MEXICO: IMPACT OF THE ELECTION

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06795618
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: May 22, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-02576
• Publication Date: July 16, 1988

Approved for Release: 2019/05/13 C06795618
Director of
Central
Intelligence
(b)(3)
National Intelligence Daily
Saturday
16 July 1988
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S 2E65/88 COP 532
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-111-017-SeGrat____
CPAS NID 88-165JX
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Contents
NR
Special Analyses
Mexico: Impact of the Election 11
(b)(3)
Record
NR Record
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Mexican Elections, 1988: Party Strengths
Baj
Callforn
Norte
Baja
California
Sur
Sonora
'Chihuahua
Durango
1:=3 Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
ED National Action Party (PAN)
ED National Democratic Front (FDN)
El Results unavailable
Coahuila
Nuevo
Le6n
amaulipa
Michoacan
Guerrero
Oaxaca
Central Mexico estados
1 Aguascalientes
2 Guanajuato
3 Queretaro
4 Hidalgo
5 Mexico
6 Distrito Federal
7 Tlaxcala
UZ
714003 (A04828) 7-88
Chamber of Deputies Makeup
6 July 1988 Election
Opposition-
48%
PRI-52%
Opposition-
27%
1985 Midterm Election
PRI-73%
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T-'oirSeeret
(b)(3)
Special Analysis
MEXICO: Impact of the Election
The opposition's unprecedented show of strength in the Mexican
election last week and the ruling party's losses mark a turning
point for the entrenched political system. The institutional
Revolutionary Party (PR!) has proclaimed its victory in the
presidential contest but has made substantial concessions to
end opposition challenges. President-elect Salinas now faces
major hurdles in establishing a presidential mandate and in
making the PRI adjust to a more competitive political
environment.
The players and the style of this election differed markedly from those
of past contests. Salinas failed to attract popular support from the
start and lacked full backing even within the party. Government
austerity measures and the absence of pump priming further
undermined his appeal. The opposition, for the first time, nominated a
popular, nationally recognized candidate�the leftist Cuauhtemoc
Cardenas�and demonstrated more unity, especially in its fight
against electoral fraud.
Tackling the Immediate Crisis
The PRI, thrown off balance by the new situation, initially wavered but
now appears intent on defending the legitimacy of Salinas's victory
while making concessions to the opposition in other areas. The
party's early, uncharacteristic indecisiveness suggests internal debate
on strategy between reformers willing to concede more losses to the
opposition and party stalwarts seeking a traditional clean sweep.
Although it declared Salinas the winner, the party-run electoral
commission accorded him a historically low 50 percent of the vote
and gave the opposition a significant share of legislative seats. The
government.also has been restrained in responding to protests�
another apparent effort to take the edge off the opposition.
Cardenas, by virtue of his popular following, presents the greatest
immediate challenge to the PRI, and the party probably is trying to
reach an accommodation with him. He no doubt recognizes the threat
he poses to the party's legitimacy by refusing to acknowledge
Salinas's win and probably will not be satisfied with just legislative
seats. The ruling party, in turn, probably believes that Cardenas�a
former PRI dissident�seeks to make the system more responsive
and may offer him a say in policymaking in return for his acquiescence
in Salinas's victory. It might, for example, permit a member of
Cardenas's coalition to become secretary of Agrarian Reform,
allowing Cardenas to promote his populist policies while keeping his
distance (b)(1)
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To t
The conservative opposition presents a smaller problem. Its
candidate, Manuel Clouthier, has conceded the presidency�although
without recognizing Salinas�and popular enthusiasm for his civil
disobedience campaign appears to be waning. But the conservatives
outpolled the left in legislative seats and may focus increasinQly on
consolidating their gains in the Chamber of Deputies
The PRI probably will weather the current challenges through
negotiations and a continued policy of restraint in the face of protests.
The opposition probably will continue to press for demonstrations, in
part to gauge the depth and permanence of its popular support.
Cardenas has called for a massive demonstration in Mexico City today;
eventually, however, he will turn his sights to the future. He faces a
formidable task in converting his loose coalition into a cohesive
organization if he is to establish political staying power.
There is a chance that confrontation between the ruling party and the
opposition will escalate. If -Cardenas perceives that the PRI remains
badly divided in its support for Salinas, he may use popular
demonstrations to press his claim to the presidency. The PRI
probably would react to sustained protests with a show of forte to
intimidate Cardenas and his followers, potentially sparking violence
that could spread to opposition strongholds nationwide.
Implications for the System
The election has produced an opening in the system that even PRI
leaders have recognized publicly, and the new competitiveness will
test the party's ability to adapt to the changing situation. Salinas's
campaign rhetoric calling for more open, "modern" politics indicates
he is disposed to depart from traditional practices, but he still faces
the tough challenge of consolidating support within the party before
he moves ahead.
Salinas will have to contend with disgruntled stalwarts who lost
legislative races as well as with dissidents who sympathized with
Cardenas. Rather than attempt to balance all interests, Salinas�who
already has alienated many of the party's old guard with his rhetoric
on the need to modernize the system�will probably shun the
stalwarts in hopes of building firm backing among reformists and
attracting some dissidents back into the party mainstream
Over the longer term, both Salinas and the PRI will have to restore
their lost legitimacy or risk erosion in the government's ability to
Implement policy and losses in municipal and even gubernatorial
� elections. Salinas will assume office in December in a weaker position
than any of his predecessors; he will be under pressure to
compromise on his tough economic agenda as well as to foster
political reform
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