SOVIET REPORTING PERFORMANCE UNDER THE ANTARCTIC TREATY
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DIRECTORATE OF
INITELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Soviet Reporting Performance
Under the Antarctic Treaty
DOCUM:ri'
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CIA/BC1 CM 70.3
March 1970
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793. and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission: or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an ti4uthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CONTENTS
Introduction
Reporting Requirements
Reporting Procedures
Scientific Repots
Information Reports
.USSR National Reports to SCAR
Reporting Inadequacies
Lack of Timeliness
Omissions and Incompleteness
Information Reports
USSR National Reports to SCAR
Soviet Concealment Policy
Conclusions
Page
1
3
4
5
5
6
6
6
8
8
10
11
15
Appendixes
Appendix A. Recommendation 1-VI of First Consultative
Meeting Under the Antarctic Treaty,
July 1961 17
Appendix B. Recommendation II-IV of Second Consultative
Meeting Under the Antarctic Treaty,
July 1962 19
Appendix C. RecomMeneltion III-I and III-II of Third
Consultative Meeting Under the Antarctic
Treat, June 1964 21
Appendix D. Recom4endation IV-XXIII of Fourth Con-
sultative Meeting Under the Antarctic
Treat, November 1966 23
Appendix E. Concealment of Affiliations in Scientific
Reports ' 25
Figure 1.
Photbgrklph
G. Ye Lazarev conducting gravimetric
observations
Map
Soviet Antarctic Research Stations (77989)
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13
Facing Page
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Soviet Antarctic Research Stations
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CRT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
March 1970
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Soviet Reporting Performance Under the Antarctic Treaty
Introduction
Ten years of cooperative activity involving 12 nations
have recently been completed under the Antarctic Treaty.
During this period considerable attention has been focused
on the manner in which the USSR has fulfilled its treaty
obligations. To evaluate the Soviet performance and to
assist in operational and policy planning, the United
States needs reliable, detailed information about Soviet
activities in Antarctica. Thus, Soviet reporting prac-
tices are of particular interest.
The Antarctic Treaty requires all signatory countries
to exchange advance information on plans, programs, and
participants in Antarctic research and to share scien-
tific data. This "requirement was a direct outgrowth of
concern about Soviet willingness to continue sharing in-
formation after the International Geophysical Year, (IGY),
1957-58, which had committed participants to such an
exchange.
This memorandum assesses Soviet performance in pro-
viding operational information required by the treaty.
Basic sources are: (1) official Soviet information re-
ports required under the treaty, (2) scientific and news
reports published by the Soviets, and (3) reports from
Free World personnel who have visited Soviet Antarctic
installations.;
Note: This mellf.odum was produced solely by CIA. It
was prepared tno Office of Basic and Geographic,Intel-
ligence and wali: ccoidinated with the Offices of Current
Intelligence, National Estimates, and Strategic Research.
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Only a preliminary attempt has been made to assess
Soviet performance in data sharing, because of the com-
plexities of the scientific activities, the variety of
disciplines involved, the differences in programs of
individual countries, anii the unpredictable time lags
in collection and processing before data can become
available at any of the pEGY World Data Centers. To
date no clear-cut evidence of Soviet refusal to pro-
vide Antarctic data has emerged. Study of their other
reporting performance, however, reveals the basic
dilemma the Soviets face in trying to reconcile per-
vasive secrecy policies with an obligation to pro-
vide detailed data on all aspects of a treaty-con-
trolled activity.
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Reporting Requirements
1. Generail requirements for exchange of inforfflation
were contained in the text of the Antarctic Treaty, signed
in December 1059. Among other exchange requirements, the
treaty provid4d that "� . . information regarding . .
scientific programs . . . and results . . . shall be
exchanged, and each Contracting Party shall give . . .
notice in advance of . . . any military personnel or equip-
ment intended to be introduced by it into Antarctica . . .."
2. The First Consultative Meeting of treaty Sig-
natories and adhering countries, held in July 196i, spec-
ified in detail the reporting obligations of contracting
parties. It formulated Recommendation 1-VI (see Appendix
A), which req4ired the exchange through diplomatic channels
among all governments operating in Antarctica of informa-
tion reports as early in each year as possible and in any
case before the end of November. The recommendation
stated that e4ch report should include the following
information: :dates and itineraries of expeditions to
and from the continent; occupations of all personnel on
all stations and ships; number of personnel in the mil-
itary services together with the ranks of any officers;
names and professional affiliations of all scientific
personnel, including those in the military services; pro-
gram of scientific work and list of principal scintific
equipment.
3. In an attempt to improve observance of reporting
requirements,1Recommendation II-IV (see Appendix a) of
the Second Cohsultative Meeting, in July 1962, reiterated
the necessitylof providing complete and timely reports.
The Third Consultative Meeting, in June 1964, expanded
the reporting obligation to include information on air-
fields and refuges (see Appendix C). At the Fourth Con-
sultative Meeting, in November 1966, the subject of in-
formation exchanges was again raised, in response to the
United KingdoM view that the information was not being
received early enough to be useful to expeditions: going
into the field. This view was supported by the other
parties and expressed in Recommendation IV-XXIII (see
Appendix D), 1which stated that as much of the required
information as possible should be exchanged by 31 October,
with the balance to be furnished before the end of November.
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Reporting Procedures
4. The Soviets have been publishing a substantial
amount of their observational data as well as informa-
tion about their activities almost from the very begin-
ning of their Antarctic operation. The information
they have published on their activities and programs
has been more detailed than they normally provide on
comparable activities elsewhere. Also, a preliminary
survey indicates that the published scientific data
are probably as comprehensive and detailed as those
released on research and exploration in other areas.
This policy can be attributed to a recognition by the
USSR of its general commitment to the spirit of the
basic objectives and organization of the IGY.
5. The IGY program broadened Antarctic activities
from purely nationalistic endeavors with limited sci-
entific scope to a comprehensive, coordinated inter-
national scientific enterprise. This change required
general adoption of the principle of exchange of in-
formation, which was implemented by the establishment
of three World Data Centers -- one in the United
States, another in Western Europe, and a third in the
USSR. Through these centers any research scientist
presumably has access to all of the observational data
in any field declared by a country to be within its IGY
program. The IGY program was voluntary and of limited
duration, however, and there was no administrative
mechanism to monitor or enforce compliance of any par-
ticipating country with its commitments.
6. One of the objectives of the Antarctic Treaty was
to formalize a continuation of the commitment to exchange
information and data on future Antarctic research and to
provide, as a minimum, a continuing forum where problems
and grievances might be introduced, discussed, and re-
solved. The consultative meetings provide such a forum
at a governmental. level. Another forum for the discussion
of scientific problems and topics was created by the sci-
entific community in the establishment of the Scientific
Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) under the Interna-
tional Council of Scientific Union (ICSU). Since SCAR is
nongovernmel 'al, however, it lacks the power to define
rights and obligations and to specify sanctions for its
membership concerning disclosure of information,
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Scientific Reports
7. Before ratification of the Antarctic Treaty in
1960 the most comprehensive sources of information on
Soviet Antarctic activities were Soviet Antarctic Ex-
peditions, 1955-1959, by A.V. Nudel'man, and the first
seven volumes of the' Works of the Soviet Antarctic Ex-
pedition, by the Arctic and Antarctic Scientific Re-
search Institute (AANII). The Nudel'man book, published
in 1959, describes the first four Soviet Antarctic ex-
peditions (SAE's), whereas the AANII volumes, published
between October 1958 and December 1959,* describe only
the first two SAE's. Both sources provide considerable ,
information of the type now required by the treaty. TheY
present very detailed histories of the operational and
scientific activitic- of the expeditions as well as
various types of personnel lists. Some volumes list only
scientists, while others name all personnel; some provide
only the individuals,' professions -- a few also give
their affiliations. .
8. Since 1960, Publicatica of the Nudel'man and
AANII series has continted with no apparent changes. So
far, 52 AANII volumes have been released; the latest,
published in 1969, describes the Eleventh SAE (1965-66).1
A lag of 2 to 5 years normally occurs between an expe-
dition und the appearance of its report.
Information Reports
9. Beginning in. 1960, after Soviet ratification of ;
the Antarctic Treaty, the USSR began issuing reports
designed to meet treaty requirements. The basic document,
an information report submitted through diplomatic chan-
nels, purports to give all the required information except
descriptions of scientific activities and equipment. Since
1962 Soviet information reports have generally followed;
the format of Recommendation 1-VI, with separate sections
approximately corresponding to individual paragraphs in
the requirement. The bulk of the reports consists of
names of scientists at the individual bases.
* The first volumel(unnumbered) was published by the 1
Academy of Sciences and technically is not part of thisl
series. However, it served as the prototype of the vol-
umes that were subsequently published by AANII and numbered
ccasecutively. Minor changes in the format of titles have
occurred occasionally. Before 1961, titles d-d not include
the word "Works" (Trudy).
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10. From 1962 through 1966, several months at r each
expedition's austral summer program, the USSR published a
supplementary information report that listed the main
accomplishments of the expedition and showed changes in
activities and personnel assignments made since the ear-
lier information report. The supplements are valuable
because they are definitive and correct any inaccuracies
in the necessarily tentative originals.
USSR National Reports to SCAR
11. The annual USSR National Report to SCAR, as well
as similar reports submitted by national Antarctic com-
mittees of other participating countries, is part of an
internationat effort to further the coordination of sci-
entific activities in Antarctii..a. Each report contains
a detailed list of the scientific observations made and
the instrumentation used in the previous year's program.
A much less detailed section summarizes planned obser-
vations for the coming year. The first SCAR report was
published ml 1959. Beginning with the Eighth SAE (1962-
63), each an ual information report has cited the latest
SCAR report for information on the expedition's Scientif-
ic activitieS as required in Recommendation
12. Use of the SCAR reports to supply info4ation
required in ,he information reports is not entirely
satisfactory', since the information on scientific pro-
grams and equipment is required by agreement between
governments and SCAR is an independent scientific orga-
nization that cannot be held responsible to governments.
All countrie except the USSR have carefully differ-
entiated be6men the functions of SCAR and the fUnctions
of national governments.
Reporting Inadequacies
Lack of Timeliness
13. In iseveral respects Soviet reporting has not met
the treaty obligations. The information reports have
consistently been submitted later than the agreed date
(30 November of the year in which the Antarctic season
begins).* This loss of timeliness frustrates the stated
* Some other treaty signatories have also had diffi-
culties in meeting the deadline, but the USSR has been
one of the most delinquent.
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treaty objective of facilitating cooperation between
national programs. ;It also prevents other countries
from responding qui.kly -- by ins7action, protest, or
other activity -- to anything su2picious found in a
Soviet report. Listed below are the submission dates
for each of the Soviet information reports and supple-
mentary information reports issued since the USSR
ratified the treaty:
Expedition
Information Report
Supplement
Sixth SAE (1960-61)!
14
Dec
1960
None
Seventh SAE (1961-62)
20
Jan
1962
6 Sep
1962
Eighth SAE (1962-63)
11
Jan
1963
15 Oct
1963
Ninth SAE (1963-60
16
Dec
1963
11 Aug
1964
Tenth SAE (1964-65).
9
Jan
1965
11 Aug
1965
Eleventh SAE (1965-86)
20
Dec
1965
13 Aug
1966
Twelfth SAE (1966-67)
9
Jan
1967
None
Thirteenth SAE (1967-68)
29
Jan
1968
None
Fourteenth SAE (1968-69)
26
Dec
1968
None
Fifteenth SAE (19691-70) 19 Dec 1969 . . .
This tabulation shows that recommendations of the Second
(July 1962) and Fouirth (November 1966) Consultative
Meetings reaffirming the 30 November due date produced
no effect on the publication dates of Soviet reports.
Neither was any effect produced by a 1966 recommendation
to provide an advance report with partial information by
31 October. Beginning in 1962, after the First Consult-
ative Meeting, supplementary information reports were .
issued for 5 consecutive years; through the Eleventh SAE.
For the past three SAE's, however, their publication has
been suspended without explanation, resulting in a serious
loss of informatiori. Curiously, this reduction in repOrt-
ing immediately followed the Fourth Consultative Meeting,
at which the USSR lupported the recommendation to increase
reporting responsibilities.
14. The USSR's use of SCAR reports to provide scien-
tific information about its expeditions has aggravated'
the lack of timeliness in its reporting. Analysis of I
the USSR's 10th SW report, cited in the information !
report on the Fourteenth SAE, serves to illustrate this
deficiency. Although the information report covered the
Fourteenth SAE (1988-69), the 10th SCAR report was a
"summary of scientific work completed in the Antarr:ticl
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during 1967 [Twelfth SAE], in the 1967-1968 summer season
[Thirteenth SAE], and plans for 1969 [Fourteenth SAE]."
The main body of the SCAR report was devoted tolthe
Twelfth SAE; for which it described each progran. and
listed the observation schedule and equipment. No in-
formation was given on the station observation program
of the Thirteenth SAE, although the field programs and
oceanographic activities of the 1967-68 summer eason
were described in some detail. The portion of the report
dealing witti. the Fourteenth SAE consisted only of a
brief summary of the scientific fields in which research
was to be performed at each station. The bulk of the
report thus iconsisted of a comprehensive description of
the 1967 resparch program, in sufficient detail to meet
the treaty requirements but 2 years out of date.!
I i
15. The information report on the Fifteenth SAE (1969-
70) repeated the citation of the 10th SCAR report for in-
formation on scientific activities and equipment. It
stated "see report in SCAR No. 10 on measures planned by
the Soviet Antarctic Expedition in 1969-1971, and on the
scientific program -Arried out in 1969." As described
above, however, the 10th SCAR report contained only a
brief summary of activities planned for 1969 andl included
no information on plans for 1970 and 1971. For he
Fifteenth SAE, then, the Soviets not only cited a source
that was essentially 3 years out of date but also gave
an erroneous description of its contents. This defi-
ciency was partially corrected, however, within month
after publication of the information report on the
Fifteenth SAE, when the 11th SCAR report was released.
It contained la "summary of the scientific program com-
pleted in the Antarctic in 1968 [Thirteenth SAE), in
the 1968-1969 summer season [Fourteenth SAE), and plans
for 1970 [Fifteenth SAE]."
I
Omission and Incompleteness
I
Information Reports
16.
l
Probably the most significant example
of
Sovi-
et noncompliance
with reporting requirements has been
the
omission of information on "seasonal" scientists from
the
last three information reports. The reports on the
Seventh through the Twelfth SAE's contained a secition
listing the names, occupations, and affiliations Of all
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scientists who participated in the austral summer program,
in addition to a section listing those who wintered over.
The report on the Thirteenth SAE, the first to omit this
information, merely stated that 139 seasonal scientists
worked aboard the four expedition ships and on the con-
tinent. As the Thirteenth SAE was also the first to use
Soviet Navy hydrographic vessels, and more than half of
the seasonal scientists were aboard these ships, identities
may have been concealed to avoid disclosure of the precise
nature of the military participation. No scientist has
ever been listed in an information report with an iden-
tified military affiliation.
17. Reports for the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth SAE's also omitted the itineraries of expe-
dition ships. Previous reports had consistently pro-
vided this information as required by Recommendation
1-V1. This extraordinary Soviet effort not to reveal
the association of military personnel and equipment
with their Antarctic activities extends even further.
For example, every Soviet information report has
categorically stated that DO ships and bases of the
SAE possess any armaments. All other countries, in
their information reports, have admitted to possessing
small arms, and occasionally other weapons, primarily
for taking seals.
18. Other sections of the Soviet information reports
are less complete than the treaty seems to require and
are certainly less detailed than corresponding sections
of most countries' reports. Soviet reporting on air-
fields and unoccupied refuges illustrates this point.
The requirements for exchange of this information were
formulated in June 1964 (see Appendix C). In August
1964 the USSR distributed a supplement to its informa-
tion report on the Ninth SAE that included comprehensive
information on these facilities. Since 1964 the infor-
mation report on each SAE has disposed of these require-
ments by simply stating that no changes have occurred.
Changes are known to have occurred, however. Various
Soviet maps show changes in airfield dimensions and
alinements. and the US exchange scientist at Molodezh-
naya in 1968-69 reported that a new airfield was under
construction at that station. Also, at least two of the
unoccupied refuges (Pole of Inaccessibility and Lazarev)
have been visited by the Soviets since 1964. By way of
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contrast, the US information reports describe in detail
the current status of US airfields and refuges for each
reporting year.
19. Soviet response to the reporting requirement on
communications facilities is also incomplete, but this
may simply be the result of a very narrow interpretation
of Recommendation 1-VI, which does not spell out the
specific types of information to be exchanged. Only
the addition of new transmitting equipment at each sta-
tion has been reported. To determine the current trans-
mitting capacity at each station one must add up the
units reported in all the information reports. Even if
this were done, and it yielded a correct total (which it
does not), the information is not sufficient to be useful
to other radio operators on the continent. The US infor-
mation report, in contrast, contains a complete descrip-
tion of transmitters, receivers, transceivers, antennas,
call signs, and circuits maintained at each station.
USSR. National Reports to SCAR
20. The SCAR reports, besides being improper
in-
struments for providing information required by the treaty
and also being out of date, have several deficiencies in
content. Because of the scanty information they provide
on current and future activities, very little is known
about at least one new Soviet research program in the
Antarctic. The 10th SCAR report stated that atmospheric
probings by rockets were to begin at Molodezhnaya in
1969, and news reports have confirmed that launchings
were begun in May of that year. The 11th SCAR report's
only reference to this activity was a statement that
launchings would be conducted in 1970. No official in-
formation is available that4 describes this research
program or lists the equip -nt involved.
21. Three other research programs have similarly
never been adequately described in the SCAR report,
although they have been underway for a sufficiently long
time to be included in the detailed section of the report.
For example, the 10th SCAR report stated that geodetic
observations of artificial satellites were to be carried
out at Vostok, Mirnyy, and Molodezhnaya in 1969. The
11th SCAR report, in the section that normally provides
detailed descriptions of each scientific program and its
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,
instruments, merely stated that simultaneous observations
of satellites were being carried out using special eameraa.
This description is remarkable for its lack of detail and
especially for the failure to identify the type of camera
used, since knowledge of the camera is the key to under-
standing the program. The llth SCAR report did not
mention the two additional cameras that were emplaced
at Novolazarevskaya and Bellingshausen in late 1969.
22. In a similar case the ninth, 10th, and 11th SCAR
reports stated that radar observations of meteor traces
mould be conducted at Molodezhnava in 1968. 1969. and
1970 respectively. I
Jan active program in this field has been underway,
at least since 1968, but Soviet reports have not yet
described the program. Given the time lag in detailed
reporting to SCAR, the 10th SCAR report would not be
expected to include this information, but omission of
the program from the detailed section of the 11th SCAR
report is exceptional even by Soviet standards. This
case is particularly noteworthy because a Western sci-
entist at Molodezhnaya reported that station personnel
were noticeably reluctant to discuss the program with
him.
23. The final example also concerns a major research
program at Molodezhnaya. Each of the last seven SCAR
reports has stated that the following year's program at
Mirnyy. Vostok, and Molodezhnaya would include study of
radio-wave propagation from terrestrial stations. Exam-
ination of the appropriate succeeding reports reveals,
however, that the Vostok and Mirnyy programs always have
been elaborately described, while the larger program at
Molodezhnaya has been omitted from the section of the
report that gives program details.
Soviet Concealment Policy
24. There is no doubt that some aspects of Soviet
domestic security policy are being extended to Antarctic
activities and reporting. One of the objectives seems
to be to conceal the identities or affiliations of ex-
pedition personnel who have been or are associated with
sensitive organizations or activities. Types of con-
cealment include omitting names, listing names without
affiliations, and showing false affiliations. Whether
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this policy is designed to disguise the extension of
sensitive domestic programs to Antarctica or simply to
avoid the embarrassment of disclosing military affil-
iations cannot always be established. The Soviets are
unlikely to admit to any military participation in their
Antarctic programs as long as they expect to benefit
from their recurrent propaganda claim that the USSR has
taken a leading role in promoting peaceful uses of the
continent while the imperialist powers have always main-
tained strong military and nationalistic interests in
the area.
25. Activities that have been most closely associated
with concealment in Antarctic reporting are mapping and
charting, geodesy, gravimetry, missile operations, geology,
mineral prospecting, and medicine. The association of
military-affiliated scientists with some of these activ-
ities, while certainly no violation of the treaty, does
identify fields of Soviet military interest in Antarctic
research. The reason for such interest in some fields
is not clear, but data on geodetic gravimetry and satel-
lite geodesy almost certainly would contribute to refine-
ment of the Soviet world geodetic system and thus improve
worldwide missile targeting. Increased military interest
in geodesy seems to be reaffirmed by the recent instal-
lation of optical tracking cameras at five Soviet stations
-- believed to be related to a program for international
cooperation in geodetic gravimetry and satellite geodesy
that is being proposed in part by a lieutenant colonel
of the Military Topographic Administration.
26. The Soviet concealment policy has persisted since
the first SAE in 1955-56, when the USSR failed to provide
the affiliations of the entire marine portion of the ex-
pedition, which included 10 Navy hydrographers. Even
the names of five of these hydrographers were omitted
from published Soviet rosters. Reports on the Second
SAE (1956-57) did not give affiliations of scientists
on the continental part of the expedition, which is known
to have included several military personnel. One of the
military men (see Figure 1)
proposed
the program of international cooperation reterred to
above. Most of the geologists on the marine portion
of the Second SAE were also listed without affiliation.
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'
�4
� -
- -0m the sarlis,Portieniet,theAhird-3A3; 1937-38, 10211-
. . . . .
AatiosiverceUitted4OVWscientlets, including most
:ammbereCoUthellinibe_detaOhments-and the fourAmembers
. of a rocketAitachmihtAhat laundhed 37doaen high-altt-.
Ando geophylicirroosts troWthe ship Oh' .This
program alsb Occalitined'the.firetconsiraOus con-
cealment of�activityi the thwarting of-attempts by
tea 03 visiting edientists.to.observe the initial
lanathin* at ,OltisyY...
� .�
.��� �
Figure 1, GI. To. Lasarov, identified as a goo-
physicist, conducting gravinetric observations
on traverse to Pionerskaytt (source: NUdelesan,
A.V. 'Soviet Antarctic Expeditions. 1955-1959,
P. 61).
13 -8:E=Ciaml:=IL
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On the 7'trine portion of the Third SAL 1957-58, affil-
istio^: --re n-itted for 36 scientists. inC-Ain7 t
rt..mbers of the mapping detachments and the, four -erh,srn
of a rocket detachment that launched 3 dozen high-alti-
tude geophysical rockets from the ship Ob'. This
program also occasioned the first conspicuous con-
cealment of activity, the thwarting of attempts by
tro US visiting scientists to observe the initial
launching at Mirnyy.
. Nu% � ir �� ���b� %-�' 1��416 �� � �
� �Ir.1� ft.t�
Figure 1. G. Iv. La4arvv. ticntittett as a Kuo.
phys s t� n t 1fl 1...ra%V �� ' r � ..0-4%
on t ravers,.. to Pi one rska �a tsoarco : Nudo 1 � man.
A . V . Sov it t a rc t tr..Ex_re,1
it
19.55-19.59.
p.
�
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Om the marine portion of the Third SAE, 1957-58, affil-
iations were omitted for 36 scientists, including most
members of the mapping detachments and the four members
of a rocket detachment that launched 3 dozen high-alti-
tude geophysical rockets from the ship Oh'. This
program also occasioned the first conspicuous con-
cealment of activity, the thwarting of attempts by
two US visiting scientists to observe the initial
launching at Mirnyy.
K zoCr311111P� I It�110111111111.I I : . �Ork
Ities.1%. brows
Figure 1. G. Ye. Lazarev, identified as a geo-
physicist, conducting gravimetric observations
on traverse to Pionerskaya (source: Nudel'man,
A.V. Soviet Antarctic Expeditions, 1955-1959,
p. 61).
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27. Although the Soviets were under no moral or
legal obligation to disclose affiliations before sign-
ing the Antarctic Treaty, the evidence of Soviet con-
cealment vas a factor in including the obligation to
provide names and affiliations of scientists within
the treaty framework. Despite this inclusion, Soviet
pre-treaty methods of selective concealment have con-
tinued into the post-treaty period (see Appendix E
for details). In at least two instances important
participants were excluded entirely from the official
information reports: one of these was a Navy hydrog-
rapher and the other a translator and assistant ex-
pedition leader whose affiliation is still unknown.
The most blatant omission vas the exclusion of the names
of summer scientific personnel on the last three ex-
peditions, including scientists on the two Navy hydro-
graphic ships that surveyed Drake Passage and the
waters around the tip of the Antarctic Peninsula. In
a number of cases the information reports have included
the names of military personnel on the expeditions but
have given them false affiliations with civilian orga-
nizations. With the elimination of the supplementary
information reports for the last three SAE's, the
Soviets may be creating a new loophole by which they
can evade fulfilling their treaty obligations, since
there is now no accounting for the final list of ex-
pedition members or corrected ship itineraries.
28. The
practice of
of research
hers of the
Soviets are also continuing the pre-treaty
not disclosing affiliations of some authors
reports: they merely describe them as mem-
SALE of their participation.
at least six of the
authors whose affiliations were most consistently omitted
were members of the military services at the time of
their work in the Antarctic. This discovery is one more
bit of evidence that the entire policy of disguising and
Omitting affiliations is designed to conceal the par-
ticipation of military personnel on Soviet Antarctic
expeditions. The conclusion is not necessarily invali-
dated by occasional omissions of affiliations of non-
military scientists if it is assumed that the success of
such a concealment policy would require the introduction
of an element of randomness into the pattern. Neither
is this hypothesis inconsistent with the fact that all
expedition scientists are given an affiliation in the
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27. Although the Soviets were under no moral or I
legal obligation to disclose affiliations before sign-
ing the Antarctic Treaty, the evidence of Soviet con-
cealment was a factor in including the obligation to
provide names and affiliations of scientists within
the treaty framework. Despite this inclusion, Soviet
pre-treaty methods of selective concealment have con-
tinued into the post-treaty period (see Appendix E
for details). In at least two instances important 1
participants were excluded entirely from the official
information reports: one of these wus a Navy hydrog-
rapher and the other a translatrw and assistant ex-
pedition leader those affiliatioa is still unknown.
The most blatant omission was the exclusion of the names
of summer scientific personnel on the last three ex-
peditions, including scientists on the two Navy hydro-
graphic ships that surveyed Drake Passage and the
waters around the tip of the Antarctic Peninsula. In
a number of cases the information reports have included
the names of military personnel on the expeditions but
have given then false affiliations with civilian orga-
nizations. With the elimination of the supplementary
information reports for the last three SAE's, the
Soviets may be creating a new loophole by which they
can evade fulfilling their treaty obligations, since,
there is now no accounting for the final list of ex-
pedition members or corrected ship itineraries.
28. The Soviets are also continuing the pre-treaty
practice of not disclosing affiliations of some authors
of research reports: they merely describe them as mem-
bers of the SAE of their participation.
at least six of the
authors whose affiliations were most consistently omitted
were members of the military services at the time of ;
their work in the Antarctic. This discovery is one more
bit of evidence that the entire policy of disguising and
omitting affiliations is designed to conceal the par-
ticipation of military personnel on Soviet Antarctic
expeditions. The conclusion is not necessarily invali-
dated by occasional omissions of affiliations of non-
military scientists if it is assumed that the success of
such a concealment policy would require the introduction
of an element of randomness into the pattern. Neither
is this hypothesis inconsistent with the fact that all
expedition scientists are given an affiliation in the
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information reports, since the latter are not distributed
to the Soviet scientific comm.:nity where questions might
be raised about false biographic information.
Conclusions
29. The Antarctic Treaty requires that all signatory
countries exchange an annual information report contain-
ing detailed and Lpecific information about their activ-
ities on the sixth continent and that they publish their
scientific findings and observations. The USSR. like
all other countries active in Antarctica, has generally
attempted to meet the first of these requirements; also,
preliminary impressions indicate that the Soviet scien-
tific data published on the Antarctic are probably as
comprehensive and detailed as those releazler, on their
research and exploration elsewhere.
30. Soviet reports on the Antarctic do, however,
fail to meet several treaty requirements. Deficiencies
in the official information reports include failure to
meet deadlines, furnishing of obsolete information, and
deliberate concealment of information on military par-
ticipation in SAE's. Discontinuance of the supplementary
reports has created a new reporting loophole. The scien-
tific reports appear to be subject to the same conceal-
ment policies as the information reports and are even
more obsolete. There is little doubt that in facing the
dilemma of reconciling their secrecy policy with their
treaty obligation, the Soviets still favor the former,
presumably either hoping that the concealment will
remain Undiscovered or counting on the inertia of the
other signatories to make no issue if it is discovered.
In their literature the Soviets suggest that they may
be counting on the existence ol the inspection provi-
sions of the treaty -- which they have never exercised --
and on published US inspection reports as proof that
they are adhering to the peaceful objective of the
treaty.,
31. !Satisfactory compliance with treaty: reporting
requirements has not been assured by a precise defini-
tion of: topics on which information is to be exchanged.
The treaty may need, in addition, both a standard by
which to measure the adequacy of compliance and a
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procedural mechanism by which noncompliance questions
may be raised, judged, and corrected without escalating
the review action into an automatic implication of
treaty violation.
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APPENDIX A
RECOMHENDATION 1-VI OF FIRST CONSULTATIVE' MEETING
UNDER THE ANTARCTIC TREATY. JULY 1961
The Representatives recommend to their Governments
that information furnished in accordance it Article
VII paragraph 5 should be exchanged between Govern-
ments through diplomatic channels as early in each
year as possible, and in any case before the end of
Novemberieach year, and should include -
1
(1) the names, types, numbers, descriptions
and armaments of ships, aircraft and other
vehiOes, introduced, or to be introduce4
into.Antarctica, and information on military
equipiment, if any, and its location in Ant-
arctica;
(2) dates of expeditions leaving for, and
arri4.ing in, Antarctica, duration of stay,
itinerary to and from Antarctica and routes
follcliwed within Antarctica;
(3) the names, location and date of opening
of the Party's bases and subsidiary stations
estalOished or planned to be established in
Antarctica, listed according to whether they
are flor summer and/or winter operations; !
(4) the names of the officers in charge of
each Of these bases, subsidiary stations,I
ships and aircraft; the number and occupar.
tions'and specialisation of personnel (inr
eluding any designated by other governments).
who ai-e.or will be stationed at each of ,
thesel bases and subsidiary stations and I
on board these ships and aircraft, including
the number of personnel who are members of
the military services together with the rank
of any officers and the names and profes-i
sional affiliation of personnel engaged in
scientific activities:
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(5) the number and types of .armaments pos-
sessed by personnel;
(6) the programme of work including scien-
tific investigation, being done and planned
at each of these bases and subsidiary Sta-
tions and on board those ships and airCraft;
and also the area or areas of operation to
be covered by such programme;
(7) principal scientific equipment;
(8) transportation facilities and commil-
nieation equipment for use within Antarctica;
(9) facilities for rendering assistance;
(10) notice of any expeditions to Antarctica
not organised by the Party but organised,
in, or proceeding from, the Party's te'rri-
toy.
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APPENDIX R
RECOMMENDATION II-IV OF SECOND CONSULTATIVE MEETING
UNDER TOE ANTARCTIC TREATY, JULY 1962
In accordance with Article VII paragraph 5 of 'the.
Antarctic Treaty, the Representatives recommend to
their Governments that they should endeavour to fur-
nish prompt and full information regarding their
Antarctic activities as listed in Recommendation
1-VI of the First Consultative Meeting, and within
the tine limits indicated in that Recommendation.,
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APPENDIX C
RECOMMENDATION OF THIRD CONSULTATIVE MEETING
UNDER THE ANTARCTIC TREATY, JUNE 1964
Information on Facilities for
the Landing of Aircraft
The Representatives, taking into account Recommen-
dation I-111 (8) of the First Consultative Meeting,
recommend to their Governments that they exchange,
within the framework of Recommendation 1-VI (8), in-
formation On airfield facilities in the Antarctic
Treaty Area, This information should include par-
ticulars of location, operating conditions andllim-
itations, radio aids to navigation, facilities for
radio communications and instrument landing, and be
in detail Sufficient to enable an aircraft to make
a safe landing.
RECO3IMENDO1ON III-11 OF THIRD CONSULTATIVE MEETING
UNDER THE ANTARCTIC TREATY, JUNE 1964
Notification of Unoccupied Refuges !
1. The Representatives recommend to theiriGovern-
ments that 'they should exchange through diplomatic
channels, before the end of November each yearJ lists
of all unoccupied buildings, huts or caches (herein-
after refelired to as refuges) maintained by ttwm in
the Treaty Area in a condition suitable for use in
emergenciesl.
2. Sucth lists should include.
1) The name and position of each
refuge.
A description of its location
The date on which it was estab-
lished.
liv) The approximate date on which
it was last examined.
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v) An estimate of the available
accommodation. facilities.
! food, fuel and supplies of
other kinds.
Any changes should be reported before the end of June
Of the following year.
3. The Representatives further recommend that Govern-
ments whose expeditions use any refuge should report as
rapidly as possible on any such use. Such Governments
should also furnish an estimate of the amount of supplies
which remain,and a report about the condition of the
refuge after use; in addition they should:
Ensure that supplies available
at these refuges are used only
under emergency conditions.
To the extent possible, and as
early as possible, replenish
the supplies consumed and in-
form the authorities who main-
tain the refuge of the action
taken.
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APPENDIX D
RECOMMENDATION IV-XXIII OF FOURTH CONSULTATIVE MEETING
UNDER THE ANTARCTIC TREATY, NOVEMBER 1966
The Representatives recommend to their Governments
that they exchange through diplomatic channels not
later than October 31st of each year, the information
specified in as many as possible of the categories in
Recommendations 1-VI, III-I and the balance
to be furnished as soon as possible thereafter and in
any case before the end of November.
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APPENDIX
CONCEALMENT OF AFFILIATIONS IN SCIENTIFIC REPORTS :
Remarkably, all scientists ever listed in the :ioviet
information reports have been identified as members of
civilian organisations. Furthermore, the report on the
Sixth SAE. the first report distributed under the treaty.
stated that "there are no military personnel at any of
the Soviet Antarctic stations or on the seasonal staff
of the expedition.' The only military participation :
ever described in an information report occurred during
the Thirteenth SAE when two Navy ships were used for
hydrographic surveying in Drake Passage and around the
Antarctic Peninsula. even in gilts case, however, the
scientists aboard the vessels were not identified, and
thus participation by military scientists was not
acknowledged.
In spite of claims of exclusive civilian partic-
ipation. there has been e�idence of the presence of
military scientists on Soviet Antarctic expeditions.
For example. Georgly Lazarev isee Figure 1 a member
of the Second and Sixth SAE's, admitted in confidence
to a US scientist that he and several others on the
sixth expedition were regular military officers but
that they had been told to represent themselves as
reservists.
be ea,a. and is. attached to tne wir-
itary Topographic Administration of the Army. His
leadership in launching the Antarctic's only geodetic
gravimetry program and in continuing promotion of an
ambitious Antarctic geodetic satellite and gravimetric
program indicates a military interest in developing a
world geodetic system in general support of ICBM
operations.
lA an attempt :to learn whether the concealment of,
military affiliations has been continued in postexpe-!
dition literature, a detailed analvsis was undertaken
of two Soviet publications that contain information on
affiliations of Antarctic scieWAAI:z. and of a third that
lists SAE participants but no Atttlidt;ons These pub-
lications are :1) the periodical Information Bulletin,
Soviet Antarctic Expedition. .21 the serial Works of the
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Soviet Antarctic Expedition. and (3) four books by A.V.
Madennan, each entitled Soviet Antarctic Expeditions
[Matesl.
The Information Bulletin, Soviet Antarctic Expedi-
tion, is the primary Soviet journal for short articles
on Antarctic research. At the head of each article,
with the author's name and scientific specialty, is
usually listed his professional affiliation. A mili-
tary affiliation has been attributed to the author of
only one of the approximately 900 Bulletin articles
published to date.* For about 16 percent of the arti-
cles, instead of giving the author's affiliation the
Bulletin merely stated the number of the SAE in which
he participated. With two exceptions since 1961, each
of the scientists in this latter category has already
been provided wi'h an affiliation in the official in-
formation report, which leads to the question of why
the Bulletin should give this exceptionaj treatment.
For analytical purposes tkw authors of Bulletin
articles were divided into six categories: (1) authors
who have always 6een listed in the Bulletin with an
affiliation (237 persons, 629 articles), (2) authors
whose affiliations have been provided with two or more
articles and omitted with only one (18 persons, 136
articles), (3) authors whose affiliations were provided
with one article and omitted with one (11 persons, 22
articles), (4) authors who published once, with no af-
filiation (42 persons, 42 articles). (5) authors whose
affiliations were provided with one or more articles
and omitted with two or more (11 persons, 31 articles
without affiliation, 22 with affiliation). and (6) au-
thors who have published two or more times, with no
affiliations (16 persons. 46 articles).
At least two conclusions can be drawn from this
initial sorting of authors. The first is that the
omission of a scientist's affiliation probably does
not necessarily indicate concealment, since several
* 1.P. Kucherov was listed in Bulletin 31, 1961, as
Chief. Central Map Production of the Navy, and head of
the Hydrographic Division of the First SAE. He is the
only Soviet Antarctic scientist whose military affili-
ation is known to have appeared in a Soviet Antarctic
publication.
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authors (category 2 above) have published as many as 20
articles of which only one has not shown the author's
affiliation. This category seems to indicate that there
is an element of randomness in these omissions. The
second conclusion is that the omissions are not, entirely
random, since affiliations are always or nearly always
omitted for some authors (categories 5 and 6 above).
The pattern of omissions cannot be explained with
certainty, but a reasonable hypothesis is that the mili-
tary affiliations of some of the scientists are. conceal-
ed by design. This explanation is not necessarily in-
validated by occasional omissions of affiliations of
nonmilitary scientists if it is assumed that the success
of such a concealment policy would require the introduc-
tion of an element of randomness into the pattern. Nei-
ther is this hypothesis inconsistent with the fact that
all expedition scientists are given an affiliation in
the information report, since the latter document is not
distributed to the scientific community where questions
might be raised about misleading biographical information.
A surprising disproportion of the authors 4ho pub-
lished without an affiliation are known to be physicians.
The average occurrence of affiliation omissions for
nonmedical authors is 13 percent (121 of 897 articles)
compared to 87 percent (27 of 31 articles) for authors
of medical articles. Affiliations have been given for
only two of the 11 physicians who have published in the
Bulletin.
This unusual treatment of physicians by the Bulletin
stimulated further biographic checks of the 11 physicians
mentioned above and of a sample who have not published
their Antarctic work. Of the nine who published in the
Bulletin without affiliation, evidence was found that
four c:ere members of the Military Medical Academy, imeni
S.M. Kirov. in Leningrad. For example. R.K. Kaluzhenko,
a physician at Vostok in 1966, published five articles
in various medical journals from 1955 to 1964 in which
he was described as a lieutenant in the medical service
and a faculty member at the Military Medical Academy.
Three other Soviet Antarctic physicians who have never
published in the Bulletin have been similarly identified
with the Military Medical Academy before or during their
Antarctic tours. Six of these seven military physicians
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had been listed in the information report as AANII
employees. The seventh worked on the Fifth SAE,
which preceded the issuance of information reports.
Of the nonmedical scientists listed in the Bulle-
tin without affiliation, only two authors could-defi-
nitely be shown to have concealed military affiliations.
The two are Georgiy Lazarev. mentioned earlier, who was
a geodesist on the Second and Sixth SAE's. and S.S.
Chikovskiy. a hydrographer on the Tenth and Thirteenth
ME's. It is interesting to note that Lazarev is one
of only two persons who have published as many as five
articles in the Bulletin without a stated affiliation.
Be was identified in four other articles as an employee
of Moscow State University and in one as affiliated
with an institute under the Academy of Sciences. The
information report on the Sixth SAE did not provide
affiliations of scientists.
Chikovskiy published three articles in the Bulletin
without giving his affiliation and one stating that he
was a member of AANII. On his second Antarctic visit
he admitted to an American that he had been a career
military hydrographer but was a university student at
the time he left on the expedition. According to this
testimony he would have been a Navy hydrographer during
his tour on the Tenth SAE. The information report on
the Thirteenth SAE stated that Chikovskiy worked for
AANII. Chikovskiy and Ye. I. Ignatov coauthored a Bulle-
tin article that did not provide the affiliation of
either scientist but instead stated that they were mem-
bers of the Tenth SAE. It may be significant that
neither of these men appears in the information report
on the Tenth SAE. These are the only known occasions
when a scientist was excluded from both the regular and
supplemental information reports on an SAE.
Of the Soviet Antarctic military personnel detected
in this exercise, three were among the 16 authors in
category 6 above, three among the 11 authors in category
5, none among !he 71 authors in categories 2, 3 and 4,
and one among the 237 persons in category 1. In addi-
tion, evidence was found that at least 20 military per-
sonnel were among the Soviet Antarctic personnel who
have never published in the Bulletin. Except for the
three physicians mentioned on page 27, the latter
group all participated in the early SAE s that were
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conducted before the Antarctic Treaty and before infor-
mation reports were issued. Bost of these military
scientists participated in hydrographic or cciintinental
mapping surveys.
�
A similar analysis of the serial publication Works
of the Soviet Antarctic Expedition, published by UNIT,
revealed that it follows a policy similar to that of
the Bulletin of providing affiliations for only select-
ed m-lief5Wiri-a the expeditions. As noted on Page 5,
this series of reports contains lists of the personnel
on each of the SAE's. Affiliations are not always
given, however, and there appears to be a trend toward
reducing the amount of personnel information in later
volumes.
For the continental portions of expeditiOns the
AAN11 reports have included apparently complete per-
sonnel lists, but they have omitted affiliations of
the members of all except one expedition. Even
Chikovskiy and Ignatov were included in Volume 49's
personnel list on the Tenth SAE after having been
omitted from the information report on that 'expedition.
Affiliations of the continental scientists were given
only in Volume 1, which provided this information for
all but two of the 29 scientists on the First SAE. The
two whose affiliations were not given were members of
the geological prospecting detachment.
For the marine parts of SAE's 1 through Ii the
volumes have also consistently included lists of sci-
entific personnel, and in contrast to descriptions of
the continental party they have normally prcvided the
affiliations of scientists. Wherever affiliations
were not given the scientists were described as mem-
bers of:the SALE. Tabulated below are the numbers of
scientists listed in the AANII reports on SAE's 1
through 11. together with the numbers for whom affil-
iations are included.
Soviet
Antarctic
Expedition
1 2
3
4
5
6
7
�
9
10
11
Scientists listed 48 67
93
21
9
8
10
15
12
11
22
Affiliations shown 0 55
57
21
9
8
10
11
10
0
0
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A systematic plan seems to be the basis for omitting
affiliations in the AANII volumes as well as the Bulletins.
For example, the report on the first marine expedition
gives no affiliations, thus concealing the fact,
that the entire 10-man hydro-
graphic detachment was composed of personnel from the
Navy Bydrographic Directorate. To compound the conceal -'
meat, five of the 10 Navy h dro ra hers are omitted
entirely from the roster
The practice. followed in four of the AAN11 reports,
of omitting the affiliations of only selected scientists
is apparently designed to conceal sensitive identities
while at the same time providing an image of releasing
detailed information. All individuals without affil-
iations are probably not military personnel, but all
military personnel are apparently included in the part
of the list that omits affiliations. Only one military I
individual, a hydrographer, Is known to have participated
in these four marine expeditions, and he is among those
with no affiliation named. Scientists whose &ffiliations
were omitted generally were involved in work of specific
interest to the Soviet military, mostly in mapping and
related sciences. For example, the scientists on the
Eighth and Ninth SAE's for whom affiliations were not
provided were all hydrographers, comprising the entire
hydrographic detachment of each expedition. The official
information reports claimed that these scientists were
all from the Main Administration of the Northern Sea
Route, a civilian agency.
On the marine portion of the Third SAE. eight of the
36 scientists for whom affiliations were not given were
in the 11-man hydrographic detachment and 16 were among.
the 19 members of the geodetic and aerial photography ;
detachments. The entire four-man meteorological rocket i
detachment was also listed without affiliations. The
reason for the latter omission is suggested by an intel-
ligence report that indicates that this group comprised.
personnel from a missile plant of the Ministry of
Defense.
Of the 12 scientists listed without affiliations in
the AANII volume on the marine portion of the Second SAE.
half were members of. the 10-man geological detachment,
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�
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while the rest were dispersed among the other 57 members
of the expedition. The geological group's activities
included echo sounding and seismic surveys that are stand-
ard scientific activities but have military application.
Four books by A.V. Nudeliman constitute the only
other systematic source of information on Soviet Antarctic
Expeditions. They are: Soviet Antarctic Expeditions,
1955-1959 (published in 1959), Soviet Antarctic Expedi-
tions. 1958-1960 (published in 1960), Soviet Antarctic
Expeditions. 1959-1961 (published in 19621, and Soviet
Antarctic Expeditions. 1961-1963 (published in 1965).
These reports summarize the operations and list the
perso,mel on the first seven expeditions and part of the
eighth. The personnel lists differ from those in the
reports described earlier in that individual affil-
iations are never provided and the lists ostensibly
include all expedition members and their occupations.
The only known exception to the completeness of the
lists is the omission of names of five hydrographers
on the First SAE
The unique value of the Nudel'man books is that
they identify nonscientist expedition members who
vould.otherwise be unknown. These books also are gen-
erally more current than comparable volumes of the
Works of the Soviet Antarctic Expedition. Unfortu-
nately, publication of the series may have been dis-
continued since 1965.
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