THE OUTLOOK IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06787050
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 26, 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
-
�
The Honorable Paul Nitze
This is the estimative paper which you re-
quested in your memorandum to me of 21 February.
Difficult as it was to compose, we hope it ail
be helpful to you.
Herewith are three copies. Please 1S1 us
know if you want distribution to other individuals
in the Government. You have the only copies out-
side this Agency.
Richard Helm'
Attachments - 3
"The Outlook in Vietnam"
�
27 February 1968
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
-
Aitpautrive Regionv
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
26 February 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: The Outlook in Vietnam
1. This Memorandum does not seek to explore all aspects
of the situation in Vietnam, or its probable development over
a long term. It is addressed only to the specific question
put to us, i.e., whether developments in Vietnam are apt to
involve a continuation of combat into the indefinite future at
a level comparable or higher than current levels, or whether it
is more probable that either the VC or the GVN will be unable
to sustain such a level beyond a few months.
2. The current phase of combat will have a critical
bearing on the further course of the war and may even prove to
be decisive. We cannot be sure how long this phase will last,
but it seems likely that by early summer the immediate results
and the longer term implications will be fairly clear to Hanoi,
Saigon, and Washington. At present, the key questions concern:
-E-T
ROUP 1
Exclude m automatic
down a -sing a
d assification
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
(1) the capabilities of the Communist forces to sustain their
current challenge, and whether they can continue the fighting
thereafter, and (2) the capabilities of the South Vietnamese
political and military establishment to cope with the tasks
imposed by the present Communist offensive.
Communist Plans and Prospects
3. Hanoi's aims in the present offensive phase are: to
register significant military successes against US and
especially ARVN forces, and to inflict such heavy losses,
physical destruction and disorganization on the GM as to
produce a total situation favorable to a negotiated settlement
on Communist terms. The Communists are not likely to have a
rigid timetable, but they probably hope to achieve decisive
results during the course of the summer. The high importance
which Hanoi now attaches to forcing the issue is evident from
the risks and costs of the enterprise.
4. The toll on Communist forces has been considerable,
even if reported casualties are greatly inflated by inclusion of
law level recruits and impressed civilians. To some extent
these losses have been offset by measures already taken. Heavy
- 2 -
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
infiltration of both new units and replacements from the North
is continuing. A strenuous, last minute recruitment effort was
made prior to the Tet attacks. A significant part of the
guerrilla and Main forces could still be committed. And, at
present, the Communists enjoy fuller access to the rural areas,
where they are recruiting heavily. They will probably be able
to recoup their recent losses, though at some sacrifice in
quality.
5. In any case, the Communists probably will maintain their
offensive for the next several months and be prepared to accept
the high losses this entails. They cannot accept such losses
indefinitely, however, and they probably will not be capable
soon again of launching repeated mass attacks of the magnitude
and widespread scale of 30-31 January. But they are almost
certainly capable of sustaining a high level of combat, including
major battles with US forces, assaults on selected cities, and
rocket and mortar attacks on urban areas and military installationG.
6. It is possible that the Communists regard the present
campaign as so critical to the outcome of the war that they will
commit their full resources to a maximum effort in the near term.
On balance, however, we think it likely that even if their present
3
-1=EuS.a.72t.7.
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
push falls short they will wish to be able to sustain a
protracted struggle. Hence they will probably not exercise
their capabilities in such a profligate manner as to deny
themselves the possibility of continuing the struggle should
the present phase fail to produce a decisive result.
GVN/ARVN Prospects
7. The will and capability of the GVN and its armed forces
remain the keys to the eventual outcome.
8. In the main, the ARVN has acquitted itself fairly well
since 30 January, though the record is uneven. Morale has held
up on the whole, and we know of no unit defections. However,
the ARVN is showing signs of fatigue and in many areas it has now
lapsed into a static defensive posture. Security in the country-
side has been sharply reduced. A long and costly effort would
have to be undertaken to regain the pre-Tet position. It is
highly unlikely that the ARVN will be inspired enough or strong
enough to make such an effort -- certainly not in the near future.
9. The GVN also performed adequately in the immediate
emergency, particularly in the Saigon area. There now appears
4
Approved for for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
to be a greater recognition of the need to push forward with
additional measures, but the Communist challenge has not yet
proved a catalyst in stimulating an urgent sense of national
unity and purpose.
10. The overall position of the government has been weakened.
Its prestige has suffered from the shock of the Tet offensive; its
control over the countryside has been greatly reduced. Popular
attitudes are confused and contradictory; the Viet Cong received
virtually no popular support, but neither was there a rallying
to the government side. Passivity is likely to continue as the
dominant attitude in most of the population, but further military
defeats could cause a sudden swing away from the government.
While the central authority in Saigon is unlikely to collapse,
its ability to provide energetic leadership throughout the
country and all levels is in serious doubt. It is possible
that over the next few months certain provinces, especially
in I and IV Corps, will be lost to Saigon's effective authority.
11. The psychological factor is now critical for South
Vietnam's whole political-military apparatus. The widespread
rumors that the US conspired with the Communists are symptomatic
5
3 -E--C B E T
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
of popular anxieties over the future course of the war and US
attitudes toward a political settlement. As yet, however, there
are no signs of a crisis of confidence within the government.
12. If major military reverses occur, the political and
military apparatus could degenerate into general ineffectualness.
If, on the other hand, US and ARVN regain the initiative and
inflict some conspicuous setbacks on the Communists and the
general offensive appears to be contained, then the GVN might
manifest new energy and confidence and draw new support to
itself. On balance, we judge that the chances are no better than
even that the GVN/ARVN will emerge from the present phase
without being still further weakened.
Alternative Outcomes of Present Phase
13. We believe that the Communists will sustain a high level
of military activity for at least the next two or three months.
It is difficult to forecast the situation which will then obtain,
given the number of unknowable factors which will figure. Our
best estimate is as follows:
6
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
-ECRET
a. The least likely outcome of the present phase is
that the Communist side will expend its resources to such
an extent as to be incapable thereafter of preventing steady
advances by the US/GVN.
b. Also unlikely, though considerably less so, is that
the GVN/ARVEI will be so critically weakened that it can play
no further significant part in the military and political
prosecution of the struggle.
c. More likely than either of the above is that the
present push will be generally contained, but with severe
losses to both the GVN and Communist forces, and that a
period will set in during which neither will be capable of
registering decisive gains.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
ABBOT SMITH
Chairman
7
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
S-E-C-R E T
I
Executive Registry
13 February 1968
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Vietnam
1. In the aftermath of the Communist Tet offensive most
Observers have agreed on the need to suspend judgment until more
.data is available. Nevertheless, such avowals have been quickly
followed by broad judgments ranging from the blackest pessimism
to the wildly optimistic. Inevitably, judgments concerning the
Objective situation in Vietnam have been mixed with and influenced
by a complex of attitudes on the justification or lack thereof
of our policy in the area and its impact on life in the US and
our posture in the world at large. Perhaps a non-emotional
approach to the problem is no longer possible for anyone with any
sense of involvement. (Many of us have been involved, in one
way or another since at least 1950 and can point to this or that
estimate, recommendation, or action which if properly followed
through by wise statesmen and soldiers would have avoided our
present frustration and malaise.)
2. But here we are and our first responsibility is to assess
the capabilities and intentions of our adversaries and the will and
3 E-C-R-B-T
GROUP 1
Exclude
downd.
automatic
assificatio
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
8 -E -C-11 E T
competence of our friends. Over the past two weeks the general
trend has been to inflate the power of the former and to derogate
the performance of the latter.
3. An Objective appraisal of the Communist position should
begin with the understanding that the winter-spring campaign --
in both its military and political aspects -- does represent a
radical shift in tactics. Beginning last fall with the battles
of Loc Nlnh and Dakto, we witnessed a departure from the low
risk approach of a protracted war effort and the switch to a
determined effort to force a relatively early and successful
conclusion of the conflict. This new strategy was impelled,
not by a sense of great strength, but by a realization in Hanoi
that the US/GVN effort in South Vietnam was gathering momentum,
that manpower in the South was increasingly being denied to the
Viet Cong, and that a war of resistance in the South based on
a predominately northern force was not politically viable. In
brief, Hanoi calculated that the strain of the war could not be
borne indefinitely and that' something drastic had to be done to
retrieve the situation.
4. The Tet offensive itself, far from demonstrating
unexpected Communist strength (give it excellent marks for daring,
2
C E-C-R-E-T
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
0-E -CRET
fair marks for coordination), confirmed the low state to which
many local Viet Cong units had fallen. In Saigon a large number
of inexperienced, recently impressed young men were used in attacks
on key targets. It also appears that many local Viet Cong units
had to be stiffened by North Vietnamese replacements. Surely,
if better trained Viet Cong units familiar with the street plans
of the various towns and cities had been available they would have
been used, possibly to decisive effect. The failure of main force
units -- Viet Cong and NVA -- to follow up quickly to exploit
the confusion of initial attacks shows poor coordinations a
lack of confidence, or both.
5. It might be said that the hoped for effect on the GVN
was worth the sacrifice of the poorly trained local units and
even their experienced cadre. But this does not detract fran the
argument that the Tet attacks are further evidence of high risk
tactics on Hanoi's part. Many of the attacks were in fact carried
out by Main Force units -- Viet Cong and NVA. Hanoi could not be
sure that surprise would be achieved; they were risking substantial
losses of trained manpower. And as it turned out, losses to
these units -- as in Kontum -- were high even with surprise.
Exposing the ad NVA Division in the vicinity of Danang-Hol-Hu
-3
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
where it was badly beaten between 8-10 February makes no sense
except in terms of a high risk determined effort for an early
and decisive impact on the ARVN, the GVN, and the US.
6. Obviously, the military punishment which Communist
forces took last fall along the Cambodian border, around the
cities during Tet, and around Khe Swih over the past month
has not forced Hanoi to call off its major effort. The scenario
is far from played out and the Communists probably have other
surprises yet to spring. More WA Divisions can be committed
across the DMZ, new Soviet-made weapons can be introduced, Viet
Cong units can be replenished by impressment from the unprotected
countryside, perhaps Khe Sanh can be over run by a maximum effort.
But Communist forces in the field are not composed of supermen,
they continue to demonstrate the inability to coordinate actions
closely, to meet readiness deadlines, to stand up to the superior
fire power and mobility of US/ARVN forces. Their chances of
success continue to rest heavily on destroying the will and
effectiveness of the ARVN and GVN.
7. .The failures of the ARVN and the GVN are, of course,
the source of much of our pessimism and frustration. We want
or expect the GVN to snap to, vitalize national administration,
4
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
raise taxes, weed out corruption, get cracking on pacification,
stimulate democracy, and generally win the hearts and minds of
the people. Progress toward many of these objectives in the
short term is quite unrealistic in view of the cultural inertia
of a traditional confucian society and quite out of the question
in the midst of a major war. Perhaps the US should be encouraged
by the simple fact that a government of sorts has now been in
continuous control since the emergence of Ky and Thieu in 1966.
Certainly the GVW and the ARVN could and should do more -- the
ARVN a good deal more -- to make the overall political and military
effort more effective. But perhaps if we had expected a little
less we would be more willing to acknowledge that some progress
had been made before Tet, that ARVN and GVN reactions during Tet
were not so futile, that South Vietnamese morale has stood up
amazing well over the past two weeks, and that the outlook is not
totally black. Obviously, if the US wavers at this juncture, the
entire structure could unravel quickly.* But there is still no
And if this should happen there would, of course, be no chance
for a "satisfactory" negotiation to ease the US departure from
Vietnam. Whether or not the US should take this opportunity to
shed its burdens and make a fast exit is another matter. The
point here simply is that it would have no alternative if it
appeared now to reduce its commitments.
-5-
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050
evidence of a widespread preference for the Communists in South
Vietnam, even if there is little evidence of a passionate loyalty
to the GVN. (Ho Chi Minh may be a popular nationalist figure in
Vietnam, this does not mean that his party shares in this esteem
either in North or South Vietnam.)
8. Thus, the issue remains in doubt. The Communists have
risked much already, including their prestige and the morale
of their forces. Many of their regular units have been subjected
to prolonged and continuous harassment and attrition. If they
back off now and return to a protracted war line they will risk
an adverse reaction among their less committed adherents in the
South who have been sustained by hopes of an early end to the
war. Meanwhile, the strains of the war which led to the adoption
of high risk tactics will still be there. If they continue to
commit their resources in all out effort over the next few
months and fail to achieve their purpose they will be in an
even less advantageous position to prolong the fighting.
JAMES GRAHAM
6
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06787050