IRAQ: DEVELOPMENT OF AWACS AND AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING PROGRAMS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06773004
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: December 31, 2018
• Case Number: F-2018-00448
• Publication Date: August 11, 1989

Approved for Release: 2018/12/18 006773004
Directorate of -Sec-Fet-
Intelligence
0047633
N�NESAR89-018
11AUGUST1989
NESA PRODUCTION OFFICER
0341-0342
Near East and
South Asia Review (u)
11 August 1989
tee
Ne
Sccrct
NESA NESAR 89-018
11 August 1989
coP% 342
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Iraq: Development of AWACS and Airborne Early Warning
Programs
Weaknesses in Iraqi air defenses exposed during the war with Iran
and fear of Israeli airstrikes have prompted Baghdad to begin
development of airborne early warning and airborne warning and
control system aircraft. The Iraqi defense industry has made
impressive progress toward these goals, but considerable technical
obstacles remain.
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The Baghdad I airborne early warning aircraft (u)
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Iraq: Development of AWACS
and Airborne Early Warning
Programs
Iraq is developing at least two versions of airborne
early warning (AEW) aircraft and is probably
attempting to develop an airborne warning and
control system (AWACS) capability as well. During
the war with Iran, Iraqi strategic air defenses were
often porous and ineffective because of gaps in radar
coverage and terrain obstructions that allowed
Iranian aircraft to approach Iraqi airspace
undetected. In response, Baghdad has embarked on a
determined effort to expand and enhance its air
defenses.
Status of the Program
The initial Iraqi AEW platform was unveiled at the
Baghdad International Exhibition for Military
Production in April. Named the Baghdad 1, the plane
is a modified IL-76 MD jet transport with a radome
mounted under the aft section of the fuselage.
the
plane is divided into three sections, each responsible
for one of the plane's intelligence collection functions.
An ELINT section monitors the plane's electronic
warfare support measures pod�a French Syrel
system that supplements the radar by acquiring
targets through electronic signals. A COMINT
section provides communications intercepts and a
voice link to ground stations and other aircraft. The
AEW section handles the plane's French-built TRS
2106 Tiger G radar.
The standard Tiger G is a ground-based air defense
acquisition radar designed for low-altitude coverage
and used primarily to supplement radars with greater
reach. It operates on a frequency band of 550 MHz in
G band and is highly resistant to electronic
countermeasures. The Tiger G is a good low-altitude
radar, but we believe its effectiveness will be
significantly limited on an airborne platform. The
Iraqis have attempted
to modify the Tiger G for airborne use and that
French engineers were "astonished" by Iraqi
technical skill in doing so. Nevertheless, we doubt that
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The TRS 2106 Tiger G radar�shown here in its
standard, ground-based version�which the
Iraqis have modified for use in AEW aircraft
a modified radar can perform as effectively in this
role as a system specifically designed for an airborne
platform.
Another problem that we believe will curtail the
usefulness of this system is a result of the awkward
placement of the radar beneath the aft fuselage. The
Iraqis had hoped to give the aircraft a look-down
capability by capitalizing on the pulse-Doppler aspect
of the Tiger G, but to
do this they were forced to mount the radar upside
down in the tail radome. This design feature affords
the system good radar coverage behind and beneath
the aircraft, but the body of the plane blocks forward
or overhead coverage. This arrangement considerably
limits the usefulness of the system, especially for
providing airborne threat warning to aircraft
performing strike missions.
Iraq had originally
intended to build the aircraft with a top-mounted dish
radome, like the US AWACS and Soviet A-50
Mainstay, which would have allowed all-around
-Seeret�
NESA NESAR 89-018
11 August 1989
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The tail randome af the Baghdad I
coverage. This approach had to be temporarily
shelved, however, after an early prototype had its dish
ripped off in flight. We believe Baghdad adopted the
tail-mounted radome as an interim measure in
response to this initial failure. The early structural
problems with dish radomes have apparently been
solved, as the Iraqi press announced on 3 July that an
"AWACS" aircraft with a rotating dish radome, the
Adnan I. had successfully completed its initial testing.
According to the official announcement, this plane-
-has the ability "to monitor fighter
planes at all altitudes, even low ones."
\ but the top-mounted dish radome probably
provides far greater coverage than the tail radome of
the Baghdad I because of the 360-degree field of
vision it allows.
Although both planes have voice and data links to
ground stations and voice communication with other
aircraft, it is unlikely that either has air-to-air data
links for efficient, real-time command and control,
which allow a true AWACS capability. furthermore,
we do not believe Iraqi fighters, including the new
MiG-29 Fulcrums, have been equipped with
air-to-air data links that would allow them to receive
information transmitted directly by an Iraqi
AWACS. Instead, the data would have to be
transmitted to a ground station and then
retransmitted to the fighters, creating a delay
_Seater
Estimated Radar Coverage
of Baghdad I AEW Aircraft*
50
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In kilernetara
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range
unacceptable in combat. Consequently, neither the
Baghdad I nor the Adnan I would be effective in an
AWACS role, making it most likely that both will
serve primarily as airborne warning platforms in the
near term
The Iraqis probably had great difficulty
adapting the Tiger G for airborne use and may have
been forced to request French assistance. In our
judgment, the AEW/AWACS programs are still in
the developmental stage, and it will be some time
before they become fully operational.
Iraqi Motivation
The decision to develop an indigenous
AEW/AWACS program was made during the war
with Iran in response to flaws in Iraqi air defenses.
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_seerer
Cross�section of Baghdad I Radar Cone
dimmaidi Baghdad I at 10.000 meters altitude
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50 Kllornetere
Gaps in Iraqi radar coverage made possible the
embarrassing, though militarily inconsequential,
Iranian air raids on Baghdad. Similarly, the
mountainous terrain of western Iran further
complicated the defense of Iraqi airspace by masking
approaching Iranian aircraft from ground-based
radar. Iraq
is also concerned about a repeat of the 1981 Israeli
airstrike that left the Iraqi nuclear program in
shambles
Although the Baghdad I and Adnan I are limited in
their capabilities, they represent a considerable
achievement for the growing Iraqi military-industrial
complex. We believe Baghdad chose to develop an
indigenous aircraft instead of attempting to buy a
foreign plane, such as the Soviet A-50, to further
strengthen Iraq's growing military industry, making it
less reliant on foreign powers and more attractive as a
55
200 kilometers
altitude 1.000 meters
ground level
military supplier to other Third World nations. The
unveiling of the Baghdad I at the Iraqi arms show�in
the midst of Israeli press disclosures concerning the
status of the Iraqi chemical and nuclear programs�
was probably intended as a message to Israel that a
repeat of the 1981 raid will be a difficult undertaking.
The announcement of the Adnan l's successful
testing�coming just after Iranian leader Rafsanjani's
trip to Moscow� suggests that Baghdad was
probably attempting to remind the USSR that Iran is
not the only important power in the region.
Outlook
Iraq's AEW/AWACS program is likely to retain its
high priority status. The Iraqis almost certainly will
attempt to develop their own data links for a true
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AWACS, or alternatively might try to purchase them
from the USSR or Western Europe. Given the
�
technical hurdles, however, we do not expect Iraq to
field a functioning AWACS before the mid-1990s. In
the interim, Iraqi AEW aircraft are likely to become
operational and will bolster Iraqi air defenses.
Iraq will probably deploy its AEW aircraft to cover
the considerable gaps in radar coverage in western
Iraq, the most likely direction of an Israeli attack.
Simultaneously, they will probably be used to monitor
Iranian activity in the east in conjunction with the
extensive ground-based radar net deployed along the
border. AEW aircraft may also be used to help
coordinate fighter cover over Iraqi airspace.
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