ISRAEL: PROSPECTS FOR THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
06806366
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
March 8, 2023
Document Release Date:
July 25, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2018-00205
Publication Date:
October 2, 1982
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ISRAEL PROSPECTS FOR THE[15678690].pdf | 121.17 KB |
Body:
Approved for Release: 2019/07/16 C06806366
.1(17-77-N\G[icl. Director of
Of 11 Central
Intelligence
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CY# 273
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
2 October 1982
711:31rSeepiet_
CPAS NID 82-2311X
MS 2931/82
� 2 Oaober 1982
7". 273
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pproved for Release: 2019/07/16 C06806366
Contents
Special Analyses
fy Israel: Prospects for the Begin Government 10
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SPECIAL ANALYSES
ISRAEL: Prospects for the Begin Government
The controversy surrounding the massacre in Beirut has weak-
ened Prime Minister Begin's hold on power and eroded his political
support. More damaging revelations are likely as the inquiry into
the incident develops. Nevertheless, Begin retains important
political assets, and he stands a reasonable chance of remaining
in office so long as no evidence surfaces of any early awareness
of the massacre on his part. Eventually, he probably will have
to dump some senior military officials�including perhaps Defense
Minister Sharon.
Begin's ability to project an image as a forceful
and adroit foreign policy operator has been badly under-
mined by the massacre. His reluctance to agree to a
full-scale inquiry also has hurt his prestige.
The Prime Minister's political standing is likely
to suffer more damage as the inquiry proceeds. Major
questions remain unanswered, particularly Israel's role
in assisting the Phalange in planning the operation and
the possible role of the Israeli-controlled forces of
Major Haddad. New revelations will almost certainly
appear.
Moreover, as long as the Army remains in
1,eudnon in force, there is a good chance of additional
embarrassing incidents that would serve to divide further
public opinion on Begin's policies and thus weaken his
standing.
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Begin's Strengths
Begin, however, still has important sources of power.
His coalition partners, although upset by his handling of
the massacre, do not want early elections and have little
political future if they desert the coalition.
Moreover, Begin's personal popularity remains high.
A poll released this week showed him still far ahead
of his rivals, although his rating declined since the
massacre.
In addition, the Prime Minister will try to keep his
coalition together by charging that opposition attacks
on him are linked to alleged US efforts to install a
new government that might make concessions on peace nego-
tiating issues. This tactic will keep some potential
dissidents in line.
Labor's Tactics
Begin's prospects also will be helped by the con-
tinuing leadership divisions in the Labor Party. Con-
tinued feuding between party leader Peres and former
Prime Minister Rabin have hindered Labor's efforts to
exploit Begin's current difficulties.
According to press accounts, Rabin is particularly
angered by Peres's efforts to court Ezer Weizman, a
member of Begin's party who quit the cabinet in 1980,
by offering him the defense post. Rabin hones to hold
that post in a Labor-led government.
Efforts to attract Weizman appear to be a major part
of Labor's strategy. Peres apparently hopes that, by
offering Weizman a key post, he can induce some members
of Begin's Likud bloc--particularly the Liberal faction--
to ioin a Labor aovernment.
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To
A Labor-led government, even if it included Weizman,
would be wracked by factional strife and vulnerable to
opposition efforts to oust it. Such a government would
find it hard to develop and sustain a coherent foreign
policy and would have difficulty initiatina negotiations
on the Palestinian issue.
Outlook
Although Begin's standing is likely to diminish as
the inquiry proceeds, the major threat to his rule prob-
ably will come in a few months when its findings are
published. The inquiry is almost certain to conclude
that major mistakes in judgment were made, and evidence
damaging to Sharon and other senior military officials
is likely to accumulate.
Begin will then be faced with a hard decision.
Although Sharon has hinted he might resign if the com-
mission's evidence points to his having had a role in
/ the massacre, Sharon probably will not go quietly and
/Begin will be reluctant to ask him to step down.
Begin respects Sharon's military expertise, and
they have close family ties. The Prime Minister prob-
ably also fears Sharon might turn on him. Pressure
from anti-Sharon elements in the coalition and public
opinion, however, is likely to require Beain to aet rid
of Sharon if he hopes to retain power.
If Begin survives, his ability to govern almost
certainly will be curtailed and his popularity probably
will not return to the levels it reached this summer.
His weakened position, however, will not lessen his
determination to combat US efforts to get Israeli agree-
ment on concessions in the peace process.
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