led
to specialization among experts and decision-makers: Those who are
knowledgeable regarding the strategically more and more important
Trucial Oman, know little or nothing about Canada, and those who are
experts on Berlin have no eyes for, or interest in, the issue of Okinawa.
The man who daily struggles with the agonizing problem of Vietnam
can hardly be expected to pay special attention to the latest coup in
Libya, and the person concerned with US aid to Latin America has
little time or inclination to consider recent political developments in
Czechoslovakia.
3. Since, by chance, it has gecome my speciality to be a generalist,
let me draw for you a sketch of how seemingly isolated developments
in specific areas are deeply interconnected in fact, how the single
stones of the mosaic actually form a clearly recognizable overall
tableau.
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Section B
1. It might be helpful to start out with a remarkable, largely
unnoticed, passage in Senator Mansfield's Report to the President,
on his recent Pacific tour. Having stated that the leaders of the Asian
countries visited by him "agree" that the role of the US in Asian
affairs should shrink, the Senator remarked that there was also
"some uneasiness" among those leaders "that the pendulum will swing
too far from [US1 over-involvement to non-involvement." Mansfield
is not a "pessimist," because -- as you may remember -- he had on
the very eve of the invasion of Czechoslovakia reported to President
�Johnson that, on the basis of his analysis of the situation in East
Europe, he considered a reduction of US forces in Germany not only
appropriate but even desirable. Actually, the Senator's wording --
"some uneasiness" in non-Communist Asia about the US moving toward
a stance of non-involvement -- constitutes a "diplomatic" understate-
ment which barely hints at, but does not really reflect at all, the over-
whelming fear of such countries as S. Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore -- and even Indonesia, the Philippines
and Australia -- to have to face potential future aggressors essentially
with their own military forces.
2. Your country specialists will tell you, if you ask them, that the
Indonesian leaders -- despite the size and relative geographic pro-
tectedness of their island nation -- have informed us of a need for the
US to "stay" for at least 3 more years in Vietnam, so that they might
peacefully consolidate their country without fear of Communist direct
or indirect aggression.
3. It also deserves to be noted that GEN Romulo -- unwaveringly
pro-US and anti-Communist -- nevertheless remarked in a public
speech, some time ago, when he took over the position of Foreign
Minister at Manila, that in view of the impossibility to rely henceforth
on US protection it would be necessary. to "adjust" Philippine Foreign
Policy. He remarked, in this connection, that, as of that day,
Philippine Foreign Office references to China would no longer be to
the "Chinese Mainland" but to the Peoples Republic of China, the
country's official designation adopted by the Mao regime. In an
interview given by Romulo at the UN in N.Y. he expressed a wish
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(see NY Times of September 22, 1969) "that the UN, in its peace-
keeping efforts, would consider [General] MacArthur's suggestion
that borders threatened by guerrilla infiltration or possible enemy
invasion be sealed off with a belt of radioactive materials." The
suggestion of so strong, and innately unpopular, a measure by a SE
Asian Foreign Minister does reveal more than mere "uneasiness" in
the face of coming dangers.
4. The Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lee, who proudly calls
himself an Asian Socialist, shocked the anti-Vietnam War Swedish
Social Democrats last year, when he declared in an address to that
party's annual Congress, that the US was fighting in Vietnam for the
independence of Singapore and that this independence was predicated
on US willingness to continue the fight.
5. You also remember that Sihanouk of Cambodia -- certainly not
a friend and even less a tool of the US -- has explained again and again
over many years that he _bad no choice but to accommodate to China the
powerful, because one day. regardless of U15 protestations-to-the -corf-:
tram Washington would move its forces out of SE Asia and he,,_.as_a�i
convinced Cambodian nationalist, deemeditThrs:Wils_t_e_ e.stablish_suraL,
relations wiffilie Communist victors of tomorrow that, at least,_the�)
Ciirttrxii-srtakeover would be-irFe-aceful." Ina very dramatic, typically
Sikra:riTeffir to the editors of NYT-the�Cambodian Chief of State
asked his US readers not to consider him naive regarding Communist
intentions. I know very well, he wrote, that, although they [Communists]
are friendly to me now, "they will say 'Sihanouk down on your knees,'
once they are victorious and oust me without ceremony." I do not have
to point out to you that, by now, the Cambodians are actually trying to
cooperate, tacitly and secretly, with the hated S. Vietnamese in a not
very successful attempt to prevent expansion of de facto Communist
control over still further areas of their small country.
6. You are also, I believe, fully aware of what Souvanna Phouma
of Laos, the leaders of Thailand and those of Malaysia -- to say nothing
of Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan -- tell us in confidence as regards their
true feelings; i. e., naked fear, concerning a US military withdrawal
from SE Asia.
II
1. The preceding paragraphs have been devoted to SE Asia not only
because -- by chance, or due to some inherent geopolitical necessity --
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NTIAL
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that region of the world happens to be at the moment our most obviously
active area of preoccupation, but also because, for that very reason,
it must be these days the center of your own attention and deepest
worries. The world, too, focuses its attention on Vietnam, as an
indicator of the direction in which US policy and strategy in general are
likely to move. You know more, of course, about US future plans and
intentions than anyone else, except the President of the US and his
Secretary of State, but I venture the assertion that any objective analyst --
be he in Peking or Bonn, Moscow or Paris, Ottawa or Cairo -- simply
cannot help reaching the conclusion that, so far, all the indicators point
in one direction only: an ultimate pull-out, a radical reduction of military
commitments, a withdrawal of US military power not simply in hotly
contested Vietnam but on a worldwide scale.
2. It can hardly be questioned by now that we are on the verge of
restoring the Ryukyus, our great stronghold in the NE Asia region, to
Japan. And even such bases as we may retain on those islands will be,
more likely than not, under the same restrictive regime now applying
to our troops and military installations in the Japanese homeland (in
accordance with the US/Japan Status of Forces Agreement). That South
Korea -- already shaken and frightened by the meek US reaction to the
captnre of the "Pueblo" and to the shooting down of our EC-121 -- is
deeply worried by this development is well known and more than natural,
especially since Seoul is afraid, not entirely without justification, that
in the "post-Vietnam" period we might thin out, or even reduce greatly,
the US forces now stationed in that country. Less well known is the
fact that the Japanese themselves -- although Tokyo, for obvious reasons,
cannot publicly admit it -- feel less well protected with the US military
strength on Okinawa diminished or newly restricted. It is generally,
and somewhat superficially, assumed that this heightened sense of
insecurity may have the salutary effect of spurring Japan into making a
greater defense effort of its own. But one must ask, whether it would
really be in the US interest, if the Japanese followed this line of thought
to its logical conclusion; 1. e., to the establishment of a purely Japanese
nuclear weapons arsenal. Moreover, the leftist opposition, and pacifism
in general, are sufficiently powerful within Japan to create such internal
upheaval, if the government were actually to embark on any large-scale
rearmament, that there would be a lengthy period of instability and
weakness in the country, before it could actually become militarily
more self-reliant. In the meantime Japan could hardly fail to seek an
accommodation with Red China or the USSR or, "ideally," both. In any
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event: The simultaneous US trend to reduce its power position in
North as well as in South East Asia, is bound to have a profound effect
on the political and strategic thinking and planning of .any Asian
country which in the ultimate analysis -- willingly or reluctantly --
has to rely on the US as a protective shield against the potential super
power: China. New Delhi, for example, cannot very well assume that
the US is prepared to come to its rescue, when it observes Washington's
eagerness to move out and away in regard to Pacific areas (such as
Indochina and Okinawa/Japan) in which the US has long had an infinitely
more pronounced and direct interest than in India. The Indian leaders,
in addition, would have to be influenced by the stark military fact that,
in the event of a Communist takeover in SE Asia, their country would
be outflanked in the East, with a pro-Chinese Pakistan constituting at
the same time a (real or imagined) threat in the West.
In
1. As regards the Mid East, it is customary to think, to the
exclusion of almost any other consideration, of the Arab/Israeli con-
flict. No doubt, the present Administration is engaged in a superhuman
effort to make the two sides see reason and prevent a "fourth round,"
but in view of earlier US performances, it must be decidedly difficult
for Arabs or Israelis to rely on anything but their own brute strength.
A US role as an effective guarantor of any future compromise solution
is simply not credible, because of our obvious past and present reluctance
(with the one exception of Lebanon in 1958) to back up diplomatic agree-
ments or political friendships with a US military presence.
2. Cynics used to believe that, because of the Jewish vote in the
US, Washington would necessarily have to intervene in Israel's favor
in any "real emergency." Actually, the historical record proves other-
wise. In 1956, we turned against our French and British allies and our
Israeli proteges and impelled the latter to evacuate the Sinai peninsula;
while in 1967, when Nasser threktened war with remarkable frankness,
we tried in every way to dissuade Tel Aviv from reacting to the Egyptian
blockade of the Straits of Tiran by non-peaceful means. Israel then
started military action on her own, strictly against our wish and will,
and won so quickly and overwhelmingly that our readiness to come to
its rescue no longer had to be tested. I do not, as you know, consider it
an a priori US task and mission to protect Israel, but it so happens that
in the eyes of the world that small Western enclave in a non-Western
IDENTIAL
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CONFI TIAL 6
environment is considered our "client," and conclusions must be
drawn, of needs, everywhere (not only in Moscow and Tel Aviv but in
other capitals as well) from the fact that the US is obviously disinclined
to support even its own client, if that would mean military involvement.
3. ThOse Arab regimes, on the other hand, which have struggled to
stay relatively pro-West can be even less trustful as regards our active
hel than the Israelis, since there is no Arab constituency in this country.
4. We have in the past been unable to protect the pro-US royal regime
in Iraq. We did not help Saudi Arabia against the Nasser-supported
Republican Yemen. We tolerated the establishment of a radically leftist,
pro-Peking rather than pro-Moscow, Republic of South Yemen, when the
British withdrew from Aden and the Aden Protectorates. We showed no
interest, when the moderate government in the Sudan was overthrown by
revolutionary radicals; and we obviously will do nothing, if after
complete withdrawal of the British from the Persian Gulf area, the
present rulers of the various Sheikdoms there should be thrown out by
wild-eyed Arab nationalists with Marxist leanings. From the point of
view of the moderate Arab leaders it must appear that friendship with
the US does not offer protection and does not pay. Only a few weeks
ago; King Idris of Libya was ousted by a group of officers leaning
toward the Iraqi type of Baathism, one of the most fanatic and anti-
Western forms of Arab radicalism. We seemed grateful that, for the
time being, the new rulers declared their willingness to tolerate our
base at Wheelus and promised not to nationalize the US and other Western
oil companies. For King Idris, however, we were either unwilling or
unable to do anything. One of the results of the Libyan coup -- apart
from the fact that roughly one billion $ in annual oil revenues has now
passed into the hands of avowed Revolutionaries -- is the ominous
deterioration of Tunisia's position. Long one of the "most reasonable"
and most enlightened among Arab countries, Tunisia, still led by the
distinctly pro-Western Bourguiba, suddenly finds herself surrounded
by two hostile neighbors: Libya and Algeria. Bourguiba can hardly
help feeling that with his moderation he has betted on the wrong horse.
Small moderate Lebanon, too -- which in 1958 was still able to call on
US military help -- is currently being forced to abandon its traditional
policy of neutrality and to tolerate, despite surprisingly courageous �
counter-efforts by its President Helou, the takeover of its southernmost
border areas by Arab Commando groups composed almost exclusively
of non-Lebanese. Considering the lack of any physical outside support
for Helou., it seems only a question of time, when be, too, will be replaced
by regimes of the kind now governing neighboring Syria and Iraq.
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5. Under the circumstances, even those Arabs who used to maintain
a degree of friendship with the US cannot possibly place great trust in
Washington's declarations of amity. It may be a paradox, but must
nevertheless be understood, that, precisely because we have shown
ourselves so peaceful and patient, so obviously unwilling to intervene
with force anywhere or against anyone, it will now be virtually impos-
sible for either Arab or Jew to see in the United States the great power
that would actually protect one side against the other and maintain any
agreed upon peaceful order by forceful means, should that prove
necessary. If a country is so clearly shying away from physical involve-
ment, it is difficult to believe that it will ever permit itself to become
so involved.
6. It has widely been assumed that the USSR would restrain the
Arabs, as we might restrain the Israelis, out of a fear of a direct
US/USSR confrontation. It should be observed, however, that the Soviet
interest to exercise such restraining influence is bound to decrease to
more or less the same degree to which Moscow's fear of a direct con-
frontation of the two super powers diminishes. The more the Soviets --
looking at US actions and inactions around the world -- become convinced
that the US remains unbendingly resolved to negotiate rather than to
confront, the smaller their incentive to restrain their clients; i. e., in
the Mid East case, the Arabs.
IV
1. In Latin America, too, the US has demonstrated such extreme
unwillingness recently to use "power" that we actually seem to have
placed a premium on hotheaded and undesirable ventures by extremists.
We have let Ecuador, Peru, and others, arrogate to themselves
exclusive fishing rights in a zone of 200 miles from their coastlines,
and we have permitted US fishing boats found in those zones to be shelled
or brought to port by foreign naval vessels, whence they have been released
only against payment of arbitrary "fines." We leaned over backwards not
to apply the Hickenlooper Amendment as a sanction against Peru for
uncompensated expropriation, by a revolutionary Officers Junta, of
hundreds of millions worth of US property. The example was quickly
foil d b Bo a wher few da s ago, ather revolutionary group,
likewise led by a general, enacted certain measures, on the very first
day of its existence, foreshadowing expropriation of US oil companies
in that country.
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2. The Latin temperament is rather volatile by nature and the
colossus to the North is not necessarily popular among Latinos. It is
dangerous, therefore, and does not promote peaceful dcvelopme
-TITLI-i'Mprii is created that irresponsible -- or even normi1ly-7qUite
elerrrern act wildly_anstiliggally withcut havin
o fear -----eaction on our part. We certainly could not hold
e 'oe,nt e recent unprecedented kid-
napping of the US-Ambassador in full daylight. But it is doubtful,
whether our concern for a single diplomat's life, our clearly manifested
"hope" that all the kidnappers' demands be fulfilled speedily to save
one man, was as humane as it seemed: Since it has become all too
clear now that the host country of a,US representative can be black-
mailed with such surprising ease, it must be feared that there will be
rther kidnappings of US diplomats in the foreseeable future.
3. It is no longer seriously doubted today that the Balaguer regime
in the Dominican Republic with all its deficiencies, is, nevertheless, the
best administration that country has ever had since 1865 (when Santo
Domingo gained its final independence from Spain). The regime was
established after order had been restored in the Republic by US military
intervention, which at the time was bitterly criticized by many, even
well-meaning people as an act of US "imperialism." No US President,
f course, would like to repeat a similar venture. Yet, it is not
desirable, ja_g_i_rery interest of peace, to let ever-irlcid-ra-usume,
rs to 10-d5T-y, that the-US-Trill ncironger -
where in Latin America at an time.
e94P/ V