THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06786624
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 8, 1968

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Top Sccret
3.5(c)
lie
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
--Top-Secret-
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8 February 1968
3.5(c)
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)io-P-stt-R-ET-
Information as of 1600
8 February 1968
HIGHLIGHTS
Communist activity throughout South Vietnam has
been comparatively quiet. The Buddhist moderates
and Saigon University faculty members have joined
other groups in pledges of support for the govern-
ment. North Vietnam's Foreign Minister Trinh has
given another interview setting �forth Hanoi's
position on negotiations.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
The Communists throughout most of South Vietnam
have been comparatively quiet over the past 24
hours (Para. 1). The situation in Khe Sanh eased
somewhat on 8 February (Para. 2). The aftermath
of the withdrawal of allied forces from Lang Vei
is discussed (Paras. 3-4). Extensive maneuvering
of Communist forces in northern Quang Tri Province
has been noted in communications (Para. 8). Heavy
fighting continues in Hue (Para. 9). Scattered
enemey action has been reported elsewhere in I
Corps: (Paras. 10-11). Except for activity in Da
Lat and near. Kontum, the military situation
in II Corps is relatively quiet (Paras. 12-16).
Fighting continues in parts of Saigon and else-
where near the capital (Paras. 17-18). Elsewhere
in III and IV Corps, there were instances of new.
Communist attacks against military installations
and urban centers, but no large-scale actions
(Paras. 19-22). '
II. Political Developments in. South Vietnam:
Vice President Ky is still critical of President
Thieu but.apparently.intends to cooperate (Paras.
1-2). Prime. MinisterLoc may be attempting, through
promises of political favors, to foil a possible
National Assembly move to oust him (Paras, '3-4),
Thieu will address the assembly on 9 February,
partly to defend his declaration of martial law
(Para. 5). The moderate Buddhists and the Saigon
University faculty have added pledges of support.
for the government to those issued by several
other groups (Para. 6).
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Communist activity through most of South
Vietnam has been comparatively quiet over the last
24 hours. There are signs, however, that a new
round of widespread action may be coming in the
next few days./
\re-
newed Communist activity in the northern provinces
and the western highlands. There are other re-
ports indicating fresh attempts in the coastal
provinces, in the delta, and in Saigon.
I Corps
2. The situation in the Khe Sanh area had
quieted down somewhat by. noon on 8 February.
North Vietnameseforces gained .control of the Lang.
Vei Special Forces camp the afternoonof. the 7th.
The camp's defenders were trying to evacuate the
area under cover, of intensive friendly aerial and
artillery bombardment. Six of-the-24 Americans
and over three fourths. of: the 450-man Vietnamese
garrison have not yet been accounted for.
3. Two relief columnshad converged on the
scene late in 'the afternoon .of7 February for a
raid on the camp. Neither column actually entered
the compound, but both didAlelp-extricate some of the
surviving 'friendly personnel. The' reliefforces
were composed of-Special-FOrces-personnel helilifted
from Khe. Sanh .and .the BV334Ahe:Laotian volunteer
battalion. At last Teport, friendly reaction
forces held some positions_near. Lang Vei, but the
Laotian volunteer battalion .was .not on the scene--
the battalion commander .and .40 of his troops were
said to be at-Khe Sanh.
4. The 6,000 refugees who approached to within
a quarter mile of the Khe' .Sanh base have returned
to the Lang Vei area.: Less than- one half of the
refugees have .now .been identified' as Lao; the. rest.
are apparently local Vietnamese.or montagnards.-
8 February 1968
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5. Some two miles southwest of Lang Vei, air
strikes were reported to have disabled two Commu-
nist tanks on the morning of 8*February. This
brings the total of enemy tanks destroyed or dam-
aged in the battle for Lang Vei to seven.
6. The identity of the Communist unit which
attacked Lang Vei has not been confirmed; it may
have been elements from the 66th Regiment of the
North Vietnamese 304th Division. A senior noncom-
missioned officer, who defected from the 66th one
week ago, stated that when he left the unit, it
was near Lang Vei awaiting orders to attack the camp.
elements of the
304th Division generally south of Khe Sanh/Lang Vei
in recent days.
7. It is possible that elements of the 101D
Regiment of the 325C� Division were involved.
On the same day, the 325C Division
headquarters shifted to a position some six miles
west of Lang Vei.
8.
The North Vietnamese 27th In-
dependent Battalion has been ordered to block Route 9
and encircle the US artillery site at Cam Lo. This
is to begin on 8 February,
An elemen of the battalion was di-
rected first to destroy allied tanks and then re-
quest assistance, if necessary, from the North Viet-
namese 320th Division. The 320th Division is cur-
rently in the north-central sector of the province
north of the US strongpoints at the "Rockpile" and
Camp Carroll. The 27th Battalion has previously been
noted making extensive battle preparations, includ-
ing the procurement of antitank mines, and rocket
and mortar ammunition.
9. Heavy fighting continued in Hue on 8 Feb-
ruary. On the south side of the Perfume River, US
Marines were advancing more rapidly than before in
clearing the residential area. The South Vietnamese
in the citadel area north of the river were progres-
sing more slowly.
8 February 1968
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10. South of Da Nang, four allied battalions
initiated on 4 February
to relieve pressure from enemy forces which pose
a threat to the city. Communist forces believed
to be in the sector include major elements of.
the 2nd North Vietnamese Division and other regi-
mental-size elements.
11. According to.an'after-action report pre--
pared to .NIACV-advisers, theTCommunist forces which
attacked Tam.Ky�city; Quang Tin Province,included..
elements..of-at least three battalions and eight.
local force companies, totaling about 1;600 men.
Enemy killed, according to body counts by Vietnamese'
and advisers, exceeded 500. This suggests.at.least
a one, third reduction in the enemy force. A.prisoner.
from one of the. localforce companies has claimed
that many members..of his unit had. no individual
weapons, but instead carried a bag.of.hand grenades
to be used in the assault. .This is .the first-indi-
cation of any.lack'of.weapons by. enemy'unitS during
the Tet offensive: Reports from US. advisers else-
where in South Vietnam. have indicated that the
enemy was-well-armed:and well-equipped..andi in
some instances, utilized weapons not previously.
employed., in certain sectors.of.the country..
II Corps
12. Except for activity in Da Lat and near
Kontum, the military situation in II Corps is com-
paratively quiet. that a
new phase of Communist activity is about to com-
mence throughout the II Corps area, and �articularl
in the western highlands.
.for attacks on
villages and key allied military targets in western
Pleiku and Kontum provinces, possibly beginning on,
8 or 9 February. These Communist1
have also revealed that the current phase of oper-
ations is referred to as "phase two" and that an-
another phase is about to begin.
8 February 1968
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13. Fighting continues.northeast.of Kontum
city. Vietnamese and US officials in Kontuth now
believe, that the .imMediate.Communist objectives in
attacking Kontum were:to kill. the .province chief,
capture the province headquarters, and inaugurate
a new "revolutionary .administration." Interroga-
tions of captured prisoners indicate that enemy.
troops had been take and hold Kontum
city. All of this miscarried, despite the fact
that enemy troops.were.in the city from 30 January
to 2 February.. The 24th North Vietnamese Regiment
apparently spearheaded.the.attacks� against various
US and South Vietnamese Army installations and bore
the brunt of- the fighting while local Viet Cong
units infiltrated the city and occupied most of the
residential areas. Approximately. 700 Communists
were killed, in the .attack at the cost of some 40
friendly dead.
14. Operations against the Communists are con-
tinuing in Da Lat. No major .areasof the city are
controlled by the enemy, but there is concern that
many Viet Cong are with the estimated 13,000 refu-
gees flooding the city. Some consideration is be-
ing given, for security reasons, to moving all Revo-
lutionary Development teams in the surrounding area
into district headquarters.
15. . According to: a North Vietnamese Army
prisOner'taken in the battle at Da Lat, it was the
Communist intention to capture and hold the city
for at least two months. They Were ordered to use
propaganda to .get'the:population.to rally to the
Communists.. . The source admitted .that this. effort
was unsuccessful. � He believed that the people
would have rallied if the Communists had taken the
city. .
16. Elsewhere in.-II. Corpsithere-are reports
that the �Viet Cong 18B. Regiment is maneuvering into
new positions. west of Nha.,Trang.. Darlac Province,
the American G,2 adviser reports that the North Viet-
namese 33rd Regimenthas been joined. by. the 95B- Regi-
ment fromPleiku Province .and that another attack
by these forces can be expected.
8 February 1968
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III Corps and Saigon
17. As of 8 February there were some
several hundred Viet Cong still operating in
Saigon's fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth police
precincts, all of which are located in Cholon. The
Communists have constructed barricades in some
areas and sharp fighting is expected before they
are cleared. The Saigon police believe that the
Viet Cong are trying to hold these positions in
the expectation that reinforcements will be arriv-
ing soon and that they are unaware of allied block-
ing operations in surrounding Gia Dinh Province.
18. Heavy fighting was reported on the north-
ern and southern outskirts of Saigon where allied
forces have contacted battalion-size Communist
units. Two US Army infantry battalions are to con-
duct a sweep across the southern half of Saigon to
clear the Viet Cong from this area.
19. Elsewhere in the III Corps area, mortar
attacks were conducted against Phu Cuong, and
against US Army base camps at Cu Chi and Lai Khe.
Patrol skirmishes took place in a number of prov-
inces, but no large-scale fighting has occurred.
Recently intercepted message have referred to
"severe" attacks which the 7th Division, elements
of which have apparently moved into central III
Corps, would launch to "contain" the US base at
Lai Khe.
20. Mortar fire was directed at Tay Ninh
city for the second time during the night of 6-7
February. Some Communist elements penetrated the
old market area near the center of the city before
being repulsed. Another enemy element was ambushed
outside the city by friendly forces who had been
forewarned of the attack by a Vietnamese security
service source.
8 February 1968
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TO � ET
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IV Corps
21. Vi Thanh, the capital of Chuong Thien Prov-
ince, which has remained generally unscathed in
the recent Communist offensive, received a number
of rounds of 75-mm. recoilless rifle fire on the
night of 6-7 February. Several rounds fell on
the MACV compound and one American was killed. An
expected ground attack failed to materialize, but
a Provincial Reconnaissance team killed 10 enemy in
a small engagement.
22. Elsewhere in the delta, military activity
yesterday was generally light. Viet Cong gunners
did unleash a heavy mortar attack on Cao Lanh,
some 75 miles southwest of Saigon. US Army troops
fought a sharp battle with Communist troops near
My Tho. The capital of Go Cong Province also came
under mortar fire. The atmosphere in several pro-
vincial capitals and towns in the delta continues
to be tense as sizable enemy forces remain in out-
lying areas. In Moc Hoa, the capital of Kien
Tuong Province, the population was reported par-
ticularly fearful because Communist forces which
attacked the town on 2 February warned that they
would return in 10 days to liberate the city.
8 February 1968
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T._c)_E_,S.E�eftET
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Vice President Ky apparently still sees
President Thieu with a critical eye, although he
has reportedly indicated to his closest advisers
that he intends to cooperate with Thieu during the
current crisis and has no thought of consolidating
his own power. On 7 February Ky told a
close Ky associate, that he
Thieu has shown his customary lack of initia-
and aggressiveness in handling the crisis.
felt
tive
2. Ky is apparently less worried than are
some of his aides about what they regard as an at-
tempt by Thieu to restrict Ky's duties on the Viet-
namese-US task force, which Ky heads.
ieu rewor e t e �ra t paper set-
ting up the task force to give it a shorter tenure
by changing such phrases as "recovery, of the people"
to "relief of the people." A number of Ky's advisers
were reportedly upset at the implications of these
changes, but Ky told them,/
that he believes the task force should not be more
than a temporary organization and need not have a
long-range charter. Ky also reportedly rejected
suggestions that he use the present situation to
get rid of Prime Minister Loc and change the consti-
tution to permit his own installation as prime
minister.
Prime 'Minister Loc
. 3. For his part, Loc seems to realize that he
is. under considerable fire for his inability to cope
with the crisis. He is apparently attempting to
foil possible efforts to remove him.
that Loc approached Senator Nguyen
Van Ngai on 6 February with a request that Ngai not
give him difficulty in the Upper House. He re-
portedly accompanied this with an offer of several
return favors, promising to appoint 50 competent
members of Ngai's Revolutionary Dai Viet Party to
government posts. He reportedly also promised to
seek-Ngai's opinions on any future national policy
decisions and to try to obtain weapons and money to
arm Dai Viet Party members against the Viet Cong.
II-1 8 February 1968
Icia--RECRET
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69548 2-68 CIA
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CRATE (11-14)
COACH (I1-12) and CRATE (I1-14) are low-wing, twin reciprocating engine aircraft used
for passenger transportation. They are similar in appearance to the Convair 240 and Martin
202. Externally, the differences in appearance between COACH and CRATE are minor with the
primary difference being in the shape of .the vertical stabilizer.
After COACH became operational in 1947 it encountered structural and performance
difficulties which required extensive modification. CRATE was introduced into service in
1954 as an improved variant and has, in general, replaced COACH in service. The range of
COACH is somewhat less than that for CRATE.
CRATE is widely used in the Soviet air forces but the majority of these aircraft in
the USSR are in civil air transport. They have been supplied to most Communist countries
and to a number of non-Communist countries. Only a limited number of COACH aircraft remain
in service.
A variation of CRATE, designated 11-14M has an increased passenger capacity from up to
24, which was achieved by lengthening the fuselage.
The performance figures given below are applicable to CRATE aircraft.
CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE
69549 2-68 CIA
Year In service
Power plant number/type
Gross weight (lb)
Normal cargo (lb)
Maximum cargo (lb)
Number of passengers/paratroops
Range/radius with normal cargo (nm)
Cruise speed (kt)
Service ceiling (ft)
1 954
2/Piston
36,300
4,750
8,100
24/21
1,600/720
130
24,400
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SECT
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T- P S C RTT
5. The operationalcharacteristics.of.the
IL-14 do nothing to clarify Hanoi's purpose. in
sending transport aircraft into the vicinity of
the Demilitarized Zone. Unlike the AN-2s, this
'cargo'. plane has seldom, if ever, been used by Com-
munist states in -a tactical role. If North Vietnam
is using its IL-14s in their normal capacity. as trans-
port aircraft; they would appear to be 'too large to
land at any airfields known to exist in the area
surrounding the zone.
6. It is possible that Hanoi has decided
to use these planes to drop important men or ma-
terial by parachute in support of the Communist of-
fensive in northern South Vietnam. This thesis is
suggested by the brief flights apparently made into
this region during the hours of darkness. 1
during the past three days have mentioned building
fires which could serve as beacons for IL-14s In-
volved in paradrop activities. �
Rumors of Surface-to-Surface Missiles in DRV
7. A report from Hanoi has supplemented lim-
ited photographic evidence of a suspect Styx sur-
face-to-surface missile site near Thanh Hoa on
19 December.
8. The Indonesian. ambassador to Hanoi. says.
that in late December he was informed by the French
representative that the Soviet Union had provided
surface-to-surface missiles to North Vietnam which
could be used against-American.ships.
8 February 1968
III-2
T S R T
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2-gErCirET
9. The Frenchman explained that North Vietnam
had pressed Moscow for the missile after the sinking
of the Eilat, pointing out that their need for such
a weapon was certainly greater than that of Egypt.
The weapon used to sink the Eilat was the Soviet-
made Styx missile, which has a range of 20-30
miles. It is primarily a vessel-launched missile,
but is thought to be adaptable to land launching.
10. In a later conversation, an East European
ambassador implied to the Indonesian that the USSR
had provided North Vietnam with Styx missiles.
8 February 1968
"l_UP�WeitrT
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
8 February 1968
�
ET
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. In an effort to relate the fighting in
South Vietnam directly to Hanoi's expressed in-
terest in negotiations, North Vietnamese Foreign
Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh staged another inter-
view on 8 February with the AFP correspondent in
Hanoi. After condemning the stubborn US attitude
and hailing the Tet offensive, the foreign minister
took up the subject of talks after an unconditional
halt to the bombings. In response to a specific
question, Trinh said such talks could include "prob-
lems in connection with the settlement of the Viet-
nam problem on the basis of the 1954 Geneva agree-
ments," and "other questions which would be raised
by the two parties."
2. In the new statement, Trinh stresses that
there is no change in Hanoi's conditions. for a peace-
ful settlement. He is more forthcoming than before,
however, about North Vietnam's willingness to dis-
cuss the whole problem of Vietnam, not just the war
in the North. Trinh specifically rejected the San
Antonio formula because it poses conditions for a
halt to the bombings. He maintained that because
the US does not want to "carry out talks to settle
the Vietnam problem, it must be held responsible for
its own obstinacy."
3. The new effort to publicize Hanoi's will-
ingness to talk in the midst of the intensified
fighting of the past week reinforces the impression
that the Vietnamese are pursuing to some extent
their "fight-talk" strategy described in many cap-
tured documents. The foreign minister, obviously
wants to keep alive the impression that, as far as
Hanoi is concerned, the door to negotiations is
still ajar. This same impression has been generated
on a less official level in a series of interviews
which North Vietnamese diplomats and overseas Front
representatives have granted in the past few days.
8 February 1968
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TO RET
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4. In the most recent of these press inter-
views, the Liberation Front man in Algiers on 7 Feb-
ruary emphasized the determination of the Commu-
nists to continue the fighting until they had ob-
tained their objectives. He opened with the stand-
ard version of Communist successes last week and said
that even the US had admitted that the Viet Cong had
committed only a small portion of their military
force to the Tet offensive. He dwelt at length on
the "extensive" popular support which the Viet Cong
military assaults allegedly mustered throughout the
country. The "alliances of peace" in Saigon and
Hue, he said, were working with the Front to force
the withdrawal of US troops and the overthrow of
the Saigon government.
5. In addition to their own propaganda tout-
ing the success of the Tet offensive, the Communists
in South Vietnam are also contacting Western (non-
American) correspondents in Saigon in an effort to
publicize their cause. Two such interviews with Viet
Cong officials have been published in the past few
days--one with Observer correspondent Mark Frankland
and another with an unidentified AFP stringer. The
Viet Cong are not identified, but the impression is
given that the interviews were held in the heart of
Saigon. The tone of the Communists is cocky and
extremely hard line.
6. In an interview with AFP, the Viet Cong
boasted that the Tet offensive was the beginning of
the "general offensive" and that the Communists in-
tended to "reconquer the capital just as we are going
to reconquer the country." Following a line charac-
teristic of Hanoi's recent commentary, the local offi-
cial tried to absolve the Communists from any blame
for war-related destruction and death to the civilian
population by claiming that it is the US that is burn-
ing cities and bombing with antipersonnel rockets. All
the Viet Cong are doing is "pushing back the attacks on
its sectors." One of the most favorable and useful as-
pects of this article, from the Communist viewpoint, is
the description of the relaxed and unrestricted way
that Communist civilians and troops in uniform move
"freely" about in the Saigon area.
8 February 1968
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7. Correspondent Frankland describes his Viet
Cong contact as an official assigned to organize
plantation workers, in the Saigon area.. It is
dotibtful that this individual was very high rank.
Some of his remarks are definitely out of step
with known party positions. He freely admitted,
for example:, that North Vietnamese troops were in
the South and said that they were there because
it was the duty of the North to help the South.
In other areas, however, his comments were a re-
iteration of, the Front!s hard-line, approach to
the necessity for continued. fighting until: the
US agreed to negotiations on Communist terms.
8 February 1968
V-3
TS LI E R- -T
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