THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06786533
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 23, 1968

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
3.5(c)
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
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23 February 19 6 E3.5(c)
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Information as of 1600
23 February 1968
HIGHLIGHTS
There continue to be many signs of enemy prepara-
tions for new offensive �actions. Communist forces
apparently have made significant headway in the
delta provinces since the opening of the Tet offensive.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam: No
'significant enemy military actions occurred on 21-23
� February. Continuing maneuvering of major forces and
stepped-up shellings near the Demilitarized Zone sug-
gest, however, new attacks may soon be made, particu-
larly against several major urban areas (Paras. 1-4).
People's Self-Defense Committees are being formed in
some northern areas of the country to assist the mili-
tary in defense of the cities (Paras. 5-6). A new
enemy 107-mm. �rocket has been identified in III Corps
(Paras. 7-10). Indications are increasing that new at-
tacks against the Saigon area are imminent (Paras. 11-
.16). The situation throughout most of the 16 provinces
of IV Corps appears to be deteriorating (Paras. 17-23).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The government has now rounded tip about 20 prominent
persons in Saigon and placed them in "protective
custody" (Paras. 1-3). The future plans of the
People's Congress to Save the Nation were outlined
by Senator Tran Van Don at a press conference on 21
February (Paras. 4-6).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
There is nothing of significance to report.
IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: There is
nothing of significance to report.
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1, . Communist shelling of allied field positions in
northern Quang.Tri-Province has-beenrstepped up in re-
cent.days.'with-nearly'1',00.0 rounds fired on 22. February--
the heaviest rate in several weeks. The first references
to "NtDay".were noted
in the Khe Sanh area. Additionally, intensive
enemy interest in .certain areas of the western high-
land's continues..
2&. There, were no major significant 'enemy military
actions on 21-23 February. The continued maneuvering of
major Communist forces suggests,.hOwever, the enemy may
soon make another move, against Saigon. and certain other'
cities throughout the country.
Threat to Northern Cities Persists
3. In addition to other indicators, a flurry of
prisoner reports suggest the major cities in
the northern section of the country, including Da Nang,
Quang Tri, and Hoi An, may, be prime targets in the im-
mediate future of renewed Communist military activity.
4. some 200 Viet
Cong sappers have already moved 'into Da Nang with the
mission of attacking allied military posts in coordina-
tion with a large-scale attack on the city. The attack-
ing force is to include the three regiments of the
North Vietnamese 2nd Division supplemented by other
main force and local force units in the coastal areas.
Reportedly the date and time of the attack on Da Nang
has not yet been decided. An assault on Hoi An, the
provincial capital of Quang Nam Province, is scheduled
to precede the attack on Da Nang.
Self-Defense Militia Units Forming in I Corps
5. South Vietnamese authorities have begun organ-
izing People's Self-defense Committees in some sections
of northern I Corps. Of 3,000 weapons allocated for
tihe five provinces of I Corps, 700 have already been
issued.
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6. Militia units are being organized in the
major cities as well as in district towns and ham-
lets and include well-screened volunteers. The
self-defense committee in each province or city
will be headed by the province chief or mayor,
respectively. Each unit will be "sponsored" by a
nearby South Vietnamese military unit which will
provide necessary training.
New Enemy Rocket Round Captured
7. US forces discovered an enemy arms cache-
containing nearly 40 107-mm. field artillery rockets
in western Tay Ninh Province early this week. Rock-
ets of this caliber had never before been captured
in South Vietnam and they were not previously known
to be in the weapons inventory of Communist coun-
tries.
8.
the main advantage of the 107-mm. weapon is
that it is somewhat lighter than the other rock-
ets currently being used by the Communists and thus
easier to transport into firing positions.
9. The 107-mm. rocket weighs 42 pounds com-
pared with 87 and 102 pounds for the 140- and 122-mm.
rounds, is slightly more than a yard long, has a
range of about five miles, and is spin stabilized.
The weapon is believed to be of Chinese Communist
manufacture; one of the captured rounds was dated
1967..
10. There is some evidence that 107-mm.
rockets were used in the attacks on 18 February
against Tay Ninh city and Quan Loi and in the
21 February attack against Dau Tieng--all located
in northwest III Corps. A newly arrived enemy
rocket unit may have conducted these attacks,
but this is unconfirmed.
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Saigon
11. Although Saigon remains relatively quiet,
sporadic clashes continue on all sides of the city.
12. On 22 February lo-
cated the headquarters of the 273rd Regiment of the
Viet Cong 9th Division, near the Saigon city limits,
less than two miles east of the Tan Son Nhut Air Base.
Since 23 January this unit appears to have moved some
100.miles southeast from the Cambodian border area.
The 9th Division's 271st and 272nd regiments have also
been identified in the area immediately north of Sai-
gon.
13.
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elements of the
North Vietnamese 7th Division have also moved east-
ward into the Binh Duong Province northwest of Sai-
gon, and elements of the 5th Viet Cong Division have
moved into the Bien Hoa area to the northeast of Sai-
gon. In Binh Duong Province a number of unidentified
units have appeared. The characteristics 3.3(h)(2)
of these elements suggest that they were formerly asso-
ciated with the B-3 Front in the central highlands. Cer-
tain of these units have been noted discussing enemy op-
erations, particularly artillery, attacks, on US forces
at Lai Khe and Ben Cat and combined operations with the
North Vietnamese 7th Division.
14.
over 5,000
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops started moving
southward from Phuoc Long Province on 20 February. The
troops will fill the gaps created by
enemy casualties during the first Tet offensive and will
be used to mount another major thrust on Saigon and prov-
ince capitals "after 22 February."
the Communists have tanks along the Cambodian border
which will be used in a second general offensive. The pre
ence of the tanks is considered unlikely, but it is pos-
sible that the enemy is moving still more troops toward
central III Corps.
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the Viet Cong will mount a second large-scale
attack on Sai on before I March.
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/the Communists will not make
concurrent heavy attacks on nearby provincial
capitals but will concentrate on penetrating
Saigon in force, if only for 24 hours, regardless
of the cost.
16. the
major tactical objectives will be the Tan Son
Nhut and Bien Hoaairbases, in order to eliminate
allied air superiority, and the 4th Precinct,
Saigon's northern port area. In the 4th Precinct
the Communists hope to capitalize on the large num-
bers of people who reportedly are already strongly
anti-GVN and anti-American because of their poverty
and extensive Viet Cong proselyting.
The Delta Provinces
17. The situation in the IV Corps remains
serious. The enemy continues to shell major urban
areas and is reported massing for future assaults
on key cities. The Viet Cong appear to be giving
particular attention to Go Cong, Ben Tre, Cao
Lanh, and Vinh Long, all provincial capitals.
18. In addition, a number of reports in-
dicate that, as a result of the South Vietnamese
Army's desire to provide maximum security in the
urban areas, the Viet Cong now control most of
the countryside and are increasing their efforts
against isolated outposts and unprotected villages
and hamlets. Because of the lack of government
authority in the countryside, the Viet Cong re-
portedly are having greater success in their
recruiting efforts. Some US observers believe
that the Communists may now have attained a
stronger posture than before the Tet offensive
despite the heavy losses they suffered in the
first wave of attacks.
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19. Route 4, the main supply link between Saigon
and the delta, is now reportedly open as far south as
Soc Trang in Ba Xuyen Province, but most of the other
major roads remain closed except when opened temporarily
by a military operation.
Go Cong Province
20. A detailed report from Go Cong Province indi-
cates that the Viet Cong are now stockpiling arms, am-
munition, food, and medical supplies in preparation
for another attack on the province capital. The Viet
Cong Military Region 2-headquarters has reportedly
ordered half of the Dong Thap Regiment from Long An
Province into Go Cong to take part in the next assault.
21. The main roads in Go Cong remain closed,
except when opened temporarily by military operations,
and food produce cannot be moved to Saigon. The
people in the province capital are said to be "scared"
and many are now, building family bunkers. Viet Cong
propaganda asserts that the offensive now being waged
in South Vietnam will continue for three months, after
which a coalition government will be established.
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22. the Go.Cong Province 3.3(h)(2)
chief is mounting military operations outside of the
capital,'but generally in areas of little enemy ac-
tivity and there have been. fewbattles. The, chief has
ordered helicopter gunships to .fire on any sampans
moving anywhere in the province except in the immedi-
ate vidinity.of the prOvince and.district capitals.
23. . The situation in Go.Cong'does not appear to
be radically different from that in.many other delta
provinces. With South Vietnamese forces immobilized
for.the Most part 'in static defensive positions within
and on the immediate-outskirts.of the key towns, the
countryside appears .to be Coming gradually under
Viet Cong control.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. The government continues to round up various
individuals in order to place them in "protective.
custody." About /0 persons. are currently reported
to have been thus detained by the Saigon police.
,Among the. latest to be "invited" to police head-
quarters are Vietnamese Conferation of Labor of-
ficials secretary general Tran:Huu Quyen. and Vo
Van Tai, the controversial leader' of the recent
electrical workers' strike, as well as Thich Ho
Giac, an associate of the militant monk Thich.Tri
Quang, who is also under detention.
2. Also detained was Ho Thong Minh, former
defense minister under President Diem, who ap-
parently was picked up on the basis of information
alleging that he intended to contact the Viet
Cong and work to bring about a coalition govern-
ment. Minh, who until recently has been living
in exile in Paris, is known to have been flirting
with antigovernment elements and National Libera-
tion Front representatives. Last autumn he re-
portedly had ceased his antigovernment activities.
Minh left .Paris on
27 January with the intention of contacting
Liberation Front representatives in Phnom Penh
and then President Thieu in Saigon in an effort
to play an intermediary's role between the govern-
ment and the Front.
3.
Fthe Communists have very little re-
gard for such people as Ho Thang Minh and others
who have take a peace-at-any-price stance.
More on the People's Congress to Save the Nation
4. On 21 February, the leaders of the People's Con-
gress to Save the Nation held their first formal press
conference. The committee, headed by Senator Tran Van
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Don, issued a communique' which called on all people
to share in the effort to save the nation and move
�
toward the completion of a "unified political front"
to oppose the Communists. The message also called
on the government to unify its efforts, revitalize
its anti-Communist policies, and create conditions
for the partiCipation of the whole nation in the
drive against Communism.
5. In a question and answer session, Tran Van
Don indicated that the committee has not yet decided
on a definite program of action, but that the first
priority is the creation of an anti-Communist front.
Detailed planning would come later. Don also fielded
several other sensitive questions relating to whether
the Congress was a Ky organization (it is not).
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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