THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06786541
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 18, 1968

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
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MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
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18 February 1968
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Information as of 1600
18 February 1968
HIGHLIGHTS
The Communists launched a new wave of of
action against urban centers in South Vietnam
the night of 17-18 February. The intensity ot the
attacks and casualties on both sides were much lighter
than at Tet.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Communists launch new wave of ,attacks on urban.cen-
ters, with action lightest in the northern provinces
(Paras. 1-4). The situation in the Saigon area is
reported, along with predictions of new attacks
(Paras. 5-9). The situations in the corps areas are
reported (Paras. 10-20).
� II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Thieu again voices reluctance to exercise forceful
leadership (Paras. 1-3). Some progress made on for-
mation of anti-Communist political front (Paras. 4-5).
The government appears to have turned in creditable
performance in the western highlands (Paras. 6-9).
The picture in the delta is somewhat more gloomy
(Paras. 10-11).
III. North Vietnamese Military Developments:
North Vietnamese aircraft again engaged in'unusual
air activity. Two IL-28s return from China and AN-2s
fly south (Paras. 1-3).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: The Com-
munist hierarchy in South Vietnam met on 11 and 12
February to review'the situation and to prepare for
continuing the offensive (Paras. 1-4). Communist
propaganda continues to focus on the northern part
of South Vietnam and to imply that the Communists are
taking over administrative control of that part of
the country (Paras. 5-9).
3.
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. In what appears to be the start of a second
phase of their offensive against urban centers, the
Communists on the night of 17-18 February launched
widespread and coordinated mortar and rocket attacks,
accompanied by scattered ground attacks, against
more than 30 towns and airfields in South Vietnam.
2. The bulk of the attacks were centered in
South Vietnam's III and IV Corps in the southern
half of the country, with scattered actions through-
out II Corps. I Corps has remained largely spared
in the current round, although skirmishing has been
reported along the coastal areas together with shell-
ing in the Hue - Phu Bai area and against Khe Sanh.
There continue to be strong indications of impend-
ing enemy offensive action in I Corps and possibly
against additional provincial capitals along the
central coast.
3. Heavy mortar and rocket fire has been di-
rected against Tan Son Nhut Airfield serving Saigon,
as well as against major allied headquarters and
installations north of the capital, possibly in an
effort to cover troop movements toward Saigon. Al-
though there have been no ground attacks against
Saigon, there has been shelling of police stations
within the capital and sporadic sharp fighting in
outlying areas to the north and south. There are
ominous indications that the capital is in for
further Communist military and political moves.
4. The current wave of attacks and resulting
casualties on both sides so far appear lighter than
at Tet.
all provincial capitals and Saigon
would be attacked at 2:00 A.M. on 18 February, nearly
all areas were alerted against possible enemy action.
Primary Communist reliance on heavy weapons fire in
the latest assaults has tended to minimize losses to
Communist forces and the chances of direct ground en-
gagements.
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Saigon Area
5. Attacks in the capital area began at Tan
Son Nhut Airfield shortly after midnight on 18 Feb-
ruary, Saigon time. About 100 rounds of 82-mm. mortar
and 122-mm. rocket fire--the first used of the latter
weapon in the capital area--were directed against
the field, resulting in four Americans killed and 92
wounded. Six aircraft were reported destroyed and 45
damaged. Some destruction of facilities on the base
was reported. There was no ground follow-up against
Tan Son Nhut, but several nearby positions including
that of an ARVN airborne element received rocket fire.
6. In the central part of Saigon, approximately
20 rounds of mortar fire hit a police compound on 18
February, killing six and wounding 33. Fighting also
occurred at points around the city, including a heavy
attack against an ARVN training center north of the
capital and a sharp battle some miles to the south.
Major POL depots just south of the city and near Bien
Hoa to the north received B-40 rocket fire, as did
two ships unloading ammunition about five miles north-
east of the capital. At last report, mortar attacks
continued on 19 February against Tan Son Nhut and cer-
tain key targets in Saigon, including the National
Police headquarters and a power plant.
7. There have been numerous reports from
low-level prisoners in recent days that additional
large-scale attacks would be mounted against Saigon.
Police Director Loan predicted new mortar, rocket,
and ground attacks and believes that the enemy may
commit two main force battalions against Tan Son Nhut,
and that other forces may raid the city's southwestern
precincts.
8. There are some other indications of further
action around the capital. A radio terminal serving
the Viet Cong Military Region 4 headquarters was
tentatively fixed in an area about four miles south-
west of Cholon--the Chinese quarter of Saigon--on 17
February. This location would represent a move of 20
miles southward from the headquarters' last position
on 15 February.
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9. Another radio terminal believed possibly to
serve an element Of COSVN--the-senior Viet Cong.mili-
tary and.politicalheadquarters in the South,-was.
also located by:direction_finding on 16 February at
a point less than six miles-east-of Saigon, or .some
95 miles from -its-.normal base area,.. Finally, there
is.tenUous.evidence that -a terminal serving an unidenti-
fied-military "Frant" headquarters in Binh Long Prov-
ince, near -the -Cambodian borderi may have begun a south-
ward deployment.- This. headquarters is believed to
be a coordinating.authority-over the three enemy divi-
.sions in III Corps' all of -which _have been noted-out
of their-normal.operating areas- -and positions closer
to. Saigon since. the -Tet-offensive.
III Corps
10. In addition to the mortar attacks around
Saigon, at least seven of the 11 provincial capitals
in III Corps also received mortar attacks on the
night of 17-18 February. Some ground follow up ac-
tion was reported against three capitals, Song Be and
Tay Ninh city north of Saigon and Bao Trai to the
northwest. The Communists reportedly used 122-mm.
rockets in the assaults,on Song Be and-Tay Ninh. Some
200 enemy troops may still be within the Song Be city
limits although only sniper fire was noted at last
report.
11. Simultaneously with the assaults elsewhere,
several US military.installations, including Bien
Hoa Airfield and nearby headquarters of US brigades
at Lai .Khe, Cu Chi and Phu Loi, also received mortar
or rocket fire. Scattered harassment was also re-
ported against US advisory compounds in the capital
of Binh Long Province as well as in areas east of
Saigon. No major damage has been reported.
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IV
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IV Corps
12. Beginning about 1:00 A.M. on 18 February,
coordinated mortar attacks were conducted on at
least eight of the 16 provincial capitals in the
delta and on a number of airfields and other mili-
tary installations, including a US military head-
quarters near My Tho and major airfields around
Can Tho. Ground attacks were launched against
four cities, Vinh Long, Cao Lanh, My Tho and Ben
Tre, but as in III Corps, the assaults appear to
have been lighter than at Tet. The heaviest ground
action seems to be at Vinh Long where air strikes
have been called in against an estimated 700-800
enemy troops believed in the city.
13. There are unconfirmed reports of enemy
concentrations in the vicinity of some provincial
and district towns in the delta which have not yet
been heavily attacked.
II Corps
14. Enemy action in II Corps has been some-
what scattered, with the major action against Phan
Thiet on the coast and mortar harassment and ground
probes in the highlands area. An enemy force esti-
mated at two to three companies attacked Phan Thiet,
temporarily seizing the town jail and freeing 500
prisoners. Although allied forces have regained
control of the prison, fighting reportedly continues
in part of the city. Casualties so far appear to
have been light.
15. Elsewhere, Communist forces conducted a
mortar attack on the Kontum Airfield and a ground
attack on a nearby position. Similar harassment
was reported at Da Lat where, in addition, about
two companies of enemy troops reportedly attacked
and entered the city. No late details are available.
Farther south, the town of Gia Nghia, capital of
Quang Duc Province, received mortar fire in the first
enemy action reported in this province since the
beginning of the year.
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16. Other major capitals in II Corps were not
attacked during the weekend, but enemy concentrations
are reported within striking range of both Nha Trang
and Tuy Hoa on the central coast. No action has
been reported in the Dak To area of Kontum Province
I Corps
17. Allied forces and positions in northern
Quang Tri Province, at Hue, and at the MACV Forward
Headquarters at .Phu Bal were struck by mortar.,
rocket,- and artillery fire on 17-18 February, and
Khe Sanh continues to come under daily mortarand
artillery fire. In addition, sharp skirmishes have
continued to occur at several points along the
northern coastal region between Da: Nang and the
DMZ, but there.have been no major outbreaks of new
fighting in I Corps.
18. Communist forces in this region, however,
remain deployed in positions threatening a number
of major targets and could renew wide offensive
activity with little warning.
the 803rd North Vietnamese
Regiment, which recently moved southward from the
DMZ to the area of Quang Tri city, suggests that
attacks may have been planned which have not yet
been carried out.
Hanoi had ordered a general
offensive in the northern half of South Vietnam to
begin in the early morning hours of 18 February--
The order in the northern provinces,
however, reportedly arrived late, forcing a delay in
the offensive.
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19. in Da Nang
a new plan of attack on the city has
been worked out, based on an assessment of failures
in the initial attack at Tet. No clear date for
the attack was specified
however, a further effort will be made to seize the
� city employing more thorough coordination between
assets within the city and attacking forces from
the outside, including major elements of the North
Vietnamese 2nd Division. Demonstrators would also
be brought in from nearby villa es. If the attack
fails, the Communists will
hope at a minimum to occupy surrounding villages as
"stepping stones" to later attacks.
20. In addition to the shelling of the south-
ern half of the city of Hue, Communist action in-
cludes continued resistance by remnants within the
Citadel area to allied forces clearing the northern
half. Some evidence of the-importance of Hue in
Communist plans continues to be derived, from tenuous
indications that.one of the three regiments of the
North Vietnamese 324B Division, which, has been mov-
ing toward Quang.Ti city, may be deploying toward
Hue. A forward element of the Tri-Thien-Hue head-
quarters, which controls enemy operations in southern
Quang Tri and all.of.Thua Thien Province., has .also
been tentatively located in- the Hue Citadel
area.
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II, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH.VIETNAM
1. President Thieu has again voiced his reluc-
tance to exercise more forceful leadership.
Anti-Communist Front
4. A small step forward in the effort to form
a broadly based anti-Communist front occurred on 18
February, when a large number of veteran politicians
and one-time military figures of widely varing politi-
cal hues, participated in a Saigon conference dubbed
the "Peoples Congress to Save the Nation." A number
of national assemblymen were present, but apparently
no members of the government's executive department
or figures closely associated with President Thieu
attended.
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5. The meeting was characterized by an uncommon
sense of urgency and commitment to the nation which
held expressions of political differences and carping
at the current performance of the Thieu government to
a minimum. A number of speakers underlined the criti-
cal need for unity in the face of the growing Communist
threat, and extolled the virtue of submerging politi-
cal "prejudices," so that .a unified bloc could be
formed to aid the government's fight against the Com-
munists. Aside from the rhetorical flourishes, the
"Congress" took the practical step of electing a stand-
ing committee to begin organizing a nongovernment anti-
Communist .front.
US Official Assesses Political Situation in Western
Highlands
6. The government appears to have turned in a
creditable performance in reaction to the Communists
Tet offensive in the western highlands.
7. According to a US official who recently visited
Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban Me Thuot towns, morale is high,
and there is new-found confidence in the ARVN's ability
to defend the towns successfully should there be new
onslaughts. Among those who praised the forceful
and effective response to the Viet Cong attacks and
the relief work which is now in full swing were per-
sons who in the past had been critical of the gov-
ernment's military, and administrative performance in
the highlands.
8. The US official also observed that there
does not appear to be any popular resentment over the
fact that much of the considerable destruction in the
towns--more than 20 percent of Ban Me Thuot has been
completely burned to the ground, for example--was
caused by allied fire power. He believes that the
civilian population is, for the most part, taking
a philosophical attitude toward the devastation,
ascribing losses to the unpleasant realities of
war.
9. AlthoughHtheremay be .,a. "small minority"
more critical of the government's effort, many local
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leaders are eagerly pitching in and helping with
the government's relief program, and the Viet Cong
failed to generate any substantial popular support
for their effort. The US official also notes, how-
ever, that .his ,assessment pertains only to the situa-
tion in the towns. Access to the countryside is
still extremely limited and reliable reports on the
situation there have not yet filtered in.
Aftermath of Tet. Offensive in Delta
9. A somewhat moresomber picture has been
.painted .by a.US official based at Can Tho city in .
the delta..41e,reports that the destruction of Can .Tho
university's only.permanent.building.during the .Tet.
fighting has!left.ill-will toward the government,
and by implication the US, which willprobably prove .
difficult to erase. .
10. He asserts.-thatpopular..resentment has been
fanned by the-fact.that Can Tho' university is 'the
only one: located in .the -delta, and as such has been
a source :of pride and hope beyond the immediate con-
fines of Can Tho. Theopinion"is-widely held that
the virtual destruction of.the .university by_govern-
ment air and 'artillery .strikes was not justified by
the small number of Viet Congwhci were holed,-up in
its sciencelibrary.building. .
� . 11. The lackluster performance .of government
troops during the delta attack as well. as widespread
ARVN looting has also contributed heavily to popular
disaffection. In addition, relations between US ad-
visers.in..the delta,and.government. military and civilian
officials, apparently.have,suffeied badly as a result
of ex-post'facto recrithinations,particularly charges
by' someARVN.officers that US military support was
intentionally kept insufficient in, the 'early' fighting.
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III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. North
Vietnamese aircraft are again engaged in unusual ac-
tivity, possibly associated with support to Communist
forces in the northern part of South Vietnam.
2
two North Vietnamese IL-28 jet light bombers
.returned to Phuc Yen Airfield from Communist China
on the evening of 18 February.. Three IL-28s flew
.from China. to Phuc Yen in. early 'February, but were.
never used in attack missions. One of these was
damaged by. US air strikes, but the other two returned
'tb China last week. IL-28s operating from North Viet-
nam would pose a limited air threat .to allied .forces
in South Vietnam and to US naval ships in the Gulf
of Tonkin.
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3. In addition, four North Vietnamese AN-2
single-engine transports took off from Hanoi - Gia
Lam airfield onthe night of 17 February for an un- 3 3(h)(2)
identified mission in the southern DRV.
they may have been headed for the Demilitarized
Zone area. North Vietnamese transports earlier this
month performed what appeared to be paradrop opera-
tions in the northwestern sector of South Vietnam
and the adjacent area of Laos.
Unusual Activity by North Vietnamese Airborne Unit
4. There are some tentative indications that
elements from North .Vietnam's only airborne unit are
involved, or are preparing to become involved, in
current military activities.
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5. There is no other evidence bearing on the
activities of the 305th or its three battalions. Some
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or all of these units could be involved with the
unusual DRV air transport activities of the past
few weeks, including paradrop operations in the
Laos/DMZ area.
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Vietnamese Communist propaganda has again
taken on a more strident tone in support of the
new wave of coordinated attacks in the South.
Vietnamese Communists Hold Meeting
2. A meeting of top members of the Communist
military and political hierarchy in South Vietnam
was held on 11 and 12 February, according to a Viet
Cong radio announcement on 17 February. The meeting
doubtless was convened to review the over-all Commu-
nist situation in the wake of the first part of the
Tet offensive, and probably was used to pass on
Hanoi's instructions for the coming weeks. A similar
meeting was held in mid-January in which final
instructions for the countrywide assaults launched
at the end of the month presumably were given to
high-ranking leaders. The recent meeting probably
covered some of the decisions leading up to the pres-
ent resurgence of Communist military activity.
3. A full text of the communique published by
this so-called "extraordinary enlarged session" of
the Liberation Front's central committee is not yet
available, but it is unlikely to disclose much of
substance anyway. A preliminary report says the con-
ference reviewed the situation since the beginning
of the "current general offensive" and discussed
the tasks for the immediate future.
4. A Hanoi broadcast summarizing the conununiqu�
indicates it contained the usual glowing Communist
description of the results of the Tet offensive,
which it claimed had created conditions favorable
for achieving final victory.
Communists Focus Attention on Northern South Vietnam
5. Despite the relative lull in new fighting
so far in the northern part of South Vietnam, Viet-
namese Communist propaganda continues to zero in on
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that area in particular. Recent Viet Cong and
Hanoi broadcasts strongly imply that new military
attacks will be accompanied by efforts to take over
administrative control of wide areas in that part
of the country.
6. The North Vietnamese party daily on 18
February carried an editorial praising "initial
victories" in the current "general offensive and
simultaneous uprisings" in central Vietnam (most
of I and II Corps). It claimed that Communist
forces have "turned the military and political
tide" there and quoted a communiqug from the Commu-
nist command in that region saying that "vast rural
areas" had been "liberated" and GVN control had
been broken in a "string" of provincial capitals
and towns. According to the paper, this put the
Communists in a position to "overwhelm the enemy
in many areas," and it promised even bigger and more
�resounding victories in the future.
7. Similarly, Hanoi came down hard on 18 Feb-
ruary with an endorsement of the establishment of
a new "People's Revolutionary Committee" of Thua
Thien Province and Hue city, which was announced by
the. Viet Cong radio last week. The announcement
claimed this committee was in process.of taking over
the administration of Thua Thien and Hue, and that
GVN. authority had been "liquidated" or was disinte-
grating. The new."provisional:administration"
allegedly has been set up under the auspices of the
Hue City "National, Democratic, and Peace Alliance,"
a front group unveiled by the Communists at the
opening of.the Tet offensive. Le Van Hao, who was
surfaced: earlier as head of the Hue "alliance," was
also said to be chief of the new "revolutionary com-
mittee."
8. Hanoi said the committee had decided to
"wipe out" the South Vietnamese administration struc-
ture "at all levels," and to "recognize" new revo-
lutionary committees allegedly being set up through-
out the Thua Thien Province.
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9. Much Much of this doubtless is sheer propaganda
designed to buttress Communist claims that "revolu-
tionary elements" from all parts of South Vietnamese
society are rising up to topple the Thieu-Ky regime.
The persistence of the claims, however, and their
continued evolution in the Thua Thien - Hue area sug-
gests the Communists are determined to establish
some sort of new political structure in this region
through political agitation and organizational
efforts now being conducted in both urban and rural
areas.
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