THE 1985 NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE: IMPLICATIONS OF CONSENSUS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06796502
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-01547
• Publication Date: July 31, 1986

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington.D.C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
FROM:
SUBJECT:
Chief
International Security Issues Division
Office of Global Issues
GI M 86-20156C/a
The 1985 NPT Review Ciference: Implications
of Consensus
1. The attached memorandum offers an intelligence
perspective on developments at last fall's NPT Review
Conference. It is intended primarily as a record of how issues
transpired and how key delegations approached and reacted to the
interplay of issues. Overall, we believe the conference outcome
represented a significant revalidation of the NPT but that the
treaty nonetheless remains vulnerable to pressures arising from
disarmament concerns and the intrusion of largely tangential
political issues.
2. CoMments and auestions are welcome and may hp addressed
to
International Security Issues Division, OGI
(U)
Attachment:
GI M 86-20156C, SC-02736/86
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VVashington. D. C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
31 July 1986
The 1985 NPT Review Conference: Implications of Consenus
� Summary
� Last fall's month-long NPT Review Conference in Geneva produced
a clear consensus that the treaty continues to contribute to world security.
This outcome was due in part to a relative lack of North-South political
tension, which in the previous review conference had led to virtual dead-
lock. We also believe that US-Soviet cooperation in support of the NPT
contributed significantly to consensus. Arms control emerged as the sin-
gle most important issue for debate, with widespread criticism of super-
power arms limitation efforts to date. �We judge that most parties believe
the long-term viability of the NPT depends in large measure on super-
power progress toward nuclear disarmament. The challenge NPT support-
ers face now is to convert the momentum gathered in Geneva into the
energy needed to sustain the treaty until 1990, when its adherents will
again review its implementation, and, in the longer term, until 1995, when
they must decide wheth tinue it indefinitely or to extend it for a
fixed period or periods.
This memorandum was prepared by Office of Global Issues. Information
available as of 31 July 1986 was used in its orenaration Comments nc queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief International
Security Issues Division, OGI,
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The 1985 Review Conference: Implications of Consensus
The Third Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons took place in Geneva from 27 August to 21 September 1985 with 86 parties in
attendance. (See Appendix for list of attendees.) Despite heated controversy on a
number of thorny issues, the parties found themselves in agreement on the basic issues
of nonproliferation, thereby tipping the balance in favor of a positive outcome. In the
end, the 1985 conference produced a clear consensus that the treaty is an instrument of
global security, reaffirming the predominant international sentiment against proliferation.
(U)
Conference Atmospherics
�
Although the preconference climate was less highly charged than in 1980, poten-
tial pitfalls were diverse and complex:
� The superpowers were more vulnerable to charges of inadequate arms reduction
efforts than they had been in 1980.
� � Iraq was certain to raise Israel's 1981 attack on the. Osirak reactor, a move with
potentially damaging consequences for the IAEA General Conference, which fol-
lowed the review conference.
� Technological strides by nonparties such as Pakistan and Brazil served as con-
spicuous reminders of the treaty's less than universal reach and efficacy.
� Egypt was likely to push for a new mechanism to finance nuclear projects in de-
veloping country parties, a proposal that threatened to undercut the IAEA.
� The United States delegation was under instructions to leave the conference
should Israel be denied observer status while others were granted such status.
After the conference, delegates were in the main satisfied: the treaty had been
revalidated by consensus, the final declaration contained several precedential and con-
structive provisions, the gentleman's agreement between the United States and the So-
viet Union had held, and conferes of all stripes had demonstrated a heartening desire
to preserve the treaty's integrity.
On the other hand, some clouds were visible on the horizon: conferees had bro-
ken with the tradition of decisionnnaking by consensus by voting on a procedural mo-
tion, an open split between Washington'and Moscow had occurred on the test ban is-
sue, the conference had been held hostage by regional politics, and some significant
issues had been finessed or not addressed at all (for example, full-scope safeguards and
activities of threshold states other than South Africa and Israel).
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The NPT Bargain: Differing Perceptions Frame Debate
As was the case at the two previous review conferences, the course and nature
of debate were dictated by differing views of the proper balance among the treaty's
nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use provisions. Specifically, Third World na-
tions focused upon the link between controlling the spread of sensitive nuclear technol-
ogy and progress in the area of arms control and disarmament. As they see it, the
nonnuclear weapon states have largely upheld their obligation not to pursue weapons
programs whereas the weapon states have failed to live up to their obligation to dis-
arm.
The weapon states, on the other hand, emphasized the explicit link between the
NPT's nonproliferation and safeguards provisions. and international and regional peace
and security. They admitted that arms control progress had been slight over the last.
five years but rejected accusations that they had failed to pursue such progress in good
faith.
As for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, developing states complained that adher-
ence to the NPT has failed to gain them full access to the nuclear fuel cycle. The sup-
pliers pointed to their record of technical assistance to the Third World and showed no
inclination to loosen controls on exports of sensitive materials, equipment, or technolo-
gy.
These varying interpretations of the NPT's obligations and constraints threatened
to destabilize the regime in Geneva. In fact, the conference was characterized by a
spirit of compromise made all the more noteworthy in view of such fundamentally dif-
fering perceptions of the NPT's objectives and implementation.
Sources of Harmony
numerous, diverse factors con-
tributed to an outcome that reinforces the nonproliferation imperative. In our judgment,
the most salient factors are a widespread belief that the NPT is simply too important to
risk for the sake of temporary political gain, the lack of solidarity among the neutral and
nonaligned group, US-Soviet cooperation before and during the conference, and the
three-committee structure.
NPT's Contribution to Security: Not Worth Risking
We judge that last year's willingness to compromise can be traced primarily to
the widely held view that the NPT contributes inherently to world security. Opening
plenary statements revealed that nations in all three geopolitical groups believe the NPT
has value despite their differing expectations and opinions regarding its implementation.
Throughout the runup to the conference, the United States had urged key mem-
bers of the neutral and nonaligned group not to lose sight of the security benefits of the
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NPT during the review. Egypt, among others, took the message to heart.
Egypt campaigned actively among the Arab and African delegations,
emphasizing the risks of a failed conference and the need to preserve the NPT system.
In fact, some of the NNA nations
seemed even more eager to ensure a successful review conference than the nuclear
weapon states and their allies. In the hectic consultations on Mexico's disar-
mament resolutions accused the major neutral and nonaligned
states of deserting Mexico one by one in a bid to ensure adoption of a consensus doc-
ument. Mexico, too, compromised in the end.
Within the Eastern Bloc a desire for consensus was also evident.
the Eastern Group had decided to give priority to .a final docu-
ment and to work for this goal as long as possible,
the Bloc countries had sought to
� avoid confrontation throughout the conference and had labored on behalf of a reconfir-
mation of the NPT.
Last year's less confrontational mood also derived from a fear of damaging the
NPT by repeating the failure of 1980. Since then, we judge, many nations have come to
view rivalries such as the one between India and Pakistan as a proximate danger. Ac-
cordingly, they have come to place greater stock in the NPT as a hedge against the
growing threat posed by regional nuclear disputes. In their view, another discordant re-
view conference could only endanger the NPT and weaken that hedge.
NNA Performance--Disunited and Ineffective
In 1980, members of the neutral and nonaligned group coordinated extensively
before the conference,,lelivered complementary opening statements, and exercised ex-
ceptional diplomatic skill in maintaining group solidarity. Their refusal to accept a bland
declaration on arms control led directly to that year's deadlock.
By contrast, uncertainty characterized NNA performance in 1985. During precon-
ference meetings in Geneva, the neutral and nonaligned nations were unable to adopt
common positions
Even traditional hardliners Yugoslavia and Mexico moderated their stances.
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In our judgment, the poor performance of the NNA can be attributed in part to
the growing crisis within the Nonaligned Movement (NAM). NAM delegates have in-
creasing difficulty maintaining solidarity and lining up support in multilateral forums, es-
pecially those that handle political matters.
US-USSR Cooperation: A Necessary Ingredient
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US-Soviet preparation for and cooperation during the conference and their com-
mon stake in an outcome that shored up the regime prevented divisive superpower
confrontation. In Geneva, both delegations lived up to their agreement to exercise re-.
straint with regard to arms control. In Moscow, however, TASS and Pravda carried arti-
cles during the conference that sniped at Washin ton's nonproliferation record, violating
the spirit of the gentleman's agreement. (b)(3)
Both delegations' willing admissions that progress on arms control had been slim
since the last conference partially defused NNA criticism on disarmanent. At the invita-
tion of the conference's preparatory committee, both nations circulated documents de-
tailing their intersessional activities related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,
thereby disarming developing country accusations on that front as well.
The delegations worked together constructively on the Friends of the President
Committee, a group formed to help the President resolve difficult issues. Even when the
committee dealt with the contentious nuclear testing issue, on which the Soviets had
seized and occupied the high ground from the first day of the conference, the Soviet
delegation helped hammer out a compromise.
Not unexpectedly, some nations viewed US-Soviet cooperation less benignly
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Committee Structure: Expanded and Effective
allocation of issues to three main committees*
versus the traditional two neutralized some potentially negative aspects of the 1985 re-
view by diffusing criticism and forcing difficult issues into discrete, manageable debates.
Most importantly, the new structure fostered consensus by giving more countries a
stake in the outcome. In the end, conferees clearly chose not to sacrifice one commit-
tee's gains because of another's omissions or commissions.
Conference Dynamics
points to complex interaction between delegates and issues during
the month-long conference. Its four phases -- opening plenary, main committee work,
preparation of the final document, and final plenary -- witnessed both the vagaries of
multilateral diplomacy and the singleminded determination of individual delegates.
The Soviets: Maneuvering for Advantage
Conferees repeatedly and forcefully expressed their frustrations over superpower
failure to achieve progress on arms control and isolated the United States on the issue
of a comprehensive test ban. By contrast, the review conference gave the Soviet Union
an opportunity, which it seized upon, to present itself as an arms control advocate in
tune with the neutral and nonaligned, an image it has been cultivating ever since.
The Soviets positioned themselves before and during the conference to use the
forum to their political advantage and to pressure the United States on arms control.
They seized the advantage on the test ban issue during the opening plenary, when the
Soviet delegate read a message from General Secretary Gorbachev pointing to the de-
sirability of a full ban on nuclear testing and citing Moscow's previously announced
testing moratorium. The Soviet statement also plugged Moscow's voluntary offer** to
the IAEA, which was concluded in February 1985. The first inspection of Soviet facilities
-- one power and one research reactor -- took place a few days before the conference
opened, an event obviously timed for maximum effect in Geneva. (U)
The Soviet Union achieved its most notable success of the conference by con-
tributing to the isolation of the United.States and the United Kingdom on the test ban
issue. The language on this issue in the final report represents the first open split on
*Comittee I assessed the disarmament and security aspects of the treaty; Comittee II, a
new committee at this conference, dealt with nonproliferation, safeguards and nuclear-
weapon-free zones; and Committee III reviewed provisions dealing with �peaceful uses of
nuclear energy.
**An arrangement whereby a nuclear weapon state permits the IAEA to apply safeguards
at civil nuclear facilities. The NPT requires safeguards only of nonnuclear weapon state
parties.
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the NPT between the United States and the USSR since the treaty entered into force 16
Years ago. Had the matter been put to a vote as Mexico proposed, the Soviet victory
� would have been unequivocal. Moscow was discreetly passive on the voting issue but,
keeping its options open, had informed the neutral and nonaligned group that it and its
uld support the Mexican resolutions if consensus proved out of reach.
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KEY *DELEGATIONS
Egypt
� Conference President Muhammad Shakir performed adequately if not force-
fully.
he
was unable to force a settlement upon Iran and Iraq, whose dispute threat-
ened to scuttle the conference.
� Led coalition of African and Arab countries who insisted upon a total prohib-
ition of nuclear transfers to Israel and South Africa.
� � Tabled interim draft that led to resolution of issue of attacks on safeguarded
nuclear facilities.
� Proposed fund to finance nuclear power projects in NPT developing countries
but acquiesced to East/West concerns in the end.
� Instrumental in engineering cleat to permit seating of Israel and PLO.
Mexico
� Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles led neutral and nonaligned offensive on
comprehensive test ban, called for vote on his disarmament proposals if
consensus not attained, and generally practiced brinksmanship
Sweden
� Ambassador Ekeus chaired drafting committee.
� Hardline considerably moderated compared to 1980, but pressed on test ban
nonetheless.
� Actively engaged in hammering out compromise on issue of safeguarding
peaceful nuclear facilities.
� Introduced but did not press resolution calling for complete separation of
civil and military fuel cycles.
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Iraq .
� Along with Yemen and Morocco, resisted seating of Israel.
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� Ambassador Al Kital, determined to return to.Baghdad with conference action
on Israel's attack on Osirak, resisted compromise until final day.
� Nearly brought down conference at eleventh hour by insisting upon referencE
in final document to alleged Iraqi attacks on its Bushehr reactor.
Australia
� Ambassador Butler instrumental in last-ditch efforts to salvage consensus
during final plenary.
� Along with Canada, urged immediate negotiation of test ban and, in disarma-
ment committee, introduced formulation that would condition full implemen-
tation of NPT thereupon.
Sri Lanka
� Ambassador Dhanapala chaired disarmament committee
West Germany
� Ambassador Wegener pointedly criticized Soviets during disarmament state-
ment, charging them with violating the disarmament provision of the NPT
� when they walked out of intermediate range nuclear force talks in 1983 and
questioning their adherence to any testing moratorium.
� Blocked consensus on full-scope safeguards in committee. (U)
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How the Issues Played Out
Comprehensive Test Ban
As expected, deliberations on a test ban offered the greatest potential at the out-
set for impasse. The Eastern Bloc, the neutral and nonaligned, and most of the Western
states favored resuming trilateral negotiations, whereas the United States and the United
Kingdom insisted that radical reductions in existing arsenals are the necessary first step
to lasting arms control. Mexico insisted that its test ban resolution be put to a vote if
consensus could not be reached, thereby threatening the outcome of the conference.
Despite the overwhelming sentiment in favor of a test ban, the pro-vote contin-
gent was never absolutely sure it could muster enough votes to ensure victory. Parlia-
mentary maneuvers designed to prevent a vote had been initiated
In the end, the United States, the USSR, and Mexico, among others, engineered a
compromise that left US isolation thinly veiled but avoided a vote that would have re-
moved the veil entirely and set this and future conferences on the path toward divisive
vote-taking. The final declaration expresses the regrets of the majority "except for cer-
tain states," a reference to the United States and the United Kingdom, that a ban had
not been concluded; the view of those "certain states" that reductions in existing arse-
nals are the highest arms control priority; and the readiness of the Soviets to negotiate.
Because the final document assigned the highest priority to negotiation of a test ban in
the Conference on Disarmament, the United States can expect to face continued resis-
tance to its position in that forum.
Nuclear Programs of Israel and South Africa
Led by a coalition of African and Arab countries, conferees repeatedly and vocif-
erously criticized the nuclear programs and ambitions of Israel and South Africa and
called for a total prohibition of nuclear transfers to those two countries. The reasons
for singling out Israel and South Africa appear to have less to- do with proliferation con-
cerns, however, than with Arab and African preoccupations about the Middle East con-
flict and apartheid. \
Moreover, none of the other threshold states was subjected to similarly harsh
treatment.
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In the end, the issue was resolved in a manner consistent with US interests--
concern was expressed about the nuclear programs of the two countries and calls for
prohibiting transfers were noted, but no conference action was invoked. Nonetheless, '
its political genesis and Washington's relationship with Tel Aviv and Pretoria are certain
to cause the subject to resurface in other nonproliferation forums.
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Israeli Observer Status
� This issue, which was resolved before the main committees got
was fraught with pitfalls:
down to work,
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� Denial of Israel's right to observe the conference could
have undermined its already tenuous position at the IAEA,
whose general conference followed immediately; and
� Seating of the PLO as a state would have set a dangerous
precedent in the UN and other international bodies wherein
the US had sought to prevent such recognition.
the NNA ac-
cepted a conference decision to seat Israel in order to preserve the spirit of
compromise. The conference also amended the rules of procedure to create a special
category for the PLO as a "national liberation organization."
On balance, the PLO request for observer status -- its first ever -- improved Is-
rael's chances of being seated by. serving as a bargaining chip for the otherwise intran-
sigent Arab nations.
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
Proposals by New Zealand and others that the conference endorse the newly ne-
gotiated South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty failed. Instead, the committee agreed
upon language that noted the treaty and welcomed it as consistent with the NPT. This
issue, which created little furor in Geneva, will be revisited once the treaty's protocols
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Full-Scope Safeguards
As in 1980, debate on full-scope safeguards* proved fractious. Major suppliers
Switzerland, Germany, and Belgium expressed continuing reservations about requiring
.such safeguards as a condition of supply, a position advocated by Canberra and Ottawa.
The disagreement was papered over when Switzerland and Belgium grudgingly accepted
a vague compromise formulation that fell short of endorsing full-scope safecivards but
tilted in that direction. Germany held out longer but eventually conceded.
In any event, the commitment of traditional suppliers to full-scope safeguards
and controls on sensitive technology is certain to be tested severely in coming years as
new non-NPT suppliers enter the competition for a shrinking market.
Attacks Against Peaceful Nuclear Facilities
The issue of attacks on safeguarded nuclear facilities and how to characterize Is-
rael's 1981 bombing of an Iraqi research reactor proved every bit as politicized in this
forum as it has in the IAEA and in the Conference on Disarmament. Iraq was deter-
mined to return to Baghdad with some conference action on the issue and, durihg the
early going, the other Arab nations stiffened Iraq's resolve. As debate progressed,
*Safeguards that are applied to all existing and future peaceful nuclear activities in a
nonnuclear weapon state. EqUivalent to the safeguards required of nonnuclear weapon
state parties in the NPT.
**Following the Indian detonation in 1974, the major nuclear suppliers convened in Lon-
don to discuss common multilateral export policies. Members of the group, known as
the London Suppliers' Group or Club, published their export guidelines in 1976 and have
not met under that rubric since that time.
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support grew within the Western Group for including at least an historical reference to
the attack. Ireland even suggested a need for new treaty provisions to protect nuclear
installations.
Early Iraqi demands that the conference adopt a resolution condemning Israel, a
precedent-setting procedure, gave way later to insistence on specific language on Israel
in the final document. On the last day of the conference, after the Friends of the Presi-
dent Committee rejected Iraq's demand for sanctions against Israel, Iraqi Ambassador Al
Kital agreed to language expressing the conference's profound concern and recalling the
1981 UN resolution on the attack. No call for conference action was approved.
For many delegates, the bloom had long since faded from this issue, which has
been debated at length in the UN and the IAEA for five years. As in those forums, Iraq's
persistence in Geneva diverted delegates' attention from the more pertinent business of
the conference and caused the expenditure of much political capital in order to preserve
consensus. Baghdad's loss of face in Geneva, its defeat at the ensuing IAEA General
Conference, and last year's UN General Assembly resolution that seeks to return the is-
sue to the IAEA almost certainly nuarantee the continued presence of this thorny issue
on the nonproliferation agenda.
Fund to Finance Power Projects
Egypt ran into heavy opposition when. it proposed a fund to finance nuclear pow-
er projects in NPT countries. Arguments from both the East and West centered on
where financing would come from and whether such a fund would undercut existing
mechanisms within the IAEA. The Soviets flatly refused to commit any hard currency,
whereas the nonaligned nations were solidly
behind Egypt. The impasse was broken when Egypt acquiesced to alternative language
calling upon the IAEA to initiate a specialiT' group to stud how to assist the nuclear
power programs of the developing nations.
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
For the first time, conferees endorsed the view that the potential benefits of
peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) have not been demonstrated. This view comple-
mented other conference language that blurs the distinction between peaceful and mili-
tary devices by stating that any further detonation by a nonweapon state would consti-
tute a serious breach of the nonproliferation ethic.
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Iran/Iraq Squabble
An eleventh-hour spat between Iran and Iraq nearly caused the downfall of the
conference. Iran wanted a reference in the final document to alleged Iraqi attacks on
Iran's Bushehr power reactor construction site*. Iraq objected to such a reference, set-
ting the stage for impasse. After hours of wrangling and caucusing, the squabble was
finally resolved at 5 a.m. when Iran and Iraq agreed to delete the disputed sentence
from an otherwise consensus text as long as their verbatim statements were appended
in annexes to the final report. Exhausted delegates then adopted the final declaration by
consensus.
This episode demonstrates both the strength and fragility of the NPT: strength in
that conferees of all persuasions, fearing impasse over an issue related only indirectly to
the NPT, labored diligently for consensus throughout the grueling all-night session, and
fragility in that the treaty was held hostage to this and other peripheral political issues.
throughout the month-long conference.
Near-Term Spillover
Reaffirmation of the NPT in Geneva influenced other bilateral and multilateral fo-
rums in the months following the conference. (U)
IAEA
Most participants in the IAEA General Conference, which convened in Vienna im-
mediately after the review conference, had been hoping to remove from their agenda
once and for all the polarizing repercussions of Israel's attack on Osirak. An Iraqi victory
on this issue in Geneva would certainly have prejudiced the outcome in Vienna, but with
Iraq's defeat fresh in their minds, IAEA delegates blocked renewed calls by Iraq for
sanctions against Israel. (U)
IAEA Director General Hans Blix took the review conference recommendations
about the IAEA seriously.
With Argentina's Admiral Castro Madero as the chairman
of the IAEA group and India, Yugoslavia, and Egypt as members, the outcome of the
one-year study is certain to reflect the prevailing view among the nonaligned and neu-
tral nations that the IAEA's technical assistance programs should be greatly expanded.
Moreover, the group, whose report is scheduled to be completed in the summer of 1987,
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may well be influenced by the outcome of the PUNE* conference during the spring of
that year.
Blix also used the recommendations and their endorsement at the US-USSR
Summit in November 1985 as a convenient hook on which to hang an appeal for addi-
tional resources for the Agency.
UN General Assembly
Sponsors of the test ban resolutions at the 1985 UN General Assembly clearly
awaited the outcome of the review conference before tabling their motions in New York.
New Zealand. and Australia fueled their traditional "urgent need" resolution with the con-
ference's statement urging negotiation of a ban in the Conference on Disarmament, the
very statement to which the United States and the United Kingdom had taken exception.
Mexico misrepresented the final declaration's treatment of a test ban in its two resolu-
tions by implying there had been a consensus in Geneva to call for immediate negotia-
tions. The first resolution, cosponsored by Sweden, appealed to the Conference on Dis-
armament to establish a committee to negotiate a comprehensive test ban**. The
second, which grew out of consultations in Geneva, urged conversion of the 1963 Limit-
ed Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) into a full test ban. As expected, all three resolutions passed
overwhelmingly.
Exasperated by debate on the Osirak matter at the review conference and at the
IAEA, General Assembly delegates passed Iraq's resolution condemning and sanctioning
Israel by a distinctly smaller margin than in 1984. On the other hand, Syria has taken
advantage of the fact that the UN resolution remands the issue to the IAEA by inscribing
in the issue of the threat posed by Israel's nuclear program on the agenda of the Sep-
tember 1986 General Conference, thus perpetuating an already protracted debate.
The 1985 Summit
Although conferees expressed regret that the last five years had yielded no
progress on nuclear disarmament, the generally positive outcome of the conference
played well at the November Summit Meeting. In their joint statement, President Reagan
and General Secretary Gorbachev noted their satisfaction with the results and reaffirmed
their commitment under the NPT to pursue nuclear disarmament. (U)
*UN Conference on the Promotion of International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of
Nuclear Energy, scheduled for March 1987.
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To a certain degree, the relationship between a positive review conference and a
successful summit dictated the behavior of the Soviet NPT delegation.
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sciously sidestepped confrontation with the United States in order to avoid poisoning
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the atmosphere before the summit.
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Looking Back to the Future
Most of the issues that framed debate in Geneva and preoccupied review confer-
ence delegates are neither new nor likely to be resolved in the near term. They not
only reflect past behavior but point to challenges to the long-term well-being of the
nonproliferation regime. These issues will, we judge, 'assume increased importance as
1995, a watershed year for the NPT, approaches. At that time, adherents of the treaty
must decide whether to continue the treaty indefinitely or to extend it only for a limited
period.
Arms Control
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Events in Geneva indicate clearly that the developing states consider the long-
term health of the NPT to be dependent in large measure upon superpower progress on
nuclear disarmament. Because many NPT parties persist in measuring arms control
progress largely in terms of a comprehensive test ban, that issue seems destined to
play a significant role in determining the viability of the NPT, and therefore,. the nonprol-
iferation regime. (b)(3)
We believe many nations have become still more chary of Washington's arms con-
trol stance, given the continuation of its nuclear testing program. The joint US-USSR
discussions on testing held in Geneva in July 1986 are probably viewed as a positive
step but will not assuage their concerns unless a substantive outcome ensues. Much of
Moscow's recent test ban propaganda played well in the Third World, reinforcing Third
World bias against US insistence that real arms control means that deem verifiable re-
ductions must come first.
The Soviet Union, in the meantime, can be expected to continue exploiting to full
advanta e its common _position with the neutral and nonali ned nations on the test ban
issue.
It also seems likely, in our view, that the final declaration's test ban provisions will
spark the movement, unveiled at the conference by Uruguay, toward converting the 1963
Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) into a comprehensive test ban. A Mexican resolution to
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that effect passed overwhelmingly at the UN indicating that the votes needed to
convene an amending conference could easily be obtained. Even though the United
States and the United Kingdom could block such an amendment by exercising the ve-
toes they hold as depositaries of the treaty, the mere holding of an amending confer-
ence would certainly focus unwelcome attention upon the issues.
The Challenge of Tangential Issues
Injection into the NPT dialogue of issues related only indirectly to nonproliferation
is potentially very harmful to the integrity of the treaty. Evidence of the debilitating ef-
fect of extraneous political debate is abundant in the annals of the UN system and, since
1981, in the IAEA, but this is the first time that the NPT has been affected by such divi-
siveness. Episodes such as the Iran/Iraq squabble, the Israeli/PLO observer controversy,
the.Osirak matter, and calls for sanctions against South Africa and Israel demonstrate
the treaty's fragility but also its strength: fragility in,that the treaty was held hostage to
peripheral issues throughout the month-long conference but also strength in that con-
ferees of all persuasions, fearing impasse over such issues, labored diligently for con-
sensus throughout the session.
Trend Toward Voting
NPT conferees' break with the tradition of decisionmaking by consensus consti-
tutes an unfavorable presentiment for the 1990 review conference. Although the break
occurred on a procedural matter--a motion during the final all-night plenary that debate
be closed on the Iran/Iraq�conferees narrowly avoided voting on Mexico's disarmament
resolutions. East-West unity staved off vote calls from the neutral and nonaligned in
1985; unless progress on arms control is forthcoming, no amount of persuasion or ca-
jolery is likely to prevent voting on matters of substance in 1990.
Dilemma for Washington
The prospect of NPT adherence by the remaining threshold countries presents a
dilemma for the United States. On the one hand, Washington is a pillar of support for
the treaty and actively seeks its universal adherence. On the other, realizing that adher-
ence does not guarantee nonproliferation but does facilitate access to nuclear technolo-
gy, Washington restricts exports of sensitive technology as a matter of national policy.
Moreover, in the case of Libya, Iran, and Iraq, whose motives and regimes are suspect
despite their membership in the NPT, the US attempts to retard their nuclear develop-
ment. Thus, the dilemma is how to continue preventing such countries from gaining
access to weapons-related technology without seeming to undermine the basic princi-
ples of the NPT.
North Korea's accession to the NPT last December exemplifies this paradox. On the
one hand, entry of this threshold state into the fold is an important step on the road to
universal adherence and, once safeguards are being applied by the IAEA, will be a wel-
come assurance of the. peaceful nature of a previously suspect program. On the other
hand, it will test anew the commitment of nuclear suppliers to facilitate exchange of
technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy�as is required of NPT signatories--
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when the recipient state has a checkered history With respect to international
commitments. Moreover, if North Korea turns to and is rejected by Western suppliers
who distrust its commitments, as has happened with Libya and Iran, Third World com-
plaints that the NPT is discriminatory will be reinforced.
South Korea's reaction to North Korea's accession belies the conventional wisdom
that the NPT enhances security, in our view. Seoul is clearly worried that, international
safeguards notwithstanding,.Pyongyang will now have unfettered access to technology
that could help it develop a weapons capability. In fact, South Korea views the North as
a greater threat now than before it adhered.
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NPT Parties
Afghanistan
Australia
Austria
� Bangladesh
Belgium
Bhutan
Bolivia s
.Brunei
Bulgaria
Burundi
Cameroon.
Canada
Cyprus
Czechoslovakia
Denmark -
Ecuador
Egypt .
Ethiopia
*Finland
German Democratic
Republic .
Germany, Federal
Republic of.
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
, Holy See
Honduras.
Hungary
Iceland
Indonesia'
Appendix
Attendance at Third NPT Review Conference
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Italy
Ivory Coast
Japan
Jordan
Kenya
Republic of
Lebanon
Libya
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg
Malaysia
Maldives
Malta
Mauritios
Mexico
Mongolia
Morocco
Nauru
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Norway
Panama
.Papua New Guinea
Peru
Philippines
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.Poland
Portugal
Romania
Rwanda
San Marino
Senegal.
Seychelles
Somalia
Korea Sri Lanka
Sudan
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Thailand
-
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
USSR
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen, Peoples Democratic
Republic of
Yugoslavia
Zaire
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NPT Signatories*
Colombia
Yemen Arab Republic
Observer States
Algeria
.Argentina
Bahrain
Brazil
Chile
Cuba
Israel
Pakistan
Spain
Tanzania
Observer National Liberation Organization
- PLO
Organizations
IAEA
� League of Arab States �
�OAS
OAU
OPANAL (Agency for Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America)
Nongovernmental Organizations
43 Total .
This Table is UNCLASSIFIED
*Both have since ratified the NPT.
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