CAN THE COALITION KICK-START A RISING IN THE SOUTH?

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06794684
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: July 31, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-02409
• Publication Date: April 1, 2003

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Director of Central Intelligence
DCI Red Cell
A Red Cell Report
Number 111 1 April 2003
In response to the events of
I I September, the Director
of Central Intelligence
commissioned CIA's Deputy
Director for Intelligence to
.create a "red cell" that
would think unconventionally
about the full range of
relevant analytic issues. The
DCI Red Cell is thus charged
with taking a pronounced
"out-of-the-box" approach
and will periodically produce
memoranda and reports
intended to provoke thought
rather than to provide
authoritative assessment.
Please direct questions or
comments to the DCI Red
Cell all
Can The Coalition Kick-Start A Rising in the South?
In the battle for Shia opinion, Saddam's continued access to the airwave; and
his thugs' presence in the south may be overshadowing the growing coalition
military pressure. Intimidation by the regime's killers is magnified by a
coalition strategy that initially bypassed southern cities on the way to Baghdad.
Locals remember their catastrophic rising of 1991; this time a full-scale
rebellion might not happen until the Shia see two developments: full control of
Basra by coalition forces and further destruction of the Republican Guard,
which was responsible for crushing the rising 12 years ago. Blasting the myth
of Saddam's "invincibility" requires that coalition forces neutralize the regime's
instruments of coercion and quickly develop liberated zones to empower
southern tribes and families, legitimize cooperation with the "liberators,' and
advertise the definitive end of Tikriti rule
The Red Cell was asked to speculate on why the population of southern Iraq has not yet
risen against Saddam Husavn and on what coalition actions might inspire the Shia to more
robust action.
Why Risk Another Disaster?
Western reporters' interviews with locals provide anecdotal evidence that, despite coalition
advances, an image of Saddam's personal power is a potent deterrent to rebellion. Many
in the south acknowledge coalition military power but remain unconvinced that Saddam is
really finished. For now, the perceived risk-reward ratio provides insufficient incentive to
rise against the regime.
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� Our reading suggests a population still cynical of US(b)(1)
motives in the wake of the 1991 catastrophe and made even more wary by the initia(b)(3)
bypass of southern cities�leaving the Shia exposed to the terror of Fedayeen thugs
as coalition forces minimize their own casualties.
� The regime's survival in Baghdad and continued broadcast of messages nationwide
despite coalition air power stokes the fear that Republican Guard tanks�which
crushed Shia small arms in 1991�will return to settle scores with rebels.
Indeed, the trauma of the 1991 suppression and the present Shia caution suggest that
another great uprising may not be in the offing. This time, a more prudent southern
populace might wait until they are physically liberated before they feel sufficiently safe to
cooperate with their liberators. At that time they might savagely turn on Saddam's
remaining killers and flunkeys.
� Some who hate Saddam but lost family members in 1991 may remain overtly hostile
towards the US even after liberation; their mood may be akin to that of Warsaw after
the Polish resistance rising of 1944, when a powerful Soviet army just across the
river stood by while the Germans destroyed the rebellion. This memory remained
vibrant throughout the Communist period.
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SaiktE,
Prompting More Active Cooperation
We see daily signs that visible coalition success against the regime's bully battalions does
facilitate local cooperation. Supportive remarks (b)(1)
are revealing�"three days ago I'd be to afraid to tell you what I'm telling (b)(1)
you now"�and growing more common. We see four factors as critical in fostering an (b)(3)
intellectual break with the regime and in determining whether the Shia will exorcise the
ghosts of 1991 in a definitive move toward the coalition (b)(3)
Physical Liberation. The liberation of cities and towns in the south�especially Basra�
could create accelerating Shia support for coalition operations. We surmise many local
notables would see the fall of Basra as compelling evidence that Saddam's forces are gone
for good and that Iraqis can and should turn to the common task of constructing a better
future.
� Demonstrated coalition willingness to risk casualties for the sake of cleaning out
Saddam's thugs might be critical to how far the Shia in particular take risks.
Building Political Legitimacy. We surmise that, once coalition forces are clearly seen as
intent upon eradicating the regime presence, some locals will cooperate�and even lead�
the building of new authority. In an atmosphere where local Shia are seen as the
successors to the Bathists, increasing numbers might be willing to direct coalition forces to
Saddamites in hiding and, perhaps, to revolt in areas still controlled by the regime.
� The destruction of the regime's coercive means will involve revenge-taking against the
murderers of 1991. Reports that locals are able to take revenge on Saddam's
henchmen in the south might stir up rebellion elsewhere.
� Revenge-taking may provide needed catharsis but will require careful coalition
management. Such oversight is more likely to work if local notables share
responsibility with liberating officers�local courts might establish a version of the legal
vetting process used in post-Communist Eastern Europe and could become a basis for
local government.
Hammering the Snakehead. As the liberation of the south is completed, prospects for
active southern cooperation would probably increase with coalition military success against
Saddam's elite units around Baghdad. In particular, Iraqis need to see televised proof that
the hated Republican Guards and other armed pillars of the regime are being destroyed.
Protecting the Holy Sites. The Shia holy sites at Najaf and Karbala will remain a
neuralgic issue regardless of strategy employed in the South. We worry that Saddam will
destroy the Tomb of Ali or other holy places and blame the US. Public statements of alarm
at Saddam's plans should be repeated over and over, and willingness to consult local Shia
leaders�and perhaps even Iran�over how to arrange the departure of Saddam's forces
from the sites might improve the coalition position in this public relations battle.
� Inviting local leaders to discuss the holy sites and view US and UK troop activities�
perhaps modeled on the Western reporters embedded in coalition military units�
might improve the US image with the Shia population and give them a new and
trusted source of information.
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