SOUTH KOREA: JITTERS IN RULING PARTY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06799609
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2019
• Case Number: F-2019-00238
• Publication Date: November 23, 1987

Approved for Release: 2019/06/03 C06799609
1
(b)(3)
Director of
Central
Intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Monday
23 November 1987
II
II
I HI
II
-CS E�72/67 COPY 532
II
II
CPAS NID 87-272JX
TCS 2972/87
23 November 1987
Approved for Release: 2019/06/03 C06799609
Approved for Release: 2019/06/03 C06799609
(b)(3
Contents
Special Analyses
South Korea: Jitters in Ruling Party
11
-lrarSOCML
TCS 2972/87
23 November 1987
NR
Record
NR
Record
NR
Record
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2019/06/03 C06799609
 Approved for Release: 2019/06/03 C06799609
�TBLC1'84-
1%V-Seeiret_
TCS 2972/87
23 November 1987
Approved for Release: 2019/06/03 C06799609
Approved for Release: 2019/06/03 C06799609
ToTh---3"-Seeret-_
Special Analysis
SOUTH KOREA: Jitters in Ruling Party
With less than a month to go before South Koreans elect a new
president, the opposition is focusing on ruling-party candidate
Roh Tae Woo's ties to Chun and the coup that began the
President's rise to power. Roh has made little headway in his
efforts to deflect attention from his identification with the
military-dominated government. While no decisive trend in voter
opinion has yet emerged, reporting from a variety of sources
suggests the ruling camp is exolorin7 ways to preempt an
opposition victory.
Leading opposition candidates Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung
have increased attacks against Roh for his role in Chun's takeover,
particularly his decision to withdraw troops from forward areas to
support Chun's move against Army headquarters in December 1979.
Both Kims have recruited former military officers to speak out against
the Army's role in politics. The success of Kim Young Sam in
persuading former General Chung Sung Hwa to join his camp has
been especially damaging to Roh. Chung, the Army Chief of Staff
overthrown by Chun, has publicly challenaed the rulina camp's
justification for removing him.
Chung and other purged officers no doubt are lining up with the Kims
partly in hopes of revenge and restitution, but their move also may
ease concerns among politically moderate voters about the Kims'
ability to reach rapprochement with the military.
Roh Tries To Look Ahead
The ruling camp�knocked off balance by the Kim Young
Sam-Chung Sung Hwa alliance�has had to defend the 1979
takeover. Roh's efforts to explain his actions have been only partly
successful. The US Embassy says some of Roh's advisers are urging
him to put even more distance between himself and Chun, perhaps
with a grand reform gesture close to election day. Roh's personal ties
to Chun�who reportedly still controls the party's purse strings�and
pressure from hardline Chun loyalists have kept Roh from going very
far. Instead, he has tried to direct the public's attention to the future,
publicly committing himself to an agenda of political and soci
welfare reforms that match or outstrip those of the opposition.
continued
11
"-Tore) egret_
TCS 2972/87
23 November 1987
Approved for Release: 2019/06/03 C06799609
Approved for Release: 2019/06/03 C06799609
The approach has not yet paid off. The ruling party's costly political
rallies have been marred by protests and low turnouts. Ruling-camp
strategists are reportedly worried about the rising popularity of Kim
Young Sam among white-collar workers and the inroads made by
fourth-place candidate Kim Jong Pil among conservative voters.
Feedback from local party organizations, the police, and rank-and-file
bureaucrats also suggests little grassroots enthusiasm for pushing
Roh's campaign. Indeed, in an effort to motivate his subordinates to
do more, Chun's security chief reportedly has told them that they
might as well "throw themselve! in front of a truck" if the opposition
Wins.
Preparing for the Worst
Planners in the ruling camp are becoming increasingly nervous about
Roh's chances in a noncontrolled election, according to a variety of
sources. As a result, they are considering black propaganda and dirty
tricks, reportedly to include ballot tampering; some officials now
appear prepared to go even further.
claims ruling-camp planners have thought about fabricating evidence
of ruling-party fraud to give Chun an opportunity to declare the
election null and void if oovernment projections from early returns
indicate Roh is losing.
Recent polls, while of questionable accuracy, suggest the race is far
from over. But signs the ruling camp is unwilling to accept defeat raise
concern about the prospect for prudent calculation in the
homestretch if the tide appears to be moving strongly against Roh.
12
TCS 2972/87
23 November 1987
Approved for Release: 2019/06/03 C06799609