THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06786546
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 14, 1968

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
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14 February 1968
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Information as of 1600
' 14 February 1968
HIGHLIGHTS
Except for continued fighting in Hue and scat-
tered contacts in the delta, the lull in the enemy
offensive against urban areas continued on 14 Feb-
ruary. Sporadic fighting was reported in the sub-
urbs of Saigon, but the capital itself continued
its gradual return to normal. North Vietnamese
gunners intensified their shelling of Khe Sanh,
but no significant ground probes were launched
against the base or other allied strongpoints in
the area.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
The enemy intensified his shelling of Khe Sanh and
continued close surveillance of aircraft activity
in the area (Paras. 1-2).
at least two battalions supported
by armor conducted the attack at Lang Vei on 6 Feb-
ruary (Para. 3). B-52 aircraft will provide con-
tinuous, 24-hour support for Khe Sanh (Para. 4).
Enemy resistance in Hue continued to be stiff (Para. 5).
The Communists have reportedly established a "Peo-
ples Court" in Hue (Para. 6). The Thua Thien Prov-
ince Chief claims a high-ranking South Vietnamese
officer defected to the Communists (Para. 7). Enemy
preparations for sustained operations in I Corps
is evidenced by road construction in the A Shau
Valley (Para. 8). Viet Cong forces overran a
refugee camp in Quang Ngai Province (Para. 9). There
is still some fighting reported in the Saigon area
and in the delta provinces.. (Para. 10-17).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Food prices
are falling gradually in Saigon, and market ac-
tivity in the provinces is resuming slowly (Paras.
5-6).
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III. Military- Developments in North Vietnam:
US strikes on: Phuc Yen- appear to have, driven Wirth
Vietnam's: ITJ28 bombers back to China (Paras. 1-2) .
TWo MIG-17s were . downed on 14. February (Para. 3) .
North. Vietnam is using its large MI-6 helicopters ,
to. transport. MIGs (Paras.' 4-5) .
. IV. Other:ComMunist Military .Developments;
, There it .nothing .of.. significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments:
The
recent interview of North Vietnamese Foreign
Minister Trinh was another attempt to highlight
Hanoi's position on talks and to make it seem as
reasonable as possible . (Paras. 5-7) .
VI. Other Major Aspects: Cambodians report
more allied helicopter activity over eastern Cam-
bodia (Paras. 1-3) .
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Khe Sanh Area
1. The Communists stepped up their shelling
of the Khe Sanh'complex during the 24-hour period
ending the morning of the 14th. They fired about
200 artillery, rocket, and mortar rounds on the
base area during the period. Light ground contact
was reported.
another attack may have been planned for
the night of 14 February.
2. Elements of the 101D Regiment/325 "C"
Division were noted
keeping US aircraft activity at Khe �Sanh
close surveillance. These elements were
on the 12th to "frequently report on the
Report clearly the quantity of all types
craft and enemy activities."
3: It is now clear
that: at least two battalions of the
29th Regithent;.325 "C" Division, supported by
armor, conducted the 6 February attack on the
.Lang Vei Special Forces Camp, � southwest of Khe
Sanh. The.enemy:captured nine South Vietnamese
soldiers, but no Americans
Communist casualties were
but one North Vietnamese company
second were detailed to evacuate
under
instructed
enemy.
of air-
not described,
and possibly a
the wounded.
4. Beginning on 15 February, B-52 aircraft
will provide continuous, 24-hour support for the
Khe Sanh garrison. This operation will involve
48 B-52 sorties per day, flown in flights of three
aircraft at one and one-half hour intervals.
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Hue
5. The battle for Hue entered its 17th day today,
as US Marine and South Vietnamese forces continued to
encounter stiff resistance in their effort to clear
the enemy entrenched in the Citadel area.
6. According to Vietnamese police sources, the
Viet Cong in Hue have established a "Peoples Court"
near the Citadel to sentence South Vietnamese mili-
tary and civilian officials. A "ranking member" of
a newly formed Communist front group in Hue--the
"alliance of Peace and Democracy"--is reportedly
serving as presiding judge.
7. Lt. Colonel Khoa, the province chief of
Thua Thien, claims that the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Political Warfare of the South Vietnamese 1st
Division, Lt. Colonel Thi, has defected to the Com-
munists. If so, Thi would be the highest ranking
South Vietnamese official known to have done so.
However, Khoa's motives in reporting this information
are suspect. He has lumped Thi with the enemy
since the latter's involvement in the Buddhist anti-
government movement in 1966.
8. The construction of a new road from the
Communist-controlled A Shau Valley base area toward
Hue provides further evidence of enemy preparations
for sustained military operations in the northern
provinces of South Vietnam.
about four miles of new road has
been constructed eastward off Route 548 in the vicin-
ity of Ta Bat. The route is apparently to be built
to the vicinity of Ta Luong. From Ta Luong, there
is an existing road to Hue, although its condition
is not known, and some reconstruction work may be
needed to restore it to use. Completion of this
new route toward Hue would give the Communists a
direct tie-in with the Laos panhandle roadhet via
Route 922.
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Quang Ngai Province
9,, An estimOed Viet Cong .platoon-size unit
attacked, overran,-,and completely destroyecta refugee.
camp:located some 12 miles north-of_Quang.Ngai-city
on 13 January. .The.camp Was garrisoned by two Rev-
olutionary Development teams and two PopularForces
platoons. Incomplete.repOrts indicate. that 94 per-
sonnel,. ncluding 59 Revolutionary Development per-
sonnel.and 35.paramilitary troops, are missing. No
information is available onthe'statusof;civilian
refugees interned at the camp.
Saigon and III Corps.
10. South Vietnamese,Army troops reported kill-
ing.58 enemy on the.western.outskirts of..Saigon near
the Phu-Tho race track the afternoon of 13 February.
South Vietnamese losses were 11 killed and .18 wounded.
The race track areahas been the scene of the'.heaviest
action in Saigon in recent days. The Communists ap--
parently.have sizable 'forces still holding out in.thiS.
sector.
11. South Vietnamese forces conducted sweeps
through several other sections of the capital area
during the past few days--including the troubled 5th
Precinct in Cholon--but no significant action has been
reported. In the outlying suburbs, however, allied
forces continue to clash with Communist troops. On 13
February nearly 100 Viet Cong were reported killed in
three separate small unit clashes from seven to 20
miles north of the capital. US and South Vietnamese
losses were 13 killed and nearly 60 wounded.
12. Meanwhile, there has been no confirmation
of several low-level reports which claimed that large
numbers of enemy troops were moving toward Saigon for
a second offensive against the city. There is tenuous
evidence that certain Viet Cong local force units
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which participated in the initial attacks on Saigon
are withdrawing to the west. Captured documents
indicate that two local force battalions
may have pulled back to central Hau Nghia Province
and a third may have returned to Tay Nihh. In addi-
tibn, a radio terminal serving the headquarters of
Viet Cong Military Region,4 was located on 12 February
in central Hau Nghia Province, nearly 25 miles north-
west of its previous location just south of Cholon.
13. Other than small-scale probes against South
Vietnamese Popular Force outposts, there was no
significant military activity in IIICorps.
IV Corps
14. Viet Cong forces launched a mortar attack
on Rach Gia, the capital of Kien Giang Province some
120 milessouthwest of Saigon on 13 February. Over
300 homes were reportedly destroyed or damaged in the
attack. There were several other incidents in the
delta on 13 and 14 February initiated by the Viet
Cong.
15. US and South Vietnamese Army forces engaged
Viet Cong forces near Vinh Long city on 13 February.
Three Viet Cong battalions appear to be sticking close
to this provincial capital and new attacks on the
city may be planned.
16. In Phong Dinh Province less than six miles
west of Can Tho, US forces discovered a large Commu-
nist arms cache containing 460 baiooka-type rocket
rounds, 59 75-mm. pack howitzer shells, 89 120-mm.
mortar rounds, and other assorted ammunition.
17. Reports continue to come in from a number
of towns ir the delta indicating that the people are
uneasy and fear new enemy attacks., Reports also re-
veal that the people in the countryside are still
feeling the impact of the Tet offensive. One of the
worst examples of-deteriorating security in rural
areas has been reported in Go Cong Province, about
25 miles south of Saigon. Reportedly, the Go Cong
Province chief has been forced to pull all revolu-
tionary development teams in from their pacification
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areas to man static defenses in the vicinity of the
province capital. This has, in effect, turned the
countryside over to the Viet Cong who are taking
advantage of the situation by increasing their
recruiting efforts and taking over villages which
were formerly declared pacified.
government programs have suffered a major set-
back and the Communists have scored a psychological
and propaganda success, if not a military victory.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
14 February 1968
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Economic Situation
5. Food prices in Saigon continue to fall
� gradually, but are still 70-75 percent higher than
the pre-Tet level. Some food deliveries are being
made to the city by road from surrounding Gia Dinh
� Province and by air from other areas. There have
been no road deliveries to the capital from the
Mekong Delta, Da Lat, or Vung Tau, but plans are
being made to bring food supplies in by convoy from
some of these areas within the next few days.
Normal:commercialldistribution of rice was sched-
uled to be resumed on 14 February.
6. Reports from some of the provinces indicate
that there are �few critical food shortages, although
pork, charcoal, sugar, and canned milk are in
short supply in some areas. Prices in some lo-
calities are running 10-30 percent above the pre-Tet
level, while in others they have held steady.
Market activity is gradually resuming although at
reduced levels because of curfews and travel re-
strictions.
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III. MILITARY MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. Repeated US air strikes on Phuc Yen appear
to have driven North Vietnam's IL-28s back to Nan-
ning--at least for now. On 14 February two of the
bombers flew toward the China border when US air-
craft neared Hanoi. They were subsequently ordered
to recover at Nan-fling because of damage to the
Phuc Yen runway. An earlier raid on Phuc Yen is
believed to have hit the other IL-28 which arrived
from China on 6 February.
2. The bombers could return to Hanoi/Gia Lam
at any time or to Phuc Yen when runway repairs
are completed.. If they remain at Nan-ning with
three other IL-28s.which flew there from.Yunnani on
6 February they will still pose a threat to US
naval forces in the Tonkin Gulf, friendly units
in Laos or Thailand,and allied military positionsl
and cities south of. the Demilitarized Zone. If
they return to Yunnani, it may indicate that a com-
bination of air strikes, bad weather-, and poor
progress in the tactical situation in South Viet-
nam have persuaded Hanoi to defer offensive air
operations for the time being.
3. In related developments, two flights of
USAF fighters which apparently were involved in the
Phuc. Yen raid each succeededin.dOwning MIG-17 air-
craft on 14 February. The-double.kill is unusual
because MIG-21s appear to have undertaken most of
the. intercept attempts against US strike groups in
recent months.'
Helicopters Haul MIGs
4.
North Viet-
nam is using its large MI-6 "Hook" helicopters to:
transport MIG aircraft.
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some fighter aircraft in� re-
mote, camouflaged revetments which presumably could
not be reached by road.
5. The Soviet-build MI-6 helicopter is the
only aircraft in'the North Vietnamese inventory which
could transport a fully assembled MIG fighter. There
are believed to be four of these helicopters hidden
in dispersal areas in the vicinity of Hanoi. They
probably have been used to carry high priority mili-
tary equipment such as jet engines and SA-2 missiles.
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Background of Latest. Trinh Interview
5. The French press agency office in Paris
has provided some background on North Vietnamese
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Foreign Minister. Trin10.s interview on 8 February
with AFP Hanoi correspondent.,-BernatdCabannes.
In this interview.theforeign minister related the
Tet- offensive in South.Vietnam to Hanoi's offer
to talk. after a bombing pause: He.also-vakied
the.language:of:his."will" talk offer to imply
that postbombing talks could cover the entire
question of the war.
6. AFP says that the timing of the interview
was a Hanoi initiative. The foreign minister
acted on a two-week-old request for an interview
and in response to questions that had already been
submitted in writing. Hanoi broadcast the inter-
view even before the copy, had reached the AFP
office in Paris. In commenting on-the interview,
Cabannes said the foreign minister's new language
meant that talks could concern "the heart of the
problem and the very solution to-the war." This
statement was approved by the North Vietnamese
Foreign Ministry.
7. This explanation of the circumstances
surrounding the interview leaves little doubt that
the North Vietnamese were attempting to promote
their "will" talk offer with another semantic exer-
cise designed to keep .the issue in the headlines
and to make it seem as reasonable and forthcoming
as possible.
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VI. OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
1. Cambodian provincial defense units con-
tinue to report allied helicopter activity over
eastern Cambodia.
2. A military post located about 25 miles
inside the Cambodian border near Post Deshayes
in Mondolkiri Province has reported that three
helicopters flew low over the post on the after-
noon of 10 February.
the Cambodians fired at the aircraft with
their "antiaircraft defenses" but did not hit them.
3. A similar incident involving five allied
helicopters occurred on 28 January at the nearby
border town of 0 Rang. Phnom Penh's silence so
far about these incursions may indicate the Cam-
bodians' intent to object only to those border in-
cidents that involve Cambodian casualties or damage
to property. It would not be unlike Prince Sihanouk,
however, to publicize such incidents at a time of
his own choosing. (See map in Section I)
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