THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

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06786616
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RIPPUB
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U
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13
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April 27, 2019
Document Release Date: 
April 30, 2019
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Publication Date: 
February 11, 1968
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, Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 /,f (_c DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM The Situation in Vietnam 12 11 February 1968 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 TSIP--SE-re'RET Information as of 1200 11 February 1968 HIGHLIGHTS There has been an easing of enemy pressure around cities and towns in some areas, but new fighting has broken out in the delta. � I.. Military-Developments in South Vietnam:. Fighting continues in areas near Saigon and in. the Mekong Delta (Paras. 1-3). The situation- in the. four corps areas is summarized (Paras.'4-15).. II. Political.Developments in South Vietnam: Internal. bickering And red tape appears to-be.hamperl- ing the efficient operation of the task force set-up to. handle civilian problems (Paras. 1-3). : The-mili- tant Buddhists-have sent Ambassador Bunker an insult- ing letter. accusing the US of firing indiscriminantly. on the An Quang Pagoda (Paras. 4-6) , III. .North. Vietnamese Military Developments: The North Vietnamese moved their IL-28 bombers from 'Phuc Yen Airfield. to Gia Lam- Airfield. and orbit them near the DRV/Chinese. border-to.avoid damage from:US-air strikes (Para...1). Additional trans- port aircraft have been detected making flights to Vinh and couldhave gone on into South Vietnam (Para. 2). .Other Communist Military Developments: There is nothing of 'significance to report. V. Communist Political Developments: Libera- tion Front officials abroad continue to maximize their publicity opportunities. The 'Front man in Phnom Penh.disc4sses a possible coalition government (Paras..1-3). In Djakarta, Communist spokesmen empha- size thepolitical:successes of the Tet: offensive (Paras. 45). The Front man in. HanOi endorses Trinh's. will- talk offer (Para. 6). Foreign Communist support (Para..7). TO 1>WCIET I Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM �. 1. There has been an easing of enemy pressure around cities and towns - in some areas. of the country during the weekend, ,although the delta has been the scene of new attacks Elements of the Communist forces concentrated south of.Da.Nang appear to be withdrawing to the southwest, but indications of imminent enemy activity near Dak To continue, The situation,athe Sanh, Hue, and Da Lat has under- gone no:significant change in the past 48 hours. 2. There are persistent reports of Viet Cong intentions to launch "large-scale attacks" against Saigon some time before 13 Febru- ary. Some of these reports allege that elements of the Viet Cong 5th and 9th divisions or the NVA 7th Division--located north of the capital within striking distance--will be engaged in or support such attacks. 3. Bien Hoa Air Base was the target of a 122- mm. rocket attack on the night of 10 February, in which one American was killed, 60 wounded, and 22 aircraft were destroyed or damaged. The same evening a US battalion had a sharp engagement with a Com- munist force near Tan son Nhut Air Base which re- sulted in 165 enemy killed. A fire started by Com- munist rockets in that area resulted in the explosion of a bunker containing 2,000 rounds of 105-mm. am- munition. In the delta the Communists attacked :the capitals of Bac Lieu and Kien Giang provinces. The threat of new activity in Kien Phong and Phong Dinh provinces has increased. I Corps 4. Khe Sanh received .sporadic mortar attacks throughout 10 February and a heavy mortar and rocket barrage around noon on 11 February, but shelling had become sporadic by early afternoon. The Lao battalion in the area is being evacuated to Da Nang, and preparations are being made to ferry it back to Laos. 11 February 1968 I-1 IIIP-S-ECRTET 'Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 T-Q-P-SECTOT 5. has reflected the shipment of large quantities of heavy caliber ammunition--up to.152-Mm.-7to points just north of the DMZ within the past week. 18 truckloads of. 130-mm. ammunition were being e ivered on 8.February. .There are also indications in that. at least one bat- talion of. the North Vietnamese 813th Regiment is mak- ing attack preparations in coastal-QUang Tri Province, Messages of 11 February suggest that'the-lst Battalion of the regiment. may be .preparing to cross the. .Qua Viet River into..Trieu Phong District, where.other. enemy units have.been active. 6. In Hue, newly reinforced South Vietnamese. troops.are.continuing their efforts, to dislodge enemy forces. from the citadel area. The Communists still hold the Imperial Palace, a portion along the citadel's southwest.wall, and a section immediately east of the citadel. Snipers are still prevalent throughout the. city. South of the Perfume River, where US Marines had gained control-earlier,.widespread.looting is be- coming a major problem.. II Corps 7. .There have.been_no major changes.in.the situa- tion throughout Ii Corps, despite a continued, threat to, the Dal< To area. In D4 Lat the Communists still con-- trol a- hamlet. on the western outskirts 'of the city._ In Darlac Province, elements of the NVA 33rd Regiment are still believed to be located.about'20 kilometers south- east of Ban. Me Thuot. Saigon and III Corps 8. - InHadditiOn to the major. skirmish north-north-. West of Saigon and the harassMent_at Tan-SonNhut_Air Base, Sporadic small-scale fire fights-persisted in. the Cholon_section of the. capital. where.ARVN troops are-still engaged in clearing efforts.. 11 February 1968 1-2 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 Tala-S-ECIZET 9. Preliminary interrogation of afield com- mander and political officer from a Viet Cong unit which participated in the recent attacks on Saigon �has revealed additional information on enemy plans and deployments in the capital area. According to the prisoners, the main mission of their two-company strike force was to seize and hold Saigon-Cholon's Chi Hoa prison, regardless of the cost. They were � absolutely forbidden to retreat and were told they would be executed if they did. The attack on the prison failed. The field commander maintained that a total of 30 battalions were in or near Saigon, with one to two divisions in reserve and artillery units "to come later." The political officer claimed �that there were some 25 battalions in the Saigon area, that the "maximum utilization" of artillery units was programmed for the "second phase of attack," and that "Divisions 5, 7, and 9" were reserve forces to provide support. 10. ,,major elements of the Viet Cong 5th and 9th Light Infantry divisions and the NVA 7th Division continue to be located within striking distance of the capital. IV Corps 11. Communist actions in the delta during the past few days have emphasized continued attacks by fire against provincial and district towns, inter- spersed with ground assaults against lightly defended rural outposts. Although the over-all intensity of ground attacks has declined sharply, several Viet Cong units in IV Corps remain deployed in close proximity to heavily, populated areas. 12. A. Viet Cong force which on 10 February at- tacked Bac Lieu city remains within the town. Some of the attackers have attempted to exfiltrate, using women and children as shields. Thirty-three persons were killed or wounded and a large portion of the city has been destroyed by fire. 11 February 1968 1-3 T9_12_,SE,GRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 TDP--ETECRIT 13. Rach.Gia, the capital of-Kien Giang Province,.came under-13740 rocket attack during the. early morning hours of 11-February. The 30-minute bombardment resulted in 19 friendly casualties and total destruction to the CORDS_ building. There-ap- parently was no follow-up -ground attack and the. city is now reported quiet.. 14. An estimated 500-man Viet Cong force has reportedly surrounded Cao Lanh, the capital of Kien Phong Province. This strike force, supported by some 400 laborers, has constructed bunker complexes 1,000 to 1,500 meters from the city proper. Due to eroding security in the rural areas, all Revolution- ary Development teams in Kien Phong have been with- drawn from their hamlets and pulled into the capital or district towns. 15. The Headquarters of :Military Region (MR)-. 3, a Major-Viet Cong command authority unprecedentd. move.. On 8 February, command authority in-southern Phong. Dinh province, marking the first time since July 1963 that Headquarters, MR .3 had-been identified outside its, normal operating area--some 50'miles to the south- west. The relocation of this headquarters into Phong Dinh Province, coupled with the recent identification of three Viet Cong main forde battalions.in,the im- mediate area of Can Tho, may portend renewed enemy offensive activity in. and around the provincial capi- tal. has made an 11 February 1968 1-4 TP--8-ECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM 1. The task force established to cope with the massive problems arising in the aftermath of the Viet Cong Tet offensive is apparently running into:serious difficulty because of internal bickering and bureau- cratic red tape, Inafrustration, General Nguyen Duc Thang, Vice President Ky's deputy on the task force, declared on 9 February that he was resigning. He has failed to appear for subsequent meetings. 2. many of the cabinet members on the task force, most notably the ministers of health and refugees, have been un- able or unwilling to work together and insist on following normal ministerial procedures. The re- sult is that needed services are not being provided for the people in a timely and efficient manner. 3. Vice President Ky,/ /is being urged to use his influence to have the constitution amended so that he could be appointed prime _minister. Several Lower House deputies, some senators, Ky's own advisers, and General Thang have all reportedly approached Ky with the proposition. Ky has apparently put them all off, at least so far.1 Ithat he is doing his best to im- prove Prime Minister Loc's image and to include him in the task force's plans and activities. Militant Buddhists Attack Alleged US Actions 4. The militant Buddhists of An Quang Pagoda have sent Ambassador Bunker an insulting letter accusing the US of attacking the pagoda "both mili- tarily and politically." The letter, signed by the An Quang director, Thich Thien Hoa, charged that the US was careless in defending Saigon, attacked the population indiscriminately and fired on the pagoda even though there were no Communists inside. 11 February 1968 TID-P-SSertET Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 5. The Americans were charged also with slan- deking'-the Buddhist bhurch-by broadcasting over - Voice of America that the Viet Cong were in the pagoda. The letter concluded with a "request" that the am- bassador order a halt to-the "calumny" and with a charge that the US alone is responsible for the deteriorating relations between the Americans and the Buddhist church.. 6. The An Quang Pagoda suffered little damage during the 1 February attack to rout the Viet Cong force entrenched there. No American troops joined in the attack, except possibly as advisers to the Vietnamese Rangers who carried it out. The mili- tant Buddhists have stood out thus far as the one significant group which has not denounced the Viet Cong attacks and has not voiced a' modicum of sup- port for the government. 11 February 1968 11-2 T ET Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS 1. In an effort to protect their IL-28 bombers from US bombing raids, the North Vietnamese moved the planes on 9 February from Phuc Yen to Hanoi/Gia Lam. This airfield is Hanoi's international air terminal and has not yet been struck. On at least four occasions since their transfer to Gia Lam the IL-28s left the field and circled in airspace over the North Vietnamese/Chinese border while US strike aircraft were in the Hanoi area. 2. indicates that at least four transport aircraft completed a Hanoi to Vinh flight during the late afternoon of 11 February. The purpose of the flights is not yet known, but the aircraft could have continued on into northern South Vietnam. 11 February 1968 TO ET Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS 1. There is nothing of significance to report. 11 February 1968 TQR_.SE.Gik�IET Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 TOP-SECRIT V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 1. Liberation Front officials abroad are con- tinuing to make every effort to be seen and heard. Twice last week, Nguyen Van Hieu, the Front's repre- sentative in Phnom Penh and one of its most authori- tative spokesmen on foreign affairs, discussed Viet Cong plans for a coalition government. Radio propa- ganda and prisoners captured in the Tet offensive have indicated that the Front intends to establish unilaterally a coalition government in opposition to Saigon. Nguyen Van Hieu, however, is the first responsible Front official to comment publicly on this issue. In an apparent effort to drum up some international support for such a government (if it should ever be established), Hieu gave a press con- ference on 8 February, and on the 9th reportedly held a special briefing for neutral diplomats in the Cambodian capital. 2. According to Wilfred Burchette, who pub- licized the press conference, Hieu said that the Front planned to establish a coalition government to replace the South Vietnamese Government after con- sultation with "other revolutionary forces." Ac- cording to a Burmese diplomat who attended the briefing on 9 February, Hieu told his diplomatic colleagues virtually the same thing. The Front in- tended to convene a national conference of the "peace and democracy forces for the purpose of form- ing a provisional government" and would hold nego- tiations with the US for a cease-fire and the with- drawal of US troops. Hieu also told the diplomats that the Front would seek "recognition and respect for the territorial integrity of Vietnam from the world and especially from Cambodia, Laos, India, Burma, Ceylon, Pakistan, and Japan." 3. At home, the Communists are taking the same line on a possible coalition government and are con- tinuing to pump up the "democratic and peace alliances." 11 February 1968 V-1 19.2-84renT Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 The Front central committee issued a statement on 9 February, and the Tri-Thien-Hue Liberation Front issued a similar statement on the 5th, offering to hold discussions with the new peace alliances "to work out the best solution for getting the US out of Vietnam and restoring peace." Both statements dramatize the intent of the new peace alliances to "set up a government of the people." 4. Communist officials in Djakarta also dis- cussed Viet Cong intentions on several occasions in recent days in private forums. Prior to the Tet of- fensive in late January, the head of the Front of- fice told Indonesian Government officials that he had attended a Front central committee meeting last summer and had come away with renewed confidence and optimism on the war. In a rare admission of past difficulties, the official admitted that US forces had had some success in the past two "dry seasons" (the winters of-65-66 and 66-67). He boasted that Communist units how had new weaponry and much greater experience and the US would not do so well this year. The Viet Cong intended to strike "several blows" this year, he said. 5. In two conversations in early February (after the opening of the Tet offensive), lower ranking of- ficials of both the Front mission and the North Viet- namese Embassy denied current press speculation that Khe Sanh was to be a second Dien Bien Phu. There would be no large-scale attack on Khe Sanh "now," they said. When asked what could be considered-a decisive battle in the current military campaign, the two officials pointed to the fight at Tan Son �Nhut Airfield. They boasted that communications be- tween the field and Saigon were broken and that in- ternational civil traffic had been disrupted. The Front man claimed that the Communists intended a "long fight against this base." Both officials emphasized the political significance of the Tet at- tacks. They said that one of the major objectives of the first phase of the fighting was to increase 11 February 1968 V-2 Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 TO-P-SErrtET the Front's political support and that this aim was as important as any military results. In these. post-Tet conversations, Front Endorses Trinh Statement 6. In Hanoi this weekend, the Front spokes- man issued an unequivocal endorsement of the re- cent North Vietnamese offer to talk with the US in exchange for a bombing cessation. Front propa- ganda in general has avoided comment on this is- sue, but on 9 February Front representative Nguyen Van Tien, in an interview with a Hungarian journal- ist, said the Front "entirely agrees with (the North Vietnamese foreign minister's) statement and fully supports its contents." The Front representa- tive also used the interview to boast that "revolu- tionary forces" controlled three out of eight dis- tricts in Saigon. The Viet Cong, he said, intended to mobilize the young people of towns and villages and arm them to help defeat any possible American "counterattack." Foreign Communist Support 7. In Moscow and Prague, the Front representa- tives were received by prominent Communist party leaders amid much publicity. The Soviets, in addi- tion, issued a special Tass statement supporting the Viet Cong offensive and the North Vietnamese offer to talk. They are also staging mass rallies. 11 February 1968 V-3 i Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C06786616 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 3.5(c)