THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06786545
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 15, 1968

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Top-Secret
/14
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
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15 February 1968
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Information as of 1200
15 February 19,68
HIGHLIGHTS
The military situation remains quiet throughout
South Vietnam, although there continue to beindica-
tions of possible offensive enemy moves in the De-
militarized Zone and against several major cities.
Meanwhile, Hanoi continues to pressure the US for a
bombing halt.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam: The
military situation in South Vietnam is summarized'
(Paras. 1-2) Sporadic artillery, rocket, and mortar
fire was directed at the Khe Sanh strongpoint as enemy
military units maneuvered throughout the area (Paras.
3-4). The Communists have opened Route 9 through Laos
to the South Vietnam border, and heavy traffic has been
noted moving eastward (Paras. 5-6). .Two regiments of
the North Vietnamese 324B Division are moving closer to
Quang Tri city, possible signaling the beginning of
large-scale offensives in the coastal area of southeast-
ern Quang Tri Province (Paras. 7-14). Allied forces are
concentrating heavy bombing and firepower on the stub-
born pocket of Communist resistance in the Citadel as
Hue city officials face problems of refugees, looting,
and lack of administrative, and security forces (Paras.
15-17). There are indications that the Viet Cong 9th
Division may be moving men and supplies toward Saigon
and further plans of the North Vietnamese 7th Division
have been revealed in a. captured document (Paras. 18-
21).. Viet Cong forces are taking steps to assert their
control in a number of rural areas in the delta (Paras.
22-25).
. II. Political Developments in South Vietnam: Vice
President Ky intends either to recommend the dissolution
of the emergency task force or to resign as its chair-
man (Paras, 1-2). Foreign Minister Do.takes 4 gloomy view
of the situation (Para. 3). Militant Buddhist Thich
Thien Minh has Allegedly called for "mutual concessions"
by both sides in the war.(Paras. 4-5).
. III., Military Developments in North Vietnam: The two
regiments of the North Vietnamese Army. 316th Division may
be leaving the country (Paras. 1-4)- A new type of
rocket may be en route to Communist forces in northern
South Vietnam. .(Paras; 5-10) �
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� IV. Other Communist Military -Developments:
There is nothing of significance.to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: Hanoi
is stepping up the pressure for a bombing halt
and for moving the war to a "fight-talk" stage
(Paras. 1-5). AFP correspondents in Hanoi have
taken note of North Vietnam's current negotiation
tactics (Paras. 6-7). Hanoi has denied that the
US sent an envoy to North Vietnam (Para. 8).
Viet Cong spokesmen continue to publicize their
plans for a future coalition government (Paras. 9-13).
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-I.. THE MILITARY SITUATION IW:SOUTIP.VIETNAM'
1. There is more evidence that the: Communists
intend to mount sustained military operations in
the Khe Sanh area, they
have opened Route 9 in Lads as far as the Vietnam
border. While the military situation in the over-
all Khe Sanh/Demilitarized'Zone area remained
relatively quiet on 15 February, major elements
of North Vietnam's 324 "B" Division continued
their ominous encroachment upon Quang Tri city.
2. No significant new Communist initiatives
were reported on 15 February in 11, 111, or IV
Corps.
t e Viet Cong t Division may
moving personnel and supplies toward Saigon.
Khe Sanh
3. The US Marine combat base at Khe Sanh
came under sporadic artillery, rocket, and mortar
fire on 15 February, but no significant North
Vietnamese ground asaults were reported.
4. The communications. of North Vietnamese
artillery, units in the Khe,Sanh.area.reflect.in-
tensiVe reconnaissance of allied activity, target
coordinate's, and requests for artillery bombard-
ment results.
indicate that some 55 targets have been
surveyed for possible registration fire.
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5.
the Communists, for the first time since 1965, have
succeeded in reopening Laotian Route 9 all the way
to the Quang Tri Province border.
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a serviceable
route with evidence of medium to heavy usage as
far eastward as Ban Houei Sane, the abandoned
Laotian Army outpost just southwest of the Com-
munist-occupied Lang Vei Special Forces camp.
6. The opening of this segment of Route 9
will facilitate the resupply and reinforcement of
North Vietnamese Army forces in the Khe Sanh area.
It could also expedite the introduction of tanks
and other armored vehicles--such as those employed
at Lang Vei on 6 February--throughout the Khe Sanh
area.
Quang Tri City
7. There is continued evidence
that at least two
the North Vietnam's 324 "B" Division
to positions near Quang Tri city.
regiments of
are deploying
8. On 13 February, the headquarters element
and two subordinate battalions of North Vietnam's
803rd Regiment were located less than seven miles
north of Quang Tri city.
at least one of
the battalions would continue to move south to the
immediate area of Quang Tri city.
9. Since 31 January,
North Vietnam's 812th Regiment have re-
flected sharply intensified reconnaissance activ-
ities in the Quang Tri city area and southward to
Phuong Dien. Although the bulk of the regiment is
believed to be deployed in Base Area 101 southwest
of Quang Tri city, a terminal serving its head-
quarters element was identified on 13 February some
eight miles northeast of the capital city.
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10. The accelerated reconnaissance activity by the
812th Regiment, the possible relocation of its headquar-
ters element, and the southward deployment of the 803rd
Regiment, all portend renewed enemy offensive activity
in the vicinity of Quang Tri city. In addition to the
provincial capital itself, probable targets include the
nearby urban areas of Phuong Dien, Hai Lang, and La
yang, as well as allied installations.
11. There were earlier indications that elements
of the 324 "B" Division's remaining subordinate--the
90th Regiment--had joined the 803rd Regiment in a move
southward toward Quang Tri city. Although this reloca-
tion has not been confirmed, the commitment of the 90th
Regiment to this area would increase the over-all threat.
12. Morale in Quang Tri city continues to dete-
riorate In addition
to the widespread fear of renewed enemy attacks, many
residents are concerned over the situation in Hue, where
the members of many families have been stuck since the
Tet holidays. Most of the news reaching Quang Tri is
badly distorted by Viet Cong propaganda claims; report-
edly� there are no radiobroadcasts available except
Radio Hanoi and Radio eking. The Vietnamese Informa-
tion Service has given out very little news thus far
during the crisis.
13. The recent visit of two senior South Vietnam-
ese military officers, I Corps Commander Lam and 1st
Division Commander Truong, to Quang Tri city, report-
edly did little to boost the morale and confidence
of local provincial authorities. Although both of-
ficers advocated a "cautious aggressiveness" on the
part of South Vietnamese forces, this was offset by
Lam's request to US officials for a special airlift of
his family out of the provincial capital. The province
chief had earlier made a similar request. Both requests
were granted.
14. Both Lam and Troung authorized the issue of
weapons to all provincial officials, and the two spe-
cifically told the sector staff to expect indiscrimi-
nate shelling and rocketing of Quang Tri city along with
enemy air and armor attacks.
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Hue
15. A stubborn force of Communist troops dug in
at the Citadel continued again on 15 February to re-
sist US and South Vietnamese efforts to drive them
out. The allied effort has been increased with the
use of 750-pound bombs and concentrated fire from
US naval guns and land-based artillery.
16. Allied forces attempting to restore order
to the city have been confronted with several major
problems. At least 24,000 refugees are clogging the
limited facilities at the university and at locations
elsewhere. Looting within the city is also con-
tinuing. The Communist forces reportedly did little
looting and even failed to take advantage of oppor-
tunities to seize documents and equipment in the
early days of the fighting.
17. There is also a bad shortage of South Viet-
namese administrative personnel to renew government
operations. Apparently, many were killed'in the
fighting, and the political allegiance of others
is reportedly questionable. US forces have been
asked to provide security for the city, and a small
force will probably augment South Vietnamese defense
forces until the over-all situation has improved.
Saigon. and Corps
18. Three Communists captured during the past
few days about ten miles north of paigOn state that
they are members of the 9th Viet Cong Division and
that they have been Toying supplies south.
the movement of men
and supplies southward in Binh Duong Province in
recent days. If the 9th Division is receiving sup-
plies from the north, a second or follow-up attack
on Saigon, reported by numerous prisoners, becomes
more likely.
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20. Allied operations on the outskirts of
Saigon have undoubtedly upset some of the enemy's
plans for this area. US and South Vietnamese forces
have reported sharp battles with elements of all
three regiments of the 9th Division to the north
and west of the capital during the past several
days. In new skirmishes from two to 25 miles north
of Saigon, eight Americans were killed on 14-15
February and nearly 70 wounded. Over 300 Viet Cong
were claimed killed, mostly by artillery and air
strikes.
21. Farther west in III Corps, there are con-
tinuing indications that the North Vietnamese 7th
Division is being employed to harass allied posi-
tions on Saigon's outer periphery. A notebook
captured recently in northern Binh Duong Province
reveals that certain elements of the 7th Division
have been ordered to break down into "highly mobile"
small units and attack US 1st Division forces. An
entry dated 16 January suggests that cadre in the
division zere told that they were to, participate in
a phase of combat operations which would last from
five to six month.
IV Corps
22. Scattered reports are now coming in on the
situation in the countryside in the Mekong Delta.
Although it is too early for an over-all judgment about
security conditions, it is clear that the Viet Cong have
taken active steps to assert their control in a number
of rural areas.
23. for example,
that one district in Sa Dec Province is "9ntirely con-
trolled" by the Communists, with the exception of the
district town and a handful of outposts. The South
Vietnamese Army units in the province appear to be dug-in
in defensive positions and unwilling to initiate of-
fensive operations. Similar conditions appear to exist
in several other provinces. ,
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24. In Vinh Long, continuing enemy mortar at-
tacks on the provincial capital and allied bombing
runs on the outskirts of the city have kept pro-
vincial officials off balance and prevented a quick
reassertion of government authority. In Phong
Dinh Province, the Viet Cong have reportedly stepped
up recruitment in the countryside in the wake of
their attacks on the cities. Reports from South
Vietnamese officials indicate that the Viet Cong
in two districts of the province are attempting to
recruit or force arms on all males between 15 and
40 years �of age.
25. In several other provinces there have been
scattered reports of Communist attempts to set up
new political and administrative organizations,
but the extent of this effort is not known.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Vice President Ky intends either to recom-
mend that the emergency task force be dissolved or
to resign as its chairman.
he would advise President Thieu
to disband the task force because 1) it has ac-
compliehed its short-term objectives of establish-
ing basic policies and procedures for relief work
and should therefore turn its work over to the
ministries directly concerned; 2) its work is
hampered now, and will be more and more in the
future, because it has no legal status and there-
fore np means of assuring that its plans are car-
ried out; and 3) most important, Ky is coming under
increasing icriticism for allegedly attempting to
augment his personal power through his task force
chairmanship. Ky himself told an American observer
that he intends to resign as chairman for much the
same reasons, but did not mention dissolution of
the task force.
2. Ky's comments however,
indicate that he is willing, and quite prepared, to
assume greater power as long as Thieu specifically
delegates it to him and makes it clear to all con-
cerned that ky is being given the power, not usurping
it. Ky is concerned with the government's sluggish
approach to current problems and believes that some-
thing must be done to give the government more ef-
fective leadership. He apparently believes that
he can contribute something but does not want to
take any unconstitutional steps to increase his
own power. He does not believe that now is the
time for any radical changes in the government.
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Tran Van Do's Views
3. Foreign Minister Do is taking a gloomy
view of the current situation. He recently-told a
foreign.observer that the Viet Cong offensive had
demonstrated the Communists will-retain the initi-
ative as long as the allies' objeCtives and methods
remain limited. He believes that the Viet Cong
will attack again, but probably with less intensity.
He foresees increased use 1of terrorist actions
which the Communists are capable of launching
anywhere anytime. Do claimed that, although the
Viet Congdid not succeed in generating a great
deal of popular support, they have instilled more
fear in the people than ever before. He believes
that the lack of a popular uprising will not deter
the Communists from continuing their attempts to
destroy the government by exposing its fragility
and creating conditions of uncertainty and despair.
Thich Thien Minh Interview
4. A Japanese newspaper, claiming an exclu-
sive interview with militant Buddhist Thich Thien
Minh, reported on 14 February that Minh had called
for "mutual concessions by the United States and
its opponent in the war." The article did not pro-
vide elaboration on these "concessions." Minh was
also quoted as saying that "many South Vietnamese
intellectuals and farmers" are siding with the Na-
tional Liberation Front, even though they are not
Communists, because they are dissatisfied with the
Saigon government.
5. Minh's statements, if quoted correctly,
could indicate that the militants may launch a new
"peace offensive" calling for immediate negotiations
to end the war. The statements are particularly
notable because the militant hierarchy has specifi-
cally refrained from issuing any formal denunciation of
the Viet Cong Tet offensive. Other important groups
have denounced the attacks.
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1.
Recent anomalies
of the 316th North Vietnamese Army. Division
may indicate that one or both of the two regiments,
currently subordinate to it, may be leaving the
country.
3. There are indications that yet another
regiment from this division may have moved to the
Demilitarized Zone area early this.year. Analysis
of North Vietnamese Army postal addresses and
deliveries indicate a battalion-level subordinate
of the 316th may have been in southern North Viet-
nam in December. In addition,
referred to
a North Vietnamese who was wounded during an
attack: on Cam Lo near: the Demilitarized Zone.
'thef,soldier was from
the 98th. Regiment,. a Subordinate of the 316th-
Division.
4. The movement of major .elements of the
324B Division south to the Quang Tri city area
has left a void in northeastern Quang Tri Prov-
ince which might be partially filled by the 98th
Regiment.
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New Communist Rocket?
5. A new type of rocket may be en route to Com-
munist forces in northern South Vietnam,
6. On 13 February an unidentified North Vietnamese
rear services unit reported that ammunition of an unknown
type would be sent to entities tentatively identified
as the 559th Transportation Group, an infiltration head-
quarters located west of Khe Sanh in Laos, and to enemy
units in the vicinity of the Demilitarized Zone. The
rounds were designated "D74," and the combined weight
of one round and its shipping case was said to be about
162 pounds.
7. Neither the designator nor the weight of this
ammunition corresponds directly with any mortar, artil-
lery, or rocket rounds known to be produced by any Com-
munist state. The use of the letter designator, however,
suggests that the type of weapon involved is a rocket.
If so, it may be a heavier rocket than any currently
employed by enemy units in South Vietnam.
8. The Communist rocket which comes closest to
the weight of the weapon described is
the Soviet 115-mm. round. This weapon is estimated to
weigh about 125 pounds and in a shipping case could
come close to the 162-pound figure mentioned in the
report.
9. The 115-mm. rocket is a relatively new Soviet
weapon which is fired from a multiple launcher mounted
on a truck. It is the first Russian artillery rocket
which is spin-stabilized, and this feature makes it
perhaps the most accurate weapon of this type in the
Soviet inventory. The truck which carries the 115-mm.
launcher is lighter than the ScAriet PT-76 tank which
has already been employed near Khe Sanh and could be
deployed from Laos to strike allied positions in the
western Demilitarized Zone area.
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10. Another possibility would be some modifica-
tion of the 122-mm. rocket which is widely used in
South Vietnam. MACV has reported that on 11 February
the Bien Hoa Air Base was attacked by 122-mm. rocket
fire from distances exceeding the known capabilities
of this weapon. It was deduced that the Communists
might be employing some type of "booster" to extend
its range. It is possible' that a booster, would
raise the combined weight of this 102-pound rocket
round and its shipping ease to the 162-pound figure
mentioned
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IV._OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. In the wake of the Tet offensive, Hanoi is
stepping up pressure for a bombing halt and for
moving the war to a "fight-talk" stage.
2. In addition to earlier efforts to publicize'
its more "forthcoming" position on talks with the US,
Hanoi apparently has taken a wide-ranging series of
diplomatic movesto, increase internatiOnal.pressureon
the US to end the bombing and to begin,negotiations.
The North Vietnamese say they will respond to a.bomb-
ing halt, by beginning talks, but they remain adamant
in.. refusing any 'prior.gesture of restraint.
3. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that
the Vietnamese Communists are ready to modify their
long-standing terms for a settlement of the war.
The evidence strongly suggests that they expect post-
bombing talks to be used chiefly to increase pressures
on the US to compromise,. and that the fighting in the
South would continue. These are tactics party leaders
have long said they would use at some stage in the
struggle.
4. Hanoi has been in touch with a number of
Western governments recently to push its case and
to underscore its readiness to talk if the US stops
the bombings. The Italian Foreign Ministry announced
on 14 February that North Vietnamese representatives
had contacted Rome early this month with such a mes-
sage.
The Swiss Government announced
on 15 February that its ambassador in Peking was en
route to Hanoi to offer his country's good offices
for a peaceful settlement. Although press reports
say this was entirely a Swiss initiative, Hanoi doubt-
less chose the time by giving permission for the visit.
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5. North Vietnam doubtless has taken similar in-
itiatives with other non-Communist countries. Indian
officials were approached in both'Hanoi and New Delhi
earlier this month with the message that North Vietnam
"sincerely wants to start negotiations." UN Secre-
tary General Thant, who met with the NoFth Vietnamese
mission chief in Paris on 14 February, probably re-
ceived the same kind of response to his peace over-
tures.
French Press Report from Hanoi
6. AFP correspondents in Hanoi took note of
North Vietnam's current tactics on 14 February. If
their story was not actually inspired by the North
Vietnamese, they probably approved of its contents.
The story says that the Communists are trying to demon-
strate simultaneously their military strength and
their desire for a peaceful settlement. The story
claims the Communists are "very satisfied" with the
results of the offensive in the South, but the Com-
munists stress that the offensive is not over yet.
The story implies that new attacks' are likely if
the US fails to stop the bombing and begin negotia-
tions.
7. The story stresses the moves made by Hanoi
to make its position more forthcoming and to meet US
conditions for prompt and meaningful discussions. It
concludes, however, that Hanoi does not intend to com-
promise on its demand for an unconditional bombing halt.
If Washington insists on any form of reciprocity,even
the "modified" version of President Johnson's San An-
tonio formula, the war will continue.
Hanoi Denies US Sent Envoy
8. Another AFP press item- broadcast by. Paris
on 15 February .says that an "informed North Vietnamese
source" in. Hanoi has.. "categorically denied" reports
that the US sent .a special envoy. tO North Vietnam. to
explore prospects for.peace. The story notes that
Canadian ICC Commissioner Ormond Diem- had been in
Hanoi recently, but that he was not acting for the
US..
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Viet. Cong. Plans for Coalition Government
9. Viet Cong. spokesmen continue to publicize
to selected audiences their plans for a .future Co-
alition government.. Radio Havana,on 15 February.
quoted Nguyen Van, 'Tien, Liberation Front .rePre-
sentative in'HanOie:as saying that the "future co-
alition government" which the Front was proposing
was to. be-composed 'of people who contributed to
the liberation of the South:byparticipating in�
the revolutionary struggle," i:e.,.those who-co-
operated with the Liberation Front.
'10: Although the circumstances under. Which Tien
made his .remarks are unclear,-the broadcas-Leaid he
.Was denying Western press speculation that the Front
hoped to be 'invited to form a coalition with the.
South. Vietnamese Government. The Front's coalition,
said Tien, would.be one in.which.the Liberation Front.
would-be "the pucleus:mith-other revOlutionary forces"
and one in which the Front.would have the "initiative."
11. Earlier last week, Nguyen Van Hieu,.the
Front representative in -Phnom Penh, -discussed Front.
plans for a. coalition government in Much'the.same
terms with selected-pro-Communist journalists and
neutral ambassadors in the Cambodian capital. 'Neither
spokesman indicated any, se/lee of urgency. They im7
plied that it would evolve.gradually after discus-
sions with. various'new revolutionary alliances which
the Communists claim are springing up. all over
South. Vietnam in. the. wake. of the Tet-offensive.
12., At home, the Front continues to try to pro-
mote such groups and to make them appear believable
and impressive A new organization in the northern
province of Thua Thien was announced on Liberation
radio on 15 February. The broadcast said that the
previously announced "peace alliance" in this area
had met with other "revolutionary forces," described
only as representatives of "uprising committees of
three districts in the city of Hue and six of the
rural districts of Thua Thien, to form a "provisional
revolutionary administration" committee for the Thua-
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Thien-Hue area. The new committee was to assume
several quasi-governmental responsibilities, but
its main purpose appears to be to keep the South
Vietnamese Government off balance.
13. The announcement surfaced two new person-
alities in the new provincial committee. Le Van Hoa,
the already announced chairman. of the peace alliance
in the area, turned up as the new committee's
chairman. His two deputies, however, are not known
to have been affiliated with the Communist or other
radical organizations in this area before. They
are Madame Nguyen Dinh Chi, a former school principal
in Hue, and Hoang.Le, a labor organizer.
15 February 1968
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. I
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