HOW SADDAM MIGHT PLAY THE TERRORIST CARD

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06772452
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2019
• Case Number: F-2019-00015
• Publication Date: October 17, 2002

Approved for Release: 2019/03/19 C06772452
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How Saddam Might Play the Terrtorist Card
Anticipating a OS attack. Sadden, may view acts of tertovism as the best nay to
defied US attention from Mn Once an Meat: i tie under way, he may use
terrorism with an eye to diverting US resources from the main battlefront an4
ultimately, to so expanding the war that the costs would be unbearable to the
US and Its allies. Saddam may also calculate that thmats of tenwist reprisals
will deter SUMO states from cooperating with the US. He might consider
launching a "false flag' terrorist strike, untraceable to Imo to make the US
focus on at-Qa Ida rather than on him. Should he WI to deter or deflect an
Invasion. Saddam may plan to unleash pre-positioned Oanariet "simpers'
against the Land Ate slaw. We would also expect him to try to elevate his
conflict with the US Into a AO-blown dash of dvilintions by facNtating al-
ea 7a, Palestinian extremi4 and other redkal Islamist operaUons and by
encouraging a broad rising among Muslim peoples laarldwii
In me
context of Saddam Hussein's historical (merest In terrorism as a weapon against the US�
we offer a speculative t of how Saddam might again be planning to use terrorist
strikes in resisting a US
Malicious Intent-401r Probable Capability
During the Guff War the coalition tlwrasted Saddam's hastily deitsed plans to use pre-
positioned terrorist cells abroad in attacks against US assets. This time, Saddam has had a
longer period of preparation and con drew on the lessons of his previous failures and the
subsequent successes of al-Qalcia and other terrorist organizations.
� As we learn more alma possible Iraqi connections to al-Qa* Ida and other terrorist
groups, is probably prudent to assume Saddam has better �terrorism forte
multipliers' than he had a decade ago.
� And In confronting a mortal challenge, Saddam strikes us as more Nicely to use
operations, thinking this might successfully fend off the US.
Terrorism As Debarreir
As Saddam seekS to forestall a US attack, he might resort to terrorist threats as a way of
discouraging Potential coalition partners from cooperating with Washington. Although a
failed gambit during the Guff war, the threat may strike Saddam as more credible now
given the current higher stakes. For aample, Saddam might warn that Iraq plans to
Initiate terrorist strikes against any state supporting an invasion, seeking to deter such
countries from hacking the US or granting basing or overflight rights. Although unlikely to
admit such attacks would Woke WMO�whidi woukl bolster the case against him�he
could couch the threat in vague terms designed to raise fears.
-MORO
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� Such tactics might cause backtracking in states,
already nervous about supporting the US, but in Europe and elsewhere such
intimidation could miscarry by underscoring the danger Saddam- poses.
� Even with a risk of backlash, Saddam might see an executed terrorist WMD .
operation as playing to existing sentiments that the US is to blame�and rather
than an anti-ract outcry mita 1st as well raise popular calls for cease-fire and
negotiations.
Creating Distractions
Saddam might envision terrorism as capable of stirring up a sufficiently sizable crisis
elsewhere to put an Iraq invasion temporarily onto the back burner. Saddam Is surely aware
of, and might seek to use, the debate in the US and Europe over whether Iraq is deflecting
attention from al-ga Ida�a controversy given new impetus by recent al-Qa' Ida leadership
audios and by attacks in Kuwait, Indonesia, and at sea against a French tanker.
A major terrorist attack, staged by Iraq but bearing all the hallmarks of an al-Qa' Ida
operation, might represent a bid by Saddam to refocus attention on al-ga' Ida and on the
risks to US equities in another locale. For such a plan, Saddam would have to calculate that
only a very Injurious operation would be capable of deflecting the spotlight from Iraq.
Diversionary possibilities include:
� etiological Attadt. Drawing a lesson Iran the US anthrax episode, Saddam could
launch a biological attack in the US using relatively unsophisticated means, while
trying to pin the attack on al-Qa' kb. He might even see the publicity about the
Washington-area sniper attacks as evidence of how easily US attention is riveted on
killings that In his mind, would be innocuous.
� Assassination. President Karzai Is already a target in his own country, and
Saddam would be far from the first suspect if he were assassinated. Iraqi special
forces might be able to carry out such an operation, or Saddam could hire
assassins. If Afghan stability were undermined�opening the possibility of a
comeback of the Tallban or al-Qa' Ida�Saddam would count on pressures for the
US to stabilize the situation hi Kabul before moving on Iraq. Jordan's King Abdaliah
might be another accessible target whose assassination could be blamed on
Palestinian or Islamic extremists.
� oil Panic. A wartime alliance between Saddam and al-Qa' Ida might yield terrorist
attacks against Gulf oil targets. Successful atbdcs against major facilities, such as
Aramco's In Saudi Arabia, might heighten Western anxiety about the impact of
further cuts atop wartime loss of Iraqi oil�while stoking concern over al-Qa ida
moving against the Saudi regime. Saddam might even by to settle old Scores by
hitting Kuwaiti or even Iranian oil fields.
� Israel. Saddam appears to be tightening links to Palestinian groups. In place of
Scud attacks, he could purchase a terrorist attack against Israel that goes to a new
level�for example, a biological or chemical attack. Saddam would count on Sharon
to lay the blame on the Palestinians and escalate his drive against Arafat. thus
distracting the US and heightening Arab opposition to a war in Iraq.
Once Saddam Is convinced hostilities are inevitable, he will have little need to conceal his
hand. intelligence on Iraq's BW and CW arsenal is sufficientii, alarming to raise our concern
that Saddam might already have the means in place abroad to attack US or allied targets.
�stem
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In a no-holds-barred fight for his existence, Saddam might want to maximize the price his
opponents will pay. Saddam has a history of using Iraqi embassies and business offices as
bases of operations and of sending weapons through diplomatic pouches. WM materials
might merely be waiting for the arrival of special weapons officers to carry out attacks.
� Saddam might even imagine a successful 11" hour biological attack against multiple
cites throughout Europe and the US would create sufficient havoc to postpone an
invasion, even if he was dearly the culpre.
Stoking the Clash of Civilizations
Saddam expects a US Invasion vial be viewed throughout the Muslim world as an attack on
all Muslims, whipping up strong and-US sentiments and rallying much of the Islamic world
to his side. The interests of Saddam, alga Ida, and other Islamic extremist groups could
thus dovetail in the common desire to attack the US and Its allies. Indeed, an invasion of
Iraq might provoke a broad terrorist front throughout much of the Muslim world to seek
revenge against the US and increase US war costs.
From Saddarn's perspective, any actions that create such. havoc could forte the US to
confront a broader crisis with the Muslim world. In addition to using links with Palestinian
groups and with a range of other potential terrorist allies at hand; Saddam might:
� Support anti-US demonstrahons by Muslims in key regions and encouraging
violence against US citizens and facilities.
� Reach out to Iranian hardliners to join In the fight against the infidel US by curbing
oil production and taking the wraps off Hizballah to go after US targets.
� Seek to create severe oil shortages in the West by sabotaging Iraq's am oil Fields
and attacking those of states cosperatIng with the US, like Await or Saudi Arabia,
as well as encouraolno other states to cut badc on production or be attacked for
aiding the US.
As a last-ditch measure, Saddam could Invite Islamist lighters�not only al-Qa' ida or
Tallban warriors but extremists from Chechnya and elsewhere�to defend Iraq. Such an
suPeal might conceivably attract thousands, manyof whom fled Afghanistan, and would
complicate US efforts to cleanse Iraq, particularly If the ilhads were willing to fight to the
death in urban guerilla warfare. Saddam would only make a move like thIS In desperation,
recognizing that such forces would be largely beyond his control. But if he at Wit saw the
darkness closing In, he might prefer to turn the country over to Islamists�who could be
relied on to vex Washington�than to the US.
-now;
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