THE NPT EXTENSION CONFERENCE: A CHALLENGING ENDGAME

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06796493
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-01547
• Publication Date: April 10, 1995

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Intelligence Report
Office of Scientific and Weapons Research
10 April 1995
The NPT Extension Conference: A Challenging Endgame
The Western Group enters the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference in a
relatively strong position, with a notional majority of some 92 NPT signatories
having indicated either publicly or diplomatically that they support indefinite
extension (see matrix of estimated country positions). Nevertheless, significant
efforts by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Arab League to negotiate
consensus positions behind alternative extension options are likely to continue
during the end game and indefinite extension is by no means assured. Obtaining
indefinite extension will depend on:
� Our ability to assuage concerns about a series of contentious issues that the
NAM consistently has linked to indefinite extension.
� The West's ability to prevent NAM supporters of indefinite extension from
� "defecting."
� Obtaining favorable voting procedures.
� Conference dynamics.
Although the composition of the "northern" or Western-Eurasian coalition
behind indefinite extension has remained relatively constant, the loyalties of the
"southern" group will continue to be vulnerable to efforts by the NAM and the
Arab League to develop alternative extension options.
As a result, and because many undecided states will delay their
extension decision until the eleventh hour, we may not have an accurate count as
we enter the vote.
WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED
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The Basis for a Possible Majority Vote
Since the Fourth Preparatory Committee (prepcom) meeting in January 1995, the bloc in
favor oaf indefinite extension has grown by approximately 30 votes and at 92 now
constitmes gimotionalmajority Of Treaty parties. The bulk of this support comes from
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)�NATO, Russia, the
former Soviet Republics, -Eastern Europe, and the rest of Western Europe with the
exception of Switzerland. Pockets of support that we assess as critical to maintaining this
majority also have emerged among the NAM but these countries remain vulnerable to
backsliding because of continued attempts by the NAM to develop a joint position. A
surge to negotiate a common NAM position is likely during the 11-12 April NAM Senior
!OffiCialsMeeting and at the Conference itself�if Conference dynamics orove favorable to a
bandwagon emerging behind a more limited extension option.
Currently, blocs of nonaligned support for indefinite extension come from:
� Central America. The six Central American states are expected to support indefinite
extension. Several of these had previously supported the "Venezuelan" 25-year fixed
period option.
� The Carribean Islands. In fall 1994, the Caribbean Community and Common Market
(CARICOM) issued a statement supporting indefinite extension. Only half of the
member states have committed to indefinite extension independently, however. 2
� The South Pacific. In 1994 the South Pacific Forum (SPF) issued a communique
supporting the unconditional indefinite extension of the NPT, and historically the SPF
has voted as a bloc.3 Nevertheless, since then a few South Pacific countries, including
Papua New Guinea, have expressed reservations about supporting indefinite extension.
� Francophone Africa. French-speaking African countries, which account for roughly a
dozen of the states in Central and Western Africa, are inclined to follow Paris' cue on
NM' extension and thus have indicated a preference for indefinite extension.
1
The Central American states are Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Panama, and Costa Rica. (U)
2 CARICOM members of the NPT are Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada,
Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago. (U)
3 NPT signatories in the SPF are Australia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea,
Solomon Islands. Tonga, Tuvalu, and Western Samoa. Additionally, Vanautu and Palau may accede before the
Conference.
This report was prepared by Office of Scientific and Weapons
Research with contributions from other offices in the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and
queries are welcome and may be directed to Chief, Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical Division, OSWR Information available as of 29 March
was used in this report
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Nevertheless, some have indicated that they would not oppose a regional or NAM
consensus, should one emerge.
Opposition Is Concentrated In the Middle East and the NAM
The Middle .East. The majority of states in the Middle East continue to oppose the
unconditional, indefinite extension of the NPT and, absent Israeli signature of the Treaty,
are notialldly to change-their positions by April. Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon,
Liby.a,$5954,,and Yemen probably will be among those voting against indefinite extension
or possibly &staining in the interests of not damaging relations with Washington. This
group probably will pursue a single fixed extension or a series of limited extensions�such
as a rolling five-year extension�as the best way of enabling them to retain leverage with
the West and Israel on arms control issues. Although the Arab League meeting in late
March failed to adopt a consensus position against indefinite extension, it left the issue
open for further discussion. The Arab League's resolution said the Arab position would
"take shape" depending on the "extent to which universal implementaion" of the Treaty
had been achieved. The resolution also supports the NAM's efforts to link other arms
control issues to the extension decision.
Nonetheless, a few positive signs are emerging:
The Non-Aligned Movement. An ad hoc NAM NV!' working group�chaired by Malaysia�
has been meeting since late 1994 with the goal of developing a unified NAM position.
Although the group completed a position paper for use by NAM countries during the NP'!'
Conference, we believe they failed to agree upon a common extension proposal.
4 The Arab League consists of Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania,
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, Yemen, and the Palestine Liberation
Organization. (U)
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Indonesia, as president of the NAM, is spearheading NAM efforts to oppose
indefinite extension. Jakarta has proposed different extension options over the last six
months, including a fixed-term extension and a series of rolling fixed periods.
�� Iran favors extending the Treaty for a fixed term unless certain alleged defects in the
Treaty�principally so-called discriminatory export control practices�are corrected.
� Mexico's opposition to indefinite extension appears to have remained unchanged as
of 10 March
Targets for NAM Maneuvering: Regions Vulnerable to the Opposition
Africa. No Organization of African Unity (OAU) consensus has emerged, largely because
many African States are ambivalent about NPT extension. States in this region probably
will be more influenced by the votes of key regional players�such as South Africa�than by
NAM hardliners:
�
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� South Africa has consistently supported indefinite extension or extension "in
perpetuity." In an effort to "bring along its neighbors in the region," on 10 March it
suggested a rolling fixed periods option as a possible compromise.
'The SADC5.constitutes a key pocket of 'opposition to indefinite extension, but South
Africa will probably influence its ultimate decision.
Southeast Asia. Since Philippine President Ramos' late January statement that Manila will
vote for indefinite extension, the six Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
nations appear to have given up efforts to reach a consensus position opposing indefinite
extension.6 Indonesia,. Malaysia, and Thailand appear intent on fixed-term extensions,
�while Singapore remains undecided. It is not clear how Brunei�which may have been
awaiting an ASEAN consensus against indefinite extension�will proceed. Other Southeast
,Asian states�Burma, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia�are also divided on the issue.
South Asia. South Asian NPT member states�concerned about neighboring India's and
Pakistan's nuclear weapon capabilities�have been consistently supportive of nuclear
nonproliferation objectives but hold mixed views on NPT extension. Afghanistan, the
Maldives, and Bangladesh support unconditional, indefinite extension�although
Bangladesh's support may be wavering. Other South Asian signatories, such as Nepal,
either support a fixed extension period or have not decided what form extension should
take. Sri Lanka, charged with presiding over the conference in April, will go along with
the consensus so as to preserve the appearance of impartiality as president.
Latin America. Most of Latin America probably will support indefinite extension in the
end, but the region also includes some key NPT troublemakers. Mexico, Colombia,
Venezuela, and Ecuador have all expressed interest in limited term extensions�citing the
5 Members of the SADC are: Angola (not an NPT signatory), Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Malawi, Mozambique,
South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. (U)
6 ASEAN members are Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Laos, Papua New
Guinea, and Vietnam participate as observers. (U)
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weapons states' poor disarmament track record (Article VI).
Seventeen countries have publicly or privately endorsed indefinite extension; the remainder
may be susceptible t�heJnbIying efforts of Mexico and other NAM opponents of
indefinite extension.
.Key Variables That Could Affect the Conference Outcome
Longstanding Linkage Issues. The issues outlined in the NAM documents presented at
�the Third and Fourth Preparatory Committee meetings remain central negotiating
positions of NAM opponents of indefinite extension. They include calls for: a time-
bound framework for eliminating nuclear weapons, treaty universality, support for nuclear
weapon-free zones, a comprehensive nuclear test ban, a fissile material cut-off, legally
.binding security assurances, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Most conciliatory
measures recently proposed by the NVVSs in an effort to widen support for indefinite
extension do not cut deeply enough to satisfy such hardline NAM opponents as Iran,
Indonesia, Egypt, and Nigeria (see inset). Maintaining majority backing for indefinite
extension will depend in part on our ability to convince NPT signatories that progress
made to date on these issues is indicative of our good faith and is at least substantial
enough to give them the political cover to support indefinite extension.
Procedural Issues. Unsettled rules relating to voting procedures may affect the outcome in
largely unpredictable ways (see inset). If simultaneous voting is adopted, a key
challenge will be to prevent adoption of a rule that would result in fallback options
acceptable to Washington being eliminated in early voting rounds. Similarly, we
believe that public balloting will help keep countries in the pro-indefinite extension
camp.
Delegate personalities. Personalities of delegates in official or unofficial leadership
positions are likely to affect conference dynamics. For example, the Committee chairmen
may have biases which could affect the tone and content of their final Committee reports
(see inset). Isaac Ayewah, the Nigerian who will chair Main Committee 1, was extremely
sympathetic to Iran's arguments when he presided over Prepcom
� The Conference President, Jayantha Dhanapala from Sri Lanka, has pledged neutrality;
however, a recent speech by the Sri Lankan ambassador to the Conference on
Disarmament may indicate that Colombo is�in fact�inclined against indefinite
extension. If Dhanapala shares his colleagues' views, given the considerable leverage
afforded the conference president, such inclinations could affect the process and
outcome of the Conference.
Collapse of US-DPRK Agreed Framework. Differences between the United States and
North Korea over South Korea's role in providing two light-water reactors to the North
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risks a breakdown in the Agreed Framework. P'yongyang has threatened to refuel its 5
megawatt electric (MWe) reactor if the reactor supplier issue is not resolved by 21 April,
about a week into the NPT Conference. The breakdown of the Agreed Framework�
particularly if it is followed by a North Korean withdrawal from the NPT and/or a return
to the UN,Secarity Council for sanctions�would underscore the international community's
Iettopfions forenforcing the NPT regime.
,Outlook
The risk of a bandwagon emerging at the Conference against indefinite extension is
real. The uncertainty stems primarily from the lack of an overwhelming consensus
behind indefinite extension, the continuing activism of the NAM and others in
promoting alternative extension options, and the likelihood that some supporters of
indefinite extension will fail to attend the Conference, abstain, or settle for second-best
options. Our ability to achieve indefinite extension will be further challenged by:
� Continued activism by the Arab League and the NAM for a more limited extension
option, including attempts to sway those NAM countries inclined to support
indefinite extension. The NAM will use focused criticism of the weapon states'
performance on such long-standing linkage issues as a Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT), a fissile material cutoff, legally binding security assurances, and
peaceful nuclear technology transfer to argue that the Non-Nuclear Weapons States
need to retain a source of leverage on the Nuclear Weapons States. Many NAM
states fear that achieving indefinite extension will curtail further reviews of Treaty
operation.
� The likelihood that many states will delay their extension decision until the eleventh
hour. We may not have an accurate view of the depth and breadth of support for
indefinite extension as we enter the actual vote.
� A NAM push for the Conference to reach all decisions by a "near consensus"�rather
than a simple majority, and the possibility that NAM hard-liners will try to adjourn
the Conference rather than accept an indefinite extension by simple majority.
Some supporters of indefinite extension have expressed concern over the strategy to
accept a 50 percent plus 1 majority vote, fearing that doing so would alienate too many
other states and jeopardize the future of the NPT. Most NPT signatories, however,
appear to understand that they will be bound by whatever the majority decides at the
conference, and we do not foresee mass withdrawals from the Treaty even if indefinite
extension is narrowly achieved:
� With the exception of North Korea, no country has ever come this close to
withdrawing from the NPT.
� There has been no indication that any country is seriously considering withdrawing
from the NPT should the vote not go their way.
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� Iran and Egypt are the only countries that previously have hinted at a possible
� withdrawal over the extension decision. Iran now denies that it would withdraw if the
Treaty is extended indefinitely, presumably because it wants to assure access to
technology for its nuclear program. Egyptian President Mubaralc said in March that
Egypt will not withdraw even if its demands are not met by the time of the Treaty
Conference.
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Contentious Issues: Conditions for NAM Support
ositivel
Security Assurances. Many May be willing to accept the UNSC Resolution on
positive and negative security assurances as an interim step on the, way to lelly,hihcf,j.
security assurances. Egypt, ver, criticat'Of, the limitations a �TVS; joint
resolution on security assurances.
Peaceful Uses ofNuclear Teehliology. Iran continues to champion !theeause for ?N NWS
access to nuclear technology and has Managed to spark a Measure of the
VintecltatoAand Ru ssia:On this i$$-Aie:.:746.1_*Olt controversy over the Russian-Iranian
nuclearooperation'agreement his refueled Iran's argument: The perceived
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inconsistency In policy between the provision of nuclear technology, to North Korea vs.
),,willlive,Treaty critics considerable ammunition
ficleaf-Weapcins2Free Zones. etAtige no country explicitly links its extension vote to
, . _ , _ � -
NYYFZ issues, US statements in support ":0,NWEZ P-ft:Q0S7Cvilliiot.,b4ManY.:.-votekbnt,
would be welcome by Many regional groups as a sign Of good faith by the NWS..'
. � �
Disarmament. The US decisions to withdraw a proposed 10-year out clause from
draft CTBT Witand to remove 200 tons,Pf-exce'ss fissilematerial nucleai
'arsenal have been viewed ositiveRegardless. ,s me hardline NAM o
riiteextension-includi rig Indonesia, Iran,. and Nigeria-consider overall Progress on -
fissile material ent7o d Other disarmament measures inadequate.
nsequenlly. the Indonesian-proposal to make future extensions of thei4vr contingent'
comoliance with a step- -step...process toward disarmament is being viewed
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Pahire gOVcnlin the Pleth.90, for taking:the Note remain unresolved. By ii
id of the Fourth Preparatory Committee, 'parties began to converge nwaproce re o
multaneous voting, in:which all proposed voting options would be listed on a single
allot telt?g wterse siona meetings, parties haveA ro:ideept4 NAM proposed
m�lt�eo�s voting ion, wIth modifications.
r,19,
fte NAM proposed a multiple vote balloting scheme in which:a.itountripan vote
or one Or4nOre,ektensiOn options on .a�itigkfballpt: $Orile NAM irietiterS believe
ch.acherne 4tensinnfoutdorite;teaSOning that sorne
�ort,
erizif indefinite extension and some Supporters of fixed extension would also
'otefor rolling extepSion as,Palatable'ilternatives.:
objeeted-todie.mulfiPle-oPtiOn per ballot
_ , , _
eoljtiOni,Per ballot rule.
ropedural,details for eliminating less popular extension_optionSyerriain,unresolved. _
The . eiternpretereice,enirentlY, is to ietaih all options on each successive ballot, in
order`.tb:ensure,that the WE ' "second-best" option does not get in the
early voting rounds.
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