UKRAINE: WHO WILL MANAGE CHERNOBYL?

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06795611
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: April 23, 2025
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2025
• Case Number: F-2016-02406
• Publication Date: December 26, 1991

Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795611
CaltoWftrrTIAL
NOFORN
Directorate of Intelligence
26 December 1991
Ukraine: Who Will Manage
Chernobyl?
Summary
A pressing challenge for leaders in the newly independent
Ukraine will be to reconcile the public to the fact that, al-
though the republic may now control its political destiny, it
will have to continue to defer to Russia on some economic
and technical decisions. One such decision is the emotion�
charged issue of the management of the Chernobyl nuclear
power plant and the republic's overall nuclear energy indus-
try. In the-summer of 1991, the Ukrainian parliament
passed a resolution asserting Kiev's right to exercise pri-
mary authority over atomic installations in the republic. In-
deed, when a serious fire broke out at the Chernobyl nu-
clear power station a few months later, Kiev took the lead
This memorandum was �re ared b
1 Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to
the Chief, RC Division,
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795611
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795611
NENTIAL
NOFORN
in dealing with the incident, rather than allow Moscow to
handle the political and physical fallout as it had during
the Chernobyl disaster in 1986.
Although the magnitude of this recent incident was only a
fraction of the earlier one (no radiation was released), the
fire was nonetheless a close�call reminder that Ukraine by
itself could not yet cope economically or technically with
another serious accident, and that it might, therefore, be
unwise�or impossible�for Kiev to sever in the near future
all ties to central nuclear authorities. In signing the historic
Commonwealth pact with Russia and Byelarus on 8 Decem-
ber 1991, Ukrainian leaders openly acknowledged this in-
terdependence by consenting to a separate clause calling
for a "special agreement" on Chernobyl. We believe this
clause will allow for Russian technical access to and con-
trol of the plant while decontamination and containment
operations continue, probably for years after the shutdown
of the reactors, which is scheduled for 1993.
Ukraine Tries to Take Control
Ukraine has had de facto jurisdiction over its nuclear power facili-
ties since at least mid-1991, when the republic's parliament, re-
sponding to enormous political pressure stemming from the earlier
Chernobyl accident, initially set a closure date of 1995 for the
Chernobyl atomic energy. station (AES). Ukraine has not yet ruled
on the fate of four other nuclear power stations currently in opera-
tion, but it has declared a moratorium on new plant construction.
Republic leaders have postponed a decision on a proposal by the
former USSR Ministry of Atomic Power and Industry (MAPI)� the
Moscow-based government agency that previously owned or over-
saw all nuclear facilities�that would enable central authorities to
retain some operational control. The proposal acknowledges repub-
2
CO i NTIAL
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795611
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795611
COb ENTIAL
lie ownership of former MAPI nuclear plants but provides for a
centralized agency to service and run the power stations through a
joint-stock state corporation. The arrangement would almost surely
rankle Ukrainian sensitivities because it epitomizes the pervasive
influence over the republic's nuclear sector exercised by Russia,
where MAPI support facilities and know-how are concentrated. As
the experience of the Baltic nations shows, that influence will
probably continue for some time: even Lithuania, which has
achieved complete political independence, still relies on a contin-
gent of Russian personnel to run its Chernobyl-type reactor at Ig-
nalina.
The importance of these jurisdictional issues was illustrated in the
accident that occurred on 11 October 1991 at the Chernobyl AES:
That evening, an electrical malfunction in an operating unit of the
plant sparked a serious fire, which caused a. large section of the
roof to collapse into a main generator room. No radiation was re-
leased because Ukrainian firemen, who were the first on the scene,
extinguished the blaze in about three hours. Had the fire gone un-
checked, however, it could have threatened the reactor itself, which
would have required massive assistance that was beyond the repub-
lic's capability.
Anticipating the political uproar this close call might generate, the
republic government seized the lead by immediately appointing a
14-member commission to investigate. Headed by veteran politi-
cian Viktor Gladush, the team included government officials, fire-
men, engineers, public health officers, and experts from the
Ukrainian Ecology and Nuclear Institutes. Ukrainians with consid-
erable experience in nuclear matters�including followup issues
from the Chernobyl accident five years ago�helped constitute a
highly visible Ukrainian majority among those dealing with the af-
termath of the fire.
Moscow Plays it Down�But Not Out
To minimize the public's perception of danger and to forestall
charges of interference in republic affairs, the Moscow-based
MAPI kept a low profile in dealing with the accident. Nonetheless,
it formed its own commission of inquiry and quietly set up a cen-
- 3 - CONF
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795611
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795611
CDF
NOFORN�
ter at the AES to manage the fire cleanup. The MAPI, which has
monitored incidents at all nuclear power stations throughout the
former USSR, assigned a midlevel spokesman to issue information
bulletins to reassure the public that there was no danger from ra-
diation.
The Chernobyl Fires�Then and Now
The October fire showed that some fundamental leadership and
policy management changes have occurred since the Chernobyl dis-
aster in 1986:
� Authority to make technology-driven decisions that have strong
political ramifications has shifted from central, industry-oriented
organizations or individuals to local political bodies. In 1986, the
republic's leadership was powerless against the central nuclear
bureaucracy. In October 1991 the populace targeted the Ukrain-
ian Council of Ministers and the parliament as the authorities
best able to take action.
� The public is now demanding and getting honest answers. Unlike
central authorities who tried to clamp a news blackout on the
1986 Chernobyl disaster, Ukrainian officials made a full disclo-
sure to the public of circumstances contributing to the October
accident, and they kept citizens informed throughout regarding
the extent of danger. The story broke internationally within a few
hours, and even the cautious Moscow press reported it on na-
tional television the morning of the 12th.
� Now, environmentalists constitute a strong and vocal political
force. At the time of the catastrophe in 1986, there was no active
environmental movement, much less one with clout. People who
are environmentally conscious are no longer on the outside look-
ing in; they often hold policymaking offices. Capitalizing on the
publicity surrounding the October fire, environmentalists secured
the endorsement of officials from nearby West European coun-
tries and neighboring Soviet republics and agitated for immediate
closure of the station. On 29 October the Ukrainian parliament
voted to shut down the station by 1993, instead of phasing it out
gradually.
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795611
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795611
CQ,D1F-t 1�ITIAL
NOFORN
Willing, But Able?
� Much as Ukraine would like to decide the future of its nuclear in-
dustry without having to consider its neighbors, we believe it is in-
extricably linked to them by economic and technical bonds.
Why They Cannot Go It Alone
Numerous obstacles hinder Ukraine from gaining self�sufficiency in
nuclear power or doing away with it altogether:
Economic Constraints
� One-fourth of Ukrainian elec-
tricity is AES generated.
� Remaining energy sources are in-
digenous coal production (down
one-third since 1990) and im-
ports of Russian oil (expected to
rise in price).
� Ukraine, in the past a significant
exporter of electricity, has
slashed energy exports, and the
country currently is renegotiating
foreign contracts to bring hard
currency earnings under republic
control and to cushion against oil
pike hikes.
� To meet near-term energy
needs, republic leaders may com-
mission three nearly completed
nuclear plants that had been put
on hold.
Technical Factors
� Ukraine lacks the trained personnel,
computer codes, and essential design
information to sustain a nuclear in-
dustry.
� Most scientists, engineers, and design-
ers are Soviet trained and indoctri-
nated in an industry culture biased
toward centralization of authority and
expertise.
� Technical documentation is in Rus-
sian; the official language for AES
operations is Russian.
� Ukraine has no significant nuclear
manufacturing. Because its reactors
are Russian built, Russia is the logi-
cal spare-parts supplier and equip-
ment integrator.
� Tasks such as data collection and dis-
semination on AES incidents and op-
erations are routed through Moscow.
The top research institutes are in
Russia.
- 5 -
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795611
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795611
.NPVENTIAL
NOVORN
Ukrainians would prefer to seek technical assistance for their nu-
clear industry from the international community rather than from
Moscow, and their chances of getting foreign help are good. West-
ern firms are eager to deal with the republic, especially if they can
help stabilize its nuclear industry. Notwithstanding the West's will-
ingness to provide assistance, however, Kiev faces serious financial
constraints that limit its ability to pay for Western technology and
equipment; the republic will therefore be forced to rely on cen-
tral�in effect Russian�experience and lcnowhow for the foresee-
able future.
Ukrainian leaders must determine, therefore, how much interaction
between the republic's nuclear industry and Moscow is politically
palatable; one issue, for example, is whether the republic will join
the joint-stock corporation proposed by MAPI. Ukrainian concur-
rence is essential for the plan to be workable because the republic
is second only to Russia in its number of nuclear power plants.
Local leaders may resist signing on, however, because of over-
whelming public sentiment that Ukraine control its own industrial
facilities. Moreover, republic leaders have expressed how little they
trust central authorities to run the nuclear power sector in the best
commercial or environmental interests of Ukraine.. Backing for the
plan would most likely come from the republic's nuclear industry
workers and officials, who would probably judge this measure of
central control and coordination a necessary evil to reduce the
chances of. a severe nuclear accident or to cope with one, should it
occur. Given these conflicting points of view, Ukrainian leaders
will have to maintain a balancing act because joining the corpora-
tion may provide their only access to the technical expertise they
need until they develop their own nuclear infrastructure or obtain
sufficient Western help.
Outlook: Reluctant Partners
The landmark 8 December Commonwealth accord, signed by
Ukraine, Russia, and Byelarus, contained a separate provision (Ar-
ticle 8) on dealing jointly with the continuing effects of the 1986
Chernobyl disaster. Ukrainian leaders thereby implicitly aclaiowl-
� edged that, unassisted, they are unable to cope with the residual
effects of that first accident. We believe the recent Chernobyl fire
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795611
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795611
CONE:1151AL
was a stark reminder to them that another major accident would
overwhelm the fledgling nation and could threaten its economic
and political viability. We expect Ukrainian leaders to incorporate
the Article 8 arrangement into an ongoing gentlemen's agreement
with vestigial central nuclear energy authorities to help protect
against such a threat. We believe the agreement will be one in
which the republic continues to work with existing organizations
for as long as necessary (allowing for continued Russian technical
access and control) but keeps the collaboration as unpublicized as
possible. For at least the near term, Kiev must remain Moscow's
cooperative�even if reluctant�nuclear partner. (b)(3)
- 7 - CONVENTIAL
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795611
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795611
NTIAL
Appendix A
Players in the Aftermath of the Chernobyl Fire
Described below are the most prominent players associated with
the October fire. Most are Ukrainian officials or public figures, but
two Moscow MAPI officials who were responsible for the power
plant at the time of the accident are also included.
The Establishment
The ranking Ukrainian official was State Minister for Industry,
Transport, and Energy Viktor D. Gladush. A longtime party offi-
cial, he was named chairman of the republic commission investi-
gating the fire. Gladush had served since June 1990 as head of a
USSR Council of Ministers commission charged with taking the
AES out of service by 1995. He had also coordinated regional re-
sponses to previous emergency situations, including supervision of
Ukrainian assistance to victims of the 1988 Armenian earthquake.
Gladush's deputy on the investigation commission was Nikolay A.
Shteynberg, chairman of the Ukrainian State Committee for Nu-
clear Safety since its establishment in August 1991. Shteynberg
was assigned to the Chernobyl AES in the mid-1980s, but he left
just before the 1986 accident because of a personality conflict with
the plant director. When the disaster occurred, he returned to the
AES on his own initiative, assumed a position of authority, and
participated in early cleanup operations. As a consequence, he was
named deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Nuclear
Safety, a title he held until assuming his current post..
The top MAPI official involved was Erik N. Pozdyshev, chairman
of the Ministry's commission of inquiry into the causes of the fire
� and the measures needed for repair of the plant. He was the MAPI
deputy minister in charge of all AES maintenance, operations, and
accident coordination. Pozdyshev knows the Chernobyl station well;
he was its director from right after the 1986 accident until prob-
ably mid-1989, when he was named deputy minister. His MAPI
colleague, Chernobyl AES chief engineer Nikolay A. Sorokin,
- 8 -
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795611
NTIAL
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795611
� C C 1 N I A L
NOFORN
heads the center set up on 12 October to manage the fire cleanup.
Both men have exercised a low-key response to the potential haz-
ards of the fire, and both have stayed out of the spotlight focused
on Ukrainian officials.
The Greens
Environmental activists Yuriy N. Shcherbak and Vladimir A.
Yavorivskiy, on the other hand, have been vocal critics of the
Chernobyl AES. Shcherbak is Ukraine's Minister for Environmental
Issues and also chairman of Green World, the Ukrainian environ-
mental group that played a large role in eliciting public demands
that the station be closed, Although Shcherbak concedes that eco-
nomic imperatives will probably keep the Chernobyl AES on line
for a while longer, he has faulted Ukrainian power officials for
failing to develop alternative energy sources. A physician for more
than 30 years, he treated Chernobyl accident victims. Shcherbak
published a series of articles and a documentary novel during the
late 1980s describing the medical and environmental effects of the
Chernobyl disaster. He said he felt compelled to unveil what he
believed to be a massive propaganda coverup of Chernobyl's con-
sequences. Shcherbak served as chairman of the Nuclear Ecology
Subcommittee of the USSR Supreme Soviet during 1989-90.
Yavorivskiy is a well-known Ukrainian novelist and poet who has
focused his writing since 1987 on the nuclear accident at Cher-
nobyl. He was one of a group of literati who founded the intensely
nationalistic People's Movement of the Ukraine for Perestroyka�
known there as Rukh�in March 1988, and he later served as its
chairman. He tried unsuccessfully to enter the Ukrainian presiden-
tial race, but he could not get the required number of signatures to
become ,a candidate. Yavorivskiy is chairman of the Ukrainian Su-
preme Soviet standing commission on Chernobyl accident issues,
and following the recent fire, he agitated for an immediate shut-
down of the station.
- 9 -
Approved for Release: 2025/03/24 C06795611