THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06786534
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 21, 1968

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
ecret
12
21 February 1968
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Information as of 1600
21 February 1968
HIGHLIGHTS
Increased Hanoi interest in the fightin in
Saigon and central III Corps is indicated
A prisoner captured in
Communist plans for additional
attacks in this area.
I. The Military Situation.in-South Vietnam:
The military situation throughout most of South
Vietnam was generally quiet on 20-21 February, but
sharp fighting continued near Saigon and in the
'Hue Citadel (Paras. 1-3). The North Vietnamese
high command in Hanoi appears to be taking an
active role in controlling the offensive in the
Saigon area (Paras. 4-9). New information has
been received on enemy plans in the Da Nang
area. (Paras. 10-16). Communist road construction
from the.A Shau Valley toward Hue has been
stepped up (Paras. 17-21).
Da Nang details
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Three outspoken opponents of the government and
ten other unidentified individuals have been taken
into police custody (Paras. 1-2). Reaction to the
Tet offensive in Ben Tre has been mixed (Paras. 3-5).
III. North Vietnamese Military Developments:
North Vietnamese IL-28 bombers stay in Hanoi area
except during US air strikes (Para. 1).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
� V. Communist Political Developments: A
prominent Communist military commander in South
Vietnam is now with the North Vietnamese Ministry
of Defense (Paras. 1-3).
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. The military situation in most of South
Vietnam was quiet on 20721 February. Sharp.
skirmishes were reported in, the. Saigon area, how-
ever', as Communist forces continue their-harass-
ment,there. Although apthor4ies have declared
the provincial capitals:of.Ph4n Thiet and Da Lat
secure, there is growing evidence that enemy
troops have been mixing with the population and
infiltrating back into both cities.
2. No major new Communist action has oc-
curred in III or IV Corps, but there have been
several small-scale mortar attacks on urban areas
and continuing attempts by the Viet Cong to in-
terdict vital.roads'leading to Saigon from the
delta provinces.
Situation in Hue Improving
3. US Marines are reported to have launched
a new drive against the Communist force entrenched
in a small area of the Citadel. Improved weather
conditions have allowed close air support. Results
of the current round Of fighting have not yet been
received. Supply convoys are moving more freely
into Hue from Phu Bai and some stores and Market
areas are reopening. Repairs to the city's.dis-
rupted facilities are in progress. .The Thua Thien
Province chief-, who also serves as mayor of the -
city, has assumed direct control over Many recon-
struction tasks.
Hanoi Control Over Saigon Area Offensive
4. Enemy communications activity over the
past several weeks reflects the greatly increased
emphasis which the Communists are placing on their
military operations in the Saigon area. The North
Vietnamese Army high command in Hanoi now appears
to be taking a more direct role in controlling
these operations.
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5. Documents captured in
that Military Region 4--the Communists
in the Saigon area--had been reorganized
expanded authority over the countryside
the capital. During the same
is believed to have established
schedules with the Viet Cong 9th
ese 7th divisions, which at that
normal operating areas along the
6. Early this year the headquarters
contact the Viet Cong 5th Division
Saigon. Finally, a radio station
the headquarters has been noted
contact with Hanoi but no communications
between it and the Viet Cong high
between October of last year and
7. The changes suggest that
assumed greater control over the
in the Saigon area and central
be charting military strategy
extent to which this development
authority of COSVN is not clear.
Current Deployments
late 1967 indicated
headquarters
and given
surrounding
period the headquarters
regular communications
and North Vietnam-
time were in their
Cambodian border.
tried to
northwest of
believed to serve
in almost daily
were noted
command (COSVN)
10 February 1968.
Hanoi may have
current offensive
III Corps and may
in this area. The
has reduced the
8. The enemy's 7th, 9th,
and 5th divisions
are currently spread in an arc from the northwest
to the northeast of Saigon. Elements of these
units could resume attacks against US bases in
central III Corps or against Saigon itself with
little warning.
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the enemy is particularly interested in the
large US base at Bien Hoa and in Xuan Loc, the
capital of Long Khanh Province.
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9. The most recent actions in the Saigon area in-
clude a reported outbreak of fighting on 21 February
near the Phu Tho race track on the western outskirts.
and at a point five miles northeast of the capital.
Over 120 Communists were reported killed in the lat-
ter action. US losses were put at 15 killed and four miss-
ing. Press reports say that four. US helicopters were
shot down.
Communist Operations in the Da Nang Area
10. Detailed information on the organization and
plans of the Communist military and political apparatus
responsible for operations in the Da Nang - Hoi An area
has been gleaned from the interrogation of the rela-
tively high-ranking North Vietnamese military official
captured in Da Nang on 5 February.
11. The captive, who claimed the rank of Captain
along with membership on the "Military Committee" of
the Viet Cong Da Nang Second Precinct, stated that the
Communists during November, and December 1967 estab-
lished the so-called "Quang Da - Da Nang Special Zone"
to take charge of all military and political activi-
ties in the Da Nang - Hoi An area.
12. ACcording to the prisoner, the creation of
the "Quang D4 - Da Nang Special Zone" was in direct
response, to the "large and modern character" of .South
Vietnamese and allied forces in the' area, including
the extensive installations in Da Nang municipality.
Considered fully developed by January 1968, -the
special zone, is' reportedlycomposed of 11 districts.
13. The "Quang Da.- Da Nang Special Zone" re-
portedly has both a headquarters base' command staff;
located'at. Que. Son Mountain in Duy Xuyen district--and
a mobile staff of approximately. 20 officers who oper-
ate in the districts.of Duy Xuyen, Dai Loc, and Go
Noi.. One special mobile company, composed of 'some 40
personnel between. the ages of 16 and 17, has allegedly.
been deployed within Da Nang city for the "general
.offensive." The company's special mission includes the
destruction of POL.facilities and power stations., the
assassination or kidnaping of' allied intelligence per-
sonnel, and the occupation of' the Da.Nang weapons depot,
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14. The captive further claimed tilat he was
to have assumed command of the Da Nang city "Com-
bined Operational Section" which would proselyte
both South Vietnamese military and civilian per-
sonnel within the municipality.
15. Among the major forces cited by the prisoner
as available for commitment to the general offen-
sive against the Da Nang - Hoi An area were the
31st Regiment/341st North Vietnamese Army Division,
two "rocket" regiments (probably the 68th and
368 "B" Artillery Regiments), two Viet Cong sapper
battalions, and two provincial mobile battalions.
Should the Communists conduct a major ground of-
fensive in this area, all three regiments of the
2nd Division probably would be available as rein-
forcements.
16. The
tacks in the
prisoner, is
possibility of significant enemy at-
Da Nang - Hoi An area, raised by the
supported to some extent by
indications of
readiness by enemy troops in the area.
offensive
Enemy Road Building in Thua Thien Province
17. Communist road construction eastward from
the A Shau Valley area of western Thua Thien has been
proceeding with increased intensity lately, with
the enemy apparently trying to get in a better po-
sition to conduct sustained offensive operations in
South Vietnam's two northernmost provinces.
18.
extensive road construction, with at least four, miles
of new road completed, in an easterly direction from
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�the A Shau Valley. This new road may well link with
a road to the coastal lowlands and to the city of
Hue.
con-
struction of a supply route from the valley to Hue
is "nearing completion."
a North Vietnamese battalion was to
try to send artillery down the.road on the night of.
25 February, possibly pulled .by motor-Vehicles.
19.
all three airfields in the A Shau Valley
are unusable, the enemy.
has constructed bunkers on-one of the runways, using
steel runway planking to help build the bunkers and
side roads. The use of sections of the runways for
construction purposes suggests that the Communists
do not intend to use the airfields to land air-
craft; however, they could be used as drop zones
for supplies or men.
Further Infiltration
20. During the past week, analysis
has.revealed.another significant
move of North Vietnamese regulars to South Vietnam
is under way. Radio terminals in Laos associated
with North'Vietnamese infiltration activities are
again active. One terminal has been. pinpointed just
12. miles due West of the A Shau Valley, and appears
to be following the -route taken by the North Vietnam--
ese 31st. Regiment. when it moved through the valley
into central Thua Thien,Province late in 1967. -
21. It is becoming increasingly clear that
current Communist plans call for attempts to sustain
and increase military pressure in the northern coastal
areas, possibly including the city of Hue. Many Commu-
nist prisoners and documents have claimed that an all-
out drive to liberate Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces
is in the offing. The present posture of the enemy's
forces, as well as the improved resupply capabilities
via both western Quang Tri Province and the A Shau
Valley would help considerably?
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
� 1. The National Police took militant Buddhist
Thich Tri Quang and oppositionists Truong Dinh Dzu
and Au Ttuong Thanh into custody on 20 February.
According to a senior Vietnamese security official,
the cabinet decided on that day to "invite" 20 per-
sons, including these three men, to accept "pro-
tective custody" because the police allegedly had
information that they were to be kidnaped by the
Viet Cong and forced to support a coalition govern-
ment. Thirteen of the 20 are now in custody, ac-
cording to this official, but he did not name the
others.
Situation in Ben Tre
3. in Ben Tre, Kien Hoa
Province, the Tet attack has reduced
the people's confidence in the government's ability
to protect them. Even strong government supporters
have been affected. Many of the refugees are
critical of the Viet Cong for violating Tet and
for having wrought such destruction. There is also
some criticism of the US and for its strong counter-
measures.
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4. The South Vietnamese Army acquitted it-
self well during the attack,
but its image has been hurt because of
a subsequent penchant for looting. Opinion ap-
parently varies as to the performance of the
province chief, Lt. Colonel Huynh Van Du, during
the attack, but in general he seems to have done
a creditable job. Other provincial officials,
however, have proved ineffective in providing
relief services for the people, leaving the brunt
of the work to religious organizations, volunteer
groups and American officials.
5. There are approximately 18,000 refugees
in Ben Tre. As many as half of these probably
will soon be able to return to their homes. Some
2,500 structures were destroyed in Ben Tre, about
30 percent of the city. Prices and availability
of food posed problems just after the attack, but
food is now plentiful and prices are expected to
go down, since food normally sold to Saigon is
now being sold locally.
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. The North Vietnamese IL-28 bombers which
returned from China on 18 February are confining
their activity to evading US aircraft. It is not
clear whether the
IL-28s are base at P uc Yen or anoi ia Lam
airfields, but the threat of US air strikes ap-
parently caused IL-28 flights from the Hanoi area
toward the China border on 19 and 21 February.
2. The two North Vietnamese fighter aircraft
noted conducting unusual, low-level test flights
on 15 February have been identified as MIG-17s on
the basis of further analysis
The highspeedsat which the flights were
conducted, the seeming unfamiliarity with the aircraft
on the part of the pilots and North Vietnam's ap-
parent new interest in offensive air operations had
prompted specUlation that a new ground attack air-
craft, such as the SU-7, could be involved.
3. indicates, however,
that the aircraft flew at speeds within the range
of the MIG-17 and that they were flown by known
MIG-17 pilots. No mention was made of braking
parachutes which high-performance aircraft like
the MIG-21 or SU-7 normally use when landing. The
sighting by US pilots of an unidentified type of
supersonic jet interceptor south of Hanoi on 9 Feb-
ruary, however, is still unexplained.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. A North Vietnamese broadcast indicates
that a major general with a long background in
South Vietnamese military affairs has been pro-
moted to a Defense Ministry job in Hanoi, presum-
ably after giving up his former responsibilities
�in the South.
2. The broadcast says that Major General
Nguyen Don, identified as a vice minister of na-
tional defense and an alternate member of the cen-
tral committee, is in Moscow heading up a North
Vietnamese delegation to the celebration of Soviet
Army day. Don has been identified for years by
prisoners and captured documents as a leading fig-
ure in the Viet Cong military command structure in
South Vietnam. In the early 1960s he became com-
mander of Viet Cong Military Region 5 which covers
most of the northern half of South Vietnam. One
prisoner captured a year ago claimed that Don had
been demoted to deputy commander of the region in
mid-1966, but there is no confirmation. Informa-
tion on his activities in the past year or so is
lacking.
3. General Don's move to the Defense Ministry
may be a routine personnel shift for a man with
many years of active duty in the South. His trip
to Moscow and his new, position indicate he is in
good standing, and it seems likely that he will
continue to play an important role in his new job.
It is possible that he was shifted to the Defense
Ministry in order to give the Hanoi high command
the benefit of his specialized knowledge of the
situation in the northern half of South Vietnam,
an area where the Communists now seem to be focusing.
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