THE CURRENT VC CAMPAIGN

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06786630
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 9, 1968

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VIETNAM AFFAIRS. STAFF
CVDCI
To: The Director
FROM: GACarver, Jr.
SUBJECT:
REMARKS:
DATE: 9 Feb be
� The attached outlines this office's views on
the current situation in Vietnam and our expecta-
tions in the near-term future. If our colleagues
in other offices concur, we believe this memoran-
dum, after coordination, should be issued as an
Agency paper. Since some of the events we
anticipate (renewed enemy attacks) are likely to
occur at any time, we would like to work with
our colleagues to get some version of this piece
published as quickly as possible.
CC:
Ge rge A. Carver, Jr.
Special A'Ssistant for Vietnamese Affairs
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9 February 1968
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: The Current VC Campaign
Recent enemy activity must be reviewed with framework of over-all
aims of winter-spring campaign -- to break will of U.S. to continue the war
and create conditions favorable for a settlement on Communist terms. In this
context, winter phase of campaign (Oct - Jan) was intended to set stage for
"decisive" period of war during spring phase. The winter phase was characterized
by major operations in outlying areas (Dak To, Loc Ninh) to engage U.S. mobile
forces, coupled with attack on US-GVN bases and administrative centers and
intensive guerrilla pressure against the pacification program. It also included
preparation for a major (conventional) warfare campaign of climactic character
in Khe Sank and general DMZ area. These activities were accompanied by
political and subversive actions preparatory to a general uprising in urban areas.
The Tet offensive represents the beginning of the spring phase -- which
our adversaries seem to regard as the decisive stage of the war. There is
abundant evidence to demonstrate that this phase aims at a general offensive
combined with a 'general uprising" through which the VC hope to inflict major
defeats on U.S. forces, disintegrate the Vietnamese forces, and collapse the
GVN. The Communists believe success in these efforts will create irresistible
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international and domestic pressures on the U.S. to neogitate, on Communist
terms, probably by mid-1968.
The evidence on the immediate objectives of the Tet campaign is less
complete, and thus subject to varying interpretations. Some reports suggest
the Communists hoped for immediate success on one throw of the dice -- to
instigate a full general uprising and seizure of power in all areas simultaneously.
If this is correct, their ability to sustain their effort only in portions of a few
cities and the heavy losses they have suffered could be construed as marking
a colossal failure, the magnitude of which might stun the Communist leadership
and deal it a psychological and material blow from which it may never recover.
On the other, hand, other reports, a careful reading of the basic documents
pertaining to the winter-spring campaign, and analysis of the pattern of recent
operations, suggest that the Tet offensive may have been intended merely as
the spectacular initial onslaught of a sustained offensive with the "general
uprising" as an ultimate, rather than the immediate goal. This interpretation
seems the more plausible for a number of reasons.
First, it seems highly unlikely that the Communists really expected, in
committing only about half their forces, to seize and hold indefinitely a significant
number of the major urban areas in the face of US-ARVN mobility and firepower.
The limited selection of targets actually struck in each city, the oft-indicated
short duration of the attack (3, 5, or 7 days), and the general absence of follow-
through or withdrawal plans, all suggest the aim of the initial onslaught was, to:�.
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achieve maximum psychological impact. The Communists made some prepara-
tions for the contingency of success, but these generally do not seem to have
reflected the thoroughness one would have expected if they were confident of
complete victory.
They have, however, created conditions which are not altogether unfavor-
able for the attainment of the basic objectives of their winter-spring campaign.
They have dealt a severe psychological blow to the urban population -- much of
which had sought sanctuary in the cities from the terrors of the war in the
provinces. While it is true that the urban populace did not rise against the GVN,
neither did it rush to the GVNts defense. The Communist attacks have resulted
in widespread devastation and imposed vast new economic and social burdens
on an already overtaxed GVN administration. They have also inflicted significant
damage on US and ARVN military installations and materiel, and tied allied
- military forces down in an effort to restore security to urban areas, to some
degree at the expense of protecting pacified areas. These limited accomplishments
may have represented the minimum objectives of the Tet offensive.
There are numerous indications that the Communists intend to continue
their pressure in many areas, probably in concert with major operations in
the Khe Sanh - DMZ region. In that sector, North Vietnamese units comprising
two divisions are probing outposts of the Khe Sanh base camp while extending
their entrenchments in siege-like action. Another two divisions appear to be
preparing for action against U.S. positions in the \Central land eastern DMZ area.
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In the coastal plain, strong Communist forces -- two or three regiments --
remain in the districts surrounding Quang Tri city, and U.S. officials expect
further attacks there. Another regiment or two are in the vicinity of Hue, and
may attempt to reinforce those units still contesting allied control for that city.
In Quang Nam province, the North Vietnamese 2d Division, reinforced by the
31st Regiment of the 341st Division and possibly the 4th Regiment, has moved
into the area between Hoi An and Danang, and may attempt strong attacks against
either or both of these cities. Communist local forces reportedly remain close
to the cities of Tam Ky and Quang Ngai,
In II Corps,. all three regiments of the North Vietnamese 1st Division
are now located near Dak To, and major action appears imminent. Reports from
Darlac province indicate that the North Vietnamese 33d Regiment is being
reinforced by the 95 B Regiment from Pleiku and that new attacks are expected.
In the central coastal provinces, Qui Nhon and Nha Trang anticipate mortar
attacks, but no major ground assaults. Two or three battalions are reported
west of Tuy Hoa in Phu Yen province, however, and new attacks are expected.
In III Corps, the 7th Division apparently remains in northern Binh Duong
province with the mission of maintaining pressure on bases of the U.S. 1st and
25th Divisions. The status of the 9th Division is not clear; major elements have
been reported in the area north of Saigon, but there are indications that others are
located further north in Binh Long province. The 5th Division, which attacked
Bien Hoa, has disengaged and may have withdrawn temporarily to regroup.
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In IV Corps, Viet Cong concentrations continue to be reported in the
immediate vicinity of several province capitals, maintaining limited pressure
through sporadic mortar attacks.
A number of reports from various parts of South Vietnam indicate that
new attacks will occur in the period between 9 and 15 February; the most fre-
quently mentioned date is the 10th. Such attacks could be mounted in any of
the areas mentioned above, and at least some probably will materialize. These
actions would be intended to further disrupt allied control in the cities, to
demonstrate the ability for repeated attacks, and thus to further intimidate the
populace and thus contribute to the ultimate goal of a general uprising.
One ominous aspect of the current posture of the enemy military forces
is their apparent implantation in the immediate vicinities of the district towns
and province capitals. This pattern, consistently reported in most parts of
the country, suggests that the Communists have moved into and asserted
authority over the rural populace in formerly pacified areas. The current flow
of refugees into district and provincial capitals may be further evidence of
this; the refugees could be fleeing their homes for fear of allied air attacks on
the Communist forces occupying their hamlets.
Several documents have suggested that the winter-spring campaign en-
tailed the creation of new guerrilla forces. A number of recent reports indi-
cate that the Viet Cong are organizing and arming new guerrilla elements, both
in the cities and in adjacent hamlets. Since Communist plans for the general
uprising must have provided for arming additional guerrilla and militia elements,
these reports are plausible. Some reports have suggested that these newly
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organized guerrillas will be used in renewed attacks on the cities. The frag-
mentary nattire of available information precludes a firm estimate of the numbers
that may be involved, but it is conceivable that they may be sufficient to offset,
at least in part, the heavy losses incurred by the Viet Gong in their recent
attacks. While the quality of such elements would be low, they could be used
as replacements for the depleted main and local force units.
There are indications that the intensified offensive in South Vietnam may
be coupled with some form of air action by the North Vietnamese Air Force, by
ground attacks in Laos, and possibly by terrorist attacks on U.S. bases in
Thailand. Recent unusual flight activity by North Vietnamese MIG-21's, and
AN-2's, and the movement of IL-28's from China back into the Hanoi area
could be indicative of preparations for some new form of hostile air action.
Reports from Laos indicate impending Communist attacks against government
installations in the north (e.g. Site 85) and south (e.g. Saravane). Some reports
say Saravane is to be attacked on the 10th or 12th -- a timeframe coinciding
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with the indicated new wave of attacks in South Vietnam. Reports from Thailand
reflect rumors of impending terrorist action against U.S. air bases. While the
Communists have not previously reflected the interest in, or the capability for
such far-flung coordinated actions, an attempt in this direction would not be
inconsistent with the general concept of distracting attention from the main
theater of operations and exercising all available capabilities in order to
decisively alter the situation in the Communists' favor.
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In sum, the evidence now available does not permit a very confident
assessment of immediate Communist objectives, the extent to which their
minimum tactical objectives (political as well as military) have been frustrated,
the impact on Communist planning and capabilities of the losses the Communists
have incurred to date, or the full impact of post Tet events on the GVN's military
and political position. The evidence available, however, strongly suggests that
there will be renewed and probably repeated Communist attacks on some urban
centers, that there will be strong Communist military pressure in the Khe Sanh
DMZ area, and that the Communists will probably attempt to cycle these actions
in a mutually complementary fashion. Furthermore, the evidence available,
plus the record of recent events, strongly indicate that the Communists have
decided to commit a major portion of their assets in a virtually "all out"
endeavor to bring the war to an early conclusion by creating a political climate
conducive to settlement on Communist terms. Whatever may be the degree of
success achieved, in Communist terms, in the initial phase of this endeavor,
the total effort inevitably involves a great element of risk. If the effort succeeds,
Communist expectations of early political "victory" could prove well founded.
If the effort fails, the entire Communist apparatus may be dealt a mortal blow.
Thus, we think it not too stark to say that the outcome of the Vietnam struggle
will probably be decided by the events of the next few weeks.
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