COULD SADDAM STEP DOWN AS A PLOY TO DELAY US ACTION?

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06772449
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2019
• Case Number: F-2019-00015
• Publication Date: October 26, 2002

Approved for Release: 2019/03/19 C06772449
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A Red Cell Report
Number 89 26 October 2002
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Could Saddam Step Down as a Ploy to Delay US Action?
/ma law dltd, Obit to &moist US ples4 Saddens ndoltt rosign as hoes
Pmeigisat end pass the trona too puppet. pottope his younger son Quay but
possibly stooge he ddekelfte httentedensI community may and less
ntaledefoon Saddam mightcelculato e wildest wellithnot rosignotion�
althooeh tieceMag no one about Who silk the shots In Imp-maid dffow the
US off stride end postpone an Inman es UN members dement I an assesentent
aim. "neve situation witt support fer,ntlfitary action erodes, ira teslenstion
ptey had Mete ellitct, Sagan, cook I easily eldtesbete h reciil to peaks' by
the 'end use Ns gesture to stet!! APR* essistance torn. USA
Saddam realizes that if the US invades Iraq, he will lose power and probably his We. Based
on his pest behavior. Saddam surely has sonic surprises up his sleeve. The Red CO
consulted CIA analysts and speculates on an eleventh hour gambit Saddam might use to
thwart an invasion,
Standing Down to Upetage Washington
Saddeim relishes power and will do Wanly anything to Mein it. His foes ate therefore
prudent to prepare for the unthinkable--steps even Saddam might see as anathema until
he sees the end approaching. For cum*, a sham resignation in which Sadden ruled
from behind the scenes would be far preferable to him than exile abroad, but he might
fear loosing control, espectally of the security forces. He mai be rrdndful of Milosevic's
fate, perhaps calculating a successor would eventually turn him vour to the war crimes
Tribunal.
� More, Saddam': personelty is IN stilted to stepping aside. He reacted negatively
when a dltibmat raised wait him the pos11)111110( Mk, Ns determination
to hang on to power even if offered peseta!" security.
Nevertheless, in the lace of ouerwtielming US and coalition force, Seddem.miw come to
see a resignation gambit as offering the best tope for personal survival and the only way
to preserve his influence: Compared to death at US hands or foreign aide, voluntary
resignation might strike him as a way retain control.through a hand-picked successor while
posturing as eider stategrian, sacrificing position for the good of Iraqi and Arab peoples.
� Saddam has already played the puppet master. Before he became president in 1979,
he ute pow from behind the throne as lracrs number bvo
Whet He Might Hope To Galf
If an attack agairat Iraq seemed Inevitable, Saddam might calculate that a last minute
resignation would at least buy him additional time while the world puzzled cAer the
significance of such a move. If key actors played their Parts adroitly, Saddam might hope
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to break up any existing coalition while denying the US the objective of regime dame. In a
best case for him, Saddam might even be able to resume formal power at the "behest of
the Iraqi people' when the heat eventually subsided.
� Even if the US refused to bite and moved ahead with Invasion plans, Saddam wduld
probably cakulate�correctly, In OUf view�that other states would pressure
Washington to pause and let the UN try to deal with the "new" regime.
� Neighboring Arab leaders might even praise Saddam's statesman-Ike .move to avert a
potential crisis for them in dealing with the Arab "streer�especially If Saddam
claimed his departure would alicav the world to rows on the "rear issue of Israeli
aggression against the Palestinians.
� A Saddam resignation would also throw the already fractious Iraq opposition off
balance and cause a scramble for infhience inside and outside Iraq. Despite suspicions
of what Saddam was really up to, Kurds and Shia opposition elements might approach
a new Iraqi leader to cut a deal.
A resignation might enhance Saddam's policy of trying to appear forthcoming on UN
inspections. Saddam could cat:Wee a figurehead would be Wel more effective in selling
the notion that Iraq had nothing to hide. With several years to conceal its programs and
remove evidence from suspect facilities, the regime stands an eccdent chance of fooling
UNMOVIC and creating pressure in the UNSC to dismantle the sections regime.
� With inspectors back in Iraq and Saddam on the sidelines, irtenational support lc( a
hard line would erode. Over time, a `new" Iraqi regime could resume its efforts tb
develop 1NMD.
Qualified Candidates for Front Man
To undertake a faux resignation, Saddam would need a 'successor" strongly convnitted to
Saddam's personal safety and the interest of the family and boxier TWA den. The new
president %mid need to be Wiling to serve ate facade bdind which Saddam would rule
and to resist efforts to transform the system or marginalize the Bath party. A Saddam
surrogate would also need credibility with the security services and the Revolutionary Guard
and have a measure of International standing, especially among Arabs state.
With thee considerations in mind, Sadden might go one of three ways:
� Dynastic. Saddam's paired successor is his younger son, Qusay, whom he has
been grooming for power. Quart, has dose ties to the security organizations and the
Bath party. lie would protect family and clan intents. He is steeped In the Arab
tradition of deference to parental authority and has less incengve than other potential
successors to betray Sadden* trust, as long as he remained corrfortable In an ersatt
role. Qusay would be seen as identical to Saddam, however, with almost no fig leaf to
cover Saddam's continuing power.
� Consdtetiorad. According to the Interim 1970 Constitution as revised, the Vice
Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Mat al-Curt, should be Saddam's
weeitai
�
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successor. Al-Dun is a loyal Saddam henchman, having StifylVed in the position since
1979. His poor health and lack of charisma suggest he would not be a threat to
Saddam., He is, however, a sleazy figure tainted by dwohniment In VR4D and would be
a poor "face* to the outside world.
. Prawnetk. Saddam might turn to Deputy Premier Tariq Ailz if he thought someone
with greater standing in the outside world would complete the ruse. A2I2 IS well known
abroad, having dealt with Western and Arab leaders for years, and Is seen as a
relative moderate. As a Christian of some urbanity, Aziz might be the sort of benign
face that can help make Saddam's strategy of tactical retreat work. His lack of a
power base and age (72) would make tem easy to rnaniaulate.
Hew It Could Happen
If he decided to resign at the eleveith hour, Saddam would in all Beilhood make a major
speech, perhaps to a flattest conclave, explaining that he was stepping down to save his
countrymen and to promote Arab Interests. He might blame the US, with its imperialist
ambitions and Zionist string-pullers, noting that efforts to oust him violated the collective
wit of the Iraq people expressed in his "unanimous' reelection in October. He would make
a plea to the Arab wort to no longer let a "false� confrontation vdth him deflect from
resistance to US and Israeli aggression.
Saddam would avcid touching�much less playing-the resignation card wet he was
convinced he had no other alternattie. In 1991, he offered to withdrew from Kierealt only
when major coalition military movements were urideway, but IN then the coalition saw
Saddam's offer as a transparent stalling tactic. This time, support for moving against
Saddam is much softer and a late surprise might find greater receptivity.
If Saddam plays thislow probability, high impact' gambit, we might see some indicators.
� On the eve of a resignation Sadden might purge of officials. of questionable kola*/
lest anyone suspect he Is going soft.
� Saddam and the Iraqi media might Inareasingly portray eh� struggle with the US
exclusively as a personal vendetta against Sadden, helping pave the way for an
accommodation with the new leader.
� detect
suncihightefrocomnsult:scwiltoth hisa resignatt:rsons, and same eath Party leaders. We might
Ifs staged resignation appealed unlikely to delay US mWtzty action, Saddam could qukidy
reassume the reins. He would swing the Iraq Propaganda apparatus into action behind a
grass roots recall to paver. The media "amid *as that Saddam, in a kat attempt to
avert conflict and pmt ect the Iraqi people, had been willing to step aside, but that eve] this
magnanimous� gesture would not satisfy the "rapadous" US administration and its allies,
the Israelis and are-Islamic Arab "lackeys."
� Such theme would resonate In the Middle East and amid activate the Arab "street' to
violent protest against any support provided to US forces.
-SEGREM
�
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