TURMOIL CONTINUES IN MIDDLE EAST

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06780631
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: May 1, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-00315
• Publication Date: March 6, 1970

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06780631
DIRECTORATE OF
OF
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 March 1970
No. 0360/70
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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the
Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant
developments of the week through noon on -Thursday. It fre-
quently includes material coordinated with oi prepared by the
Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research,.
and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requir-
ing more comprehensive treatment and therefore published sep-
arately as Special Reports are listed in the contents pages.
WARNING
The WEEKLY SUMMARY contains classified information af-
fecting the national security of the United States, within the
meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as
amended. Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
Elmluded frees automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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Middle East - Africa
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE
TURMOIL CONTINUES IN MIDDLE EAST
There has been no progress toward a general Arab-
Israeli settlement, and the exchanges of gunfire and
invective are growing ever sharper. Meanwhile, tra-
ditional divisive forces are at work among the Arab
states and the Palestinian commando orgaaizations.
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19
21
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TURMOIL CONTINUES IN MIDDLE EAST
Having made no progress
toward a general Arab-Israeli
settlement--not even a return to
a cease-fire--the contending na-
tions are engaging in ever sharper
exchanges of gunfire and invec-
tive.
Arab chiefs of state and
leaders of the major fedayeen or-
ganizations appear to have been
sobered by the reaction to the
airline bombings, and most have
issued statements deploring the
incidents. Moscow's initial re-
action to the Swissair crash was
to accuse Israel and the US of
using fabricated press reports
to implicate the Arabs. Both
Soviet and Arab propagandists
continue to inveigh against Is-
raeli bombings of Egypt, and to
call for international condemna-
tion of US support for Israeli
"aggression."
Israel
Israel's initial fears that
a general panic among civil air-
line operators would cut its aer-
ial lifeline have receded since
the Arab terrorist bombings of .
the,Amip041asend_Austrian aircraft
on 21 February. Suspended pas-
senger, mail, and air-freight
flights to Israel have been almost
completely resumed; concerned gov-
ernments and airlines have taken
additional security precautions;
and international organizations
dealing with civil air traffic
are to hold formal meetings on
the terrorist threat in the near
future.
Israel's hawkish minister
of transportation, General Weiz-
man, has indicated that Israel
will await the results of inter-
national attempts to eliminate
the danger before resorting to
independent action, which would
almost certainly take the form
of retaliation against Arab in-
terests. Prime Minister Golda
Meir and Foreign Minister Eban
have both emphasized that Israel's
objective is to ensure the safety
of civil aircraft flights. At
the same time, they have made it
eminently clear that they would
regard any constriction of Is-
rael's air transport connections
as an extremely serious matter.
Weizman equated the prospect
of a de facto aerial blockade with
Nasir's closing of the Strait of
Tiran in 1967. Mrs. Meir said
flatly that terrorist attacks
against air transportation "must
stop." Unless the airlines adopt
effective security measures of
their own, she added, Tel Aviv
will act to protect the "freedom
of aviation."
Israel-Egypt
International revulsion over
the two airliner explosions served
to divert the critical attention
that had been focused on the
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Israeli air raid near Abu Zabal
in Egypt on 11 February that left
some 100 Egyptian civilians dead.
Even before this, however, the Is-
raelis had resumed their deep-
penetration bombings of Egypt.
Mrs. Meir told students at
Hebrew University that the pur-
pose of the raids was to relieve
Egyptian pressure on Israeli
forces along the Suez Canal, to
disrupt Nasir's plans for a new
war, and to make the Egyptian
people aware of the falseness of
Cairo's claims of military prow-
ess. Although she soft-pedaled
the thesis that Tel Aviv is seek-
ing Nasir's downfall, it is un-
likely that the Israelis' objec-
tives in this regard have changed.
Fedayeen leader Yasir Ara-
fat, already/ under attack within
his own organization--Fatah--
because of,his relatively con-
servative stance, may find his
position/even more shaky as a
result cif his recent trip to
the Soviet Union. Arafat's
main objective in Moscow was to
gain Om measure of political
recognition, or at least in-
creased status for the Palestin-
ianicause as a national libera-
Page 22
I
Moscow side-stepped Vie ques-
tion of political recogation of
specific fedayeen orgarAzations
by giving Arafat a pleAge to work
for more-official intkrnational
f
recognition, but on after the
fedayeen had forme a single united
organization, almo t an impossible
Prerequisite at pi/resent.
Mosc9w may try to soften
the rebut& slightly by providing
some additional support through'
regular' channels, and Arafat may
gloss/over his failure by seeking
su pott frag_gther quarters in
t months.
Lebanon
The government may face re-
newed difficulties because of
fedayeen activities.
rilla organizations have r sti-
tuted full-scale param ary
training in Palesti � refugee
camps, despite ic announce-
ments that training had
ceased. �To forestall any govern-
ment �interference, the fedayeen
may try to keep Lebanese security
f8E-091& e ,..1.11g the camps.
Moreover, some of the com-
mando groups have reportedly in-
filtrated large numbers of their
men into southern Lebanon over
WEEKLY SUMMARY 6 Mar 70
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the last two weeks, despite the
army's efforts to restrict them
to the Mount Hermon area. The
new arrivals. have resumed opera-
tions against upper Galilee and
may have also opened up a new
front in western Galilee. Their
operations, have included firing
from Lebanese territory into Is-
rael, an action that was specifi-
cally prohibited by the govern-
ment-fedayeen agreement last No-
vember.
Israeli officials, while
keeping a wary eye on developments
in Jordan, have decried
the "very large"
increase in tedayeen activity on
the Lebanese border.
Jordan
King Husayn may be mulling
over some changes in his cabinet.
According to press re-
ports, "diplomatic sources" in
Beirut consider Foreign Minister
Rifai the leading contender for
the premiership.
A reshuffle at this time
would be generally construed as
linked to the negotiations sev-
eral weeks ago between the King
and the fedayeen, who had de-
manded various cabinet changes
throughout the preceding crisis.
A Damascus press agency last week
quoted Yasir Arafat as saying the
King "agrees" with the commando
organizations regarding the re-
placement of Prime Minister Tal-
huni with Rifai. Arafat is said
to have added that the fedayeen
also want the King's uncle, Sharif
Nasir, removed as commander of the
Jordan Arab Army, but he did not
indicate whether the King had
"agreed" to this as well.
Husayn will probably delay
any reshuffle for some weeks in (b)(1)
order to avoid the appearance of 0:0(3)
knuckling under to the fedayeen.
Whatever the King's motivation
for reshuffling the cabinet, how- (b)(3)
(piti
ever, he will�almost certainly Ps/14-MM )
suffer some loss of prestige that
will redound to the fedayeen's (b)(3)
advantage. The replacement of
Sharif Nasir, in particular,
would be widely interpreted as a
significant concession on
King's part. (b)(3)
man
menti g
the Li
sent to
Accordinit
the trows ma
turned/to their
numberfof the Coun
The ruli g Revolutionary Com-
Council fray have begun imple-
a dision to withdraw (b)(1)
anitroops that had been (bp)
pt in recent months.
a variety of sources,
ave already re-
me bases. A
,J's members,
oppose junta leader'Qad-
daff's oro-Eavotian policies:
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
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6 Mar 70
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