PORTUGUESE GUINEA - GUINEA: REBELLION IN ABEYANCE

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06773319
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: September 4, 2019
• Case Number: F-2018-01470
• Publication Date: January 26, 1973

Approved for Release: 2019/08/19 C06773319
-Secret_
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
EEKLY SUMMA
'Secret
26 January 1973
No. 0354/73
Copy N2 45
Approved for Release: 2019/08/19 C06773319
Approved for Release: 2019/08/19 C06773319
(b)(3)
The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by
the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes signif-
icant developments of the week through noon on Thursday.
It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared
by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic
Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology.
"ropics requiring more comprehensive treatment and there-
fore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the
r.ontents.
WARNING
The WEEKLY SUMMARY contains classified information
.iffecting the national security of the United States, within
the meaning of Title 18, sections 793 and 794, of the US
Code, as amended. -Its transmissiOn or revelation of its con-
cnts or receipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by
!avv.
DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
The WEEKLY SUMMARY
?lust be handled within the
framework of specific dissemination control provisions of
OC.10 .1/7.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
CONTENTS (26 January 1973)
Portu
G in a -
in
NR Record
NR Record
Approved for Release: 2019/08/19 C06773319
Approved for Release: 2019/08/19 C06773319
Portuguese Guinea - Guinea
REBELLION IN ABEYANCE
Amilcar Cabral's assassination in Conakry on
20 January has almost certainly stalled the anti-
Portuguese insurgent movement he headed. It also
has plunged nervous President Toure into a new
frenzy of defensive activity motivated by concern
both for the rebel movement and his own regime.
loure, who had given the insurgent forces
under Cabral wide latitude in Guinea, has acted
quickly to control the situation. While Toure rai's
against imperialist plots, the Guinean military has
moved to disarm insurgent elements throughout
Guinea and taken control of the Conakry installa-
tions of Cabral's organization. Rebel personnel in
the capital reportedly have been divided into
small groups and placed under the control of
Toure's party.
No conclusive evidence identifying Cabral's
killers is available as yet, although Toure has
announced that the commander of the rebel
"navy" has confessed. Toure predictably has
placed basic responsibility on the Portuguese,
who have, just as predictably, denied all responsi-
bility. In a radio interview on 22 January, Toure
charged that most of the assassins were members
of the Portuguese colonial army who had pre-
tended to desert to the rebels. On 23 January,
Toure claimed the commander and "others" had
been captured by the Guinean Navy the day after
the assassination while fleeing to Portuguese
Guinea in commandeered rebel boats. Toure
claimed they had several hostages, including a top
Cabral aide, Aristide Pereira. Toure also has a s-
serted that a move is under way to "uproot" a
"fifth column" within the rebel organization.
Two rebel patrol boats apparently did leave
Conakry harbor shortly after the assassination
the fugitives
actually were captured by a Soviet destroyer from
the contingent that has been protecting Toure
since the 1970 Portuguese-backed raid on his
capital. Toure requested Soviet help when the
Guinean Navy proved unable to complete :ts
mission.
Page 20
Toure's public treatment of the affair is in-
tended, above all, to refute the damaging explana-
tion, offered by Lisbon and widely accepted in
press accounts, that Cabral's murder resulted
from factionalism within the rebel movement. In
fact, available evidence points in that direction
and also suggests that Toure's prompt control
measures were motivated by concern that warfare
might break out between the factions, presenting
a security hazard to his own regime as well as
further weakening the nationalist cause.
the killers probably were
disaffected rebels.
in the two weeks
prior to the assassination, long-standing frictions
between mulatto Cape Verdians, who are dom-
inant within the rebel leadership, and mainland
black Africans, who make uo most of the rank
and file, grew much worse
the mulattoes and blacks were kept
separate by the Guineans.
Toure's take-charge attitude, plus rebel de-
pendence on the Guinea base, means that the
Guinean President will have a strong say about
the insurgents' future leadership and direction.
No successor to Cabral has emerged, and Toure is
in command. The two most likely successors are
Luiz Cabral, Amilcar's brother, and Pereira. Luiz
headed the rebel office in Dakar and Pereira the
Conakry office. Toure's restrictions on the insur-
gents during the sorting-out period makes rebel
military initiatives unlikely and can only ad-
versely affect their stated intention to declare an
independent rebel government.
Meanwhile, Toure, despite his concern over
the various problems raised by the assassination,
is clearly bent on exploiting the event to prop-
agate the nationalist cause and enhance Guinea's
prestige. He evidently intends to stage another
spectacular funeral like the one he put on last
year for Nkrumah.
WEEKLY SUMMARY 26 Jan 73
Approved for Release: 2019/08/19 C06773319