SITUATION APPRAISAL OF POST-VC OFFENSIVE PROBLEMS IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE AND ANTICIAPTED ENEMY ACTIONS

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06786477
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 29, 1968

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INTEWGENCE INFORMATION CABLE
DATE '-19 A-(?)
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The following intelligence information, transmitted from a CIA Field Station, requires review within the Clandestine Services
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Distribution for BACKGROUND USE ONLY tor � 2 a
ihasiar7176,01.16ehded from agleam*
dewipeding sea
COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM
DOI: FEBRUARY 1968
SUBJECT:
ACO:
SOURCE:
,))
POST-VC-OFFENSIVE PROBLEMS IN
NANG TRI PROVINCE AND ANTICIPATED ENEMY ACTIONS
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
SUMMARY: IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE, WHERE MOST OF THE
ASSAULT FORCES WERE NV, THE ENEMY LOST AT LEAST ONE-FOURTH
OF HIS STRENGTH AND PERHAPS ANOTHER ONE-FOURTH IN WOUNDED.
THE ENEMY FOLLOWED HIS PLAN OF ATTACK EVEN THOUGH IT WAS
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k OBVIOUS HE HAD FAILED TO 'ACCOMPLISH HIS OBJECTIVES. �MOST
IALLIED COMMANDERS WERE WELL PREPARED TO MEET THE ATTACK WHEN
IT CAME. WITH VERY FEW EXCEPTIONS GVN OFFICIALS AND ARVN
'PERFORMED WELL THE PEOPLE REtSED TO RALLY TO THE ENEMY
AND IN MANY CASES FOUGHT BACK BY 15 FEBRUARY MOST OFFICES
OF THE PROVINCE ADMINISTRATION WERE OPEN AND FUNCTIONING
THE ENEMY'S MOVE INTO FORMER RD PRIORITY AREAS IS REGRETTABLE.
THE REFUGEE PROBLEM ADDED TO THE RECOVER ��RECONSTRUCT ION
EFFORT THAT LIES AHEAD WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT THE 1968
PACIFICATION EFFORT A SECOND VC /NVA ATTACK IN NANG TRI
NOW SEEMS LESS OF A POSSIBILITY, AT LEAST IN THE NEAR FUTURE,
THAN IT DID THE FIRST THREE WEEKS FOLLOWING TET THE ENEMY
DOES SEEM MOTIVATED, HOWEVER, BY AN OVERWHELMING COMPULSION
TO ACHIEVE A QUICK AND STARTLING VICTORY. ALTHOUGH THE
ENEMY SAW AN OPPORTUNITY IN HUE HE WILL SOONER OR LATER
TIRE OF THE HUE STRUGGLE AND DRIVE AT SOME OTHER TARGET
FOR A QUICK PSYCHOL IGICAL VICTORY, WHICH COULD BE A PRELUDE
TO NEGOTIATIONS. KHE SAPH IS THE MOST OBVIOUS 'OPPORTUNITY.
BECAUSE OF U.S. AIR AND FIRE POWER HE PROBABLY WOULD BE
FORCED TO USE AIR POWER AS WELL AS TANKS. WHEN THIS
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HAPPENS HE 'WILL IN REALITY BE ESCALATING THE WAR. WHETHER
HE IS READY AND WILLING TO DO SO IS OPEN TO QUESTION.
THE CHARACTER OF THE TET -OFFENSIVE INDICATED THE ENEMY
WAS. MORE INTERESTED IN A QUICK END TO THE WAR. MOST
ALLIED COMMANDERS FEEL THAT THE VC MUST EFFECTIVELY BLOCK
ALLIED CAPABILITY TO REINFORCE AND RESUPPLY COMBAT ELEMENTS
IF HE WANTS TO MOUNT A SUCCESSFUL ATTACK IN QUANG TRI. THE
ENEMY DOES HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO REACH VIRTUALLY ALL ALLIED
BASES ON ROUTE NO. 9 AND EASTWARD TO CUA VIET WITH ARTILLERY.
THE ENEMY HAS BEEN MORE ADEPT AT PROPAGANDAIZING.THE PEOPLE
THAN THE ALLIEliS. HE HAS CONTINUED TO OPERATE AMONG THE
PEOPLE, TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT ALLIES HAVE BEEN CON�
STRAINED TO REMOVE THE PEOPLE AS REFUGEES. THE ENEMY NEEDS
TO SUBSTITUTE A SYSTEM OF HIS OWN FOR THE PRESENT SYSTEM--
WRECK GVN HAMLET AND VILLAGE INSTITUTIONS, LAND�USE SYSTEMS,
AND CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC TAPROOTS. THE OUTLOOK IN QUANG
TRI IS THAT IHE ENEMY WILL RESIST VIGOROUSLY ALLIED EFFORTS
TO PERMANENTLY REESTABLISH RD SECURITY. HE WILL STEP UP.
HIS ATTACKS AGAINST BASES AND LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AS A'
MATTER OF GENERAL POLICY, IF NOT AS A PRELUDE TO A SECOND
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OFFENSIVE. HE PROBABLY WILL TRY TO HANG ONTO TO HUE. AND/OR
�
THE ENVIRONS OF HUE. HE MAY IN DESPERATION TRY TO. TAKE KHE
SANH TO EMBARRASS THE U.S. WAR EFFORT. HAVING LOST FACE,
AND WITH COMMUNIST CHINA'S BACKING AND URGING, THE ENEMY
MAY BE HEEDLESS OF THE ESCALATION FACTOR. IF THAT IS THE
CASE THE ALLIES HAVE A NEW FACTOR TO WORRY ABOUT.' END SUMMARY.
� 1. THE NATURE AND THE EFFECT OF THE ENEMY'S SO-CALLED TET
OFFENSIVE IN QUANG TRI PROVINCE APPEARED TO BE VERY MUCH LIKE
'WHAT HAPPENED IN MOST PROVINCES UP AND DOWN THE COUNTRY. THERE
WERE SOME SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES HOWEVER. FOR EXAMPLE, MOST OF
THE ALLIED COMMANDERS IN-PROVINCE CORRECTLY DIAGNOSED THE ENEMY'S
INTENT IN ADVANCE AND WERE WELL PREPARED TO MEET THE ATTACKS WHEN
THEY CAME. AS A RESULT THE ENEMY LOST AT LEAST ONE-FOURTH OF HIS
0 TOTAL MILITARY STRENGTH IN THE QUANG TRI LOWLANDS AND ANOTHER
FOURTH MAY HAVE.BEEN.WOUNDED. IN QUANG TRI THE ASSAULT FORCES
WERE MOSTLY REGULAR NVA UNITS, NOT VC. AS WAS THE CASE IN MANY
PROVINCES, THE ENEMY'S PLAN WAS INCORRECT IN CONCEPT AND FAULTY
IN EXECUTION. IN QUANG TRI HE-1ELEGRAPHED HIS PUNCH IN MANY WAYS
An HE FAILED-TO ACHIEVE A COORDINATED EFFORT WHICH WOULD HAVE
GIVEN HIM A MUCH GREATER SHOCK EFFECT. IN FACT THE ENEMY COM...
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PULSIVELY FOLLOWED HIS PLAN OF ATTACK IN NANG TRI EVEN THOUG.H. IT
WAS OBVIOUS THAT HE HAD FAILED TO ACCOMPLISH HIS PRELIMINARY OB-
JECTIVES OF CUTTING OUR LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS AND NEUTRALIZING
I OUR COMBAT BASES.
2. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE ENEMY EXPECTED A GREATER RESPONSE
,
, � I FROM THE PEOPLE THAN HE RECEIVED. THE PEOPLE NOT ONLY REFUSED TO
) : RALLY TO THE ENEMY'S SIDE, IN MANY CASES THE COURAGEOUSLY FOUGHT
BACK. THE PERFORMANCES OF MANY POPULAR FORCE/REG IONAL FORCE (PF/
RF) AND RD GROUPS WERE ESPECIALLY NOTEWORTHY. ALTHOUGH MANY OF
- THESE UNITS WERE REDEPLOYED TO MORE SECURE AREAS AS THE ENEMY'S
ATTACK UNFOLDED OTHERS WERE LEFT IN POSITION TO FIGHT, AND FIGHT
)
THEY DID. IN SOME AREAS THE RURAL PEOPLE REFUSED FOOD TO FORAGING
) I NVA SOLDIERS.
THE PEOPLE WERE
STILL PROVINDING TIMELY INFORMATION DESPITE THE SHARP INCREASE IN
THE NUMBER OF ENEMY TROOPS IN THEIR MIDST AND DESPITE THE INTENSE
ENEMY PSYWAR EFFORT THAT ACCOMPANIED HIS BATTLE EFFORT.
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� 3. NO GVN OFFICIAL fN OUANG TRI DESERTED HIS POST OR OTHER-
WISE PROVED TO .BE A TRAITOR OR A COWARD. THE CHIEF BUDDHIST PRIEST
IN HANG TRI, THICH,T)IIEN BINH, WAS DEMONSTRABLY PROGVN THROUGHOUT
THE EMERGENCY PERIOD. ONLY THE PROVINCE CHIEF, LIEUTENANT COLONEL
NGUYEN AM, APPEARED TO BE SHOCKED TO A POINT OF TOTAL INEFFECTIVE-
NESS AT THE HEIGHT OF THE ENEMY ATTACK, BUT HIS. BURDEN WAS
PICKED UP BY THE REST OF HIS STAFF AND BY HIS AMERICAN ADVISORS.
THE COMBINATION OF THE TET OFFENSIVE AND THE TET HOLIDAY PREVENTED
0. THE PROVINCE ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY FROM FUNCTIONING FULLY FOR
SEVERAL DAYS AFTER THE EMERGENCY ABATED. BY 15 FEBRUARY, HOWEVER,
MOST OFFICES WERE OPEN AND FUNCTIONING. FORTUNATELY THE SOCIAL
.0 WELFARE AND REFUGEE SERVICES WERE ON THE JOB THROUGHOUT THE MEER
GENCY PERIOD. THEY FUNCTIONED VERY WALL INDEED.
4. THE MOST DISCOURAGING 'FACTOR FROM THE FREE WORLD'S STAND-
POINT WAS THE PARALYSIS WHICH GRIPPED THE 1ST ARVN REGIMENT. THIS
FOUR-BATTALION REGIMENT SUFFERED ONLY LIGHT CASUALTIES DURING THE
ATTACK BUT THEY FAILED TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLOIT THEIR
�0
ADVANTAGE AFTER THE ENEMY WAS REPULSED WITH HEAVY LOSSES.
COUPLED WITH AN ALMOST COMPLETE ALLIED SYWO BREAKDOWN IN THE
RURAL AREAS, PERMITTED THE ENEMY TO MOVE INTO THE POWER
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VACUUM IN THE FORMER RD PRIORITY AREA IN NANG TRI PROVINCE. .
5. THERE WERE SEVERAL INSTANCES OF ENEMY�GENERATED BLACK
PROPAGANDA PLOYS. A RADIO BROADCASTING STATION PURPORTING TO BE
AN OFFICIAL GVN OUTLET STATED ON DIFFERENT OCCASIONS THAT GENERAL,
4
!VIEN HAD BEEN CAPTURED BY THE AN QUANG BUDDHISTS IN !SAIGON WHO HAD
� 'PUBLICLY GONE OVER TO THE.VIET CONG; THAT AMERICAN B-52S HAD
BOMBED HUE; THAT THE AMERICANS WERE PULLING. OUT Of THE WAR/AND
OPTING FOR A COALITIpN GOVERNMENT AND THAT NEGOTIATIONS WERE IM-
MINENT, WHICH WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN THE CEDING OF HANG TRI AND
1
"!THUA THIEN PROVINCES TO NORTH VIETNAM. IN THE RURAL AREAS THE
1
'ENEMY REPEATEDLY TOLD THE POPULACE THAT KHE SANH HAD FALLEN AND
I THAT HUE WAS IN VC HANDS. STORIES OF ARVN, POL ICE, AND RF /PF MASS
!DESERTIONS TO THE ENEMY WERE ALSO BRUTED ABOUT. (COMMENT: LINH
'WANG VIEN IS INTERIOR MINISTER; CAO VAN VIEN IS JGS CHIEF.)
6. INTERESTINGLY' ENOUGH THE PEOPLE WE USUALLY CONSIDER TO
BE THE ELITE IN THIS PROVINCE SEEMED TO BE MORE AFFECTED BY RUMORS
THAN THE commpN FOLK. THE COMMANDER OF THE 1ST ARVN REGIMENT IN
FACT PUBLICLY CHASTISED THE AMERICAN MILITARY'S RESPONSE :TO THE
�ENEMY'S CHALLENGE. HE, SIMMERED DOWN LATER, BUT AT TIMES OTHER GVN
5
OFFICIALS SEEMED TO BE DEEPLY DEPRESSED AND /OMEWHAT UNREASONABLE
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IN THEIR ATTITUDES. THE HUE SITUATION AFFECTED MANX OFFICIALS
WHO HAD FRIENDS AND RELATIVES IN THAT BESIEGED CITY. THE VORTEX
OF POWER AND CULTURE WHICH DESCENDS FROM HUE TO THIS PROVINCE WAS
SUDDENLY AND COMPLETELY WIPED OUT, OR SO IT SEEMED TO THE OFFICIALS
IN QUANG TRI. IT WAS LAMENTABLE BUT NOT SURPRISING, THEREFORE, TO
FIND ARVN COMMANDERS ESPECIALLY IN A STATE OF SHOCK. BY 25 FEBRUARY
SOME ASPECTS OF NORMALCY HAD RETURNED AND AN EFFORT, STILL RELATIVELY
FEEBLE, WAS BEING MADE TO GET ON WITH RECOVERY AND PACIFICATION.
7. THE REFUGEE PROBLEM IN QUANG TRI AS A DIRECT RESULT OF
THE TET OFFENSIVE WAS NOT SEVERE, BUT THE REFUGEE POPULATION
GENERATED AS A RESULT OF PRE�TET AND POST.-.TET MILITARY OPERATIONS,
ESPECIALLY IN HUONG HOA (KHE SANH) AND CAM LO DISTRICTS, HAS BEEN
CONSIDERABLE. APPROXIMATELY 14,000 NEW REFUGEES WERE EXPECTED. o
THE CARE AND FEEDING OF THESE PEOPLE COMMANDED A. GOOD PROPORTION
OF THE STAFFS OF BOTH CORDS AND THE GVN AND WILL CONTINUE TO DO SO
FOR SOME TIME. THE REFUGEE PROBLEM ADDED TO THE RECOVERY�RE-
BUILDING EFFORT WHICH LIES AHEAD PROBABLY WILL ADVERSELY AFFECT
THE 1968 PACIFICATION EFFORT IN QUANG.TRI.
8. THE SECOND ATTACK ON QUANG TRI CITY, WHICH, DURING THE
FIRST THREE WEEKS OF FEBRUARY, SEEMED INEVITABLE AND. IMMINENT,
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NOW SEEMS TO BE LESS OFA POSSIBILITY AT LEAST IN .THE NEAR FUTURE.
THE ENEMY APPARENTLY COMMITTED THE BULK OF HIS AVAILABLE FORCES .
IN THIS AREA TO THE. TET OFFENSIVE. WHEN THAT FAILED, HE SAW AN �
OPPORTUNITY IN HUE AND SHIFTED SOME FORCES, THE 812TH AND THE 95TH �
NVA REGIMENTS, TO THUA THIEN IT DOES NOT Ni/W SEEM LIKELY THAT
HE CAN REINFORCE HIS TROOPS IN AND AROUND HUE SOON ENOUGH. THE
ENEMY DOES SEEM TO BE MOTIVATED HOWEVER, BY AN OVERWHELMING COM-
PULSION TO ACHIEVE A QUICK AND STARTLING VICTORY. HE THEREFORE
MAY THROW GOOD MONEY AFTER BAD, GAMBLING ON WEAKENING OF OUR RE-
SOLVE TO HOLD HUE. SOONER OR LATE.R THE ENEMY IS BOUND TO TIRE OF
THE HUE STRUGGLE AND IN A LEMMING�LIKE FASHION DRIVE AT SOME OTHER
TARGET FOR A QUICK PSYCHOLOGICAL VICTORY WHICH COULD BE A PRELUDE
TO NEGOTIATIONS FAVORABLE TO THE NFLSV.
� 9. THE MOST OBVIOUS OPPORTUNITY OPEN TO HIM IS AT KHE SANH.
ALTHOUGH KHE SANH NO. LONGER HAS ANY POLITICAL VALUE VIS4VIS THE
,GVN, IT HAS ASSUMED AN IMAGE GREATER THAN IT DESERVES IN, TERMS OF
U.S. MILITARY PRESTIGE IN VIETNAM. IT IS STILL, THEN, A, LEGITIMATE
'TARGET IN HANOI'S EYES.. THE ENEMY NO. LONGER HAS THE ELEMENT OF
�'SURPRISE WORKING FOR HIM IN KHE SANH. HE, MUST REALIZE THAT. WHEN
,HE BEGINS. HIS ASSAULT, ON KHE SANH HE WILL PROBABLY BE HIT ON THE
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FLANKS AND REAR BY ELEMENTS OF TWO AIR-MOBILE U.S. Davi slows AND
�
MASSIVE AIR AND ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENTS. AT KHE-SANH THE ENEMY
� DOES HAVE SHORT SUPPLY LINES AND FAVORABLE TERRAIN. 'TO TIP THE
SCALES IN THE ENEMY'S FAVOR HOWEVER, THE ENEMY WILL PROBABLY BE
FORCED TO USE TACTICAL AIR AS WELL AS ARMOR. WHEN THIS HAPPENS
THE ENEMY PROBABLY REALIZES HE WILL IN REALITY BE ESCALATING THE
: WAR ANOTHER NOTCH. WHETHER HE IS READY AND WILLING TO DO SO IS
OPEN TO QUESTION.
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10. THE CHARACTER OF THE TEl OFFENSIVE, HOWEVER, INDICATED
THAT THE ENEMY WAS MORE INTERESTED IN A QUICK END TO THE WAR, NOT.
AN ESCALATION. THE MUCH�HERALDED SECOND WAVE OF ATTACKS ON CITIES
AND TOWNS IN VIET NAM WILL BE MUCH HARDER FOR THE ENEMY TO BRING
OFF BECAUSE THE FIRST ATTACK WAS SO EXPENSIVE FOR HIM. HE SUFFERED
GRIEVOUS LOSSES IN MANPOWER AND SUPPLIES. GUERRILLAS AND VC
CADRES WHO HELPED HIM IN ALL PHASES (LOGISTICS, INTELLIGENCE, AND
GUIDES) HAVE BEEN HURT. THE PEOPLE, SOME OF WHOM WERE MUSWUMPS
BEFORE HAVE HARDENED AGAINST HIS CYNICAL AND BLOODTHIRSTY VISAGE.
AND IT IS DIFFICULT TO VISUALIZE HOW THE ENEMY CAN REPEAT IN
ACHIEVING TACTICAL SURPRISE. AN ANALYSIS OF THE TET OFFENSIVE
WOULD 'PROBABLY SHOW THAT WHERE THE ENEMY DID NOT ACHIEVE THE
ELEMENT OF SURPRISE, HE WAS SOUNDLY DEFEATED. THIS WAS THE
DIFFERENCE IN (WANG TRI AT LEAST.
11. ASSUMING THAT THE ENEMY STILL WANTS TO MOUNT A SUCCESSFUL
ATTACK IN QUANG TRI, MOST COMMANDERS FEEL THE ENEMY MUST EFFECTIVELY
BLOCK ALLIED CAPABILITY TO REINFORCE AND RESUPPLY COMBAT ELEMENTS.
HE MAY STILL STRIVE FOR TACTICAL' SURPRISE BY SACRIFICING HIS UNDER�
STRENGTH BATTALIONS NOW IN QUANG TRI IN DIVERSIONARY ATTACKS
ON BASES AND CITIES FROM THE REAR, WHILE THROWING IN FRESH
;
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TROOPS IN A MAIN EFFORT FROM THE NORTH AND WEST. THE ENEMY HAS.
THE CAPABILITY TO REACH VIRTUALLY ALL ALLIED BASES ON ROUTE NO'.
9 AND EASTWARD TO. CUA VIET WITH ARTILLERY. A MASSIVE ARTILLERY
SIEGE OF THESE BASES COUPLED WITH THE GROUND TACTICS MENTIONED
ABOVE COULD PROVE TROUBLESOME BUT NOT NECESSARILY C4TROPHIC.
12. THERE IS A DANGER IN VIEWING THIS CAMPAIGN IN CONVENTIONAL
MILITARY TERMS. THE ENEMY ALREADY HAS FORCED THE ALLIES IN KHE
SANH AND ALONG THE DMZ TO THINK IN TERMS OF "SET PIECE" BATTLES.
AFTER FORCING THE ALLIES INTO MILITARY POSTURES FOR ENGAGEMENTS
OF THIS SORT, THE ENEMY THEN REVERTED TO REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE
WHICH HAS TO DO MORE WITH PEOPLE AND POLITICS THAN IT DOES WITH
CONVENTIONAL ARMS. THE ENEMY STILL CONTINUES TO HOLD.THE RD AREA
OR A GOOD PART Of IT. HE HAS BEEN MUCH MORE ADEPT IN PROPAGANDIZ,ING
THE PEOPLE THAN THE ALLIES HAVE. HE HAS CONTINUED TO OPERATE
AMONG THE PEOPLE, TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT ALLIES HAVE OFTEN BEEN
CONSTRAINED TO REMOVE THE PEOPLE AS REFUGEES. THIS TENDENCY IS
VIEWED BY MANY AS PACIFICATION IN REVERSE. THE ENEMY'S GOAL IS
TO CREATE HAVOC AND ANARCHY TO 'ELIMINATE "OUR" SYSTEM IN ORDER TO
SUBSTITUTE ONE OF HIS OWN. 'THE ENEMY NEEDS TO WRECK GVN HAMLET
AND VILLAGE INSTITUTIONS, LAND�USE SYSTEMS AND CULTURAL AND
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ECONOMIC TAPROOTS. THE DELIBERATE GENERATION OF REFUGEES, ES-
PECIALLY WHEN THEY ARE GVN-ORIENTED IN THE MAIN, IS TANTAMOUNT. TO .
AN ADMISSION OF PACIFICATION BANKRUPTCY,
13. THE OUTLOOK IN OUANG TRI IS THAT ENEMY WILL RESIST
VIGOROUSLY ALLIED EFFORTS TO PERMANENTLY REESTABLISH RD SECURITY.
HE WILL STEP UP HIS ATTACKS AGAINST BASES AND LINES OF COMMUNI-
CATIONS AS A MATTER OF GENERAL POLICY IF NOT AS A PRELUDE TO A
, SECOND OFFENSIVE. HE WILL PROBABLY TRY TO HANG ONTO HUE AND/
OR THE ENVIRONS. OF HUE. HE MAY IN DESPERATION TRY TO TAKE kHE
SANH TO EMBARRASS THE U.S. WAR EFFORT. HAVING LOST FACE AND WITH
RED CHINA'S BACKING AND URGING, THE ENEMY. MAY BE HEEDLESS OF THE
ESCALATION FACTOR. IF THAT IS THE CASE THE ALLIES HAVE A NEW
'FACTOR TO WORRY ABOUT.
14.
IREPORT CLASS 5ErefrE'r
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