STAFF CONFERENCE ON THE VIETNAM SITUATION

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06786611
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 12, 1968

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,,, VIETNAM AFFAIRS STAFF
0/DCI
DATE: 12 Feb 68
TO The Director
FROM:GWAllen.
SUBJECT :
REMARKS:
Attached is a summary of the thrust of
this morning's meeting.
EW. ALLEN
Vietnamese Affairs Staff
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12 February 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Staff Conference on the Vietnam Situation
1. The DCI convened a meeting in his conference room on
12 February 1968 of representatives from all components of the Agency
concerned with Vietnam. He stated that the question before the meeting
was whether more U.S. troops were needed in South Vietnam to cope
with the type of offensive we have seen in the past ten days. He added
that the problem should be viewed in terms of the anticipated performance
of the Vietnamese armed forces. He asked for the views of each person
present on this question.
2. Mr. George Carver (SAVA) stated that the issue of the war
hangs in the balance. He seriously questioned RVNAF ability to take
another heavy blow. All of ARVN is entirely committed while a major
portion of the enemy's forces are not committed. We thus have a test
of wills, and if cracks in the GVN apparatus appear they can rapidly
spread. U.S. troops have crystallized ARVN in some areas and addi-
tional U.S. troops would help in other areas. He expressed concern
about ARVN's behavior, noting that generally they have placed too much
reliance on artillery, and there have been disquieting reports of looting.
3. Mr. R. J. Smith (ADDI) said that he was uncertain about the
situation and that much data needed was still not available. It is still not
clear whether the VC effort is pointed at a crystallization of will. The
enemy's Tet offensive might have produced a good hard shock to his forces.
We are not certain how many of his resources remain uncommitted. We
don't know how badly his forces have been chewed up. Regarding the long-
term problem, we already have too many troops in Vietnam. We are
fighting the wrong kind of war and cannot accomplish by military means
what needs to be accomplished by other -- political means. We should
lower our level of effort for the long pull, and convince the enemy we
won't get out until stability exists. He is not sure whether enclaves are
the answer, but the large search and destroy missions do not seem to be
the way to fight the war. If the VC indeed make an all-out effort, more
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U.S. troops might be useful to meet that threat; however, we would never
get these troops out. We should stay with what we have, and shift to a
long-term effort, recognizing that it might take five or six years.
4. Mr. Abbot Smith (D/ONE) agreed that we lack information.
He does not expect the GVN and ARVN to collapse, basing this judgment
largely on the fact that it hasn't thus far. The top GVN command knows
it must stick. The worst condition would not then be a collapse, but the
grievous loss of positions here and there. More U.S. troops would help
ARVN to continue, but it really can't accomplish too much. He believed
the problem would take longer than the five or six years cited by R. J.
Smith,
5. Mr. James Graham (ONE) expressed uncertainty regarding the
status of ARVN. He believes the Communists are still determined to make
a large scale effort to bring about a solution unacceptable to us. Their
tactic of forming new fronts is obviously an effort to bring about a coalition
which would be essentially a Communist front. The enemy apparently is
determined to put additional resources into the fight, including additional
divisions from North Vietnam (citing the indications of the possible
presence of the 316th Division north of the DMZ). If the U.S. is determined
to gain a solution, involving something less than a Communist front govern-
ment, it would be necessary to put in additional U.S. troops. The fight in
I Corps will engage all U.S. and ARVN reserves while the Communists
coordinate other attacks in other areas. This situation risks unravelling
ARVN and the GVN. The Communists have been hurt but they retain sig-
nificant capabilities and seem prepared to use them. If the U.S. wants a
favorable solution, it must stay with what it takes to win.
6. Mr. Bill Colby (FE) said we are addressing the wrong question.
More appropriate questions would be what is our policy and how determined
are we to execute it? Not should we send more boys, but in what way should
we use them. This is the same question we addressed in 1965. We put
more forces in then, but this hasn't saved the situation. Our forces are
thinly spread, we have no depth. The fact that the enemy offensive used
only local forces shows how thin ours are. The enemy has a second punch
he can mount with regulars, and he can pour more forces down from the
North. His recent air activity shows that he is prepared to commit addi-
tional resources. If our policy is to prevent a Communist victory, then
we should send more U.S. forces, make this completely a U.S. war, and
set up the GVN as a colony as we did in Korea. On the other hand, if we
want out, let's take advantage of the possibilities of a coalition. Gen. "Big"
Minh might be our Souvanna. This would keep our options open. If we
don't want that, then we need a new strategy which would get around the
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problem of thinness. When we sent in troops in 1965, we didn't change
our strategy, we merely sugar-coated it with the term pacification, but
we continued the emphasis on killing Communists. If our strategy is to
fight a limited war, we need new approaches. Sending additional troops
with the same strategy and same approaches is not enough.
7. COC) said the Communists can keep up the
pressure. ARVN performance has been spotty and she is not sure ARVN
can take another heavy blow. The Communists can be expected to be much
more active politically and she is not sure the GVN can withstand this
pressure. She is not confident that the people can withstand the combina-
tion of increased insecurity and increased Communist political action.
Although the people did not support the Communists in their recent
offensive, they remain essentially passive, have been intimidated and
are psychologically vulnerable. She feels we do need a new strategy and
that we are spread too thin militarily.
8. (OCI) said that the analysts are not confident
because of the lack of data. It will be difficult to make firm conclusions
until we see what develops in the way of the Communists' military cam-
paign. We cannot be sure now whether the enemy can conduct even normal
levels of activity. The enemy seems still to have strong capabilities,
however, and probably will carefully ration these capabilities depending on
developments, exploiting advantages where they exist. He will probably
keep the pressure on for as long as he can, and his abilities to dragoon
people, as reflected in recent reports, suggest he may be able to replace
at least some of his losses. ARVN has been badly hurt, as reflected in
the indications of its lack of aggressiveness and its poor response to the
more recent attacks. It looks like ARVN is headed down hill, and that
we can't reverse the situation without the wholesale commitment of U.S.
forces. Our best strategy might be to put in one or two more divisions
to try and hold for a couple of months. There is a real danger that the
intimidation of the populace will mount and that the uncommitted elements
will become so tired and war weary that they will opt for accommodation
with the Communists. Additional U.S. troops might hold things together.
9. Mr, Douglas Blaufarb (FE/VNO) said we should face the fact
that a coalition would be merely a face-saving way of surrendering, and
he personally rules this out as an acceptable option. Additional U.S.
troops would just get us deeper into the morass. It is too late for a new
approach, we cannot now, in 1968, admit that our whole effort all along
has been mistaken. He is hopeful that the ARVN picture is not as black
as some of the otheilAapparently believe. He thinks that ARVN may be
better off than before and capable of meeting another enemy effort. The
GVN leadership has behaved well, and is reflecting confidence in the
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situation. Our station in Saigon seems to feel that we are in reasonably
good shape. If we do send more troops, we should attempt to get a better
balance between the combat forces and support elements.
10. (OER) said that the situation shows that we
don't have enough forces, and that the VC can tear the country apart at
will. The number of additional U.S. forces required to alter the situation
probably is unacceptable. The alternative would be to change our strategy,
get troops into those parts of the country that count, and maintain security
there. If Ambassador Komer is right in saying that the answer lies in the
hearts and minds of the people, additional U.S. troops obviously are not
the answer. He is quite gloomy, and feels that the best we can do is to
try to weather the storm. We should change our strategy, make optimum
use of our forces, and make it clear to the GVN that if it can't get going,
initiate reforms, mobilize its resources, and get popular participation,
then we must admit that we have made a mistake, cut our losses, and
negotiate our way out while saving as much face as possible. If the GVN
leaders can't cut the mustard, we ought to get out.
11. (OER) said we have a number of un-
certainties regarding VC capabilities, the status of ARVN, the rural
situation, and the urban populace. More U.S. troops really will not
contribute a lot. While they would add to our military capabilities, it is
possible that a continued VC offensive would lead to massive ARVN
desertions. The population might give up under pressure. Further urban
attacks are likely, as the VC try to get the urban population to throw in
with them. We have to change our strategy and our role -- it is not just
a simple question of additional troops, we are past the point where that
will do some good. We need a new strategy and a new assessment; a
new strategy would enable us to withdraw gracefully.
12. Mr. E. Drexel Godfrey (ADC) said that if we examine what
has been said by prisoners, documents, and the NLF, the target of their
offensive is as much the GVN as it is the U.S. The enemy is skillful and
inventful, and probably will direct the next phase of his campaign against
particularly weak targets -- ARVN and the GVN. He fears this develop-
ment the most, because this activity could start a stampede. Regarding
U.S. reinforcements, our strategic reserve -- which consists of perhaps
two divisions -- will not contribute much. Deploying this force
would have serious consequences at home and we would not be able to
respond to Pueblo-type incidents. We would have to go into partial mobili-
zation because others might be tempted to take advantage of our Vietnam
problem to present us with additional problems elsewhere.
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13. Mr. Joseph Smith (FE) said that he agreed generally with
Bill Colby. It seems the war may be lost, and that all we have tried has
not worked. We seem to have nothing to offer but proposals and suggestions
for what the GVN can do. We have set up the GVN psychologically so that
it merely relies on us to bail them out of their deepening difficulties. The
best we have gotten from them is their willingness to participate in a joint
relief effort and their performance in that effort has been dramatized by
the resignation of Gen. Thang -- our "white hope." Now we are looking for the
kind of GVN that can make a deal. The more we do and the more resources
we commit, the more they merely talk about their unwillingness to negotiate.
Sending more U.S. troops might have some psychological effect, but only if
it is done in the context of mobilization,. Without mobilization, we would be
wasting time and nothing would be gained but a vast popular outcry in the
U.S. We should not put in more troops and we should tell the Vietnamese
that they have to solve the problem.
14. Mr. Tom Karames sines (DDP) said he is not quite as gloomy
as Joe Smith and some of the others. He agrees that we need a fundamental
rethinking of our strategy. We have to get the Vietnamese more active and
he is not sure that putting in more U.S. troops will accomplish this. We
must impose demands on the GVN for actions similar to those proposed in
Mr. Carver's memo, and we must make it clear that they must buckle down.
Their troop mobilization is a move in the right direction. Sending more
U.S. troops might deter the GVN from doing what it should and it would
also show the North Vietnamese that their Tet offensive had accomplished
what they wanted. He is not sure that we should confirm for them now
that this is the case. He is not pessimistic regarding ARVN and thinks
that they have put up a pretty good show thus far.
15. Admiral Taylor (DDCI) said he was inclined to agree with
Tom Karamessines and with George Carver's remarks about the possi-
bility of the situation unravelling. We are dealing with risks and un-
certainties. The question is not whether we should send more troops
but how many can we send and in what timeframe. He expects that the
Communists will emphasize terrorism in pacified areas of the countryside
rather than in the cities. Regarding ARVN, we don't know how many have
returned to duty, but some have come back voluntarily. Reports indicate
signs of popular outrage against the Communists but we can't be certain
how deep this feeling goes. We don't know who is hurting the most. We
know how much we have suffered but we don't really know what this effort
has cost the enemy. If his information is bad and he failed in his objectives,
he must regroup. How does North Vietnam assess the problem? Will they
take into account their own self-interest, or will they "go for broke" in
some areas? Perhaps we should re-examine our strategy, because a
Korean-type war is wrong in Vietnam. We have to take our chances on how
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this will turn out and not send more troops because we can't handle threats
in other areas without mobilization. In effect, we have put all our chips in
this poker game but we are not sure whether the other fellow has put his chips
in. The real question is how much can ARVN hold on. In summary, he feels
that we should hold what we have, and not put in more, because he is not too
gloomy.
16. Mr. George Allen (VAS) said that, unfortunately, we are being
asked to make judgments without having all the facts but this is the nature
of our profession. He believes the Communists will maintain their pressure
at least at the level and in the form that we observed in the winter phase
of his campaign. While the enemy has suffered a qualitative loss in recent
attacks, we cannot be confident that he has not been able to replace those
losses through impressment and recruiting in newly occupied areas. He is
not confident that ARVN will be able to hang on, and thinks that we should
expect some disintegration in areas where ARVN is isolated from contact
with U.S. forces. We can't be sure how the RF and PF in isolated rural
areas have withstood the enemy thrust and we should not be too hopeful of
the extent to which that half of the Vietnamese armed forces, which was on
leave at Tet, has been able or is even seeking, in the confused environment
which exists, to return to their units. We should not be too hopeful con-
cerning the GVNTs ability to rise to the occasion. The Vietnamese have
not, in the past, been noted for their ability to respond effectively to a
crisis. With respect to rethinking our strategy, certainly this is necessary.
But, any retrograde movement resulting from a revised strategy carries
with it the danger of exacerbating our problems because of the adverse im-
.
pacf4 would have on ARVN and the populace. It may be too late to try to
devel?p the kind of political action needed to enable the GVN to mobilize
the 'people in its support. While sending additional U.S. troops would
bolster the performance of ARVN in some areas, no foreseeable forces
will really enable us to retrieve the situation. It seems as though the
Communists are likely to succeed in their basic aim of convincing us that
we cannot achieve a military solution and that we should, therefore,
negotiate for the best terms we can get. This obviously will entail some
form of coalition and perhaps Bill ColbyIs suggestion regarding Gen. "Big"
Minh is the answer.
Distribution:
Orig. - DCI
GEORGE W. ALLEN
Vietnamese Affairs Staff
SFr T
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