THE IRAQI OPPOSITION: STRUGGLING TO MAKE A DIFFERENCE

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• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
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• Publication Date: September 1, 1993

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!La
'Secret- rn er0
Directorate of Intelligence
The Iraqi Opposition:
Struggling To Make
a Difference
REM PatIS UNARY
cities&
Intelligence Research Paper
NESA 93-10030
September 1993
Cap.v 188
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Mat.
Reverse Blank
Directorate of of Intelligence
The Iraqi Opposition:
Struggling To Make
a Difference
Intelligence Research Paper
This paper was prepared by Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Annlycm with
contributions lw
It was coordi-
nated with the Directorate of Operations
Comments and queries are welcome and may he
directed to the Chief.
NESA
fieeeti�
NESA 93-10030
September 1993
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Maxi
Key Findings
Infarmation available
av af 1 September 199.1
was used in this report
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The Iraqi Iraqi Opposition:
Struggling ToMake
a Differenc
Iraqi opposition groups are not likely to achieve lasting unity, amass broad
domestic support, or develop enough military and political clout to depose
President Saddam Husayn or play a dominant role in Iraq after he is gone
unless many hurdles can he overcome. After nearly three years of halting
progress toward unily. Iraqi dissidents arc struggling to articulate a na-
tional agenda that oes bc ond their
Saddam.
) overthrow
shows that the
movement consistently is plagued by divergent goals, personal rivalries,
and interference by neighbors�particularly Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.
To become a more effective opposition, these groups would have to for-
mulate a program that appeals to a broad array of Iraqis, assuage Arab
Sunni fears, and demonstrate an abilit to carry out coordinated political
and military operations inside Iraq.
Strong Western support, especially for the Iraqi National Congress (INC),
has prompted unprecedented cooperation among major opposition groups,
raised the opposition's international profile, and enabled it to develop into
an instrument of pressure on the Baghdad regime. This support has al-
lowed the INC to achieve some modest initial goals, including antiregime
political and propaganda operations. Despite these advances, we believe
the many difficulties facing the Iraqi opposition will severely limit its abil-
ity to become more than one of many pressures on Saddam's regime or to
resent credible alternative to his regime for the foreseeable future.
The Iraqi opposition movement comprises numerous ethnic, political, and
religious groups based principally in Middle Eastern and Western capitals.
Most Sunni and Shia opposition leaders have been exiled from Iraq for
many years and have little popular support, military capability, or public
recognition inside the country. Their ideologies and plans often reflect the
national and regional goals of their backers. These backers frequently vie
for control of individual groups and for greater influence over the opposi-
tion movement as a whole. Since the Gulf war the number of new and
splinter groups, individual dissidents, and umbrella organizations has bur-
geoned, comipiicating efforts to unite and intensifying competition between
sponsors.
Iraqi Kurds, shaped by a long history of resistance to the central govern-
ment, are the most powerful and organized opposition to Saddam Husayn
and have the most cohesive support inside Iraq. That support is ethnic and
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September 1993
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�Secret-
regionally based. The Kurdish gm s do not have a countrywide appeal
based on a program or ideology
The Kurds have had some success since the Gulf war in asserting their po-
litical autonomy from Baghdad and forming institutions of government
and local administration, including a Kurdish legislature, Council of
Ministers, and a nominally unified Kurdish opposition front. The primary
Kurdish leaders, Mas'ud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, compete with each
other for leadership of the Kurds and the allegiance of smaller Kurdish po-
litical and tribal groups.
Despite the Kurds' success in asserting their autonomy, their long history
of internecine squabbling suggests their unity will remain vulnerable to
recurring personal rivalries, interference by Iran and Turkey, and economic
and military pressure by Baghdad. The regime's economic embargo of
northern Iraq and its impeding of UN humanitarian and security activities
there could motivate some Kurdish leaders to break ranks and scck an ac-
commodation with Baghdad to ensure the survival and well-being of their
own faction. Moreover, Kurdish unity depends on Western political sup-
port and the protection afforded by Operation Provide Comfort and the
coalition-imposed no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel. We believe a sig-
nificant reduction in such support would cause some Kurds, particular!
Mas'ud Barzani, to reopen negotiations with the government.
Exiled Arab Shia groups represent a larger percentage of Iraq's population
than any other branch of the opposition, but
they are highly factionalized, heavily influenced
by Iran, and wary of Western intentions and other dissidents. Tehran
created the largest Shia opposition group�the Supreme Assembly for the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq�headed by Iraqi cleric Muhammad Baqr
al-Hakim. Tehran also holds sway over the second-largest group, the
divided Da' wa Party Tehran provides these and
other groups substantial financial, political, and military support as well as
access across the Iranian border to Shia areas in southern Iraq. Tehran's
support several Iraqi Shia military forces in Iran and
maintain contacts with rebel units in southern Iraq. Nevertheless, the Iraqi
Shia rebels' lack of unity and military coordination has kept them from
advancing beyond small-scale hit-and-run attacks against regime forces.
Tehran's dominance of its Iraqi opposition clients has fragmented the ex-
iled Shia opposition and alienated many Iraqi Shias who like their Arab
Sunni countrymen, fear domination by Iran.
many Iraqi Shias oppose the Iranian
system of radical Shia clerical rule and resent Tehran's perceived aspira-
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tions to create an Iraqi regime in its own image. Sharp disagreements over
the extent to which to submit to Iran's control have split the Da'wa Part
Other exiled Iraqi opposition groups are plagued by acute rivalries, diver-
gent agendas, and competition for sponsors. These groups comprise a
broad range of secular, religious, political, and ethnic groups based in
London, Damascus, and Saudi Arabia. Many of these dissidents began
publicly to oppose Saddam during the Gulf crisis and arc perceived by
many Iraqis and sponsors as opportunists ea cr to n h themselves with
Western and Arab support, jNonc have a sig-
nificant following inside Iraq an we ieve they could play important
roles in a new regime only if most of the cunLBatist military and po-
litical apparatus is swept away with Saddam
Meddling by regional sponsors decreases the chances the opposition can
succeed against Saddam. Syria, Iran, and Saudi Arabia compete for control
of individual groups and greater influence over the opposition movement.
Although each wants Saddam's downfall, all have expressed doubt that the
opposition will achieve enough unity, milita stren
threaten Saddam's hold on power.
Damascus. Tehran, and Riya n will continue to support the opposition
iiiliopes of toppling Saddam and bringing about a regime more favor:dile
to their own interests, but
us-
ing Iraqi dissidents to iiiiii e me goals ot rival sponsors will be a top
priority.
Saddam's campaign of terrorism, intimidation, and propaganda is a persis-
tent threat to opposition activities inside Iraq and abroad. Iraqi operatives
have carried out assassinations and bombings against dissidents in northern
Iraq and Jordan. Many Iraqi Arab Sunnis are receptive to Saddam's
propaganda that portrays the opposnraitors and Western lackeys
bent on partitioning Iraq. Saddam is showering
some Shia and Kundish mow leaders with cash, gifts, and weapons in ex-
change for their sonnortifinst opposition parties, rebels, and dissident
tribes.
Most exiled dissidents believe the Western-backed INC represents their
best chance for unifying and keeping pressure on Saddam. As long as the
INC can stay together, we believe it will serve as a thorn in Saddam's side
and a rallying point for disaffected Iraqis abroad. It ii,cludes most major
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Kurdish, Shia, and independent groups and has made rapid progress
toward organizing its leadership and olic committees and articulating a
pluralistic, democratic agenda
Despite this progress, the INC faces serious challenges to its viability.
Arab Sunnis, Shias, and regional sponsors fear
Kurdish aspirations for self-determination and federalism�which arc part
of the INC platform�will divide the opposition and lead to the fragmenta-
tion of Iraq. They say that Damascus, Tehran, and Ankara have pressed
their opposition clients to oppose the INC's federalism policy. Arab Sunni
and Shia groups seek a more proportionate representation in the INC's
Presidential Council and Executive Committee, and some Shias want a
more Islamic agenda
The INC has taken steps to assuage regional con-
ccms about the Kurds and to include more Shias and Sunnis, but
such measures have not eliminated these contentious
issues and suggest they will provide a continual underlying source of ten-
sion.
Saddam's ouster�if and when it comes�is likely to find Iraqi opposi-
tionists still arguing over basic issues and unable to implement a coordi-
nated plan for a post-Saddam government. A sustained period of unity
before Saddam's departure would help the opposition build credibility
abroad and influence inside Iraq, but it has a long way to go to develop
the political and military muscle necessary to make it a viable political en-
tity. The struggle for power that would emerge in Iraq makes it unlikely
that Saddam would be succeeded by the kind of pluralistic, parliamentary,
democratic government envisioned by the INC.
Opposition competition for power in a post-Saddam regime could contrib-
ute to protracted instability in Iraq. In a worst case scenario, opposition
demands, rivalries, and military moves could increase domestic tensions or
lead to violence that a new and possibly weaker regime would find
difficult to control and eventually cause a partitioning of the country�at
least temporarily�into ethnic and sectarian enclaves. Despite the stated
intent of almost all opposition leaders to maintain Iraq's territorial in-
tegrity, their demonstrated lack of coordination would limit their ability to
stem widespread unrest.
The complete disintegration of Iraq is not inevitable. International eco-
nomic pressure, fear of losing Western support, and fear of domination by
Iraq's neighbors could help prevent a slide into chaos. Some opposition
leaders, particularly those with strong domestic constituencies like the
Kurds, could play important roles in post-Saddam Iraq
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APpsiat_
Contents
Page
Key Findings
lii
Scope Note
ix
Many Groups With Divergent Goals
2
Vulnerable to Fragmentation
8
Hindered by Meddling Sponsors
13
Syria
13
�
Iran
15
Saudi Arabia
16
Dependent on Western Support
17
Lacking Credibility Inside Iraq
19
Challenged by Iraqi Countermeasures
20
Outlook
21
Shaky Transition After Saddam
22
Appendixes
A. The Iraqi National Congress: The Opposition's Best Hope
_
25
R. Iraq's Dissidents: Who They Are and TWant
29
C.
45
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Scope Note
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This paper deals only with Iraqis who have announced themselves as op-
positionists and operate in exile. The Iraqis who are most likely to topple
Saddam arc those close to him in his regime, security forces, or the Iraqi
military. Consideration of these oppositionists
is beyond the scope of his paper.
ix
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Figure I
Shia and Kurdish Majority Areas. September 1993
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The Iraqi Opposition:
Struggling
a Difference
Since the Gulf war. Iraqi opposition groups have
enjoyed broad international attention and Western
support in their struggle to overthrow the regime
of President Saddam Husayn. Baghdad's weakness
and strong Western backing of the dissidents have
allowed them to organize and carry out antiregime
political and propaganda operations. Several fac-
tors have given impetus to the opposition move-
ment:
� UN sanctions keep Saddam's regime isolated.
� Baghdad's repeated defiance of UN demands and
Saddam's diplomatic and military miscalculations
help keep international pressure on Baghdad and
sustain foreign interest in the opposition.
� Operation Provide Comfort has deterred the Iraqi
Army from crushing the Kurds and eliminating
northern Iraq as a base of operations for the op-
position.
� The Iraqi military has been unable to crush the
low-level insurgency in the south or eliminate
the many clandestine Shia opposition cells that
emerged after the Gulf war.
� Low morale among Iraq's regular Army troops
causes a small number of defections to the oppo-
sition in northern Iraq and allows the opposition,
particularly the Kurds, to collect intelligence
through disgruntled Iraqi soldiers.
�
� Iraq's economy is worsening along with the pub-
lic mood, stirring popular anger against
Saddam's regime.
� The Kurds control territory inside Iraq, giving
the opposition a domestic base for their political,
propaganda, and possibly military operations
against the regime.
� The Turks have provided the Iraqi opposition
with access to northern Iraq. Syria, Iran, and
Saudi Arabia have given individual groups a
regional base of operations in their respective
capitals.
In part as a result of these factors, the opposition,
under the auspices of the Western-backed Iraqi
National Congress (INC). has made unprecedented
progress toward unity over the last year. The INC
has weathered numerous attempts by neighboring
states to manipulate it or gain overall control of the
opposition. INC unity and strong Western support
have helped individual groups, especially the
Kurds, to spurn Baghdad's overtures. Western�
particularly US--support has included financial
aid, frequent meetings between opposition
representatives and senior Western officials, media
attention to the opposition's plight, and Western
political pressure on Middle Eastern states to
receive INC delegations. Saudi and Kuwaiti deci-
sions to receive such delegations have bolstered
INC hopes that other governments in the region
will follow suit. Efforts by Baghdad to discredit,
intimidate, or eliminate INC leaders suggest that
Saddam considers the group a nuisance and is try-
ing to remove potential threats from the organiza-
tion
Despite these advances, the Iraqi opposition must
overcome numerous hurdles before it can present a
significant challenge to Saddam. After nearly three
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years of conferences, committee meetings, group
mergers, and soliciting foreign support. Iraqi oppo-
sition groups are still trying to agree on and imple-
ment a unified agenda that goes beyond their wish
to overthrow Saddam Husayn. The opposition
broadly consists of three groups�Kurds, Shias,
and independent nationalists�who are at least tac-
tically committed to cooperation against Saddam,
especially under the auspices of the INC.
Competing political, ethnic, and religious agendas;
personal rivalries; and meddling by foreign
sponsors�particularly Syria, Iran, and Saudi
Arabia�impede progress toward unity, hinder the
establishment of coordinated political and military
efforts against the regime, and prevent the growth
of credib litv in the non sition among the Iraqi
populace
Many Groups With Divergent Goals
The Iraqi Kurds have the most powerful and po-
litically organized opposition to Saddam Husayn
inside and outside Iraq. They are the least assimi-
lated major ethnic community in Iraq, have a long
history of opposition to the central government,
and arc the only group to obtain any autonomy
from Saddam's Ba'thist regime. A review of their
actions over the past two years indicates that the
Kurds have tried to take advantage of their de
facto autonomy since the Gulf war to build
Kurdish unity, broaden foreign support, reorganize
Kurdish government�including the formation of a
Kurdish legislature and Council of Ministers�and
revive their economy and culture
The two main Kurdish opposition groups, the
Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK), have a long history of
rivalry. KDP leader Mas'ud Barzani and PUK chief
Jalal Talabani have often differed on their goals for
Iraqi Kurdistan and on how to deal with Baghdad
and foreign sponsors:
� Barzani \
has only recently
begun to cooperate more closely with the West.
2
Table 1
Major Iraqi Opposition Groups at a Glance
Group
Lenders
Description
Kurdish
Kurdish Democratic Mos'ud HtirLani
Party
Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan
Kurdish. tribal
Joist Talahani
Unity Pony of
Kurdistan
Somi AM al-Rahman
Mabmud Ali Ullman
Mulahsim Shiwan
Kurdish.
socialist
Kurdish,
socialist
Kurdish Tribal Society lawhar Hugon Surchi _Kurdish. tribal__
Kurdish Communist Ariz Muhammad Kurdish.
Party Communist
SAW
_
Supreme Assembly Muhammad Haqr Arab Shia
for the Islamic al-Hakim
Revolution in Iraq
Da'wa Party
Muhammad
Mandi al-Asifi
Arab Shia
Islamic Action
Organization
fund al-Imam
Muhammad Taqi Arab Shia
Mudorisi
Ahdallah Shirazi
Iraqi Hizballoh Haytham Mahfuz
Independent/Nationalist
Independent Iraqi Tolib
Alliance Hoson al-Noqib
Iraqi National Union
lyad al-Alawi
Salali ol-Shaikhly
Arab Shia
Arab Shia
Independent.
Sunni. Shia
Independent.
Sunni. Shia
Free Iraq Council Sad Salih Jahir Independent.
secularist
Iraqi Socialist Party Mubdir ai-Ways
Both Party
Iraqi Free Officers'
Movement
Mandi al-Uhaydi
Independent.
ROCI 0 lint
Nationalist
Hasan al-Naqib
Arab Sunni.
nationalist
Iraqi National
Turkoman Puny
Mur.afir Arslan
Independent.
Turkoman
Over the years he has turned to Iran, the Soviet
Union, and, to a lesser extent, Syria as his
primary backers.
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POOR QUALITY QUALITY PAGE
Figure 2
Iraq: Kurdish Front Members and Their Place in the Kurdish Legislature
Number of seas
Islamic Movement (I)
Assyrian Democratic Movement (11) --
Kurdish Toilers' Party (0)
Kurdish Communist Party (I)
Independent Democratic Party (1)
Kurdish People's Democratic Party (1)
Kurdish Socialist Party (I)
Kurdish Democratic
Party (SO)
Note: The Kurdish Front, founded in 1988, comprises the Kurd-
ish Democratic Party, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Kurdish
Communist Party, Kurdish Socialist Party, Kurdish People's
1)emocratic Party, Kurdish Toilers': Party, Assyrian Democratic
Movement, and Independent Democratic Party (Basalt). Of these
eight groups, only the first two won enough votes in May 1992 to
qualify for seats in the Kurdish legislature. None of the remain-
IIII Kurdish Front Members
of Legislature
O Other Kurdish Front Members
na Non-Kurdish Front Members
of Legislature
Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (50)
lug six netted more than 4 percent of the vote, well below the 7
percent minimum agreed on before the election. Nevertheless,
alter the election, Kurdish leaders agreed to expand the legis-
lature from 100 to 105 scats and gave a seat to four of the re-
maining Front groups, as well as one to a non-Kurdish Front
group, the Islamic Movement.
18arzani has shown a
greater readiness than Talabani to deal directly
with and accept support from Saddam
3
311014 9.93
a a .urlrcrcrsce in August 1993, Barzani
did not rule out the possibility of talks with the
Baghdad regime, if conditions warranted.
� Talabani is well known for his more cosmopoli-
tan, Westernized, and leftist orientation.
Street-
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Figure 3. 3. Iraqi Kurds war In Kurdish�run
IrgislarIve election. May 1992
Before the Gulf war he moved between
Syria and Iran as his primary backers, but he
now draws most of his support from the West.
We believe Burzuni's and Talabani's willingness to
cooperate with each other against Saddam is due in
large part to strong Western support and protection.
The presence of Provide Comfort forces in Turkey
since the Gulf war has helped them sustain un-
precedented political unity and expand Kurdish au-
tonomy and enabled them to spurn repeated Iraqi
offers to break with the rest of the opposition and
negotiate a new autonomy agreement. Their
cooperation has given them significant leverage
with less powerful and less organized opposition
blocs, making them the most effective players in
the Iraqi opposition movement.
-Seem&
4
Kurdish unity is symbolized by the eight-group
Kurdish Front, which oversees most Iraqi Kurdish
political, military, and economic matters in north-
ern Iraq. Barzani and Talabani hold sway over the
Front by virtue of their leadership of the two most
powerful Kurdish rebel forces. Their strong control
occasionally frustrates the smaller groups in the
body, some of which merged in 1992 to increase
their leverage in Kurdish affairs. The effort has
been unproductive, and some of the smaller
groups have now aligned themselves with one of
thc two main paities.
Most Iraqi Shins oppose the regime of Saddam
Husayn. Iraqi Shia discontent is rootcd in centuries
of religious and political differences with Iraq's
minority Arab Sunni Muslims, who traditionally
have dominated the government and military, plus
years of political disfranchisement and harsh
repression by Saddam. The Shia opposition com-
prises diverse exile groups based in Iran, Syria,
and London, as well as many small, indigenous
Iraqi rebel cells known mainly through announce-
ments of their activities in Iran-based opposition
press reports and broadcasts. The three largest and
most politically active Iraqi Shia groups arc the
Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in
Iraq, an umbrella organization founded by Iran in
1982 and headed by Iraqi Shia cleric Muhammad
Buqr al-Hakim, the Da'wa Party of Muhammad
Mandi al-Asifi, and the Islamic Action
Organization led by Muhammad Taqi Mudarisi. All
arc staunchly anti-Saddam, and all arc based in
Tehran. Most Iraqi Shia groups support the
coalition-imposed no-fly zone over southern Iraq
as a first step toward protecting them from
Saddam
These groups advocate a UN-sponsored secu-
rity zone in southern Iraq to provide Iraqi Shias
relict from government ground attacks and
Baghdad's economic blockade.
The Shia factions find more to divide them than
unite them, including the nature and orientation of
a post-Saddam regime. Infighting, factionalism,
and Iraqi repression have kept the Iraqi Shia oppo-
sition from building unified support inside Iraq.
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Figure 4
Strategic Resources In Northern Iraq, September 1993
.""
No. fly :one north
oh 36th parallel
Power plant
Pelmleum refinery
Oiltield
-- Oil pipeline
A Chemicals (petrochemicals
and fenilizers)
Fieavy Industry
(armaments and
motor vehicles)
Metal processing
Gran and steel)
Cement
light industry
(oletronICS, furniture,
and paper products)
Textiles
Food processing
Lake Van
5
N.,
Despite the deterrence provided by coalition presence In
the area. Kurds are vulnerable to economic and military
pressure from Baghdad. The Kurdish economy Is based
on agriculture and Is virtually devoid of easily exploitable
strategic resources. The Kurds hold a few power plants
and some light industries, but government forces retain
control of all key oil, heavy Industry, and military industry
facilities. The lightly armed Kurdish prshmerga face
Iraqi forces along � 450-km front and could not thwart
� concerted Iraqi effort to retake most or northern Iraq.
Soceet
7261149 99704.337 923
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Figure 5
Strategic Resources in Southern Ira
Irug�Syria�Lehonon
pipeline (dom.&
Power plant
Petroleum refinery
Oilfield
Oil pipeline
Chemicals (petrochemicals
and fertilizers)
Heavy industry
(arrnaments and
motor vehicles)
Metal processing
(Iron and steel)
Cement
Light industry
(eletrunics, furniture,
and paper products)
Textiles
Food processing
Shia holy site
100 Kilometers
100 Mlles
'Secret--
September 1993
'As Saimaa
No fly zone south
0132nd parallel
InntS
pipeline IIPS.4 It
rimed
Slut
129050 0,20662/ nal
Unlike the Ktuds, Iraqi Shies control no territory Inside Iraq. Most rebel activity is now limited to
small-scale, hit-and-run attacks EOM Iraqi troops, convoys, and water diversion projects in the marsh
amas, which are encircled by government forces. The Iraqi Army controls all major cities and rands, oil
resources, and industries. The coalition-enforcad no-fly zone below the 32nd parallel has not prevented
government shelling and burning Shia villages and efforts to dry the marshes. Attempts to drive rebels
out of the marshes also displace civilians and destroy their fishing- mid apiculture-based livelihood.
6
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Figure 6
Selected Iraqi Opposition Groups: Divergent Interests and Agendas
Kurdish Democratic
Party
Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan
Unity Patty of
Kurdistan
Kurdish Tribal
Society
Supreme Assembly
for the Islamic
RooMon In Iraq
Da \au Party
Iraqi litzballah
Islamic Action
Organization
Jund al-Imam
Independent Iraqi
Alliance
Iraqi National
Union
Free Iraq Council
Iraqi Socialist Party
Bath Party
Iraqi Free Officers'
Movement
Kurdish Communist
Party
Iraqi National
ilarkoman Party
7
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The traditional aim of some of these Tchran-based
groups to establish an Iranian-style Islamic govern-
ment in Iraq has cost them the support of many na-
tionalistic and secular Iraqi Shins, as well as
support among Kurdish and Arab Sunni opposition
groups. Many Iraqi Arab Shias share their Arab
Sunni countrymen's deep-rooted and oft-repeated
fear of Iranian domination and have publicly stated
that they prefer a united Iraq free of Iranian in-
fluence.
'tiled Iraqi Shies have repeatedly stressed
t eir raqi nationalism and independence from Iran
despite their reliance on Iran as their primary
source of support and safehaven. The persistent �
divisiveness among Shia factions helped Baghdad
to crush the uprising in southern Iraq after the Gulf
war and has since prevented Shia insurgents from
organizing more than small hit-and-run attacks
against regime forces there
The third broad category of Iraqi oppositionists.
nationalists and independents in exile, comprises
a wide array of groups and individuals from diver-
gent backgrounds. most of whom have been out of
Iraq for many years. This category includes in-
dividual Arab Sunnis and Shias. Kurds, Islamic ac-
tivists and secularists, former Balhist officials and
military officers, businessmen, and intellectuals.
Although some of the individuals have public
recognition, contacts, or small followings inside
Iraq, none have the sizable support enioyed by the
major Kurdish and Shia groups.
many Iraqis view these
groups and individuals as opportunists interested
primarily in enriching themselves with Arab and
Western support.
Many of the nationalists and independents in exile
began to publicly oppose Saddum's regime only
after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.
Most are based in London, Damascus, or Riyadh
and have representatives elsewhere in Europe and
the United States
Several of the smaller groups
and individuals have merged in hopes of increasing
their leverage and effectiveness in the opposition
movement. The Free Iraq Council. Independent
Iraqi Alliance, and Iraqi National Union were
formed from such mergers. Many of the groups
�Seeret-
8
were part of the London branch of the Joint Action
Committee founded in Syria in December 1990,
The Joan Action Committee was over-
shadowed by the INC, whose Western backing has
given some of these exiled oppositionists promi-
nent roles alongside senior Kurdish and Shia lead-
ers.
Vulnerable to Fragmentation
Personal rivalries among oppositionists, differing
ideologies, and ethnic differences inhibit the
coalescence of the factions into a powerful force
against Saddam. Organizations like the INC have
tapped successfully the widespread and deep-seated
hatred of Saddam to bring most of the opposition
factions together under one roof. Divisive factors
slow the INC's progress toward establishing and
promoting a clear strategy for Saddam's removal
and replacement.
Some leaders have a long history of rivalry, and
the advent of the INC has sparked competition
among others. Kurdish leaders Mas'ud Barzani and
Jalal Talabani, for example, have competed for
most of the last three decades for dominance over
the Iraqi Kurds. Over the years their relationship
has been marked by periods of uneasy cooperation
against the Baghdad regime bounded by intense
competition and military conflict between their
Kurdish supporters. Several times during the Iran-
Iraq war, Barzani and Thlabani each sided with
Saddam's regime against the other. The resurgence
of the Kurdish Front and formation of the INC
have led to unprecedented cooperation between the
two, but the seeds of renewed compction are not
far below the surface. Barzani and Talabani main-
tain separate political and military entities within
the Kurdish Front, cultivate their own ties to for-
eign sponsors, and compete for the support of
smaller Kurdish groups
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SETIVr
Personal Rivalries Hinder Kurdish Military Unity
Kunfivit peshmergo fighters training an a 14050s
vintage 106.rnm v rifle. their most iffertive
antitank wearon
Competing loyalties and equipment shortfalls are
likely to hinder Kurdish efforts to establish a uni-
fled nzilitary
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will face the challenge of:
� Forging a unified force out of many rival locally
based militias. For example
in
November 1992 militia leaders were un-
willing to cede control of their troops to an apo-
litical united Kurdish force,
The Kurds have since made
Kurdish recruits training at the United Peshmerga
comp near As Sulannuniyah fur c duty as
bodyguards for had nalabani.
slow progress in building the force, but overall
control of the recruits still rests with individual
Kurdish opposition leaders.
� Shifting allegiance away fivm individuals arid
groups to the institution.
� Operating effectively between two rival Kurdish
leaders whose strong inclination will he to com-
pete for influence over the force.
The militias now possess little more than light
weaponry. and Kurdish leaders will appeal in-
creasingly to the West. particularly the United
States. for military and logistic support.
The growth of the opposition movement since the
Gulf war has intensified the competion for per-
sonal power among dissidents. A prime example of
this is Ahmad Chalabi, whose aggressive leader-
ship of the INC has been a recurring source of
controversy. Chalabi is a wealthy London-based
dissident
He is chairman of the INC Executive
9
Committee and is its former spokesman. He coor-
dinated and drafted the INC's platform and is
largely responsible for its early successes in or-
ganizing and balancin man com tin a
-ifteavei-
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Kurdish Federalism: Sowing the Seeds of Separatism
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Popular sentiment for an independent Kurdistan
runs deep in SOMP areas of northern Iraq. A member
official Talabanrc PUK in As Sulaymaniph proudly
displam a homemade wheel cover showing the
Kunlish flag and a map of greater Kurdistan
The Kurdish legislature voted in October 1992 in
favor of a separate Kurdish state within a feder-
ated Iraq. The idea appears popular among Iraqi
Kurds, many of whom are reluctant to abandon
traditional Kurdish aspirations for full indepen-
dence. Jabal 7inabani is a longtime proponent of
Kurdish federalism but has been pushing his ideas
more forcefully since 1990. He has said publicly
that pu.st Kurdish autonomy agreements with the
central government failed to address the Kurds'
national and territorial claims or to adequately
consider their unique ethnic and cultural status in
Iraq. He supports Kurdish self-determination
within a united Iraq and an ambiguously defined
"federal" relationship with the central government.
KDP leader Barzani has also championed the idea
since the Vienna meeting of the Iraqi National
Congress in June 1992, but he defines federalism
as an enhanced vers'on a the 1970 Kurdisl -Jr
a=greemen
Although
thusiasm for federal
the Kurds must take
role in the Iraqi app
omy and has said th
forgotten or betraye
Some of Talabana a
federalism appear to
later shi t toward in
Romani shows less en-
cm than Talabani, he argues
dvantage of their leading
sition to expand their auton-
t he fears the Kurds will be
soon after Saddam is gone.
d Barzani's statements about
leave the door o )en or a
e endence
Kurdish federalism has been a volatile issue in the
INC and is likely to be a future source of opposi-
tion strife. fatal Talabani obtained INC endorse-
ment of his position in June 1992, but only after he
pledged the Kurds would not secede from a united
Iraq. About 45 percent of the representatives at the
INC Vienna conferente opposed Talabangs views.
and the issue was a source of contention at subse-
quent INC gatherings in northern Iraq in
September and October 1992
In a tactical compromise to keep
the Issue from dividing the fledgling INC, the
Kurds toned down their federalist rhetoric in late
October. The Kurds agreed to officially postpone
INC consideration oft/se issue until a post-Saddam
referendum could be taken in exchange for a
guarantee that other apposition groups would
"respect" the Kurds' right to determine their future
relations with the rest of the country.
Despite the compromise, we anticipate that achiev-
ing and extending a federal system will remain a
top Kurdish priority Kurdish leaders have been
careful to publicly declare their consent to remain
Seerer-
Throughout the first year of the INC's
10
existence, Chalabi's detractors complained that his
leadership was discouraging Iraqi domestic and
foreign support and alienating some independent
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silence his critics
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within a united, federated Iraq, but they continue
behind the scenes to seek opportunities to press
their federalist demands and to probe regional and
international reactions t
deuce.
To keep pres-
sure on fellow dissidents. Mas'ial Barzani in late
1992 appeared to leave the door open to Saddam 's
offer to implement a "federal" system in northern
Iraq if the Kurds sever ties to the rest of the oppo-
sition.
Barzant publicly rejected Saddant's offer but asked
Saddam to specify his terms.
Despite the Kurds' and INC efforts to reassure out-
siders of their commitment to the unity of Iraq,
neighboring states and key oppositionists have
voiced suspicions that the Kurds will push for full
independence from Iraq. The INC compromise did
not mollify Iran. Syria, or Turkey, whose foreign
ministers have met several tunes over the last year
to discuss developments in northern Iraq and to
coordinate their efforts to counter Iraqi Kurdish
and INC moves. The issue remains a source of ten-
sion between Ankara and Iraqi Kurds despite
growing ties. The issue played a part in Ankara's
decision in 1993 to renew political ties to Baghdad
by sending a charge back to the Iraqi capital.
Renewed Kurdish emphasis on the subject could
hasten Turkey's termination of Provide Comfort 11.
SARI, the Islamic Action Organization, and other
Shia groups are also wary of the Kurds' intentions
and have warned that the issue will remain a
threat to opposition unity.
oppositionists. The controversy came to a head just
before the third INC meeting in northern Iraq in
February 1993, at which time a new spokesman
was elected to help lower Chalabi's profile and
II
Nevertheless, Chalabi re-
mains chairman of the Executive Committee, and
his background and leadership style will continue
to be a source of tension between INC members
and a convenient target of criticism from other dis-
sidents, regional governments and Saddam's
propagandists.
Other opposition leader
are examples of personal ambition
and competition among dissidents:
many see the opposition
movement more as a vehicle for personal
aggrandizement than a crusade auainst Saddam
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Differing ideologies hinder the coalescence of the
various factions into a powerful force against
Saddam. Divergent secular and clerical viewpoints
have been a source of contention at numerous
opposition meetings, including those held by the
INC. Shims participating in INC conferences in
northern Iraq have acquiesced to the body's policy
statements that minimize Islamic interests and em-
phasize democratic ideals, suggesting some have
moderated or temporarily shelved traditional hopes
for an Islamic state in Iraq. Many Shia opposi-
tionists, particularly the Da'wa Party and the
Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in
Iraq (SAIRI), have strong religious aspirations arid
have pushed hard for a more Islamic agenda
Possible future efforts to press the INC more force-
fully for religious concessions could deepen Shia
differences and further undermine opposition unity.
Many exiled Iraqi dissidents regard SAIRI leader
Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim as the premier Shia
leader because of his longstanding leadership of
the largest Iraqi Shia umbrella organization. Other
Shias�both inside and outside Iraq�resent his
close tics to Iran's radical clerical regime, and
some will look to other prominent Shias, particu-
larly the more moderate London-based Muhammad
Bahr al-Ulum or the eventual successor to the late
Iraqi grand Ayatollah 70'i, to represent their in-
terests
Kurdish advocacy of self-determination and a
Kurdish state within a federated Iraq will continue
to be a siumblingblock for the opposition over the
medium and long term. Kurdish self-determination
and federalism are part of the INC platform, but
criticism by opposition members and neighboring
states forced the INC to shelve discussion of these
ideas soon after its founding
Some Arab Sunni and
nationalist groups backed by Syria and Saudi
Arabia continue to boycott the INC to protest these
policies and formed small umbrella groups to rival
�Secce.L
12
Despite the Kurds' assur-
ances that they do not intend to secede from Iraq,
other opposition groups and regional sponsors con-
tinue to express suspicion that Kurdish federalist
rhetoric masks a deeper intent to pursue full in-
dependence that would lead to the partition of Iraq
Ethnic and sectarian suspicions between dissidents
arc a source of fragmentation. Friction between
Arabs, Kurds, Turkomans, Sunnis, and Shias are
deeply rooted in Iraq, and relations among opposi-
tion groups are marred by these historic tensions.
The INC has faced serious disagreements over
proportional representation of its constituent
groups. The most serious confrontation occurred
over Shia complaints of underrepresentation in the
Presidential Council and Executive Committee.
SAIRI tem-
porarily suspended its membership in early 1993
until the INC expanded Shia membership on the
Executive Committee. The compromise may have
temporarily assuaged Shia concerns about under-
representation, but Shia representation in the INC
remains far below the percentage of Shias in Iraq's
overall population. The oft-repeated demand of
Da'wii and SAIRI for a greater share in opposition
decisionmaking shows that the issue is far from
resolved
Other ethnic and religious groups are fighting for a
greater say in the opposition. Arab Sunni nation-
alists based in Syria are withholding support for
the INC because of its stance on Kurdish self-
determination
To attract Arab Sunni support inside
Iraq, the INC in February 1993 added several
Sunnis to its Executive Committee. Muzafir
ArsIan, head of the Turkey-backed Iraqi National
Turkoman Party and member of the INC Executive
Committee, has voiced similar concerns about un-
derrepresentation of Turkomans in the INC
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and hinted he would pull out
if Turkoman representation were not expanded.
Hindered by Meddling Sponsors
The diverse goals of sponsors in the region have
sparked competition for control of individual
gmups and greater influence in the opposition
movement, reducing the chances for unity, coordi-
nated action, and success against Saddam. Syria's
and Iran's longtime provision of support and safe-
haven to many exiled groups has bought them
varying degrees of influence over the agendas and
activities of their respective clients. Since the Gulf
war, Saudi Arabia has also tried to woo and con-
trol opposition clients, but
Riyadh has succeeded
only in further fracturing the movement. These
sponsors have attempted to manipulate or under-
mine the INC, and Syria and Saudi Arabia formed
rival umbrella organizations that they can control.
All three have said their involvement with the op-
position is motivat
Saddam but
ncy appear more interested in using the opposi-
tion to advance their own interests and thwart
those of rival sponsors:
� As Baghdad's longtime principal Arab rival,
Syria's intent is to replace Saddam with a regime
of Ba'thist military officers or Ara
tionalists sympathetic to Damascus
Damascus ears an oppo-
sition victory led by other elements would con-
tribute to Iraq's disintegration and create several
unstable and possibly hostile entities on its
eastern border. Syria competes with Iran for in-
fluence over Iraqi Shia groups to broaden its
sway over the opposition movement as a whole.
�
ran s pnmary aim is to use its Iraqi Shia
clients and its contacts with Iraqi Kurds to
13
gain influence influence inside Iraq, particularly in a post-
Saddam regime. Tehran has tried to lure Iraqi
Kurdish opposition leaders into cooperating
against Iranian Kurdish dissid nts
northern Ira
Saudi Arabia's in-
volvement with the opposition is aimed at ensur-
ing the continuation of Arab Sunni rule in Iraq
and preventing the fragmentation of the
country�which could leave a large, Iranian-
backed Shia end v
border.
Syria
Until the formation of the INC, Syria was is lead-
ing sponsor and main base of operations for many
opposition grou s. Thc rinci al benefici
Syrian suoportr
have been Sunni
Arab nationalist groups such as the Iraqi Ba'th
Party. Iraqi Free Officers' Movement, and a hand-
ful of former Iraqi officials, all with
Iraq's ruling elite.
Syria's influence over opposition affairs reached its
peak with the formation of the Damascus-based
Joint Action Committee in late 1990, but its zenith
was short lived. Despite several unity conferences,
which included many of the groups that now make
up the INC, the committee became mired in ideo-
logical differences and failed to agree on a unified
�Seeret
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The Joint Action Committee: Failure To Form a
More Perfect Union
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The Joint Action Committee of the Iraqi
Opposition, founded in Damascus in late
December 1990, was the first serious effort by
Iraqi opposition groups to forge a common politi-
cal program and present an alternative to the re-
of Saddam Husayn
The group:s.
18 charter members included most the major
Kurdish, Arab Sunni. Shia, and independent Iraqi
opposition groups. The group's five-member execu-
tive body included representatives from the
Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in
Iraq, Da'sva Party, Iraqi Communist Party, Ba'th
Party, and Kurdish Front. A London-based branch
of the committee, formed in January 1991, in-
cluded members fmm the original 18 groups, but it
quickly expanded to include more independent
groups and individuals.
The focal point of the committee's manifesto was a
call for Saddam:s overthrow and replacement with
a liberal, democratic Iraqi government. The com-
mittee also advocated esmblishmetu of an interim
national unity government, an end to all forms of
repression, and implementation of a host of politi-
cal. religious, and human rights. Three subsequent
conferences in March, June, and December 1991
succeeded in expanding the committee's member-
ship to 25 groups and forming numerous subcom-
mittees, but they did not progress far beyond the
group's original platfin*
From its inception the Joint Action Committee was
hampered by many of the problems that tradition-
ally have rendered the Iraqi opposition ineffective.
The Damascus-based branch was dominated by
Syria, which continually struggled with Iran for
control the organization's agenda and the
loyalty of Iraqi Shia groups. Competing political
interests, factional bickering, personal squabbles,
poor leadership coordination, a scarcity of Arab
and Western support, and a general inability to
agree on a plan of action also hindered the group.
The Kurds' decision in mid-I991 to accept
Baghdad's offer to negotiate a new autonomy
agreement put their participation in doubt, angered
Damascus and other committee members, and
dealt a major blow to the group's unity,
By late 1991 many dissidents were becoming in-
creasingly frustrated with the committee's inability
to agree on an agenda and plan of action. In early
1992, Ahmad Chalabi and other London represen-
tatives began planning a confi,rence to enhance
opposition unit); elect new leaders, include more
opposition groups and individuals, and formulate a
new agenda. The conference in Vienna in June
1992 created a new organization, the Iraqi
National Congress. effectively ending the Joint
Action Committee and dealing a serious setback to
Syria's efforts to control the Iraqi opposition.
agenda. Moreover, an effort by Kurds�key players
in the group�to reach a separate autonomy deal
with Baghdad in the spring of 1991 dealt a serious
blow to the committee's unity efforts,
Despite the Joint Action Committee's failure, Syria
remains active in trying to manipulate the opposi-
tion movement
14
Syrian competition with Iran
has fractured some groups,
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Damascus has tried to use its influence with
Da'wa, the Ba'th Party. and Communist grottos to
obstruct INC efforts to unify,
Frustration over its failure to control the INC, op-
position to INC support for Kurdish federalism�
which it fears would hasten Iraq's fragmentation.�
and disappointment over a general loss of in-
fluence to Western sponsors prompted Damascus in
early 1993 to sponsor a small rival organization
headed b its own clients, accordin to rcss
reports
Damascus remained onyAdihiTC
even after Tehran began encouraging its Shia
clients to join and after Riyadh received an INC
delegation. Repeated efforts by INC leaders to win
Syrian SLIDDOM have failed
\ Damascus continues ef-
forts to cobble together a broad-based umbrella
group led by pro-Syrian Ba'thists.
Iran
Iran's extensive support for Tehran-based Shia
groups gives it significant influence over the poli-
cies and military activities of these groups and
leverage in their relationship with the rest of the
Iraqi opposition.
Iran as the single largest provider of aid
exiled Iraqi Shia opposition groups and to rebel
groups operating in southern Iraq. Iran provides
these groups with financial, political, intelligence,
and military support as well as training and access
to Shia areas of southern Iraq for subversive opera-
tions:
� The Supreme Assembly. Da'wa Party, and
Islamic Action Organization are the primary
beneficiaries of Iranian safehaven and support.
� Iran also provides limited support to some
Damascus- and London-based Shia groups,
primarily factions of the Da'wa Party.
15
Tehran's influence with these groups has been a
source of recurring friction between them, but most
Iraqi Shia groups lack the necessary outside fund-
ing or alternative means of gaining access to
southern Iraq to enable them to act independently
of their Iranian sponsor.
In a tactical move to improve ties to Baghdad, the
INC, and the West, Tchran recently has tried to
play down its control of the Iraqi Shia opposition
and has reduced support to the Shia rebels operat-
ing in southern Iraq. Since the failure of thc Iraqi
Shia uprising in 199I�during which Iran openly
sent aid and Iranian personnel into Ira �Tehra
has focused on siving covert aid
Despite efforts to keep a low profile, Iran's in-
fluence over Ira i Shia rou s remains stron
We believe Tehran's encouragement of Iraqi Shia
groups to increase their involvement in the INC
is aimed at helping Iran maintain influence
Secret
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in opposition affairs and to monitor the West's in-
volvement with the INC.
Even while
it is encouraging its clients to cooperate with the
INC, Iran has signaled its willingness to restrict
their activities to suit its political purposes.
Iranian officials' opposition to the US and coali-
tion presence in the region is motivating them to
cultivate ties to Kurdish opposition leaders to mo-
nitor US and Kurdish intentions, to lure opposition
leaders away from the West, and to increase Iran's
influence over Kurdish affairs in northern Iraq.
The officials
promised humanitarian aid andeconomic as-
sistance in exchange for Kurdish cooperation
16
Saudi Arabia
Since the Gulf war, Riyadh has tried repeatedly to
woo opposition clients from other regional and
Western backers and to sponsor opposition gather-
ings to gain more direct control over the move-
ment.
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Other Saudi efforts have contributed to the opposi-
tion's lack of unity and effectiveness. In April
1993. Riyadh sponsored a new London-based um-
brella organization called thc Iraqi Cct1tral
Committee for Dialogue and Followup
The committee comprises a
handful of independent groups and Saudi- and
Syrian-hacked former Iraqi officials and
nationalists�most of them Arab Sunni Muslims.
17
Dependent on Western Support
Many Iraqi oppositionists are looking to the INC
as the best vehicle for achieving unity, but we be-
lieve the Congress's success in attracting members
and forging a consensus is in large part because of
its strong Western backing and does not indicate
that the members will adjust their divergent goals
for the sake of long-term cooperation.
Western support of the INC was crucial in the de-
cision of Iran to allow groups under its control to
attend INC gatherings in northern Iraq.
I See appendix A for a more detailed discussion of the history.
strengths. and weaknesses of the INC
-Sweet
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POOR QUALITY PAGE
_Seerer
18
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There arc several reasons for the attraction of these
divergent groups to Western support. Western
financial and poliiical support provides many Iraqi
dissidents an alternative to meddling regional spon-
sors. Since the Gulf war, several groups and in-
dividuals who formerly depended heavily on
regional sponsors have weakened old tics and
drawn closer to the West. haat Talabani, Mits'ud
Barzani, Masan al-Naqib, and sonic London-based
independents are among those who have decreased
their dependence on Syria and Iran in pursuit of
Western support. Western bucking has given these
and other dissidents unprecedented access to senior
Western officials, international media, and Middle
Eastern governments. The opposition has achieved
levels of cooperation under the Western-backed
INC that far exceed previous halfhearted attempts
by Syria. Iran, and Saudi Arabia to unify them.
Moreover, Western bucking gives opposition
groups a legitimacy that they have not achieved in-
side Iraq. If and when Saddam's regime falls,
Western support and pressure on a successor re-
gime could help some Iraqi oppositionists play a
role in shaping the post-Saddam government that
they could not have hi der limited
regional sponsorship.
Current levels of Western support for the INC have
enabled it to build unity, raise its international pro-
file, and help it become a political and propaganda
nuisance for Saddam. In our view, this support is
insufficient to enable the group to achieve its goals
of overthrowing Saddam Husayn and installing a
democratic, pluralistic government in Baghdad.
Even if Western support were substantially in-
creased, the INC would face formidable political,
military, and propaganda challenges from Saddam.
Moreover, the INC would have to overcome the
strong internal differences and outside pressures
that have rendered the opposition feckless and
which persist despite Western backing.
Disagreements over basic ideological issues make
progress toward a unified agenda slow and ardu-
ous. Many Iraqis and regional sponsors view the
exiled dissidents as opportunists who engage in
19
�9erfEt�
factional maneuverin , backbitin , and com tition
for forei n so n
Kurdish leaders, at t e ris o �amag-
ing I unity, recently hinted they may restart
negotiations with Baghdad unless the United States
increased assista cc to fleKussisecording to
press report. Saddam's
continuing propaganda that the INC is merely a
Western puppet will reduce its credibility among
some Iraqis.
Lacking Credibility Inside Iraq
A significant obstacle to the opposition's making a
difference inside Iraq is its general lack of a broad
popular following there. Aside from the Kurds,
most other opposition groups have no sizable or
unified supoorl in Ira
many Iraqis. Sunni and Shia alike,
have little regard for opposition elements outside
the country. Most exiled Iraqi dissidents have not
been in Iraq for many years and
/have little influence or pub-
lic recognition there. Many groups claim to have
broad contacts with and pledges of loyalty from
Iraqi military officers and units, but there is no in-
dication that any of these contacts has resulted in
significant antiregime operations./
Domestic support for the opposition is lacking
among Iraq's Arab Sunnis, who control the oovern-
evic_ml
!Saddam has made a
priority of protecting elite Arab Sunnis�
particularly in the security services and senior
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A Historical Perspective on Regime Changes in
Iraq
Iraq has undergone at least seven major power
shifts and numerous failed coups since it gained its
independence from the United Kingdom in 1932.
Most changes have been violent, and all have been
instigated by the military�either unilaterally or in
concert with Iraq-based political leaders. In con-
trast, no opposition group based outside the coun-
try has effected a political change inside. Several
coups inspired or supported by neighboring states
have similarly jailed Even the Reed, Party. which .
was founded outsitk Iraq. took 25 years and one
failed coup to build a tvell-organized clandestine
political network inside Iraq and recruit the key
military and political figures necessary to make a
successful play for power in 1968. Many Iraqis
and regional observers believe the absence of
known and respected military officers in the ranks
of the Iraqi opposition will be a major hindrance
If) the opposition :s success. A brief survey of the
military's involvement in political change in lraq
supports this conclusion:
� In October /936, Gen. Raqr Sidqi led a military
coup that brought leftist reformers into the
government and set the precedent for military in-
volvement in Iraqi politics.
� Less than a year later a cabal of Arab nation-
alist Army officers assassinated Sidqi, removed
the leftists from the government, and gradually
returned to power the promonarchy politicians
who had previously governed Iraq.
� In April 1941 a coup by nationalist military
officers led by former Prime Minister Rashid Ali
forced the UK-backed regent and pro-UK politi-
cians to flee Iraq. Within a month, UK troops
reestablished control, Rashid Ali and his gener-
als fled to Iran, and many of his supporters were
jailed or executed.
� In July 1958 a small group of Army officers, led
by Abd al-Karine Qtesint, revolted and as.sassi-
flared the young King. the regent, and longtime
Prime Minister Nati al-Said.
� In February 1963, Qasint was killed in a military
coup led by moderate Army officers and the
Da 's!: Party. A tion-Ba'thist Abd al-Salam
Muhammad Arif was appointed president.
� Nine months of hitter infighting between moder-
ate and radical Ba'thist factions eroded the
party's control of the government. In November
1963, Arif, backed by a group of moderate Army
officers, seized control and ousted the Ba'thists
in Iraq's first bloodless coup.
� In July 1968 a group of young officers collabo-
rated with the Fla'th Party to overthrow the Arif
government. Non-Ba'thisr officers who partici-
pated in the coup were ousted in turn by their
Ba'thist coconspirators, led by Gen. Ahmad
Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Husayn.
ranks of the military�from the worst of the hard-
ships of life in postwar Iraq. Saddam has suc-
ceeded in playing on his Sunni constituents' fears
that the opposition is only a front for Western ef-
forts to partition the country and destroy the Arab
Sunni heartland. Such propaganda would play an
even more important role in rallying Arab Sunni
support behind Saddam if an opposition with a
large Kurdish and Shia representation increased its
ability to threaten the regime.
(b)(3)
�Sesset.
20
Challenged by Iraqi Countermeasures
Saddam is using his pervasive security services to
eliminate or intimidate dissidents at home and
abroad. Iraqi intelligence has a reputation for car-
rying out brutal, little-disguised assassinations tc
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(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
frighten potential dissenters. Baghdad is suspected
in several grisly assassinations of Saddam's o po-
nents in Amman. Jordan during 1992
Iraqi operatives
have carried out several bombings and assassina-
tions of opposition figures in the north and at-
led numerous other bombings
er attempts y
agh1ud to undermine Kurdish dissidents or
separate them from the rest of the opposition in-
clude:
(b)(1) � Dispatching emissaries to Kurdish leaders with
(b)(3) offers to restart autonomy negotiations and to
' implement "federalism" in Iraq
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
� Maintaining an economic embargo, conducting
terrorism against UN relief convoys, and cancel-
ing the 25-dinar note, which accelerated deterio-
ration of the Kurdish economy.
Saddam's security services have been effective at
21
protecting him from coup plots over the years, and
every plot that is thwarted increases his aura of in-
vincibility and the ability of the services to deter
other would-be plotters
Saddam works against the opposition by employ-
ing well-practiced propaganda and public relations
schemes to win the loyalties of Iraqis at home.
Many of Saddam's Sunni constituents approve
of his harsh repression of Shins and Kurds�whom
thcy believe would do the same to Arab Sunnis if
given the chance.
Outlook
Difficulties in sustaining unity and conducting
large-scale coordinated operations make it unlikely
that the Iraqi opposition by itself will force
Saddam from power.
Kurdish militias and Shia rebels are adept at small
hit-and-run attacks on isolated regime targets, but
they are no match for the larger, better trained, and
better equipped Iraqi military. Even during the
Kurdish and Shia uprisings in 1991. when the
government was at its weakest, the rebels could
not hold territory in the face of coordinated regime
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counterattacks. An opposition plan to encroach on
government-held territory or attack major cities
such as Mosul, Karkuk, or Al Basrah would alarm
the Arab Sunni heartland and cause many Sunnis
to rally behind Saddam. Many Shins, who com-
prise the majority of the rank and file of Iraq's
regular Army, would be swayed by Saddam's argu-
ment that an opposition victory would divide the
country and lead to foreign domination.
Nevertheless, some opposition groups, particularly
Iraq-based Kurdish and Shia rebels, could add to
the pressures on Saddam and contribute to his �
downfall by sustaining low-level insurgencies that
drain regime security resources and erode military
morale.
Large numbers of officers and
soldiers deserted or defected to the opposition dur-
ing the uprisings in 1991 and some would do so
again, although we believe the opposition exagger-
ates the extent of its contacts and support in the
Iraqi military. The INC has the potential to keep
political pressure on Saddam by lobbying foreign
governments, highlighting Iraqi human rights
abuses, and increasing contacts with disaffected
Iraqis, particularly military officers
Strong Western political and financial support will
be crucial if the opposition is to sustain even
fragile unity, increase pressure on the current re-
gime, or play a role in a post-Saddam government.
Independent and nationalist groups and individuals
based outside Iraq will depend on Western support
to give them a level of prominence, leverage, and
recognition in the opposition and the region that
they would otherwise lack. Without such backing,
squabbling and competition for sponsors would in-
crease and leave many of these groups more ex-
posed to manipulation by Syria, Iran, and Saudi
At abia
Kurdish opposition groups, whose territorial hold-
ings, domestic support, political unity, and com-
parative military strength make them critical to the
success of the INC, are particularly vulnerable to
Secret
22
any decrease in Western support or protection.
the Kurds view
Operation Provide Comfort and the coalition-
enforced no-fly zone north of the 36th parallel as
essential to keep Saddam from launching a major
offensive to retake Kurdish-controlled areas in
northern Iraq. We believe on the basis of past be-
havior that without such protection Kurdish unity
would quickly degenerate, and some Kurdish lead-
ers would seek an accommodation with Baghdad to
forestall reprisals, protect their interests, and
preserve a measure of Kurdish autonomy. Iraqi
Kurds probably would receive little help from
Turkey in keeping Saddarn at bay once Operation
Provide Comfort ended. Turkey fears that Kurdish
federalist rhetoric will lead to independence and
fuel greater separatism among its own Kurds.
Shaky Transition Alter Saddam
Despite strong Western support and progress
toward unity, Saddam's ouster�if and when it
comes�could find exiled Iraqi oppositionists still
arguing over basic issues. Once Saddam is gone, a
principal point of opposition unity�hatred of
him�would cease to exist. Deep-rooted ideologi-
cal differences and personal rivalries would be
likely to resurface and hinder the opposition's abil-
ity to implement a coordinated plan for a post-
Saddam government. If Saddam were deposed in a
military coup, some opposition groups or leaders
would try to make separate deals with a new re-
gime to protect their own interests, often at the ex-
pense of erstwhile allies within the opposition
movement
A sustained period of opposition unity before
Saddam's ouster would help to gain some recogni-
tion among Iraqi citizens, but it might still leave
the opposition with an enormous domestic credibil-
ity problem if it were not the agent of his fall.
1
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Many Iraqis would continue to view most of the
exiled dissidents, particularly those who waited un-
til the Gulf crisis to take a public stand against
Saddam. as opportunists and traitors. To relieve
these suspicions, opposition members would have
to formulate an agenda that appeals to a broad ar-
ray of Iraqis and assuages Arab Sunni fears that an
opposition takeover would threaten their lives, fa-
milies, and fortunes. They also would have to
demonstrate an ability to carry out coordinated po-
litical and military operations inside Iraq that
would discredit the ruling Tikriti elite, attract
popular support, and help dispel the predominant
perception that they are divided, ineffectual, and
controlled by foreign interests
Few if any post-Saddam contenders, either from
the current Baghdad establishment or front among
exiled oppositionists, would have the broad popu-
lar support to rule uncontested. Considerable time
could pass before a strong leader emerged or rival
leaders came to a political and military accommo-
dation. In a worst case scenario, competition be-
tween rival ethnic groups and their associated
opposition parties could quickly sharpen, contrib-
ute to domestic tensions or violence, and lead to a
temporary partitioning of the country. We believe
many Kurds hold traditional aspirations for in-
dependence and would push strongly for Kurdish
self-determination in a post-Saddam Iraq. Iraqi
Shias resent years of harsh Ba'thist repression, and
Saddam's departure probably would unleash a
wave of revenge attacks and bloodletting. In the
event of a coup against Saddam, a weak central
government or a divided military would face seri-
ous difficulty in quelling a rebellion on the scale
of the domestic unrest that occurred during the
Kurdish and Shia uprisings in 1991. If a new cen-
tral authority could not extend its control over the
north and south, a de facto partitioning into ethnic
and sectarian enclaves could occur. Despite the
stated intention of most opposition leaders to main-
tain Iraq's territorial integrity, their difficulty in
sustaining unity and coordinating their activities
would limit their ability to contend with
widespread violence
RePerse Blank
23
Regardless of of the circumstances of Saddam's
departure, the political disintegration of Iraq is not
inevitable, because there are strong regional politi-
cal forces and domestic social and economic fac-
tors that could help prevent a slide into chaos. No
opposition group would want to risk losing
Western and regional support. The difficulty of
sustaining an isolated, landlocked Kurdish state
among hostile neighbors probably would temper
Kurdish demands for independence. Fear of sub-
version, intervention, or domination by Iraq's
neighbors�especially Iran, Turkey, and Syria�.
would be strong motivation for opposition factions
to seek a political settlement with the new regime
that preserved national unity
It is unlikely that Saddam would be succeeded by
the kind of pluralistic, parliamentary, democratic
government promised by most INC members. Even
if a successor military regime survives the chaos of
the immediate post-Saddam period, movement
toward a representative form of government is
likely to be protracted and arduous at best.
Opposition leaders most likely to participate in a
post-Saddam regime would be those with sizable
domestic support, namely the Kurds and Shias.
Although Mas'ud Barzani, Jalal Talabani, and
Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim would be the main
candidates, many less important opposition figures
and tribal leaders with local support would also vie
for influence with the new regime. Many of the
long-exiled dissidents probably would have a
chance of participating only if the opposition
helped precipitate the regime's downfall and if a
large number of current Ba'thist and Tikriti politi-
cal and military leaders v__e_re-st,!zeitt_fron!,-mower
along with Saddam.
-Secret�
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Appendix A
The Iraqi National Congress:
The Opposition's Best Hope
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
The Iraqi National Congress (INC) has made morc
progress in its first year than any Iraqi opposition
umbrella group toward building unity and articulat-
ing a pluralistic, democratic national agenda. The
organization has weathered repeated efforts by
regional opposition sponsors and rival dissidents to
undermine its unity, has succeeded in keeping key
Kurdish and Shia groups in its ranks, and has
made visible progress toward organizing its leader-
ship and policy committees. Nevertheless, the INC
faces serious challenges to its viability, including
luck of support from Iraq's neighbors, low credibil-
ity inside Iraq, persistent internal squabbling and
competing interests, and ineffective coordination
among key leaders.
The INC was founded in Vienna in June 1992 by a
group of 150 mostly London-based and Kurdish
dissidents. One of the prime movers behind the
conference was Ahmad Chalabi, former head of
the London Joint Action Committee, who played a
key role in organizing the meeting, crafting its
agenda and final communique
The delegates elected a 17-member Executive
Committee and agreed on a final statement that
called for Saddam's overthrow and pleaded for in-
creased Western support and media coverage of
their plight. These initial successes were over-
shadowed by other contentious issues. Damascus,
Riyadh, and Tehran kept the Sunni nationalist and
Shia groups under their control away from the
meeting, detracting from INC unity efforts. The
Kurds, particularly Jalal Talabani, caused a stir by
pressing hard for INC recognition of the Kurds'
right to self-determination�a right that the group
recognized only after the Kurds agreed not to se-
cede from Iran
25
Figure 8. Soon after the founding of the Iraqi
National Congress in June 1992, Congress lead-
ers visited Washington to lobby for support. The
delegation. shown outside the White House. In-
eluded (left to right) Laith Ohba. Muhammad
Bahr at. titans. Salah Ma. ud
Banani. Arifflbd al�Razzaq�no longer an INC
member�and Ilusbyar Dhoti. assistant to
Miss ud Banani. Not shown. but also in atten-
dance, were Jab! Talabani and Barham Sank
Thialtani's representative in the United States
Subsequent INC conferences improved the group's
organizational structure and made progress toward
unity, but the group encountered stiff regional op-
position and internal struggles. Four meetings have
been held on Iraqi soil�an unprecedented opposi-
tion accomplishment�under Kurdish protection:
� A conference in September 1992 of 100
delegates reaffirmed the liberal, democratic prin-
ciples set forth in the Vienna meeting. Syria and
Iran, apparently concerned about further loss of
influence within the opposition, directed their
respective Arab Sunni and Shia clients to attend
the meetings, enabling the INC to significantly
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expand its membership and begin debate on the
percentage of each party's representation in the
organization.
� The next meeting in late October 1992 elected
leadership bodies and attempted to settle the con-
tentious issues of Kurdish federalism and ethnic
representation. The delegates elected a three-man
Presidential Council comprising Kurdish leader
Mas'ud Barzani, London-based Shia cleric
Muhammad Bahr al-Ulum. and Arab Sunni and
former Iraqi Gcn. Hasan al-Naqib. They also
created a 300-member General Assembly and ex-
panded the size of the Executive Committee to
26. Syrian-backed groups that attended the first
meeting in northern Iraq renewed their boycott
of the INC over the issue of ICurdish federalism.
Despite the small size of these groups, their ab-
sence highlighted the INC's lack of appeal to
Arab Sunni elites in Iraq. Iranian-backed Shia
groups attended, but they complained bitterly
about Shia underrepresentation in the Presidential
Council and Executive Committee. Shia leader
Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim declined a position in
the presidential troika. The conference officially
postponed discussion of the issues of Kurdish
federalism and self-determination until a referen-
dum could be held in a free post-Saddam Iraq.
� Several problems arose soon after the October
conference. Syria and Iran quickly criticized the
meeting, which did little to assuage their con-
cerns about Kurdish and Western domination of
the opposition. Damascus, Tchran, and Ankara
soon organized a series of ministerial-level meet-
ings to discuss the issue under the broad heading
of developments in northern Iraq. Tehran-
sponsored groups loudly criticized the INC for
continued refusal to increase Shia representation.
Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in
Iraq (SAIRI) anger over the issue led it to sus-
pend its membership in January 1993. INC mem-
bers and critics began increasingly to criticize
INC spokesman and Executive Committee chair-
man Ahmed Chalabi. Some charged his sordid
background and self-serving leadership style hin-
dered INC credibility and engendered personal
squabbles.
Seeret
26
� The third conference in northern Iraq in February
1993 sought to put some of these issues to rest
and succeeded in making modest gains. A
compromise was reached on the issue of
underrepresentation, whereby the Executive
Committee was expanded by five members, in-
cluding one Shia and two Sunnis. Two seats
were left vacant in hopes of attracting
Damascus-based Iraqi nationalists to rejoin. A
25-member Advisory Council was created to in-
clude members who were upset at having been
excluded from other leadership bodies. To si-
lence INC critics and reduce infighting,
conference leaders replaced Ahmed Chalabi, the
1NC's controversial spokesman, with the lesser
known Arab Sunni Salah al-Shaikhly.
� The INC's international credibility got a boost in
April 1993 when the Presidential Council was
received by senior US and UK officials, but
regional support is still lagging
� A fourth INC meeting in northern Iraq in August
1993 was dominated by souabblina
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Despite its successes, the INC faces formidahle
obstacles in its push for unity and credibili0
ithe
group lacks sizable support among Iraqi Arab
Sunnis. After a shaky start SAIRI reaffirmed its
participation in the INC. but the issue of represen-
tation remains a point of contention for Shias.
Sunnis, and some smaller ethnically based groups.
Reverse Blank
27
For example, example, Arab Shirts still compose less than
26 percent of the Executive Committee, far below
the 60 to 65 percent of Shias in Iraq's overall
population. Neighboring states are wary of INC
intentions or are openly hostile. Syria and Saudi
Arabia have formed rival, albeit weak, organiza-
tions of Arab Sunnis and nationalists,1
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Appendix B
Iraq's Dissidents:
Who They Are and
What They Want
Kurdish Groups
Kurdish Democratic Party
The KDP is the oldest. best known, and largest
Iraqi Kurdish opposition party. It was founded by
Mullah Mustafa Barzani in 1946 and gained promi-
nence during the Kurdish rebellion in the 1970s.
After Mustafa's death in 1979, he was succeeded
as KDP leader by his sons Idris�who was killed
fighting Iraqi forces in I987�and Mas'ud. Mus'ud
Barzani heads a five-man Politburo that formulates
KDP policy and manages the daily administration
of the party. The Politburo oversees a 17-member
Central Committee that helps formulate policy and
manages the party's bureaus and local rebel and
support networks. Thc trt is headquartered in
Salah ad Din, Iraq.
The KDP's primary support inside Iraq tradition-
ally has been among rural, conservative tribal
Kurds in the mountainous areas north and north-
east of Irbil. The KDP's strong showing in the
Kurdish election in May 1992�it received 45 per-
cent of the vote�suggests it has growing backing
among city dwellers, unions, and professional
groups in areas traditionally dominated by the rival
PUK.1
Barzani tried in 1991 to negotiate an autonomy
agreement with Baghdad after the Gulf war, draw-
ing strong criticism from other opposition groups
and regional sponsors andieadine to deep divi-
sions in the Kurdish Front.1
29
Secret�
I By early 1992. Baghdad's
refusal to compromise on major issues, its eco-
nomic embargo of the Kurds, and opposition from
other Kurds to a compromise discouraged Barzani
_from_our&oinather negotiations.1
Serve&
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(b)(3)
(b)(3)
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Barzani has moved to strengthen ties to the West
and improve his leadership position in the opposi-
tion. The KDP traditionally had received the bulk
of its outside support from Iran and Syria. Since
the breakdown of autonomy talks with Baghdad in.
1991, Barzani has joined Jalal Talabani in pursuing
closer ties to Turkey and the West. Barzani partici-
pated in the formation of the Western-backed Iraqi
National Congress in June 1992 and has accompa-
nied Talabani and other Iraqi opposition represen-
tatives on tours of Western and Arab capitals to
gamer support. He plays a leading role in INC ef-
forts to unify the opposition and organize INC ac-
tivities based in northern Iraq. In addition, he has
moved closer to Talabani by advocating the notion
of "federalism" for Kurdistan within a united Iraq.
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
The PUK. the second-largest Kurdish opposition
group, is headed by lalal Talabani, who has been
prominent in the Iraqi Kurdish movement for three
decades. Talabani served under Mullah Mustafa
Barzani in the early 1960s but broke away in 1964
to form the Kurdish Revolutionary Party. In 1975
this group joined another Kurdish party called the
Iraqi Marxist Komaleh Party to create the PUK.
Talabani, a onetime Marxist. has largely dropped
his socialist rhetotic--in part to attract more
Western support�but still advocates "social
democracy" in Iraq. Before the Gulf crisis, the
PUK received most of its support from Syria. The
group now depends on Western governments but
maintains uneasy ties to Syria and Iran
The PUK's headquarters is in Shaqlawah. Iraq, and
its traditional area of operations is in southern and
eastern Kurdistan. Kurdish election results show
PUK support to be strongest in the cities of
As Sulaymaniyah, Irbil, and Karkuk. More than the
tribal-based KDP, the PUK has appealed largely to
�Secret� 30
city dwellers and Kurdish intellectuals, although
the upheaval of the Gulf war appears to have
shifted and blurred traditional lines of support. For
example, Kurdish election results showed Barzani
has much support in traditional Talabani strong-
holds, whereas Talabani was strongly backed by
many Kurdish tribal leaders in his opposition to
Barzani's conduct of the Baghdad autonomy talks.
Since the Gulf war, Talabani has aggressively ad-
vocated Kurdish self-determination. He opposes
Kurdish autonomy as defined by the 1970 Iraqi-
Kurdish autonomy agreement and instead favors
a vaguely defined "federal" system that would
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give the Kurds substantial independence within a
unified Iraq
The INC, pressed hard by Talabant,
adopted a policy favoring Kurdish self-
determination and federalism within a united Iraq
as part of its platform at the Vienna conference in
(b)(3) June 1992.
PUK cooperation with the KDP has grown steadily
since the Kurdish election, but longstanding differ-
ences remain just below the surface.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Moreover, recurring PUK-KDP military
skirmishes and the PUK's occasional allegations
that Barzani maintains ties to and accepts gifts
from Saddam show that suspicions run deep.
Unity Party of Kurdistan
The Unity Party of Kurdistan was formed in
August 1992 from three smaller Iraqi Kurdish par-
tics seeking to increase their leverage with the
larger and better known KDP and PUK.
Muhammad Mahmud (Semi) Abd al-Rahman,
former leader of the Kurdish People's Democratic
Party and the third most prominent Kurdish leader,
spearheaded the merger with the Kurdish Socialist
Party of Mahmud Ali Uthman and the little-known
Independent Democratic Party (Basok) headed by
Mulahsim Shiwan
The Unity Party is led by a
three-member Presidential Council as well as a
nine-member Politburo and a 24-member Central
Committee and reflects the socialist agenda of its
three leaders. The party is a member of the Iraqi
National Congress. Before the merger, Ra'sul
Ma'mand, a senior leader of the Kurdish Socialist
Party, broke away from the main group. This fac-
tion merged with Jalal Talabani's PUK in February
1993. according to press reports. In July 1993.
Sami Abd al-Rahman merged his wing of the party
with Mas'ud Barzani's KDP and urged his two
coleaders to join the KDP,
31
Kurdish Tribal Society
The Kurdish 'hibal Society was formed by a group
of 40 Iraqi Kurdish tribal leaders�unaffiliated
with any particular political group�in September
1991 to increase their leverage in Kurdish affairs.
most of the tribes that comprise the society�
particularly the Surchi. Harki. and Zebari�were
formerly aligned with Baghdad and belonged to
regime-backed militia groups called fursart or
National Defense Battalions. Their subservience to
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Baghdad has earned them the nickname jush or
donkeys. Leaders of such tribes were handsomeiy
rewarded by Saddam for their willingness to fight
Kurdish rebels or to refrain from siding with them.
Whcn the Kurdish uprising reemerged in the wake
of the Gulf war, these tribes abandoned Saddam
and sided with thc rebels.
This reversal left these tribes vulnerable on two
fronts. On the one hand, they arc distrusted by the
Kurdish Front and have been excluded from its
decisionmaking. The KDP has been the most out-
spoken opponent of the society. perhaps out of '
concern that it may undercut sonic of the KDP's
support among the tribes
The PUK has been more supportive and may have
encouraged the formation of the croon as a
challenge to the KDP,
On the other hand, society members
fear manipulation or fu-
ture reposats by Saddam for their perceived trea-
son.
Saddam is lobbying the group's members to regain
their su rt them. Society leaders
hope their banding together
wi provi e a structure for mutual support and
keep individual tribal leaders from accepting
Saddam's offers.
(b)(3)
Although the society claims to support the Kurdish
Front militarily, its political views and overall
goal
group opposes
Kurdish autonomy and prefers full integration
within Iraq and cooperation with a strong, Sunni..
controlled cc.ntral government. A handful of tribal
leaders were ousted from the group for supportinci
Kurdish self-determination and independence
The society
opposes the INC because it includes groups that
have no support inside Iraq
Society ea ers routine y accuse t eir
rivals, particularly Mas'ud Barzani and Jalal
-SeataL_
32
Talabani, of corruption, mismanagement of Kurdish
interests, and controlling the Kurdish legislature.
Shia Groups
Supreme Assembly for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq
The Iran-based Supreme Assembly for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI) is the most prominent
Iraqi Shia opposition group. Iran created the or-
ganization in 1982 as a 40-group umbrella organi-
zation for most Iraqi Shia and some Kurdish
dissidents to coordinate their activities and ensure
Iranian influence over them. Since 1982, Iranian
meddling, factionalism, and infighting have
reduced SAIRI's membership to about 15 groups.
The Assembly is headed by the Iraqi Arab cleric
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The Kurdish Front and Legislature
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
After the two main Kurdish opposition groups, the
most powerful Kurdish organization is the eight-
member Kurdish Front. The Front includes the
KDI; PUK, Kurdish Communist Party, Kurdish
Toilers' Party Assyrian Democratic Movement,
Kurdish Socialist Party, Kurdish People's
Democratic Party, and Basok/Independent
Democratic Party�the latter three comprising the
Unity Party of Kurdistan. Mas'ud Barzani founded
the Front in 1988�probably at Syria :r behest�to
revive the opposition movement after Baghdad
crushed the Kurdish rebellion in 1988 and Iran
drastically cut its support. Between 1988 and
1990, Kurdish infighting, divergent goals, and
limited outside support rendered the organization
moribund until it revived during the Gulf crisis.
Since the end of the Gulf war; the Front has con-
trolled most of the Kurds' political, military, and
economic affairs in northern Iraq and has
alienated many tribal groups by excluding them
from its decisionmaking. Barzani and Talabani:s
status as the real powers behind the Front has
frustrated other Front members and gave rise to
the Unity Party merger Recurring political and
ideological squabbles, personal rivalries, and
occasional military skirmishes between member
groups probably will continue to hinder the Front's
coordination and effectiveness.
In a precedent setting move to solidify their de
facto autonomy from Baghdad, Iraqi Kurds elected
a I05-member Legislative Assembly on 19 May
1992. The election was sponsored by all eight par-
ties of the Kurdish Front. but the KDP and PUK
control all but five of the legislature's seats. In
July 1992 the legislature appointed a I4-member
Council of Ministers, which allegedly is responsi-
ble for all aspects of Kurdish government and
civilian administration. Real control of Kurdish af-
fairs rests in large part with the parties. A KDP-
PUK written agreement in September 1992 that
claims to cede "complete power" to the legislature
gives it some responsibility for administrative and
economic affairs but leaves the parties in control
of Kurdish military and foreign affairs
Muhammad Ba r al-Hakim
SAIRI s main goa
had been to establis an ranian-style Shia state in
Iraq. Although some SAIRI members are still in-
tent on this goal, Hakim and his representatives
have begun to stress themes like Iraqi nationalism,
democratic pluralism, and the territorial integrity of
Iraq. At the same time, SAIRI leaders are minimiz-
ing their longstanding ties to Iran, which in the
past weakened the group's appeal inside Iraq--
owing to deeply rooted Iraqi Shia fears of Iranian
domination�and cost it broader international sup-
Port.
SAIRI depends on Iran for political, military, and
financial support as well as access to Shia areas of
southern Iraq
33
Tehran provides SAIRI lead-
ers with cars, guards, and houses. Outside Iran,
SAIRI maintains frequent contacts with Syria,
although ties have been strained by SAIRI's partic-
ipation in the INC.
The military arm of SAIRI is called the Iraqi
Mujahidin, founded in 1979 and run by Hakim's
younger brother, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim. Iran's
Ministry of Intelligence and Security oversees the
Iraqi Mujahidin. The group is made up of Shia
Iraqi Army deserters, former Iraqi prisoners of war
from the Iran-Iraq war, and Iraqi refugees of
Iranian origin.
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Table 2
Minor Kurdish Parties and Officials
�..�__
Group Eeaders
�
Assyrian Ikrnocratic Movement
Independent Democratic Party
(Hawk)
- ---� �
Yunadam Yusir Kama
Lincoln Malik
Albert Yalda
Mulahsim Shiwan
Islamic League of Iraqi Fayli
Kurds
Inlamic 14.h.oremcni of.ku-rd-iSta;
Ahd al-Jalil al�Fayli
Abu Ahmad Quart
Abu Haydar Fawzi
Abu Muhammad Jabar
Alm.Huda Tariq
All Abd al-Aria
Kurdish Army of Islam Abbas Shuhin Ahu llama
Kurdish Communisi Party Aziz Muhammad
Fakri Karim
Kurdish Mosul Vilayci Council
(Also known as Kurdish
Conscrvaiivc Party)
Shaykh Umar al-Surchi
Kurdish People's Democratic
Party
Sarni Abd al-Rahman
Kurdish Socialist Party
Kurdish Toilers Party
Mahmud All Ullman
Ra'sul Mo'mand
Kadir Aziz
34
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Figure 10. Lightly armed Iraqi Miijthldin
rebels palm! the marshes in southeastern Iraq.
April 1992. Baghdad has nearly completed an
ertenske water diversi tttt project and several
associated causeway projects aimed at drying
large areas rif the marshes, wIthli provide
safe/wren and staging areasrh7gtel hibanthrun
attacks against Iraqi farces.
�Serrer�
Saha pm,
Since the failed Shia rebellion of 1991, SAIRI has
tried to promote the impression that it is putting
political distance between itself and Iran to im-
prove tics to other opposition groups and Arab and
Western governments. Hakim began the process in
December 1991 when he visited Syria to improve
ties to opposition groups based there and to apolo-
gize for SAIRI mistakes during the Shia rebellion
that presumably included allowing., Trqn
prominent role
Hakim has Ansi co aauai Arabia and Kuwait on
several occasions in search of support. SAIRI
representatives in Vienna and Damascus have tried
to assuage US concerns about Iran's control of the
orgaj!a4ionandi encourage closer US-SAIRI
ties.
SAIRI efforts to put distance between itself and
Tehran also stem from real tensions between the
two.
35
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philosophical and ethnic differences between Arab
and Persian Shias as an underlying cause for a
growing lack of trust between the Tehran govern-
ment and SAIRI. SAIRI leaders see themselves in
competition with Iranian clerics us the standard
bearers of thc Shia cause in Iraq and
their rela-
tions with Tehran are strained. Despite these
strains. SAIRI's lack of substantial outside funding
probably will keep it under Iran's influence for the
foreseeable future
SAIR1's decision to join the INC in late 1992 has
enhanced opposition unity, but its public rejection'
of INC-endorsed Kurdish federalism and temporary
suspension of its membership earlier this year to
protest Shia underrepresentation suggest its partici-
pation could be tenuous
Daiwa Party
Al-Da'wa al-lslamiyyah (The Islamic Call Party),
commonly called Da'wa. is the oldest and largest
Iraqi Shia dissident group. It was founded in Iraq
in the late 1950s by the Iraqi cleric Muhammad
Baqr Ail-Sadr and gained prominence after Iran's
Ayatollah Khomeini assumed power in 1979.
Saddam's execution of Sadr in 1980 drove the
party underground and most of its Iraqi leaders
into exile. Baghdad continued its harsh repression
of Da'wa members and sympathizers throughout
the Iran-Iraq war, but the party revived its political
and subversive activities in southern Ira during
the Shia uprising in April 1991.
Da'wa is highly factionalized. The primary faction
is the Iraqi Da'wa Party, based in Iran and led by
Muhammad Mandi al-Asifi. The group depends on
Iran for financial and other support but also
receives contributions from Shias abroad, espe-
cially in Pakistan and Europe.
The Iraqi Da'wa Party is for-
mally under the SAIR1 umbrella, but it operates in-
dependently of SAIR1 and Hakim. The group is a
-Saccat� 36
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Made 3
Minor Shia Parties and Officials
Group
Leader
Independent Islamic Conference Abel al-Arnir Alwats
Iraqi InabaIlah
Ilaytham Mahfuz. Hajj Qathim
Abd al�Mandi
Iraqi Islamic Revolution
Dhiya al-Dabas
Salim Hasan
Islamic Action Organization Muhammad Taqi Mudarisi
Islamic Bloc
Nun al-Alwan
Nazar Haidar
Shaykh MuIssin al-Husayni
Rida Jawad al-Taqi
Muhammad al-Alusi
Islamic Forces Frani
LAM Kubba. Sayyid Husayn
Sadr
Islamic Movement Organization Abu Aura al-Hakim. Ain Najafi
Jund al-Imam (Soldiers of the Ahdallah Shirazi. Muhammad All
Imam) Shirazi. Sami al-Radri
Khalaf Hammadi
Muhammad Alawl
Izzal Shahbandar
37
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Table 3
Minor Shia Parties and Officials (continued)
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iiroup
Leaders
Kho'i Helms�lent Foundation Vasil al-Khol. Laith KuMa
Habitat Ahl al-Bayt (League or Muhammad Bahr al-Ulum
the Family of the Prophet)
Turkish Islamic Movement in Abbas Nilson Musa al-Bayati
Iraq
Union of Islamic Forces Khalaf Munim Hammndi
Sayyid Mustafa lama! al-Din.
Akram MUM Hadi. Husayn Akil
al-Riknhi. So'd Jawad
member of the Iraqi National Congress. The main
branch of the party has traditionally advocated
Iranian-style Islamic social revolution, government,
and economics.
Da'wa's longstanding and sharp ideological differ-
ences with Iran have led some party members to
become more independent and to espouse a more
moderate agenda. The major break came in 1990
when part of Da'wa moved much of its political
� aratus to London
Nevertheless, this so-called moderate bloc
still receives funding from Iran and is closely tied
"-SeenaL
38
to the Da'wa leadership there.
Its members are
more open to liberal, pro-Western views, no longer
insist on complete Islamic rule in Iraq, and favor a
pluralistic, democratic state rather than an Iranian-
style clerical regime.
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Some Du'wa subgroups have separated almost
completely from the major wing of the party be-
cause they resent Iran's domination of the move-
ment. One such group is the Islamic Da'wa Party,
formed by Muhammad Abd al-Jabbar, Abd
al-Halim Ruhaymi, and other party leaders in June
199I.
The group insists on complete
independence from Iranian interference. To the
chagrin of Damascus, the group has joined the
main Da'wa bloc in INC efforts to unite the Iraqi
opposition.
"Independent" and "Nationalist" Groups
Independent Iraqi Alliance
The Independent Iraqi Alliance comprises moderate
Shia and Sunni nationalists and former Ba'thists. It
was founded in late 1990 by former Iraqi official
Talib al-Shabib. In May 1991, Shabib joined forces
with the Syrian-backed National Salvation Front of
Hasan al-Naqib, with whom Shabib shares leader-
ship. The group claims a fairly liberal agenda that
includes support for Arab nationalism, main-
taining Iraq's geographical integrity, establishment
of a democratic government, free national
elections and universal suffrage, establishment
39
of a free market economy, and use of Iraq's oil
wealth to benefit all Iraqis
Naqib's and Shabib's experience, public recogni-
tion, and contacts inside and outside Iraq have en-
hanced the group's position within the opposition.
It is a member of the Iraqi National Congress.
Naqib boycotted the first INC meeting in Vienna�
probably under Syrian pressure�but was chosen at
the meeting in September 1992 in northern Iraq as
the Arab Sunni representative on the 1NC's three-
man Presidential Council. Naqib's willingness to
defy his Syrian sponsors by joining the INC
leadership has strained ties to Damascus.
(b)(1)
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Iraqi National Union
The Iraqi National Union (Wifaq al-Watani), also
called the Iraqi National Accord, is an independent
London-based group founded by former Iraqi offi-
cials lyad al-Alawi and Satoh al-Shaikhly in 1991.
Both leaders have been in exile since at least the
mid-1970s. A third senior leader of the group,
Adnan Muhammad Nun, is a former Iraqi general.
From his base in Turkcy. Nun i oversees Wifaq
paramilitary operations inside northern Iraq and at-
tempts to recruit Iraqi military officers to join the
opposition. The group's stated aims are to institute
a pluralistic, democratic government in Iraq, end
Iraqi human rights abuses, and maintain the coun-
try's geographical integrity
(b)(1) Wittig obtains most of its support in the
(b)(3) West, although its members have close relations
with Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. The group
publishes a newspaper entitled BaRhdad that it dis
(b)(1) tributes internationally
(b)(3)
-Secret�
As a charter member of
the INC, Wifaq leaders serve on the INC Executive
Committee. Salah al-Shaikhly was aonointed as
INC spokesman in February 1993.
40
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Seaast�
'Table 4
Other Independent Parties and OMelais
Croup
Arab National Group
Leaders
Ahmad Habubi
Arab Organisation of Human Adsh al-Jadir
Rights
Association of Iraqi Democrat Salih al-Dugla
firth Pony
Ariz Ailyan
Mandi al- Uhaydi
Iraqi Central Committee for Ant AM al-Razzaq
Dialogue and Followup
Sed Jabir
Shaykh Mandi al-Khalissi.
Gen. Abdll Amir al-Uhhais.
AM al-Mir Alwan.
Hushm al-Haidary
Jawhar Husayn Surchi.
Arshad Tawfiq
Iraqi Free Officers Movement Hagan al-Naqib
Iraqi National Democratic Pony Nnbil al-Janabi
Iraqi National Turkoman Pony Muzafir Arslan
41
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Table 4
Other Independent Parties and Officials (continued)
1.eaders
Iraqi Royalists Ali Hin Hussein
Kamal Khan
Irsql.Socirdist Party Muhdir td�Ways
. . __�
National SolYation Council Shaych Sarni Azarah-Majan
Organitation of Human Rights Leith Kuhha
in Iraq
- --
Sahib al�Haltim
United Democratic Forces Azir. al�Hahaz, Nun i Ahd
al-Rahman Husnyn
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
Free Iraq Council
The Free Iraq Council is a loose grouping of
diverse London-based oppositionists, including
former Iraqi military officers, politicians, and some
Islamic religious leaders. The 23-member council
was founded in 1991 by Sad Salih Jabir. a liberal
democrat from a distinguished Iraqi Shia family
arid former head of the now defunct New Umma
""Setret,-
42
Party. .Jabir publishes an opposition newspaper �
called Free Iraq. The group is plagued by ideolog-,
ical and political divisions
Nevertheless, Jabir remains active in op-
affairs. He has frequent contact with other
opposition groups and Western and Arab govern-
ments, particularly Saudi Arabia.
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Jabir has been a harsh critic of the INC and its and Iranian efforts to manipulate the opposition
Executive Committee chairman Ahmed Cha/abi. In movement. In early 1992 he began to work closely
April 1993 he was appointed spokesman of the with SAIRI leader Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim
Saudi-backed Iraqi Central Committee for esoite Hakim's close ties to Tehran
Dialogue and Followup
Reverse Blank
Jabir has been highly critical of Syrian
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